JUDGMENT : ANIL K. NARENDRAN, J. 1. The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P. No. 28 of 2007 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Chavakkad, a petition filed by the respondent herein-landlord, under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 seeking eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule building. The Rent Control Court granted Ext.P1 order of eviction dated 15.02.2012 in R.C.P. No. 28 of 2007, under Section 11(3) of the Act and directed the tenant to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the landlord, within a period of one month from the date of that order. 2. Feeling aggrieved by the order of eviction, the tenant preferred R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012 before the Additional Rent Control Appellate Authority-IV, Thrissur. In that appeal, the landlord filed I.A. No. 3440 of 2016, an application under Section 12 of the Act, seeking an order directing the tenant to pay the admitted arrears of rent with interest, failing which to issue show cause notice and direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the petition schedule building. In I.A. No. 3440 of 2016, the Appellate Authority passed Exhibit P2 order dated 09.01.2017, whereby the tenant was directed to pay admitted arrears of rent within a period of 4 weeks from the date of that order or to show sufficient cause to the contrary. Later, by Ext.P3 judgment dated 07.02.2017, the Appellate Authority stopped the proceedings in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012. The said judgment reads thus: “I.A. No. 3440 of 2016 disposed. Appellant directed to put respondent in possession of petition scheduled building under Section 12(3) Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and proceedings in RCA are stopped.” 3. Feeling aggrieved by Ext.P3 judgment of the Additional Rent Control Appellate Authority-IV, Thrissur, dated 07.02.2017 in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012, the tenant is before this Court in this original petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking an order to set aside that judgment and to direct the Appellate Authority to dispose of R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012, on merits. 4. On 11.04.2017, when this original petition came up for admission, this Court issued notice by speed post to the respondent. 4. On 11.04.2017, when this original petition came up for admission, this Court issued notice by speed post to the respondent. This Court granted an interim order, which reads thus: “Prima-facie we find that the petitioner has not been given an opportunity to show sufficient cause for not complying with the direction passed under Section 12(2). Hence admit the O.P. (RC) and there will be an interim stay for a period of two months.” 5. The interim order granted on 11.04.2017, which was extended from time to time, was extended until further orders on 16.08.2017. During the pendency of this original petition the respondent-landlord died and his legal heirs are impleaded as additional respondents 2 to 7. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and also the learned counsel for additional respondents 2 to 7/legal heirs of the deceased landlord. 7. By Ext.P3 judgment dated 07.02.2017, which is under challenge in this original petition, the Additional Rent Control Appellate Authority-IV, Thrissur, stopped the proceedings in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012, under Section 12(3) of the Act, stating that I.A. No. 3440 of 2016 filed by the landlord is disposed of. 8. The landlord filed I.A. No. 3440 of 2016 in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012, under Section 12 of the Act, seeking an order directing the tenant to pay admitted arrears of rent with interest, failing which to issue show cause notice and direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the petition schedule building. In that application, the Appellate Authority passed Exhibit P2 order dated 09.01.2017, whereby the tenant was directed to pay the admitted arrears of rent within a period of 4 weeks (i.e. 28 days) from the date of that order or to show sufficient cause to the contrary. 9. In paragraph 4 of this original petition, the petitioner-tenant has stated that, after Exhibit P2 order the Appellate Authority posted R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012 on the 28th day of that order, i.e. on 07.02.2017. When the case was called on 07.02.2017, the tenant paid an amount of Rs. 35,000/- to the learned counsel for the landlord, in the open court. When the case was called on 07.02.2017, the tenant paid an amount of Rs. 35,000/- to the learned counsel for the landlord, in the open court. However, without recording that payment of arrears of rent, the Appellate Authority by Ext.P3 judgment disposed of I.A. No. 3440 of 2016 and directed the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the petition schedule building, under Section 12(3) of the Act, and also stopped the proceedings in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012. 10. According to the tenant, by remitting the admitted arrears of rent on 07.02.2017, the tenant has complied with the provisions under Section 12(4) of the Act. As evidenced by Ext.P4 memo, the landlord had acknowledged on 07.02.2017, the payment of Rs. 35,000/- made by the tenant towards admitted arrears of rent. Therefore, the Appellate Authority committed a manifest error, while disposing of I.A. No. 3440 of 2016, vide Ext.P3 judgment dated 07.02.2017, and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the petition schedule building and stopping the proceedings in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012, under Section 12(3) of the Act. 11. Section 12 of the Act deals with payment or deposit of rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction. As per Section 12(1), no tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, shall be entitled to contest the application before the Rent Control Court under that Section, or to prefer an appeal under Section 18 against any order made by the Rent Control Court on the application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. As per Section 12(2), the deposit under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time as the court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred to in sub-section (4). As per Section 12(2), the deposit under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time as the court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred to in sub-section (4). As per the proviso to Section 12(2), the time fixed by the court for the deposit of the arrears of rent shall not be less than four weeks from the date of the order and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than two weeks from the date on which the rent becomes due. As per Section 12(3) of the Act, if any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. As per Section 12(4), when any deposit is made under sub-section (1), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the landlord in the prescribed manner, and the amount deposited may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority in that behalf. 12. Section 12(1) of the Act enjoins a tenant, against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, to pay to the landlord, or deposit with the Rent Control Court, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of payment or deposit, and continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court, in order to contest that application for eviction before the Rent Control Court. Similarly, Section 12(1) of the Act enjoins a tenant, in order to prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act against any order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made by a landlord under Section 11, to pay the landlord, or deposits with the Appellate Authority, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority. 13. In order to have recourse to the provisions of Section 12(1) of the Act, it is a pre-requisite that, there should be an application for eviction made by a landlord under Section 11, or an appeal filed by the tenant under Section 18 against any order made by the Rent Control Court on such an application made by a landlord under Section 11. Without satisfying any one of the conditions given in Section 12(1), the landlord cannot recourse to the provisions of Section 12 of the Act. 14. In Joy Daniel vs. N.A. Ibrahimkutty and Others, 2020 (2) KHC 543 , on the question as to whether Section 12(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act casts an obligation on the tenant to pay the admitted arrears of rent in order to contest an appeal filed challenging an order under Section 12(3), which is to the effect of stoppage of the proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the premises, a Full Bench of this Court held that, Section 12(1) provides such an obligation only in the case of an application under Section 11 or in the case of an appeal preferred under Section 18 against an order passed by the Rent Control Court on an application under Section 11. 15. In Pochappan Narayanan vs. Gopalan, 1990 (2) KLT 1 , one of the contentions put forward by the learned counsel for the landlord was that, payment or deposit of arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due is a condition precedent which has to be satisfied by the tenant, before he can prefer an appeal against an order of eviction made by the Rent Control Court. Reliance was placed on the language of Section 12(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, which provides that no tenant shall be entitled to prefer an appeal under Section 18 against an order of eviction made by the Rent Control Court unless he has paid or deposited all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due till the date of preferring the appeal. The Division Bench, found that the right of appeal against an order of eviction made by the Rent Control Court is not conferred by Section 12 of the Act. The right of appeal is conferred by Section 18. Section 12 imposes certain obligations on the tenant of paying or depositing admitted rent during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction, and the consequences for committing default in fulfilling those obligations. The word ‘prefer’ used in Section 12(1) is not to convey the same meaning with which it has been employed in Section 18, which confers a right of appeal against an order of the Rent Control Court. The word ‘prefer’ not having been defined in the Act, it has to be assigned the ordinary meaning having regard to the context in which the said word is used. The meaning of the word ‘prefer’ given in Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition is “to bring before; to prosecute; to try; to proceed with.” It is therefore clear that the word ‘prefer’ can be used in the context of Section 12(1) for conveying the lodging of the appeal or prosecution of the appeal or proceeding with the appeal. Section 12(3) of the Act, which speaks of the consequences of the failure to pay or deposit the rent as contemplated by Sections 12(1) and (2), says that all further proceedings should be stopped and an order made directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. The consequence contemplated is not dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it is not maintainable but only to stop all further proceedings in the appeal. Therefore, the Division Bench held that the word ‘prefer’ has been used in Section 12(1) of the Act not to convey the lodging of the appeal but to convey that the appeal already lodged in accordance with Section 18 shall not be proceeded with or prosecuted further if the conditions specified in Section 12(1) are not fulfilled. Therefore, the Division Bench held that the word ‘prefer’ has been used in Section 12(1) of the Act not to convey the lodging of the appeal but to convey that the appeal already lodged in accordance with Section 18 shall not be proceeded with or prosecuted further if the conditions specified in Section 12(1) are not fulfilled. Paying or depositing of all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant is not a condition precedent for presenting an appeal under Section 18 of the Act. The appeal gets properly lodged when the same is presented in accordance with Section 18 of the Act. 16. The liability of a tenant under Section 12(1) of the Act, against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, or who prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act, against any order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made by a landlord under Section 11, is limited to all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of payment or deposit, and he shall continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. 17. The object of the provisions of Section 12(1) of the Act is to deny the defaulting tenant the right to contest the application for eviction before the Rent Control Court, or to prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act against any order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made by a landlord under Section 11, unless he pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by him to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. 18. 18. Section 12(2) of the Act enjoins a tenant to deposit the admitted rent under sub-section (1), within such time as the court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed. The time fixed by the court for the deposit of the arrears of rent and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than that specified in the proviso to Section 12 (2). As per the statutory mandate of Section 12(1), on an application filed by the landlord under Section 12, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, has to order payment or deposit of arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the petition schedule building, up to the date of payment or deposit and the tenant shall also be directed to continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, regardless of the relief sough for in that application. Therefore, even in a case in which the relief sought for in an application filed under Section 12 of the Act is confined to payment or deposit of admitted arrears of rent up to the date of application or up to the date of order to be passed in that application, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is statutorily bound to pass an order directing the tenant to pay or deposit admitted arrears of rent up to the date of payment or deposit and continue to pay or deposit rent which may subsequently become due, until termination of that proceedings. 19. As per Section 12(3) of the Act, if any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. 20. 20. In Pochappan Narayanan 1990 (2) KLT 1 , a Division Bench of this Court noticed that, Section 12(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with consequences flowing as a result of the failure on the part of the tenant to pay or deposit admitted rent. When the tenant fails to pay or deposit the admitted rent, as provided in Section 12(1) and (2), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case maybe, will be required to ask the tenant to show cause why all further proceedings should not be stopped and an order be made directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. When such an opportunity is afforded to the tenant, the tenant is entitled to show, if there is sufficient cause, for his failure to pay the amount or deposit the rent as provided in Section 12 (1) and (2). If the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not making the payment or deposit of the rent within time, it will not make any order stopping further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. If, however, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is not satisfied about the cause shown, an order has to be made stopping all further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. 21. In Pochappan Narayanan the Division Bench held that, before the consequences contemplated by Section 12 (3) of the Act can ensue, the conditions specified in Section 12 (1) and (2) have to be satisfied. It is therefore clear that, before any steps can be taken under Section 12(3) for making an order against the tenant who has committed default in paying or making the deposit as contemplated by Section 12(1), the procedure prescribed by Section 12(2) has to be satisfied. A tenant who does not fulfil the obligations imposed on him by Section 12(1) cannot be visited with the penal consequences contemplated by Section 12(3), unless all the conditions specified by Section 12(2) are satisfactorily fulfilled. Even after the court acts in accordance with Section 12(2) and the tenant still commits default, the tenant has to be given one more opportunity of showing cause as to why penal consequences contemplated by Section 12(3) should not be imposed on him. Even after the court acts in accordance with Section 12(2) and the tenant still commits default, the tenant has to be given one more opportunity of showing cause as to why penal consequences contemplated by Section 12(3) should not be imposed on him. It is only when the court is not satisfied with the cause shown that it can pass an order stopping all further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. 22. In Narayanan vs. Vinod, 2004 (3) KLT 955 the order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority under Section 12(3) of the of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was assailed before the Division Bench, on the ground that the petitioner-tenant was not granted time as stipulated in Section 12(2) to deposit the arrears of rent and that, he had not been issued with any notice under Section 12(3) to show sufficient cause for not depositing the rent and, therefore, the order directing eviction of the tenant is contrary to the provisions of Section 12. The Division Bench noticed that, the provisions of Section 12 of the Act are mandatory and no tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord is entitled to contest the same or to prefer an appeal under Section 18, against any order passed by the Rent Control Court, unless he had paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the Rent Control Court or with the Appellate Authority, all arrears of rent admitted by him to be due in respect of the demised premises up to the date of payment and continues to pay or deposit the rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority. Section 12(3) of the Act then mandates that if any tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent as aforesaid the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority shall ‘unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary’ stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the demised premises. Section 12(3) of the Act then mandates that if any tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent as aforesaid the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority shall ‘unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary’ stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the demised premises. In other words, if the admitted rent due is not deposited during the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, all further proceedings have to stop and the authority concerned is required to make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in vacant possession of the premises, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause for not depositing that rent. 23. In Narayanan, on the question as to whether the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, where admitted rent has not been paid, is required to issue a separate notice to the tenant to enable him to show sufficient cause for the default in payment of admitted rent or is it for the tenant himself to file an application and bring to the notice of the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority the reasons which prevented him from depositing the rent, the Division Bench held that, if the admitted arrears of rent are not deposited within the time fixed by the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority the tenant makes a default resulting in the penal consequences of his immediate eviction by stopping all further proceedings. This, however, will not happen if the tenant is able to show sufficient cause for making the default in not depositing the admitted rent. From the language of Section 12(3) of the Act and the legislative intent, it is not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority to issue any separate notice to the tenant to enable him to show sufficient cause for not depositing the admitted arrears of rent. When the time fixed for the deposit of arrears of rent runs out and the tenant has not deposited the same, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is not expected to pass an order of ejectment of the tenant forthwith. 24. When the time fixed for the deposit of arrears of rent runs out and the tenant has not deposited the same, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is not expected to pass an order of ejectment of the tenant forthwith. 24. In Narayanan the Division Bench held that, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, while fixing the time within which the arrears of rent shall be deposited by the tenant should normally adjourn the hearing of the case to a date beyond the date fixed for depositing the rent, thereby allowing reasonable time to the tenant to show sufficient cause for not depositing the rent, if he has committed default in payment. It will then be for the tenant to move an application before the concerned authority to show sufficient cause for the non-payment of rent. In other words, the interval between the date up to which the rent is to be deposited and the date on which the order under Section 12(3) is passed should be reasonable to enable the tenant to show sufficient cause for committing the default, if he so chooses. If the tenant moves such an application and points out the reasons which prevented him from depositing the arrears of admitted rent, the concerned authority will examine the issue on merits to find out whether sufficient cause has been shown or not. If sufficient cause has been shown, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority will not order immediate ejectment of the tenant. If no application is filed by the tenant or if the reasons shown by the tenant are insufficient, the penal consequences as contemplated in Section 12(3) of the Act shall follow. Section 12(3) of the Act is a mandate to the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority to order immediate ejectment of the tenant, if the tenant does not deposit the admitted arrears of rent, the only exception being, if he is able to show sufficient cause for not doing so. In that view of the matter, the Division Bench concluded that, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, where admitted rent has not been deposited by the tenant, is not required to issue any separate notice to the tenant, to enable him to show sufficient cause for committing the default. 25. In that view of the matter, the Division Bench concluded that, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, where admitted rent has not been deposited by the tenant, is not required to issue any separate notice to the tenant, to enable him to show sufficient cause for committing the default. 25. In Shaji M. vs. SNDP Sakhayogam, Alappuzha and Another, 2020 (2) KHC 574 a Full Bench of this Court held that, in view of the principle evolved in Narayanan 2004 (3) KLT 955 , from the language of Section 12(3) of the of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and from the legislative intent, it is not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority to issue any separate notice to the tenant to enable him to show sufficient cause for not depositing the admitted arrears of rent. Instead, when the time fixed for deposit of the arrears of rent runs out and the tenant has not deposited the same, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is not expected to pass an order ordering ejectment of the tenant forthwith. The Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should normally adjourn the hearing of the case to a date beyond the date fixed for deposit, thereby allowing reasonable time to the tenant to show sufficient cause for not depositing the rent, if he has committed default in payment of the arrears of rent. The interpretation made and the directions issued in Narayanan is more apt and appropriate to be held, as a view which can be legally sustained. The opportunity to be afforded to the tenant to show sufficient cause with respect to the failure to pay or deposit rent, as directed in Section 12(1) and (2), within the date stipulated, is not an empty formality. The principles of natural justice would mandate that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should afford the tenant with such an opportunity. 26. The principles of natural justice would mandate that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should afford the tenant with such an opportunity. 26. In Shaji M. on the question as to whether the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is required to issue any specific notice to the tenant to show cause, the Full Bench noticed that, the consequences provided under Section 12(3) of the Act follows when there occurred a default in complying with the direction for deposit or payment of the admitted arrears. Therefore, on the date stipulated for effecting such payment, by virtue of the order passed under Section 12(1) and (2), the tenant becomes fully aware that, unless sufficient cause has not been shown for the default committed, the consequence of stoppage of the proceedings and direction to put the landlord in possession of the building, would follow automatically. Therefore, there is no necessity to alert the tenant by issuing any specific notice in this regard, calling upon him to show sufficient cause. On the other hand, providing of a further opportunity after the last date stipulated for effecting the payment or the deposit, is mandatory. If no sufficient cause is shown within such extended date to which the rent control petition is posted, it is absolutely within the authority and competence; and is the natural consequence that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should stop the proceedings and direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Such a procedure, if followed, would be sufficient compliance for providing reasonable opportunity satisfying the statutory requirement contained in Section 12(3). Hence the Full Bench concluded that the decision in Narayanan 2004 (3) KLT 955 , even-though passed without noticing the decision in Pochappan Narayanan 1990 (2) KLT 1 had laid the correct law. The Full Bench noticed that its view in this regard has got support from the decision of the Apex Court in Sankaran Pillai vs. V.P. Venuguduswami, (1999) 6 SCC 396 , the decisions of this Court in C.V. Xavier vs. Francis Leonard Pappali, 1975 KLT 542 and Narayanan vs. Muraleedhara Maran, 1964 KLT 509 . 27. The Full Bench noticed that its view in this regard has got support from the decision of the Apex Court in Sankaran Pillai vs. V.P. Venuguduswami, (1999) 6 SCC 396 , the decisions of this Court in C.V. Xavier vs. Francis Leonard Pappali, 1975 KLT 542 and Narayanan vs. Muraleedhara Maran, 1964 KLT 509 . 27. In Sankaran Pillai vs. V.P. Venuguduswami, (1999) 6 SCC 396 the Apex Court held that, it is for the tenant to show sufficient cause and not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, to issue any show cause notice calling upon the tenant to show cause why an order of eviction shall not be passed. 28. In C.V. Xavier vs. Francis Leonard Pappali, 1975 KLT 542 a Division Bench of this Court held that, the reasonable opportunity contemplated under Section 12(3) of the Act must be a reasonable and real opportunity and is not an empty formality and that, if the tenant is not given such opportunity to show sufficient cause, an order passed under Section 12(3) would be unsustainable. 29. In Narayanan vs. Muraleedhara Maran, 1964 KLT 509 a Division Bench of this Court held that, when the court had passed an order directing a party before it to do a particular thing, in default of which certain consequence is to follow, if the party is to be relieved of the consequences of any non-compliance of that order, he has to make a specific motion thereof showing sufficient cause for his non-compliance of the order and making appropriate prayer therein. Otherwise the order would work itself out and the default to comply with it will bring the appointed consequences on the tenant. 30. As per sub-section (4) of Section 12, when any deposit is made under sub-section (1), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the landlord in the prescribed manner, and the amount deposited may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority in that behalf. 31. 31. In the instant case, the landlord filed R.C.P. No. 28 of 2007 before the Rent Control Court, Chavakkad, under Section 11(3) of the Act, seeking eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule building, in which the Rent Control Court granted Ext.P1 order of eviction dated 15.02.2012, whereby the tenant is directed to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the landlord, within a period of one month from the date of that order. Against that order of eviction, the tenant preferred R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012 before the Additional Rent Control Appellate Authority-IV, Thrissur, under Section 18 of the Act. In that appeal, the landlord filed I.A. No. 3440 of 2016, under Section 12 of the Act, seeking an order directing the tenant to pay the admitted arrears of rent with interest, failing which to issue show cause notice and direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the petition schedule building. In that application, the Appellate Authority passed Exhibit P2 order dated 09.01.2017, whereby the tenant was directed to pay admitted arrears of rent within a period of 4 weeks from the date of that order or to show sufficient cause to the contrary. 32. As already noticed, Section 12(1) of the Act enjoins a tenant, in order to prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act against any order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made by a landlord under Section 11, to pay the landlord, or deposits with the Appellate Authority, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority. The time fixed by the Appellate Authority for the deposit of the arrears of rent and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than that specified in the proviso to Section 12(2). The time fixed by the Appellate Authority for the deposit of the arrears of rent and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than that specified in the proviso to Section 12(2). As per the statutory mandate of Section 12(1) of the Act, regardless of the relief sough for in the application filed by the landlord under Section 12, the Appellate Authority has to order payment of arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the petition schedule building, up to the date of payment or deposit and the tenant shall also be directed to continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority. Therefore, in I.A. No. 3440 of 2016, the application filed by the landlord under Section 12 of the Act, instead of directing the tenant to pay admitted arrears of rent within a period of 4 weeks from the date of that order, the Appellate Authority ought to have directed the tenant to pay or deposit admitted arrears of rent up to the date of payment or deposit, within a period of 4 weeks from the date of that order and continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due, until the termination of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority, within two weeks from the date on which the rent becomes due. 33. Section 12 of the Act imposes certain obligations on the tenant to pay or deposit admitted rent, during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction under Section 11, before the Rent Control Court, and also the proceedings in an appeal filed under Section 18, before the Appellate Authority, against such an order of eviction. Section 12(3) of the Act also provides for the consequences, which were to follow, for committing default in fulfilling those obligations. In view of the law laid down in Pochappan Narayanan 1990 (2) KLT 1 the consequence contemplated under Section 12(3) is not dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it is not maintainable but only to stop all further proceedings in the appeal. Therefore, paying or depositing of all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant is not a condition precedent for presenting an appeal under Section 18. 34. Therefore, paying or depositing of all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant is not a condition precedent for presenting an appeal under Section 18. 34. Section 12(3) of the Act deals with the consequences flowing as a result of the failure of the part of the tenant to pay or deposit admitted rent. Before the consequences under Section 12(3) can ensue, the conditions specified in Section 12(1) and (2) have to be satisfied. Section 12(3) mandates that if any tenant fails to pay or deposit the admitted rent as provided under Section 12(1) and (2), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Therefore, if the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is satisfied about the cause shown by the tenant, it will not make any order under Section 12(3) of the Act, stopping further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. 35. It is clear from the plain language and also the legislative intent of Section 12 of the Act that, it is not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, to pass an order under Section 12(3), stopping further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, once t he time limit fixed for payment or deposit of admitted rent runs out, and the tenant defaulted payment or deposit of rent in terms of the order passed under Section 12(1) and (2). Though it is not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, to issue any separate notice to the tenant to enable him to show sufficient cause for not paying or depositing the admitted arrears of rent, as held by the Division Bench in Narayanan 2004 (3) KLT 955 and approved by the Full Bench in Shaji M. 2020 (2) KHC 574 , the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is not expected to pass an order forthwith, stopping further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, under Section 12(3). 36. 36. Before passing an order under Section 12(3) of the Act, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should normally adjourn the hearing of the case to a date beyond the date fixed for payment or deposit of admitted rent, thereby allowing reasonable time to the tenant to show sufficient cause for not paying or depositing the admitted rent, if he has committed default in payment of the same, within the time limit stipulated in the order passed under Section 12(1) and (2). Such an opportunity to be afforded to the tenant to show sufficient cause is not an empty formality. The principles of natural justice would mandate that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority should afford such an opportunity to the tenant before passing an order under Section 12(3). 37. The consequences provided under Section 12(3) of the Act follow when there occurred a default by the tenant in complying with the direction in an order passed under Section 12(1) and (2), for deposit or payment of the admitted arrears of rent. On the date stipulated for effecting such payment, by virtue of that order, the tenant becomes fully aware that, unless sufficient cause has not been shown for the default committed, the consequence of stoppage of the proceedings and direction to put the landlord in possession of the building, under Section 12(3) would follow automatically. There is no necessity to alert the tenant by issuing any specific notice in this regard, calling upon him to show sufficient cause. On the other hand, providing of a further opportunity after the last date stipulated for effecting payment or deposit of admitted rent, is mandatory. If no sufficient cause is shown within such extended date to which the rent control petition is posted, it is absolutely within the authority and competence, and is the natural consequence that, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should stop the proceedings and direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. As held by the Full Bench in Shaji M. 2020 (2) KHC 574 , such a procedure, if followed, would be sufficient compliance for providing reasonable opportunity satisfying the statutory requirement contained in Section 12(3) of the Act. 38. As held by the Full Bench in Shaji M. 2020 (2) KHC 574 , such a procedure, if followed, would be sufficient compliance for providing reasonable opportunity satisfying the statutory requirement contained in Section 12(3) of the Act. 38. In the instant case, by Exhibit P2 order dated 09.01.2017 in I.A. No. 3440 of 2016 in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012, the Appellate Authority directed the tenant to pay the admitted arrears of rent, within a period of 4 weeks from the date of that order or to show sufficient cause to the contrary. After Exhibit P2 order, the Appellate Authority posted R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012 on 07.02.2017. When the case was called on 07.02.2017, the tenant paid an amount of Rs. 35,000/- to the learned counsel for the landlord, in the open court. As evidenced by Ext.P4 memo, the learned counsel for the landlord had acknowledged on 07.02.2017, the payment of Rs. 35,000/- by the tenant towards admitted arrears of rent. The specific case of the petitioner-tenant in paragraph 4 of this original petition is that, without recording the payment of admitted arrears of rent, the Appellate Authority by Ext.P3 judgment disposed of I.A. No. 3440 of 2016 and directed the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the petition schedule building, under Section 12(3) of the Act. 39. Once the tenant has made payment of Rs. 35,000/- towards admitted arrears of rent, which was acknowledged by the learned counsel for the landlord on 07.02.2017, the Appellate Authority, instead of passing orders under Section 12(3) of the Act stopping the proceedings in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012 and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the petition schedule building, ought to have proceeded with that appeal on merits. In that view of the matter, Ext.P3 judgment of the Appellate Authority in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012, stopping the proceedings in that appeal and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the petition schedule building, under Section 12(3) of the Act, cannot be sustained in law. While issuing such a direction, the Appellate Authority committed a manifest error and acted contrary to the statutory mandate of Section 12 of the Act. 40. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. While issuing such a direction, the Appellate Authority committed a manifest error and acted contrary to the statutory mandate of Section 12 of the Act. 40. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under Article 227(1) of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. 41. In Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. 42. In Jai Singh vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (2010) 9 SCC 385 , while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well established principles of law. The High Court is vested with the powers of superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction under this Article is, in some ways, wider than the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember the well known adage that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a ‘bull in a china shop’ to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. 43. It cannot be exercised like a ‘bull in a china shop’ to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. 43. In K.V.S. Ram vs. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, (2015) 12 SCC 39 the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 44. In the instant case, as already noticed, the Appellate Authority, while stopping the proceedings in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012 and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the petition schedule building, vide Ext.P5 judgment, committed a manifest error and acted contrary to the statutory mandate of Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, Ext.P3 judgment of the Appellate Authority in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012 warrants interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 45. In Jasbir Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 8 SCC 294 the Apex Court held that the power of superintendence conferred upon the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India over all courts and Tribunals throughout the territory of the State is both of administrative and judicial nature and it could be exercised suo-motu also. 46. In Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423 a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court reiterated that Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked by the High Court suo-motu as a custodian of justice. 47. 46. In Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423 a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court reiterated that Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked by the High Court suo-motu as a custodian of justice. 47. As already held hereinbefore at paragraph 18, even in a case in which the relief sought for in an application filed under Section 12 of the Act is confined to payment or deposit of admitted arrears of rent up to the date of application or up to the date of order to be passed in that application, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is statutorily bound to pass an order directing the tenant to pay or deposit admitted arrears of rent up to the date of payment or deposit and continue to pay or deposit rent which may subsequently become due, until termination of that proceedings. Therefore, Exhibit P2 order dated 09.01.2017 of the Appellate Authority in I.A. No. 3440 of 2016 in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012, which is one issued contrary to the statutory mandate of Section 12 of the Act, warrants interference and the same is modified as one requiring the petitioner-tenant to pay or deposit admitted arrears of rent up to the date of payment or deposit and continue to pay or deposit rent which may subsequently become due, until termination of the proceedings in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012, exercising the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, suo-motu. 48. Accordingly, the petitioner-tenant is directed to pay to the respondents-landlords or deposit with the Appellate Authority, admitted arrears of rent up to the date of this order, on or before 18.10.2021 and continue to pay or deposit rent which may subsequently become due, until termination of the proceedings in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012, within two weeks from the date on which the rent becomes due. 49. In the result, this original petition is allowed, by setting aside Exhibit P3 judgment dated 07.02.2017 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Thrissur, in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012 and directing the Appellate Authority to consider R.C.A. No26 of 2012 on merits, in case the petitioner-tenant pays to the respondents-landlords or deposits with the Appellate Authority, admitted arrears of rent up to the date of this order, on or before 18.10.2021. 50. 50. Both parties are directed to appear before the Additional Rent Control Appellate Authority-IV, Thrissur, on 18.10.2021. Since the Rent Control Appeal is of the year 2012, the Appellate Authority shall dispose of R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of two months from 18.10.2021. 51. In case of any default on the part of the petitioner-tenant to continue to pay or deposit rent which may subsequently become due, until termination of the proceedings in R.C.A. No. 26 of 2012, it would be open to the Appellate Authority to invoke the provisions under Section 12(3) of the Act. No order as to costs.