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2021 DIGILAW 836 (KER)

Vidya Ramaswamy, D/o. Ramaswamy v. Union of India

2021-09-16

DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN

body2021
JUDGMENT : The coalescing interplay of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the “RFCTLARR Act” for short), and National Highway Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the 'NH Act' for short), in computation of the compensation payable, consequent to acquisition of property by the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI), is presented in the facts of this case; and this being an aspect which is not often correctly understood by the owners/claimants of the acquired properties, requires to be notified in public domain through a declaration of this Court. 2. Very often, parties who have suffered acquisition, approach this Court apprehending that they will be subjected to a raw deal in computation of the compensation eligible to them, because it is likely to be done under the NHAI Act and not under the “RFCTLARR Act” . This, however, appears to be misplaced, as I will presently explain in this judgment, after placing on record an apercus of the constitutive facts involved. 3. The petitioners are stated to be the owners of certain properties which have been acquired under the requisition of the NHAI and they say that an Award has been issued by the “Competent Authority for Land Acquisition” (CALA), as per the provisions of Section 3(G) of the NH Act. 4. The petitioners say that going by Ext.P1 notification of the Government of India, dated 28.08.2015, compensation is required to be computed exclusively as per the provisions of the “RFCTLARR Act”; but that when they requested for reference of the Award for enhancement of compensation to the competent Authority under its ambit, the respondents are proposing to do so under the provisions of Section 3(G) of the “NH Act”, by causing such reference to the District Collector. The petitioners say that this is illegal and unlawful because the reference can be made only under the provisions of Section 64 of the “RFCTLARR Act” and therefore, that it should reach the competent District Court and not the District Collector. 5. The petitioners thus pray that the competent respondents be directed to refer the Award, which they admit has not been produced before this Court, to the competent Court under Section 64 of the “RFCTLARR Act”. 6. 5. The petitioners thus pray that the competent respondents be directed to refer the Award, which they admit has not been produced before this Court, to the competent Court under Section 64 of the “RFCTLARR Act”. 6. I have heard Sri.T.S.Harikumar -learned counsel for the petitioners; learned Assistant Solicitor General of India -Sri.P.Vijayakumar, Sri.Salil Narayan -learned Standing Counsel for NHAI and learned Special Government Pleader -Sri.Hanil Kumar. 7. Sri.Salil Narayan, learned Standing Counsel for the NHAI, commenced his submissions in opposition to the afore plea made by Sri.T.S.Harikumar, saying that the petitioners seem to have approached this Court under a wrong impression and on an apocryphal apprehension. He invited my attention to Ext.P4, which is a notice issued to the petitioners under Section 3(E) of the NH Act, to show me that the compensation under the Award had been computed and determined by the CALA only under the provisions of the “RFCTLARR Act”. He submitted that, therefore, the petitioners will have to approach the District Collector under Section 3(G) of the NH Act, if they are dissatisfied and that the said Authority will then consider it wholly guided by the principles under the “RFCTLARR Act”. He argued that this is exactly what has been mandated through Ext.P1 order of the Central Government, which stipulates that the provisions of the “RFCTLARR Act”, relating to determination of compensation, as per the 2nd Schedule thereto, will be applicable to the “NH Act” also. He, therefore, prayed that this writ petition be dismissed. 8. I find substantial force in the submissions of Sri.Salil Narayan, learned Standing Counsel for the NHAI because, as per Ext.P1, the provisions of the “RFCTLARR Act” have been made applicable to all the Statutes which are covered by Schedule Four therein and the NH Act certainly is one among them. Apodictically therefore, the computation of compensation and evaluation of the amenities will have to be done as per Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the “RFCTLARR Act”. 9. In the case at hand, I find that when notices were issued to the petitioners under Section 3E of the “NH Act” intimating them of the issuance of the award, it had been categorically stated therein that the computation of compensation has been done strictly in terms of the “RFCTLARR Act”. 9. In the case at hand, I find that when notices were issued to the petitioners under Section 3E of the “NH Act” intimating them of the issuance of the award, it had been categorically stated therein that the computation of compensation has been done strictly in terms of the “RFCTLARR Act”. Indubitably, therefore, the petitioners can obtain no cause for concern or apprehension, as impelled by them in this writ petition, because if they are to seek enhancement of the amounts under the Award as per Section 3G of the “NH Act”, the District Collector will act strictly as per the provisions of the “RFCTLARR Act”. 10. It is so declared. 11. The sole other issue which remains in this case is if the petitioner can be now allowed to approach the competent District Collector, under the provisions of Section 3G(5) of the “NHAI Act”. I am enjoined to consider this issue because Sri.Salil Narayanan, learned Standing Counsel for the NHAI, urged a contention that even though the petitioners ought to have approached the District collector under the afore provision, they chose not to do so; and consequently that the statutory time frame for doing so has now elapsed. The afore argument, technically, would have some force, but when it is assessed on the specific facts of this case, I am sure that petitioners would still be able to invoke such remedy. This is because, being under the bonafide impression that the Award in question ought to be referred to the competent District Court under the provisions of the “RFCTLARR Act”, the petitioners preferred Exhibits P5 to P7 before the CALA on 18.03.2020, 07.03.2020 and 31.01.2020 respectively. The pleadings on record also indicate that learned counsel for the petitioners had earlier made a similar request before the CALA, but that it was replied to through Exhibit P8, informing that the competent Authority under Section 3G(5) of the NHAI Act is the District Collector. That being said, I am also aware that petitioners have approached this Court only on 19.03.2021, but the fact remains that they were under the bonafide impression that, notwithstanding Exhibit P8, their applications, namely Exhibits P5 to P7, would be considered by the CALA under the provisions of the “RFCTLARR Act”. That being said, I am also aware that petitioners have approached this Court only on 19.03.2021, but the fact remains that they were under the bonafide impression that, notwithstanding Exhibit P8, their applications, namely Exhibits P5 to P7, would be considered by the CALA under the provisions of the “RFCTLARR Act”. I cannot recriminate them for this because it is without doubt that the provisions of the “RFCTLARR Act” would have to apply in their case, which is also now expressly admitted. They may, therefore, have harboured the legitimate impression that their request for escalation will have to be considered only by the District Court. The fact that the District Collector would act only under the provisions of the “RFCTLARR Act” does not seem to have been advised to the petitioners; and their above impression was certainly plausible because, in Exhibit P8, the CALA notified their counsel that the decision on their request for escalation of the amounts under the Award can be taken only by the District Collector under Section 3G(5) of the NHAI Act, but without clarifying that this will be done exclusively under the mandate of the “RFCTLARR Act”. I, therefore, find no reason to deny the petitioners an opportunity to invoke their legitimate remedy; and presumably, knowing the mind of this Court, Sri.Salil Narayanan, learned Standing Counsel for the NHAI, submitted that if this Court is reserving such liberty to the petitioners, they they may be directed to approach the District Collector without any further delay. In denouement, I allow this writ petition, granting liberty to the petitioners to approach the competent District Collector, who is the Appellate Authority under the provisions of the NH Act, through appropriate applications seeking enhancement of the amounts under the award; and if this is done within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, it shall be considered on its merits by the said Authority, after affording necessary opportunities of being heard to them, thus culminating in apposite orders thereon, as expeditiously as is possible.