ORDER 1. This matter is taken up through hybrid arrangement (virtual/physical mode). 2. This application has been filed by the respondent no.1-petitioner seeking recall of order dated 16.10.2019 passed by this Court in FAO No. 571 of 2018 and further seeks direction to hear the said appeal on merit. 3. The respondent no.1-petitioner is working as Junior Clerk in Sadhu Gaudeswar College, Kanikapara in the district of Jajpur, which is a category-I college in respect of both +2 and +3 wing as the said college had received grant-in-aid prior to 01.06.1994. The respondent no.1-petitioner was appointed as against the 6th post of Junior Clerk (on composite workload basis), on 15.03.1991, pursuant to which he joined on the same day. His joining was approved by the governing body resolution dated 13.12.1991. The college, being a composite category-I non-government college, the admissibility of the post and eligibility of the incumbent holding such post is to be determined as per the provisions contained under paragraph 9(2)(B)(i) of the Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994. Taking into consideration the work load of the college, 6th post of Junior Clerk was admissible during the academic session 1989-90. But, as the respondent no.1-petitioner had joined on 15.03.1991, he had not completed the required period of five years by 01.06.1994. Thereby, he was not extended with the benefit of grant-in-aid beyond 01.06.1994, the cutoff date fixed by the authority concerned. When the post held by the respondent no.1-petitioner was sent for approval and release of grant-in-aid, pursuant to Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994, as the same was not admissible, he was left out. But his post was approved against 1st post of Junior Clerk in the +3 Degree wing of the college to receive block grant @ 100% from 01.02.2009, vide Government order no.14122/HE dated 19.05.2010. 3. 1 Prior to this, the respondent no.1-petitioner had preferred OJC No. 10228 of 1997 for non-consideration of his claim for grant-in-aid, pursuant to Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994, which was disposed of vide order dated 29.01.1998 with the direction to appellant-opposite party no.2 to consider and dispose of the representation and communicate the decision within three months. In compliance of the said order, the claim of the respondent no.1-petitioner was examined and as he was found to be ineligible to avail the benefit of grant-in-aid as per the Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994, he was subsequently accommodated as per the Grant-in-Aid Order, 2009. In compliance of the said order, the claim of the respondent no.1-petitioner was examined and as he was found to be ineligible to avail the benefit of grant-in-aid as per the Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994, he was subsequently accommodated as per the Grant-in-Aid Order, 2009. Again, the respondent no.1-petitioner preferred WP(C) No. 22849 of 2011 with a prayer for approval of his appointment under Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994 and release of grant-in-aid, as admissible and due to him, and this Court disposed of the said writ petition vide order dated 20.09.2011 with direction to the State Government-appellant no.1 to examine his claim for getting the benefit under Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994, but the same was rejected vide order dated 11.09.2012. Consequentially, the respondent no.1-petitioner preferred GIA Case No. 759 of 2012 under Section 24(B) of the Orissa Education Act, 1969. After due adjudication, the Educational Tribunal, vide order dated 07.03.2018 passed in GIA Case No. 759 of 2012, set aside the order under Annexure-3 passed by appellant-opposite party no.2 releasing block grant under the provisions of Grant-in-Aid Order, 2009 and directed to approve the appointment of the respondent no.1-petitioner as Junior Clerk against the 1st post in Sadhu Gaudeswar Degree College, Kanikapara and release the grant-in-aid under the Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994 @ 1/3rd w.e.f. 01.06.1996, 2/3rd from 01.06.1998 and full salary cost w.e.f. 01.06.2000 in his favour and with entire differential arrear salary components by fixing his salary within a period of four months and to pay the differential arrear salary within eight months from the date of communication of the order. This order has been sought to be challenged in this FAO. 4. When the FAO was listed on 16.10.2019, this Court passed the following order:- ' None appears for the parties. 2. Delay in filing the appeal, if any is condoned. 3. The issue involved in the appeal is now squarely covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in Civil Appeal No.7295 of 2019 (arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8343 of 2019 [State of Odisha & Another vs. Anup Kumar Senapati & Another] disposed of on 16.09.2019. 4. Since the issue is now covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and nothing remains to be decided, it will not be appropriate for this Court to issue notice to the respondent(s), which may cause unnecessary legal expenses and to keep the matter pending. 5. 4. Since the issue is now covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and nothing remains to be decided, it will not be appropriate for this Court to issue notice to the respondent(s), which may cause unnecessary legal expenses and to keep the matter pending. 5. In that view of the matter and in terms of the aforesaid judgment, the appeal stands allowed and disposed of accordingly. The parties will be governed by the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 16.09.2019 passed in Civil Appeal No. 7295 of 2019. 6. However, if the respondent(s) is/are aggrieved by this order, it is open for the respondent(s) to file application within a period of thirty days from today for revival of the appeal. The Misc. Case(s)/I.A.(s) connected to the appeal, if any is/are also disposed of. Certified copy of this order be granted on proper application.' 5. Mr. S.K. Dash, learned counsel for the respondent no.1-petitioner urged before this Court that the order dated 16.10.2019, on the face of it would indicate that it has been passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the respondent no.1 without issuing notice for condonation of delay, inasmuch as at the outset of the order it has been specifically mentioned that 'None appears for the parties'. But despite that the appeal has been allowed by condoning delay without being noticed, in view of the judgment of the apex Court in State of Odisha & Another vs. Anup Kumar Senapati & Another Civil Appeal No. 7295 of 2019 (arising out of S.L.P(C) No. 8343 of 2019) disposed of 16.09.2019. It is contended that such an order should not have been passed by this Court without giving opportunity of hearing, therefore, the same should be recalled and the respondent no.1 may be given opportunity of hearing to participate in the proceeding. To substantiate his contention, he has relied upon the judgments in National Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar and others, AIR, 1994 SC 39 : (1994) Supp. (3) SCC 406; Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria, AIR 1953 SC 23 ; Hanumant Singh v. Kiran Kumari & Ors, (2012)1 SCC 225 . 6. Mr. D.K. Mohanty, learned Addl. To substantiate his contention, he has relied upon the judgments in National Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar and others, AIR, 1994 SC 39 : (1994) Supp. (3) SCC 406; Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria, AIR 1953 SC 23 ; Hanumant Singh v. Kiran Kumari & Ors, (2012)1 SCC 225 . 6. Mr. D.K. Mohanty, learned Addl. Standing Counsel appearing for the State-appellants submits that the order dated 16.10.2019, which is sought to be recalled, puts a mandate that if the respondents are aggrieved by the said order, it is open to them to file an application for recall within a period of thirty days, from the date of passing of the order, for revival of the appeal. As such, this application for recall has been filed beyond the period of thirty days and, thereby, the same cannot be entertained. More so, the order dated 16.10.2019 has been passed in view of the judgment of the apex Court in State of Odisha & Another vs. Anup Kumar Senapati & Another, Civil Appeal No. 7295 of 2019 (arising out of S.L.P(C) No. 8343 of 2019) disposed of 16.09.2019. 7. This Court heard Mr. S.K. Dash, learned counsel for respondent no.1 and Mr. D.K. Mohanty, learned Addl. Government Advocate appearing for the appellant-opposite parties. 8. A perusal of the Interlocutory Application filed by respondent no.1-petitioner would go to show that in paragraphs-3 & 4 thereof, it has been specifically pleaded as follows:- '3. That the respondent-petitioner has a fair chance of success in the appeal. Coming to know that the above noted appeal has been disposed of behind his back only on 24.01.2020, the appellant applied for and obtained a certified copy of the Order dated 16.10.2019 on 05.02.2020. Since the Order was passed without notice to the respondent No.1, there was no occasion to know about it at any earlier point of time. 4. That it may be submitted that the appellate Court lacks jurisdiction to pass the final order on merit, when the appeal awaited orders in the matter of condonation of delay, for which notice to the respondent ought to have been issued. Thus, it is submitted that the Order dated 16.10.2019 cannot be countenanced with law and is not sustainable.' 9. As it reveals, since this Court had not issued notice to the respondent no.1-petitioner, he had no knowledge about the order dated 16.10.2019. Thus, it is submitted that the Order dated 16.10.2019 cannot be countenanced with law and is not sustainable.' 9. As it reveals, since this Court had not issued notice to the respondent no.1-petitioner, he had no knowledge about the order dated 16.10.2019. It came to his knowledge only when he received the certified copy on 05.02.2020. 10. In Chesta Holdings Ltd. v. Karlin, (1959) 3 All ER 656, it was held that the word 'notice' is not synonym for the word 'knowledge'. 'Notice' is a word which involves that knowledge may be imparted by notice. Knowledge is not a condition of mind. 'Knowledge' is the act or state of knowing; clear perception of fact; that which is or may be known. It means acquaintance with things ascertained or ascertainable; specific information. 11. In Jai Prakash v. State, JT 1991 (1) SC 228, it has been held that knowledge signifies a state of mental realization with bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which human mind remains supine or inactive. 12. In Arun Navalji More v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 12 SCC 613 , it has been held that the standard test of 'knowledge' is whether the person whose conduct is in issue either knows of the relevant circumstances or has no substantial doubt of their existence. 13. In Mahadev Prasad v. Mansa Ram, AIR 2008 Raj 206 , while considering the second proviso of Order-IX, Rule-13, the Court held that the word 'knowledge' occurring in second proviso of Order-IX, Rule-13 of the Code means the knowledge of date of hearing and not of 'pendency of suit'. 14. In view of the principles of law, as discussed above, and applying the same to the present fact, it is made clear that the order which was passed on 16.10.2019 was never brought to the notice of the respondent no.1-petitioner and, therefore, there was no occasion on his part to file an application within thirty days period granted for recalling or modification or clarification of the order. When he received the certified copy on 05.02.2020, he moved the present application for recalling the order dated 16.10.2019 passed by this Court. Thus, the objection raised by Mr. D.K. Mohanty, learned Addl. When he received the certified copy on 05.02.2020, he moved the present application for recalling the order dated 16.10.2019 passed by this Court. Thus, the objection raised by Mr. D.K. Mohanty, learned Addl. Standing Counsel appearing for the State appellant-opposite parties, that since the petitioner has filed the application beyond thirty days period the same cannot be entertained, has no justification, particularly when the respondent no.1-petitioner had not appeared in the case nor had he the occasion to know whether such order has been passed by this Court nor the said order been communicated to him so as to file the application within thirty days period prescribed by this Court. 15. On perusal of the application, it is found that the petitioner has filed the same for recalling the order dated 16.10.2019 passed by this Court in the above appeal. 16. In Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb, (1999) 4 SCC 396 : AIR 1999 SC 2089 , the apex Court held that a tribunal or a Court may recall an order earlier made by it if (i) the proceedings culminating into an order suffer from the inherent lack of jurisdiction and such lack of jurisdiction is patent, (ii) there exists fraud or collusion in obtaining the judgment, (iii) there has been a mistake of the Court prejudicing a party, or (iv) a judgment was rendered in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had not been served at all or had died and the estate was not represented. The power to recall a judgment will not be exercised when the ground for reopening the proceedings or vacating the judgment was available to be pleaded in the original action but was not done or where a proper remedy in some other proceeding such as by way of appeal or revision was available but was not availed. The right to seek vacation of a judgment may be lost by waiver, estoppels or acquiescence. In the opinion of this Court, the present case is covered under Clause (iii) of the above principles laid down by the apex Court. 17. In Keshardo Chamria (supra), the apex Court held that the Judge has jurisdiction to correct his own error without entering into a discussion of the grounds taken by the decree-holder or the objections raised by the judgmentdebtors. 18. 17. In Keshardo Chamria (supra), the apex Court held that the Judge has jurisdiction to correct his own error without entering into a discussion of the grounds taken by the decree-holder or the objections raised by the judgmentdebtors. 18. Similarly in National Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra), the apex Court held that any order or judgment cannot be passed without giving notice to adverse party. 19. In Hanumant Singh (supra), the apex Court, while setting aside the order impugned, directed the learned Single Judge to decide the appeal de novo after hearing both the parties and further directed the First Appellate Court not to proceed in the matter in pursuance of the directions passed by the learned Single Judge. 20. The cumulative effect of the above judicial pronouncements made by the apex Court is that if an order has been passed by a Court without affording opportunity of hearing to the parties, then in that case, the said mistake of the Court is prejudicing the party, the same can be rectified if the same has been brought to the notice of this Court. 21. In view of the above reasons, admittedly since the order dated 16.10.2019 was passed in absence of the parties and the appeal was allowed, in view of the judgment of the apex Court Anup Kumar Senapati (supra), the same cannot sustain in the eye of law and the appeal is to be heard by affording opportunity of hearing to both the parties. Accordingly, the I.A. is allowed. The order dated 16.10.2019 passed in F.A.O. No. 571 of 2018 is recalled.