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2021 DIGILAW 833 (ALL)

Ram Chandra Verma v. State of U. P.

2021-08-09

MOHD. FAIZ ALAM KHAN

body2021
JUDGMENT : MOHD. FAIZ ALAM KHAN, J. 1. Heard Sri. Kunwar Mukul Rakesh, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Kunwar Sushant Prakash, learned counsel for applicant, Sri. Yatindra Kumar Agnihotri, learned Additional Government Advocate for State and perused the record. 2. The instant petition has been filed for quashing the charge-sheet dated 23.10.2009 and the summoning order dated 30.11.2009, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st, Sitapur in State vs. Ram Chandra Verma, Criminal Case No. 2845 of 2009 arising out of Crime No. 372 of 2009, under Section 406 I.P.C. P.S. Sidhauli, District Sitapur. 3. Though the service on opposite party no. 2 was reported to be sufficient vide communication dated 6.7.2010 of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sitapur and Sri. L.P. Shukla, Advocate had filed his vakalatnama on his behalf but no-one is present for him today. 4. Necessary facts required for disposal of this application is that opposite party no. 2 filed an FIR against the applicant on 7.5.2020 Priti Saraf and Another vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Another in Criminal Appeal No. 296 of 2021 dated 10th March, 2021 at 21.30 hours at P.S. Kotwali Sidhauli, Sitapur stating therein that the opposite party no. 2 had contacted to buy one lac bricks at the rate of 1650/- per thousand bricks from the applicant and had paid Rs. 1,50,000/- through account payee cheque and Rs. 15,000/- as cash, however the bricks were not supplied and the applicant had also sold his brick kiln to some other persons and, therefore, has misappropriated the money of opposite party no. 2. After thorough investigation a charge-sheet was submitted by the Investigating Officer under Section 406 I.P.C. and the Magistrate has also taken the cognizance of the offence and vide summoning order dated 30.11.2009 summoned the applicant to face trial for the offence under Section 406 I.P.C. aggrieved by the same the instant petition has been filed by the applicant praying to quash the summoning order dated 30.11.2009, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st, Sitapur in State vs. Ram Chandra Verma, Criminal Case No. 2845 of 2009 arising out of Crime No. 372 of 2009, under Section 406 I.P.C. 5. Sri. Sri. Mukul Rakesh, learned Senior Counsel vehemently submits that the instant case is of such a nature where by any stretch of imagination criminal proceedings could not be initiated as the dispute is purely of civil nature and even if the allegation of the FIR is taken on its face value, the same appears to be a case of breach of promise or contract on the basis of which only civil case could have been filed. It is further submitted that there were no sufficient ground before the Magistrate to summon the applicant to face trial and the Magistrate has materially erred in summoning the applicant to face trial. It is further submitted that the cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate without application of judicial mind and the order of taking cognizance and summoning the accused has been passed on proforma simply by filling up the blanks which reveals that the Magistrate has not applied his judicial mind. It is further submitted that the proceedings before the courts below are nothing but the abuse of the process of law and, therefore, the same be quashed. Learned Senior Counsel relied on a judgment of this Court dated 15.12.2017, passed in Petition (482 Cr.P.C.) No. 3551 of 2009 (Desh Bandhu Srivastava vs. State of U.P.) 6. Learned Additional Government Advocate for State while controverting the arguments of the learned counsel for applicant submits that the arguments of learned counsel for applicant is with regard to the factual aspects of the case which cannot be gone into by this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, it is now, no more res integra and this Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is required to examine whether the averments in the F.I.R./complaint constitute the ingredients necessary for an offence alleged under the Penal Code. If the averments taken on their face do not constitute the ingredients necessary for the offence, the criminal proceedings may be quashed under Section 482. A criminal proceeding can be quashed where the allegations made in the F.I.R./complaint do not disclose the commission of an offence under the Penal Code. The F.I.R./complaint must be examined as a whole, without evaluating the merits of the allegations. A criminal proceeding can be quashed where the allegations made in the F.I.R./complaint do not disclose the commission of an offence under the Penal Code. The F.I.R./complaint must be examined as a whole, without evaluating the merits of the allegations. Though the law does not require that the F.I.R./complaint reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence in verbatim but the complaint must contain the basic facts necessary for making out an offence under the Penal Code. 8. The opposite party no. 2 has alleged in the F.I.R./complaint that the applicant has committed offence under Section 406 of the Penal Code. It would thus be necessary to examine the ingredients of the Section 406 IPC and to see whether the allegations made in the complaint, taken on their face, attract the offence of section 406 of the Penal Code. 9. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Pratibha Rani vs. Suraj Kumar and Others, MANU/SC/0090/1985, while discussing the ingredient of “Entrustment” held as under:- “Section 405 of the Penal Code reads thus: “Section 405 - Criminal breach of trust - Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust.” A careful reading of Section 405 shows that the ingredients of a criminal breach of trust are as follows: (i) A person should have been entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion over property. (ii) That person should dishonestly misappropriate or convert to their own use that property, or dishonestly use or dispose of that property or willfully suffer any other person to do so. (iii) That such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust. Entrustment is an essential ingredient of the offence. (iii) That such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust. Entrustment is an essential ingredient of the offence. A person who dishonestly misappropriates property entrusted to them contrary to the terms of an obligation imposed is liable for a criminal breach of trust and is punished under Section 406 of the Penal Code. The jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be exercised with care. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, a High Court can examine whether a matter which is essentially of a civil nature has been given a cloak of a criminal offence. Where the ingredients required to constitute a criminal offence are not made out from a bare reading of the complaint, the continuation of the criminal proceeding will constitute an abuse of the process of the court. “39. The Supreme Court in a large number of cases has held that the fundamental core of the offence of criminal breach of trust is that a property must be entrusted and the dominion of the property should be given to the trustee. In the present case, all these conditions, even according to the findings of the Court Though not its conclusion are clearly established. That the view of the High Court is absolutely wrong would be clear from a number of authorities, some of which we would like to discuss here. 40. In Chelloor Manaklal Naravan Ittiravia Nambudiri vs. State of Travancore, MANU/SC/0091/1952 : AIR 1953 SC 478 this Court made the following observations: As laid down in Section 385, Cochin Penal Code (corresponding to Section 405, Indian Penal Code) to constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust it is essential that the prosecution must prove first of all that the accused was entrusted with some property or with any dominion or Power over it....It follows almost axiomatically from this definition that the ownership or beneficial interest in the property in respect of which criminal breach of trust is alleged to have been committed, must be in some person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on account of some person or in some way for his benefit. 41. 41. In Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney vs. State of Bombay, MANU/SC/0030/1956 : 1956 Cri. L.J. 1116 Sinha, J. (as he then was) observed thus: For an offence under Section 409, Indian Penal Code the first essential ingredient to be proved is that the property was entrusted....But when Section 405 which defines criminal breach of trust speaks of a person being in any manner entrusted with property, it does not contemplate the creation of a trust with all the technicalities of trust. It contemplates the creation of a relationship whereby the owner of property makes it over to another person to be retained by him until a certain contingency arises or to be disposed of by him on the happening of a certain events. 42. In Akharbhai Nazarali vs. Md. Hussain Bhai, MANU/MP/0021/1961 : AIR 1961 M.P. 37 the Madhya Pradesh High Court made the following observations: It may be that the deduction and retention of the employees' contribution is a trust created by virtue of that very fact, or by virtue of a provision in statute or statutory rule. But even apart from the latter, the mere fact of telling the employees that it is their contribution to the provident fund scheme and then making a deduction or recovery and retaining it, constitutes the offence of criminal breach of trust. This is so obvious that nothing more need be said about it. 43. These observations were fully endorsed and approved by this Court in Harihar Prasad Dubey vs. Tulsi Das Mundhra and Others, MANU/SC/0263/1980 : 1980 Cri. L.J. 1340 where the following observations were made: This, in our opinion, is a correct statement of the position and we also agree with the learned Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that “this so obvious that nothing more need be said about it.” We, therefore, think that the impugned order quashing the charge against the respondents is obviously wrong. 44. In Basudeb Patra vs. Kanai Lal Haldar, AIR 1949 Cal. 44. In Basudeb Patra vs. Kanai Lal Haldar, AIR 1949 Cal. 207 the Calcutta High Court observed thus: Whereas the illustration to Section 405 show equally clearly that the property comes into the possession of the accused either by an express entrustment or by some process placing the accused in a position of trust....On the facts of the present case, which, as I have said, are not open to question at this stage, it is quite clear that the ornaments were handed over to the petitioner by the beneficial owner in the confidence that they would be returned to the beneficial owner in due time after having been used for the purpose for which they were handed over. If this is not an entrustment, it is impossible to conceive what can be an entrustment. (Emphasis ours) 45. This ratio was fully approved by this Court in Velji Raghavji Patel vs. State of Maharasatra, MANU/SC/0091/1964 : 1965 Cri. L.J. 431 where the following observation were made: In order to establish “entrustment of dominion” over property to an accused person the mere existence of that person's dominion over property is not enough. It must be further shown that his dominion was the result of entrustment. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by Harris, C.J. the prosecution must establish that dominion over the assets or a particular asset of the partnership was by a special agreement between the parties, entrusted to the accused person. 46. In the case of State of Gujarat vs. Jaswantlal Nathalal, MANU/SC/0091/1967 : 1968 Cri. L.J. 803 Hegde, J. speaking for the Court observed thus: The expression ‘entrustment’ carries with it the implication that the person handing over any property or on whose behalf that property is handed over to another, continues to be its owner. Further the person handing over the property must have confidence in the person taking the property so as to create a fiduciary relationship between them. 47. In Sushil Kumar Gupta vs. Joy Shanker Bhattacharjee, MANU/SC/0201/1970 : (1970) 3 SCR 770 this Court observed thus: The offence of criminal breach of trust is committed when a person who is entrusted in any manner with property or with dominion over it, dishonestly misappropriates it or converts it to his own use....The appellant's manner of dealing with the money entrusted to his custody clearly constitutes criminal breach of trust. 48. 48. In the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal vs. S.K. Roy, MANU/SC/0229/1974 : 1974 Cri. L.J. 678 this Court held that for ‘entrustment’ two things are necessary, viz. (1) the entrustment may arise in “any manner” whether or not it is fraudulent and (2) the accused must have acquisition or dominion over the property.” 10. Thus condition necessary for an act to constitute an offence under Section 405 of the Penal Code is that the accused was entrusted with some property or has dominion over the property and dishonestly misappropriates it or converts it to his own use. 11. Perusal of record would also reveal that in the FIR filed by the opposite party no. 2 against the applicant it has been specifically stated that opposite party no. 2 had contracted to buy one lac bricks at the rate of Rs. 1650/- per thousand bricks from applicant and he had paid Rs. 1,50,000/- to the owner of the brick kiln/applicant through account payee cheque and Rs. 15,000/- as cash to him, who in turn promised to supply the bricks to opposite party no. 2. On 2.6.2007 he at about 12.00 noon stated to have arrived at the brick kiln of the applicant to get his bricks but the applicant informed him that at that time bricks of good quality were not available and, therefore, he will deliver the same afterwards. It is further stated in the FIR that after waiting for some days, he again went to the applicant with tractor and trolley to get the bricks but the same were not delivered to him and when after waiting for long he came to the brick kiln again he was informed that applicant and his wife had sold the brick kiln to one Asha Gupta. Despite efforts by opposite party no. 2 neither the money was returned nor the bricks were given to the complainant by the applicant. 12. It is also apparent that during the course of investigation the statement of the complainant/informant was recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. wherein he has corroborated the version of the FIR and it is also stated that the cheque of Rs. 1,50,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- cash was given to the applicant/accused in the presence of witnesses Banwari and Arvind Kumar Jain. He has also provided copy of the receipt given by the applicant to the Investigating Officer. 1,50,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- cash was given to the applicant/accused in the presence of witnesses Banwari and Arvind Kumar Jain. He has also provided copy of the receipt given by the applicant to the Investigating Officer. 13. Opposite Party No. 2 also appears to have filed a complaint before the Consumer Forum, Sitapur, which was dismissed by the Forum on the score that the same is not cognizable by the Forum as the issue involves complex factual determination which could only be adjudicated by full fledged trial and also that the proceedings for recovery of money are not cognizable by the Consumer Forum. 14. I now come to the question as to whether or not a clear allegation of entrustment and misappropriation of the money was made by the informant in the FIR and, if so, was the Court below was justified in summoning the applicant to face trial under section 406 of the Penal Code. It is well settled that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a FIR or a complaint the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint/FIR or the documents accompanying the same. It has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. In case no offence is coming out on the allegations and the ingredients of Section 405 & 406, I.P.C. are not made out, this Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings. In the present case perusal of the F.I.R./complaint and the statement of the informant recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. would show that the allegations with regard to the commission of offence under section 406 IPC by the applicant are clear, specific and unambiguous and, therefore, the complainant should be given a chance to prove his case in the trial. It is, of course, open to the accused at the trial to take whatever defence that is open to him but that stage had not come yet. 15. The important portions of the F.I.R./complaint and the statement of the informant recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. may be spelt out as under: (1) that the informant had agreed to buy one lac bricks from accused applicant who was the manager of the brick kiln, at the rate of 1650/- per thosand bricks and had paid Rs. 15. The important portions of the F.I.R./complaint and the statement of the informant recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. may be spelt out as under: (1) that the informant had agreed to buy one lac bricks from accused applicant who was the manager of the brick kiln, at the rate of 1650/- per thosand bricks and had paid Rs. 1,50,000/- to the accused-applicant through account payee cheque and Rs. 15000/- in cash as advance. (2) that applicant had assured the informant that he will supply the bricks as agreed between them. (3) that informant had gone to the brick kiln of the applicant on 02.06.2007 at about 12.00 p.m. to receive the bricks but he did not deliver the bricks on the pretext that bricks are not of good quality. (4) that thereafter the informant had stated to have gone to the brick kiln of the applicant many times with tractor trolly, but he did not deliver the bricks. (5) that applicant and his wife had sold their brick kiln to others and despite repeated requests neither the bricks were supplied nor the money of the informant was returned. 16. Taking all the allegations placed above, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the aforesaid allegations do not prima-facie amount to an offence of criminal breach of trust against the applicant punishable under Section 406 of the Penal Code as the amount of Rs 1,65,000/- was allegedly entrusted to the applicant by informant for the fulfillment of his obligation to supply the bricks to the informant and contrary to the terms of the obligation, neither the bricks were supplied nor the money was returned to the informant/opposite party no. 2 and in this way the money was misappropriated and converted to his own use by the applicant. Thus, there can be no room for doubt that all the facts stated in the F.I.R. and statement of informant recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. constitute an offence under Section 406 IPC and the informant cannot be denied the right to prove his case at the trial. 17. Next submission of learned Senior counsel is with regard to the fact that the order of magistrate whereby the cognizance has been taken and summons has been issued is a proforma order and the same shows non application of mind by the magistrate. 17. Next submission of learned Senior counsel is with regard to the fact that the order of magistrate whereby the cognizance has been taken and summons has been issued is a proforma order and the same shows non application of mind by the magistrate. To butress his point he relied upon a case decided by a single Judge of this Court in 482 No. 3551 of 2009 dated 15.12.2017 whereby the proforma summoning order of the magistrate was quashed on the ground that the same has been passed by filling blanks in proforma order. Perusal of the order of the magistrate whereby the applicant has been summoned would show that the same is a proforma order, however the magistrate on the same day has endorsed on the Charge-Sheet as “Cognizance taken, Register” which shows that the after perusing the charge-sheet and the case diary he has endorsed this on the Charge-Sheet. However no reason has been assigned by the magistrate for taking cognizance and issuance of summons. 18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat vs. Afroz Mohammed Hasanfatta, MANU/SC/0139/2019 while considering the need of the magistrate to record reasons for taking of cognizance and issuance of summons in cases based on police report (Charge-Sheet) framed a point mentioned below and answered it as under:- “While directing issuance of process to the Accused in case of taking cognizance of an offence based upon a police report Under Section 190(1)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure, whether it is mandatory for the court to record reasons for its satisfaction that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the Accused? “20. In Para (21) of Mehmood Ali Rehman, this Court has made a fine distinction between taking cognizance based upon charge-sheet filed by the police Under Section 190(1)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure and a private complaint Under Section 190(1)(a) Code of Criminal Procedure and held as under: 21. Under Section 190(1)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate has the advantage of a police report and Under Section 190(1)(c) Code of Criminal Procedure, he has the information or knowledge of commission of an offence. But Under Section 190(1)(a) Code of Criminal Procedure, he has only a complaint before him. Under Section 190(1)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate has the advantage of a police report and Under Section 190(1)(c) Code of Criminal Procedure, he has the information or knowledge of commission of an offence. But Under Section 190(1)(a) Code of Criminal Procedure, he has only a complaint before him. The Code hence specifies that “a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.” Therefore, if the complaint, on the face of it, does not disclose the commission of any offence, the Magistrate shall not take cognizance Under Section 190(1)(a) Code of Criminal Procedure. The complaint is simply to be rejected. 21. In summoning the Accused, it is not necessary for the Magistrate to examine the merits and demerits of the case and whether the materials collected is adequate for supporting the conviction. The court is not required to evaluate the evidence and its merits. The standard to be adopted for summoning the Accused Under Section 204 Code of Criminal Procedure is not the same at the time of framing the charge. For issuance of summons Under Section 204 Code of Criminal Procedure, the expression used is “there is sufficient ground for proceeding.....” whereas for framing the charges, the expression used in Sections 240 and 246 Indian Penal Code is “there is ground for presuming that the Accused has committed an offence.....” At the stage of taking cognizance of the offence based upon a police report and for issuance of summons Under Section 204 Code of Criminal Procedure, detailed enquiry regarding the merits and demerits of the case is not required. The fact that after investigation of the case, the police has filed charge-sheet along with the materials thereon may be considered as sufficient ground for proceeding for issuance of summons Under Section 204 Code of Criminal Procedure. 22. In so far as taking cognizance based on the police report, the Magistrate has the advantage of the charge-sheet, statement of witnesses and other evidence collected by the police during the investigation. Investigating Officer/SHO collects the necessary evidence during the investigation conducted in compliance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in accordance with the Rules of investigation. Evidence and materials so collected are sifted at the level of the Investigating Officer and thereafter, charge-sheet was filed. In appropriate cases, opinion of the Public Prosecutor is also obtained before fling the charge-sheet. Evidence and materials so collected are sifted at the level of the Investigating Officer and thereafter, charge-sheet was filed. In appropriate cases, opinion of the Public Prosecutor is also obtained before fling the charge-sheet. The court thus has the advantage of the police report along with the materials placed before it by the police. Under Section 190 (1)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure, where the Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence upon a police report and the Magistrate is satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding, the Magistrate directs issuance of process. In case of taking cognizance of an offence based upon the police report, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons for issuing the process. In cases instituted on a police report, the Magistrate is only required to pass an order issuing summons to the Accused. Such an order of issuing summons to the Accused is based upon subject to satisfaction of the Magistrate considering the police report and other documents and satisfying himself that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused. In a case based upon the police report, at the stage of issuing the summons to the Accused, the Magistrate is not required to record any reason. In case, if the charge-sheet is barred by law or where there is lack of jurisdiction or when the charge-sheet is rejected or not taken on file, then the Magistrate is required to record his reasons for rejection of the charge-sheet and for not taking on file. In the present case, cognizance of the offence has been taken by taking into consideration the charge-sheet filed by the police for the offence Under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 477A and 120B Indian Penal Code, the order for issuance of process without explicitly recording reasons for its satisfaction for issue of process does not suffer from any illegality.” (Emphasis Mine) 19. Thus if after perusal of the Charge-Sheet and the case diary the magistrate has taken cognizance and there is sufficient grounds to proceed further and reasons for the same has even not been recorded by the magistrate the same will not vitiate the cognizance and summoning order. However the situation may be different where there is no material at all in the case diary and the prosecution case even if taken on its face do not disclose commission of any offence. 20. However the situation may be different where there is no material at all in the case diary and the prosecution case even if taken on its face do not disclose commission of any offence. 20. The Apex Court in State of Karnataka vs. M. Devendrappa, MANU/SC/0027/2002, 2015 (3) SCC 424 while considering the R P Kapoor and Bhajan Lal (see below) has opined as under:- “In R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/0086/1960 : 1960 Cri. L.J. 1239, this Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash proceedings: (i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction. (ii) Where the allegation in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirely do not constitute the offence alleged. (iii) Where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 8. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is function of the trial judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of private complainant as unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, MANU/SC/0115/1992 : 1992 Cri. L.J. 527. A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:- (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constituted only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala-fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 21. Hon'ble Supreme Court in its recent decision, in the case of Priti Saraf and Another vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Another in Criminal Appeal No. 296 of 2021 dated 10th March, 2021 has held as under:- “32. In the instant case, on a careful reading of the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet, in our view, it cannot be said that the complaint does not disclose the commission of an offence. The ingredients of the offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC cannot be said to be absent on the basis of the allegations in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet. We would like to add that whether the allegations in the complaint are otherwise correct or not, has to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be led during the course of trial. Simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract or arbitral proceedings initiated at the instance of the appellants, that does not by itself clothe the court to come to a conclusion that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court for exercising inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing such proceedings.” 22. Thus it is manifestly evident from the law aforesaid that even if any case has been filed by the complainant/ informant before the consumer forum and the same has been dismissed on the ground of alternate remedy, the same could not clothe this case as a civil dispute. 23. Thus it is manifestly evident from the law aforesaid that even if any case has been filed by the complainant/ informant before the consumer forum and the same has been dismissed on the ground of alternate remedy, the same could not clothe this case as a civil dispute. 23. In view of above, I am satisfied that the F.I.R. and statement of the complainant recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. prima-facie discloses an offence of criminal breach of trust, as defined in Section 405 and punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code and no illegality has been committed by the Court below in either taking the cognizance or in summoning the applicant-accused to face trial under aforesaid penal section. Keeping in view the over all facts, circumstances and the aforesaid case laws no case has made out for the quashing of the proceedings, charge-sheet or the summoning order passed by the trial Court. 24. For the reasons given above, I do not find any substance in the application of the applicant and the same is therefore liable to be dismissed. The application filed by the applicant is, thus dismissed. The trial Court is directed to conclude the trial at the earliest without granting soft adjournments to the either party, in accordance with law. 25. Interim order, if any, is hereby vacated. 26. A copy of this order be immediately sent to the trial Court. 27. It is clarified that observations of this court made herein before are only for the purpose of disposing this application and the same shall never be construed as the opinion of this Court on merits and the trial Court shall independently appreciate the evidence which would be produced by the parties and will come to its own conclusion without being guided by any observation made in this order.