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2021 DIGILAW 829 (ALL)

Secretary Central Board of Secondary Education v. Kabir Jaiswal

2021-08-06

MUNISHWAR NATH BHANDARI, SUBHASH CHANDRA SHARMA

body2021
JUDGMENT : 1. By this appeal, a challenge is made to the judgment dated 02.12.2020 by which the writ petition preferred by the petitioner-non appellant was allowed. 2. The writ petition was filed to seek a direction on the Central Board of Secondary Education (C.B.S.E.) for change of name of the petitioner-non appellant in their record from Rishu Jaiswal to Kabir Jaiswal and issue the certificate. The prayer aforesaid was allowed by the learned Single Judge. 3. It is after taking note of the fact that on the application made by the petitioner-non appellant to a competent authority, the name was changed from Rishu Jaiswal to Kabir Jaiswal with publication of Notification in the Gazette of India, bearing No. 44 New Delhi, Saturday, November 2 - November 8, 2019. Based on the Gazette Notification, a prayer was made to the C.B.S.E. to change the name of the non-appellant in their record and issue the certificate. 4. The prayer aforesaid was not exceeded to rather it was rejected vide order dated 27.05.2020. It was mainly on the ground that school records does not support change of name, as sought by the non-appellant. That was the only ground to deny change of name in the record. The learned Single Judge after relying on the judgments of the High Court so as the Apex Court and referring to the relevant clauses of C.B.S.E. Bye-laws, found no reason to deny change of name and accordingly order impugned was set aside with a direction to undertake exercise, as directed therein within a period of two months. 5. Learned Additional Advocate General Sri. Manish Goyal submits that the impugned order has been passed holding C.B.S.E. Bye-laws to be non statutory and thereby ignoring the period within which change of name can be sought, directions have been given. It is also submitted that in a recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jigya Yadav (Minor) through Guardian/Father Hari Singh vs. Central Board of Secondary Education and Others, 2021 SCC Online SC 415, the C.B.S.E. Bye-laws were held enforceable. The learned Single Judge held that the Bye-laws are not having flavour of statute, thus, period of three years to seek correction or change in the name as per clause 69 of the Bye-laws could not have been affected the prayer. The learned Single Judge held that the Bye-laws are not having flavour of statute, thus, period of three years to seek correction or change in the name as per clause 69 of the Bye-laws could not have been affected the prayer. It is also submitted that period of three years has been given to seek correction or change in the name while applicant is a student of C.B.S.E. and not after passing of the examination of the C.B.S.E. 6. Referring to the facts of this case, it is stated that non-appellant cleared C.B.S.E. Examination in the year 2013 while application for change in name was given in the year 2019. It was admittedly beyond the period of three years even if a liberal construction of the Bye-laws is taken to allow a student to seek change in the name after passing C.B.S.E. Examination. The application was beyond three years even then. 7. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that in case of change of name by the candidate at his choice, a declaration by the Court of law is required. In the instant case, there was no declaration by the Court of law and thereby the judgment of learned Single Judge is even hit by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra) where it was made necessary. 8. The prayer is to set aside the judgment of learned Single Judge. 9. The appeal has been contested by the learned counsel for non-appellant. He submits that judgment in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra) is not adverse to the non-appellant rather it supports him. In the case of Jigya Yadav (supra), the Apex Court has referred to the period for seeking correction or change of the name but therein also, the appeal was not dismissed by the Apex Court on the ground of expiry of period rather a favourable direction has been given. 10. Accordingly, the judgment aforesaid favours the non-appellant. 11. It is even in reference to the request for change of name. In case of change of name on choice of the candidate, the certificate can be issued by the C.B.S.E. when the application is supported by the school record or the public document. In absence of it only, there was a need to seek declaration from the Civil Court. 12. In case of change of name on choice of the candidate, the certificate can be issued by the C.B.S.E. when the application is supported by the school record or the public document. In absence of it only, there was a need to seek declaration from the Civil Court. 12. Learned A.A.G. has misconstrued the direction of the Apex Court to urge that in case of change of name, the declaration from the Court of law is necessary in all eventualities. This is going against the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra). The prayer is accordingly to dismiss the appeal more so when the learned Single Judge has given reference of the catena of judgments of the Apex court holding C.B.S.E. Bye-laws to be non-statutory and in a case even if the matter is driven by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra), the finding recorded therein with the direction are favourable to the non-appellant. 13. The application was otherwise within the period given under the Bye-laws for the reason that the non-appellant passed out C.B.S.E. Examination in the year 2013 while change of name was much subsequent to it. A Notification in the Gazette was published in the year 2019 to notify the changed name and that was the occasion for the non-appellant to seek change in the name in the year 2019. The application aforesaid was made immediately after issuance of the Gazette Notification, thus, there was no delay on part of the non-appellant to seek change in the name. As per Bye-laws, it was of ten years at the relevant time. 14. We have considered the submission advanced by the parties and perused the record. 15. The ground raised by the appellant to assail the judgment of the learned Single Judge is mainly in reference to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra). 16. The first argument is as to whether change in the name can be sought after passing C.B.S.E. Examination. The learned Single Judge has referred to clause 69.1 of the Bye-laws. 16. The first argument is as to whether change in the name can be sought after passing C.B.S.E. Examination. The learned Single Judge has referred to clause 69.1 of the Bye-laws. The issue aforesaid would be discussed later but there is an admission of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that even the Apex Court in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra) has allowed correction or change in the name of a student after passing out the C.B.S.E. course. The first issue for our consideration remains in reference to Para 171 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra). The said Para is quoted herein: “171. As regards request for “change” of particulars in the certificate issued by the CBSE, it presupposes that the particulars intended to be recorded in the CBSE certificate are not consistent with the school records. Such a request could be made in two different situations. The first is on the basis of public documents like Birth Certificate, Aadhaar Card/Election Card, etc. and to incorporate change in the CBSE certificate consistent therewith. The second possibility is when the request for change is due to the acquired name by choice at a later point of time. That change need not be backed by public documents pertaining to the candidate: (a) Reverting to the first category, as noted earlier, there is a legal presumption in relation to the public documents as envisaged in the 1872 Act. Such public documents, therefore, cannot be ignored by the CBSE. Taking note of those documents, the CBSE may entertain the request for recording change in the certificate issued by it. This, however, need not be unconditional, but subject to certain reasonable conditions to be fulfilled by the applicant as may be prescribed by the CBSE, such as, of furnishing sworn affidavit containing declaration and to indemnify the CBSE and upon payment of prescribed fees in lieu of administrative expenses. The CBSE may also insist for issuing Public Notice and publication in the Official Gazette before recording the change in the fresh certificate to be issued by it upon surrender/return of the original certificate (or duplicate original certificate, as the case may be) by the applicant. The CBSE may also insist for issuing Public Notice and publication in the Official Gazette before recording the change in the fresh certificate to be issued by it upon surrender/return of the original certificate (or duplicate original certificate, as the case may be) by the applicant. The fresh certificate may contain disclaimer and caption/annotation against the original entry (except in respect of change of name effected in exercise of right to be forgotten) indicating the date on which change has been recorded and the basis thereof. In other words, the fresh certificate may retain original particulars while recording the change along with caption/annotation referred to above (except in respect of change of name effected in exercise of right to be forgotten). (b) However, in the latter situation where the change is to be effected on the basis of new acquired name without any supporting school record or public document, that request may be entertained upon insisting for prior permission/declaration by a Court of law in that regard and publication in the Official Gazette including surrender/return of original certificate (or duplicate original certificate, as the case may be) issued by CBSE and upon payment of prescribed fees. The fresh certificate as in other situations referred to above, retain the original entry (except in respect of change of name effected in exercise of right to be forgotten) and to insert caption/annotation indicating the date on which it has been recorded and other details including disclaimer of CBSE. This is so because the CBSE is not required to adjudicate nor has the mechanism to verify the correctness of the claim of the applicant.” 17. Learned Senior Counsel has made much emphasis in reference to sub-para (b) of para 171. In the case of change in name by choice, the student is required to seek a declaration from the Court of law. In the instant case, no such declaration was sought, thus, the learned Single Judge could not have directed the appellant to undertake the exercise for issuance of certificate in the changed name. 18. We have carefully gone through Para 171 of the judgment in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra) and find that after a detailed discussion on the issue, appropriate directions were given by the Apex Court in Para 171. The first direction is when change is sought in the C.B.S.E. certificate inconsistent to the school record. 18. We have carefully gone through Para 171 of the judgment in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra) and find that after a detailed discussion on the issue, appropriate directions were given by the Apex Court in Para 171. The first direction is when change is sought in the C.B.S.E. certificate inconsistent to the school record. The aforesaid can be sought based on a public document like birth certificate, aadhar card/electoral card, etc. to incorporate change in the C.B.S.E. record consistent therewith. 19. The second contingency is for change of name on acquisition of name by choice. In that case, if the application is not backed by school record or public document, then a declaration of Court of law is necessary. 20. Sub-Para (b) deals with the issue in regard to change of name acquired by the candidate by choice. There, the application can be supported by school record or public document, in absence of it, declaration of the Court of law has been mandated. The declaration of the Court is sought when an application is not supported by school record or public document. The Bye-laws provides for declaration by the Court of law and publication but it cannot be read against the statutory provision. Notification in Gazette is not only a public document but stand in-rem with presumption under the Evidence Act, 1872. 21. In view of the above, we are not in agreement with the learned Senior Counsel that in all eventualities, a declaration is required to be sought from the Court of law in case of change of name by choice. The Bye-laws is to be read down to make it consistent to the statutory provision. A public document can be basis to seek change in the name. 22. In the instant case, the non-appellant made an application to the competent authority to seek change in the name from Rishu Jaiswal to Kabir Jaiswal. The prayer was exceeded too and accordingly on completion of the legal formalities, the changed name was published in the Gazette. The learned Single Judge could not dispute that Notification in the Gazette is a public document rather it is to be read in-rem against the rest of the word. The prayer was exceeded too and accordingly on completion of the legal formalities, the changed name was published in the Gazette. The learned Single Judge could not dispute that Notification in the Gazette is a public document rather it is to be read in-rem against the rest of the word. The change in the name was sought based on the Gazette Notification i.e. a public document, thus, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to direct the non-applicant to seek a declaration from the Court of law for change in the name rather based on the public document, the application to seek change in the name should have been considered. The Bye-laws are not statute though made enforceable but cannot be read against the statutory provisions, like the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The presumption given under the Act of 1872 cannot be brush aside by the Bye-laws after publication of Notification in Gazette. 23. The other issue raised by learned counsel for appellant is the nature of Bye-laws. They are claiming it to be under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution of India, therefore, enforceable in law. Again much is not required to be discussed as it has already been dealt with by the Apex Court in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra). The Apex Court held C.B.S.E. Bye-laws to be enforceable in law. 24. We are now touching the issue of the period by which the application could have been given by the candidate for change of name. The Apex Court in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra) has given summary of development of examination Bye-laws which was tabulated therein and for ready reference, quoted herein: CBSE EXAMINATION BYELAWS Correction in candidate's name Correction in names of candidate's father/mother Change of candidate's name Change in names of candidate's father/mother Change/correction in candidate's date of birth Time period Before 2007 Amendment Permitted to make it consistent with school record. Permitted to make it consistent with school record. Alteration/addition/deletion permitted to make it different from school record upon fulfilment of two conditions permission by court of law and notification in government gazette. Alteration/addition/deletion permitted to make it different from school record upon fulfillment of two conditions permission by court of law and notification in government gazette. No change in date of birth permitted. Only corrections permitted to make it consistent with school records. Alteration/addition/deletion permitted to make it different from school record upon fulfillment of two conditions permission by court of law and notification in government gazette. No change in date of birth permitted. Only corrections permitted to make it consistent with school records. For correction in name No limitation. For D.O.B. within 2 years of declaration of result. Post 2007 Amendment Permitted to make it consistent with school record. Permitted to make it consistent with school record. No change in name/surname permitted. No change in name/surname permitted. Same as before. For name within 10 years of declaration of result. For D.O.B. same as before. Post 2011 Amendment Same as before. Same as before. Can be considered on written request of candidate/father/mother duly forwarded by Head of the Institution. Can be considered on written request of candidate/father/mother duly forwarded by Head of the Institution. Same as before. For change of name within 10 years of declaration of result. Post 2015 Amendment Permitted to make it consistent with school record but only within one year of result. Permitted to make it consistent with school record but only within one year of result. Can be considered upon fulfilment of two prior conditions before publication of result of candidate permission by court of law and gazette notification. No change in name of father/mother of candidate permissible. Same as before. Only time was reduced to one year after declaration of result. For correction of name within 1 year of declaration of result. For D.O.B. within 1 year of declaration of result. Post 2018 Amendment Same as before. Time limit changed to five years after declaration of result. Same as before. Time limit changed to five years after declaration of result. Same as before. Caption made mandatory for showing the changed information in certificate. Change in name of father/mother permitted with same conditions as applicable in case of change of name of candidate. No change in date of birth permitted. Two categories of corrections permitted as per school records and as per court orders. For correction of name within years of declaration of result. For D.O.B. within 5 years of declaration of result. 25. The table quoted above shows amendment in the Bye-laws from time to time and as the non-appellant/petitioner passed out C.B.S.E. Examination in the year 2013, thus, the provision of Bye-laws, as was existing in the year 2013, is to be applied. For D.O.B. within 5 years of declaration of result. 25. The table quoted above shows amendment in the Bye-laws from time to time and as the non-appellant/petitioner passed out C.B.S.E. Examination in the year 2013, thus, the provision of Bye-laws, as was existing in the year 2013, is to be applied. The relevant Bye-laws is of the year 2011, then existing in the year 2013. The application was maintainable within 10 years of declaration of result. The declaration of result is in the year 2013 thus period of 10 years was to expire in the year 2023 whereas the application for change of name was made in the year 2019 i.e. within the period of 10 years from the date of declaration of result. The issue as to whether period given under the Bye-laws would apply from the date of declaration of result or the date when application was made has been clarified by the Apex Court in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra). It is with a finding that the period of limitation to make an application would apply from the date of declaration of result. The relevant paras of the judgment are quoted herein for ready reference: “123. As noted above, the Byelaws permit change of name only if permission from the Court has been obtained prior to the publication of result. It puts a clear embargo on any change of name sans prior permission before the publication. The provision is problematic on certain counts. Firstly, it is not a mere restriction on the right, it is a complete embargo on the right post publication of result of the candidate. It fails to take into account the possibility of need for change of name after the publication of result including the uncertainty of timeline required to obtain such declaration from the Court of law due to law's delay and upon which the candidate has no control whatsoever. Whereas, while amending the Byelaws in 2007, the CBSE itself had noted that children are not of mature age while passing school examinations and they may not be in a position to decide conclusively on issues concerning their identity. The Byelaws completely overlook this possibility when it ordains seeking declaration from the Court prior to the publication of results of the concerned examination conducted by it. 124. The Byelaws completely overlook this possibility when it ordains seeking declaration from the Court prior to the publication of results of the concerned examination conducted by it. 124. The overriding state interest, as per the Board, to retain this stringency is nothing but efficiency of administration. Administrative efficiency, despite being a crucial concern, has not been and cannot be elevated to a standard that it is used to justify non-performance of essential functions by an instrumentality of the State. To use administrative efficiency to make it practically impossible for a student to alter her identity in the Board certificates, no matter how urgent and important it is, would be highly disproportionate and can in no manner be termed as a reasonable restriction. Reasonableness would demand a proper balance between a student's right to be identified in the official (public) records in manner of her choice and the Board's argument of administrative efficiency. To sustain this balance, it would be open to the Board to limit the number of times such alterations could be permitted including subject to availability of the old records preserved by it as per the extant regulations. But to say that post the publication of examination results and issuance of certificates, there can be no way to alter the record would be a case of total prohibition and not a reasonable restraint. 125. The limitation as regards maximum period upto which changes can be permitted also requires a different approach. Upon receiving the certificates, the student would naturally be put to notice of the particulars of certificates. Due to young age and inadvertence including being casual and indolent, a student may fail to identify the errors or to understand the probable impact of those errors and accordingly, may not apply for rectification immediately. It is also possible that a student may not have to use the certificates immediately after passing out and by the time she uses them, the limitation period for correction may elapse. Therefore, a realistic time for permitting corrections is very important. Indeed, it can be commensurate with the statutory or mandatory period upto which CBSE is obliged to preserve its old record. 126. However, we need not explore upon the question as to whether the exercise of a fundamental right can be foreclosed by prescribing a rigid period of limitation. Therefore, a realistic time for permitting corrections is very important. Indeed, it can be commensurate with the statutory or mandatory period upto which CBSE is obliged to preserve its old record. 126. However, we need not explore upon the question as to whether the exercise of a fundamental right can be foreclosed by prescribing a rigid period of limitation. In case of any ordinary civil rights, it is important that the action for enforcement of such rights is initiated in prescribed time and consistency is maintained, but is it permissible to say the same about fundamental rights? The rights which are recognised as fundamental under the Constitution are “preferred or chosen freedoms” and a very sensitive and realistic approach has to be taken in such matters. We wonder whether after the lapse of prescribed time, let us say 3 years, there could be no reasonable and legitimate circumstances to warrant change of name. 130. One of the primary functions of the Board is to grant certificates to its students. Effective maintenance and regulation of standard of education would include complete accountability of the Board in grant of such certificates and its duty does not get extinguished after publication of examination results and issue of certificates. Rather, it extends to taking care of post-publication concerns of students as and when they emerge, as students seek to use their certificates for purposes of higher education and career opportunities. A narrow reading of the functions of the Board would leave glaring gaps in the field of school education and may jeopardize the welfare of students with legitimate concerns. 147. The provision for “change” of name is far more stringent and calls for a thorough review to settle the correct position. As per the present law, change of name is permissible upon fulfilment of two prior conditions - prior permission of the Court of law and publication of the proposed change in official gazette. These conditions co-exist with another condition predicating that both prior permission and publication must be done before the publication of result. What it effectively means is that change of name would simply be impermissible after the publication of result of the candidate even if the same is permitted by a Court of law and published in official gazette. These conditions co-exist with another condition predicating that both prior permission and publication must be done before the publication of result. What it effectively means is that change of name would simply be impermissible after the publication of result of the candidate even if the same is permitted by a Court of law and published in official gazette. In other words, once the examination result of the candidate has been published, the Board would only permit corrections in name mentioned in the certificate. Further, changing the name out of freewill is simply ruled out. 152. The Byelaws provide for a two-tier mechanism for recording change of name or other details (as indicated above). One of them is prior permission or declaration by a Court of law to be obtained. As regards public documents like Birth Certificate, Official Gazette, Aadhaar Card, Election Card, etc., the same enjoy legal presumption of its correctness in terms of explicit provisions contained in Chapter V of the 1872 Act. The 1872 Act extends such presumption in terms of Section 76 read with Sections 79 and 80 of the 1872 Act and as in the case of Official Gazette under Section 81 of the same Act. Even other legislations concerning public documents attach equal importance to the authenticity of such documents including while making changes in their certificates to which we have alluded to in this judgment. Understood thus, there is no reason for the CBSE Board to not take notice of the public documents relied upon by the candidate and to record change on that basis in the certificate issued by it, for being consistent with the relied upon public documents. It matters not if the information furnished in the public documents is not entirely consistent with the school records of the incumbent. The CBSE while accepting those documents as foundational documents for effecting changes consistent therewith may insist for additional conditions and at the same time while retaining the original entry make note in the form of caption/annotation in the fresh certificate to be issued by it while calling upon the incumbent to surrender the original certificate issued by it to avoid any misuse thereof at a later point of time. It would be permissible for the CBSE to insist for a sworn affidavit to be given by the incumbent making necessary declaration and also to indemnify the CBSE. It would be permissible for the CBSE to insist for a sworn affidavit to be given by the incumbent making necessary declaration and also to indemnify the CBSE. The fresh certificate to be issued by the CBSE may also contain disclaimer of the Board clearly mentioning that change has been effected at the behest of the incumbent in light of the public documents relied upon by him. In addition, the incumbent can be called upon to notify about the change in the Official Gazette and by giving public notice as precondition for recording the change by way of abundant precaution. 158. As noticed in the submissions above, there is a conflict of opinion amongst the High Courts as regards the point of time which would determine the applicability of Byelaws. The frequent amendments carried out by the CBSE had made it imperative for the courts to grapple with this question. The immediate question is whether the date of declaration of result or the date of application for changes would be determinative of the applicable Byelaws. While addressing this question, the Delhi High Court in Kalpana Thakur took the view that the Byelaws existing on the date of application would apply, irrespective of amendment. This view can be discerned from the following paragraphs of the judgment: “12.2 In my view, the submission of Mr. Bansal that amended Bye-laws 69.1(i) would apply, is untenable, for a simple reason that the amendment to the said bye-law was notified only on 25.06.2015, a date which falls beyond the date on which the application for change of name was preferred in the instant case. The argument advanced in support of this submission by Mr. Bansal that the Office Order was in place prior to the date of the application, in my view, will not sustain, as the Office Order, is an internal document, which could have no legal validity till the position taken therein is put in public realm. The very fact that a notification in respect of the amended Bye-law was issued by respondent no. 1/CBSE, would show, that the decision to amend bye-law 69.1(i) required a public notice. 12.3 Consequently, all applications for change of name which are filed prior to notification dated 25.06.2015, will be governed, in my view, by the un-amended Bye-law 69.1(i). The very fact that a notification in respect of the amended Bye-law was issued by respondent no. 1/CBSE, would show, that the decision to amend bye-law 69.1(i) required a public notice. 12.3 Consequently, all applications for change of name which are filed prior to notification dated 25.06.2015, will be governed, in my view, by the un-amended Bye-law 69.1(i). Therefore, quite logically, the petitioners, in my opinion, would have to be given the reliefs as sought in the writ petition.” Notably, the question before the Court was slightly different. It was only whether the un-amended Byelaws would continue to apply if the application was preferred before the date of amendment. Nevertheless, the Kerala High Court in Vyshnav has taken a different view of the matter and observed that the Byelaws existing on the date of passing out would apply. It observed thus: “5. On an analysis of the said rule and amended provision it is evident that, the first respondent relied on an incorrect provision in order to non-suit the petitioner by rejecting the applications submitted for change of name. Therefore, Exts.P7 and P9 cannot be sustained under law, since the same is violative of the rule provided for the purpose. Petitioner has passed out in the year 2013 and therefore, the law as it stood then has to be taken in to account, since there is no retrospective operation to the amendment. Therefore, I quash Exts.P7 and P9 and direct the first respondent to re-consider the application submitted by the petitioner based on Rule 69(1(i), as it stood before as is specified above.” 159. Considered in the context of the Byelaws, the controversy is actually simple in nature. The Byelaws consistently provide that the period of limitation is to be calculated from the date of declaration of the result and issue of certificate. It means that the period of limitation begins to run against the student after declaration of result and publication of certificates as the student is put to notice of the contents of the document, upon its issue. The student can now be said to be in a position to verify the correctness of the certificates. The irresistible outcome of this legal position is that the Byelaws existing on the date of such declaration/publication of result and issue of certificate would be relevant for the purpose of effecting changes in the certificates. The student can now be said to be in a position to verify the correctness of the certificates. The irresistible outcome of this legal position is that the Byelaws existing on the date of such declaration/publication of result and issue of certificate would be relevant for the purpose of effecting changes in the certificates. The express language of the Byelaws would be defeated if we say that the law existing on the date of application for recording change would be relevant. That would negate the very importance of having a period of limitation for correction of the certificates. 160. If the limitation of applicability of Byelaws was to be reckoned from the date of application for correction/change and not the date of result of the examination conducted by CBSE, we would be leaving things to a state of uncertainty. For, a student who could possibly have surpassed the limitation period under un-amended Byelaws would regain the right to change the certificates if the Byelaws existing on the date of application permit so and provide for a longer period. Similarly, a student who had ten years for carrying out changes under the un-amended Byelaws would lose her right if Byelaws are amended within the ten-year period so as to provide for a much shorter, say two years, limitation period. Certainty, consistency and predictability are the hallmarks of any legal relationship and it is in the interest of public policy that legal interpretation preserves and protects these hallmarks. This determination, however, is only to state the legal position and may not have any immediate bearing on the cases before us.” 26. In the light of the finding recorded by the Apex Court in the paras quoted above, it is a case where the application for change of name was given within the time frame provided under the Bye-laws. 27. In view of the above, we are unable to accept the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that application for change of name was submitted after the period of limitation. 28. At this stage, we may also clarify that the Bye-laws existing in the year 2013 was permitting an application for change of name within 10 years of declaration of result, thus, the argument that an application for change of name or correction of the certificate could have been given only by the candidate while pursuing the C.B.S.E. studies is not acceptable. When Bye-laws permits, an application for change of name within 10 years from the date of declaration of result then it would be applicable even for a candidate passed out the C.B.S.E. Examination. If there exists contradiction in the Bye-laws, beneficial provision is to be applied for the student. 29. In totality, we do not find any reason to cause interference in the judgment of learned Single Judge. The issue has now been decided by the Apex Court in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra) and we have recorded finding not only in reference to the Bye-laws but judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jigya Yadav (supra), thus find no reason to cause interference to the directions given by the learned Single Judge. The writ petition would now be governed by this judgment. 30. With the aforesaid finding, the appeal is disposed of.