JUDGMENT : T.R. RAVI, J. 1. The original petition has been filed by the State and its Officers who were respondents in O.A. No. 1365/2018 on the file of Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal). The respondent was the applicant before the Tribunal and the application had been filed challenging the directions to recover amounts which had been paid to him as pay and allowances excessively, from the DCRG payable to him. 2. The respondent entered the service as Second Grade Draftsman on 19.7.1983. The First Time Bound Higher Grade was sanctioned to him on 19.7.1993 on completion of 10 years of service. Thereafter, the respondent was appointed as First Grade Draftsman in the departmental quota, by direct recruitment through the Public Service Commission, on 11.7.1996. The Second Time Bound Higher Grade was sanctioned to the respondent on 19.07.2001 on completion of 18 years of service, including the service rendered as Second Grade Draftsman. The Third Time Bound Higher Grade was sanctioned to the respondent on 18.07.2006 on completion of 23 years of service, again including the service rendered as Second Grade Draftsman. 3. An audit objection was raised regarding the grant of the Second and Third Time Bound Higher Grades on the reason that the respondent was appointed as First Grade Draftsman with effect from 11.07.1996 as per the advice of the Public Service Commission and hence the post of First Grade Draftsman should be treated as entry post for the further Time Bound Higher Grades. The respondent submitted his reply pointing out that he was appointed as First grade Draftsman as a departmental candidate and hence his entry post will remain as Second Grade Draftsman. It was also pointed out that even going by the audit objections there is no difference in the scale of increment and pay fixed. The respondent had challenged the inaction to take a decision on the audit objection by filing O.A. No. 3037 of 2013 before the Tribunal, which was disposed of by Annexure A4 order dated 28.01.2014 directing the Chief Engineer of Public Works Department to consider and pass orders on the representation submitted by the applicant, after hearing him. The respondent thereafter retired from service on 31.05.2015. The respondent thereafter retired from service on 31.05.2015. The Chief Engineer as per Annexure A6 dated 19.03.2016, directed to cancel the Second and Third higher grades already granted to the respondent and to re-work the grant of higher grades, on the basis of completion of 10 years and 16 years of service with effect from the date on which the respondent was appointed as First Grade Draftsman. Annexure A6 was challenged by the respondent before the Tribunal and by Annexure A7 order dated 30.08.2017, the Tribunal allowed the original application and directed the Chief Engineer to pass fresh orders after hearing the respondent. It is thereafter that the Chief Engineer issued Annexure A8 order, wherein also the conclusion is the same as it was in Annexure A6. It is challenging Annexure A8 order that the respondent filed O.A. No. 1365 of 2018 before the Tribunal. 4. The Tribunal by Ext.P8 order allowed the original application and set aside the order directing recovery of amounts paid to the respondent, relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), (2015) 4 SCC 334 . Aggrieved by the order Ext.P8, the State and its Officers have filed this original petition. 5. Heard Sri. B. Vinod, Senior Government Pleader on behalf of the petitioners and Sri. P. Nandakumar, learned counsel for the respondent. 6. According to the learned Senior Government Pleader, the reliance placed by the Tribunal on the judgment in Rafiq Masih (supra) was not legally valid and the original petition ought to have been dismissed on the basis of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in High Court of Haryana and Punjab vs. Jagdev Singh, AIR 2016 SC 3523 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that the principles laid down in Rafiq Masih (supra) will not apply in the cases of employees who have given an undertaking to the effect that excess amounts paid will be refunded. The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that the above submission cannot be countenanced in the light of the fact that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jagdev Singh (supra) did not hold that the earlier judgment in Rafiq Masih (supra) was wrong and had only carved out a distinction in cases coming under the second criterion of employees noted in paragraph 18 of the judgment in Rafiq Masih (supra). In Rafiq Masih (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “18. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship, which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to herein above, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law: (i) Recovery from employees belonging to Class-III and Class-IV service (or Group ‘C’ and Group ‘D’ service). (ii) Recovery from retired employees, or employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery. (iii) Recovery from employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued. (iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post and has been paid accordingly, even-though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post. (v) In any other case, where the Court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover.” 7. In the subsequent decision in Jagdev Singh (supra) in paragraph 9 the Apex Court held as follows: “9. The submission of the respondent, which found favour with the High Court, was that a payment which has been made in excess cannot be recovered from an employee who has retired from the service of the State. This, in our view, will have no application to a situation such as the present where an undertaking was specifically furnished by the officer at the time when his pay was initially revised accepting that any payment found to have been made in excess would be liable to be adjusted. While opting for the benefit of the revised pay scale, the respondent was clearly on notice of the fact that a future re-fixation or revision may warrant an adjustment of the excess payment, if any, made.” In paragraph 10 of the judgment, the Apex Court extracted paragraph 18 of the judgment in Rafiq Masih (supra). Thereafter in paragraph 11, the apex Court held as follows:- “11. Thereafter in paragraph 11, the apex Court held as follows:- “11. The principle enunciated in Proposition (ii) above cannot apply to a situation such as in the present case. In the present case, the officer to whom the payment was made in the first instance was clearly placed on notice that any payment found to have been made in excess would be required to be refunded. The officer furnished an undertaking while opting for the revised pay scale. He is bound by the undertaking.” 8. The effect of the judgment in Jagdev Singh (supra) on the judgment in Rafiq Masih (supra) was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the judgment in State of Kerala and Others vs. Vinod Kumar C.R. 2020 (4) KLT 230 . In paragraph 7 of the judgment the Division Bench held as follows:- “...........On a reading of both Rafiq Masih and Jagdev Singh, it is difficult for us to accept the contention of the learned Government Pleader that Jagdev Singh is a complete departure from the principles laid down in Rafiq Masih. From a reading of paragraphs 10 and 11 of Jagdev Singh, it appears to us that the Supreme Court had only clarified that in the case of recovery from retired employees or employees who are due to retire within one year of the order of recovery, there would be no bar in ordering recovery, if the employee concerned had executed an undertaking agreeing to refund any excess payment. We cannot read Jagdev Singh as having laid down the proposition that in every case where there is an undertaking as aforesaid, recovery can be ordered from the employee concerned whatever be the point of time that such payment was made. We cannot overlook the fact that there is not even a suggestion in Jagdev Singh that in the event of there being an undertaking to refund excess pay, none of the situations envisaged as items (i) to (v) of Rafiq Masih can be pressed into service.” 9. It can thus be seen that the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not interfere with the directions contained in paragraph 18 of the judgment in Rafiq Masih (supra) regarding clauses 1, 3, 4 and 5. It can thus be seen that the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not interfere with the directions contained in paragraph 18 of the judgment in Rafiq Masih (supra) regarding clauses 1, 3, 4 and 5. In the case on hand, it can be seen from the facts narrated above that the mistake regarding the grant of Second and Third Time Bound Higher Grades occurred in 2001 and 2006 respectively. This was 14 and 9 years respectively prior to the retirement of the respondent. So also, the decision to cancel the Second and Third Time Bound Higher Grades granted to the respondent was finally taken only as per Annexure A8 order dated 25.01.2018, which was much after the retirement of the respondent. In the above circumstances, the dictum laid down in Rafiq Masih (supra) squarely applies to the facts of this case. The order for recovery is issued after the retirement of the respondent. The respondent belongs to Group-C and Class-3 category of employees and the recovery is ordered five years after the occurrence of the mistake as stipulated in Rafiq Masih (supra). The judgment in Jagdev Singh (supra) has not in any way modified the above said conditions contained in the judgment in Rafiq Masih (supra). We do not find any illegality or irregularity or impropriety in the order Ext.P8 of the Tribunal. No grounds have been made out warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. The original petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.