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2021 DIGILAW 848 (KER)

State of Kerala, Represented by its Principal Secretary Revenue Department, Secretariat v. Abdulkhani S/o. Mohammed Mustafa

2021-09-22

S.MANIKUMAR, SHAJI P.CHALY

body2021
JUDGMENT : Shaji P. Chaly, J. The captioned writ appeals are filed by the State Government and its officials challenging the judgments of a learned single Judge in W.P.(C) Nos. 33704 of 2011 and 22714 of 2013 dated 05.09.2013 and 17.01.2014 respectively, whereby the writ petitions were allowed and the sale conducted by the revenue authorities under Section 49 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968 (‘Act, 1968’ for short) were set aside. The subject issue relates to the amounts that were due from the writ petitioners on account of Abkari Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1989 ('Act, 1989' for short) and Kerala Toddy Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1969 ('Act, 1969' for short) in common and the sales tax due from the writ petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 33704 of 2011. 2. Apparently, since there were no bidders, when the sale was conducted, the Government purchased the property by virtue of the powers contained under Section 50 of the Act, 1968. Since the issues raised in the writ appeals are substantially common in nature, we thought of disposing of the appeals by a common judgment, for which the parties have agreed to. 3. In W.P.(C) No. 33704 of 2011, an extent of about 1 acre 30 cents of land in Parassala village of Neyyattinkara Taluk belonging to the writ petitioner was put up for public auction on 20.12.1999 and the property was bid by the Government for Re.1 as per the provisions of the Act, 1968. According to the writ petitioner, the sale proceeded as per Exts. P1 to P3 notices dated 15.05.1999, 05.10.1999 and dated nil respectively. As per Ext. P3 notice issued under Section 49(2) of Act, 1968, it was informed that the sale will be conducted on 20.12.1999. However, there were no bidders, which according to the writ petitioner, was due to lack of publication regarding the sale as provided in the Act, 1968 and the Rules thereto. 4. It is the case of the writ petitioner that the proposed sale was conducted in a fraudulent and clandestine manner without informing any intending purchasers. It was also submitted that if the proposed sale was published in newspapers and the Gazette as provided under Section 75(2) of Act, 1968, a large number of bidders would have taken part, since the property is situated by the side of a National Highway. It was also submitted that if the proposed sale was published in newspapers and the Gazette as provided under Section 75(2) of Act, 1968, a large number of bidders would have taken part, since the property is situated by the side of a National Highway. The writ petitioner has also had a case that a portion of the property alone was sufficient for discharging the amount of Rs. 27,57,349/-, which was demanded as per Ext. P3 notice. However, the State Government bought the entire property worth about Rs.360 lakhs for an amount of Re.1, by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 50(2)(i) of the Act, 1968, which is illegal and against the provisions of the Act, 1968. The writ petitioner had also a contention that the State Government had purchased the property in its own name, when the amount sought to be recovered was also on behalf of other statutory institutions, which procedure was found to be illegal by a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in District Collector v. Subaida Beevi [ 2010 (1) KLT 913 ], wherein it was held that if the auction was conducted by the State Government and there were no bidders, the Government should have purchased the property on behalf of the requisitioning organisation. Here in this case, the requisitions were made by the authorities under the Act, 1989 and the Act, 1969 to recover the amounts due to them. It is true, amounts were due to the State Government towards the Sales Tax also. 5. Even though a counter affidavit was filed by the second appellant, i.e., the Commissioner of Land Revenue, the learned single Judge was of the clear opinion that the sale conducted by the revenue authorities cannot be sustained under law. It was found by the learned single Judge that there was no proper publication of the sale notice in contemplation of Section 49(2) of Act, 1968; that there is an unexplained delay of 7 years in confirming the sale and that too without noticing the payments effected by the writ petitioner; that the property should have been purchased in favour of the requisitioning authority and the State; and that the action of the State Government in purchasing the property in its name alone, in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Subaida Beevi (supra), is illegal and bad. 6. 6. In fact, writ petitioner had applied for an amnesty scheme prevailing at that time, which was declined as per Ext. P12 order by the Assistant Commissioner of Excise, Thiruvananthapuram dated 22.07.2008, which was affirmed in appeal by the Revenue Divisional Officer and in revision by the Land Revenue Commissioner as per Ext.P15 order dated 17.09.2011 holding that since the property was sold in public auction, the amnesty scheme cannot be extended to the writ petitioner. However, the learned single Judge set aside the aforesaid orders passed by the said authorities and further directed the Government and the District Collector to settle the dues extending the benefit of the amnesty scheme, on the writ petitioner making a fresh application. The Government and the District Collector were also directed to restore possession of the property in question to the writ petitioner, on the writ petitioner depositing Rs.20 lakhs towards the dues within a period of two months over and above the payment of Rs.6,38,375/- remitted by the predecessor in title of the property on 30.12.1999 and Rs.1,72,700/- on 20.03.2000. 7. Insofar as W.P.(C) No. 22714 of 2013 is concerned, amounts were due towards Abkari dues and the Kerala Toddy Workers' Welfare Fund Act, 1969. Therein also, an extent of 42 cents of landed property was put up for auction and in absentia of bidders, the property was bought by the Government. The very same grounds in regard to the illegal purchase by the Government was advanced by the writ petitioner therein also. It is relevant to note that, the entire amount was paid by the writ petitioner though belatedly, which was accepted by the concerned authorities without any objection. 8. The learned single Judge, after appreciating the proposition of law laid down by the Division Bench in Subaida and also taking into account the fact that the sale conducted was illegal, the proceedings of the District Collector in regard to the bought-in-land dated 11.11.1988 bearing order No. D-2621/88 was annulled and further directed the respondents to carry out mutation in favour of the writ petitioner after observing that since the property is claimed to be in occupation of the writ petitioner, there can be no hindrance to the acceptance of basic tax. It is, thus, challenging the legality and correctness of the judgments in the writ petition, the appeals are preferred. 9. It is, thus, challenging the legality and correctness of the judgments in the writ petition, the appeals are preferred. 9. The paramount contention advanced in the appeal by the State is that since amounts were due to the State Government under the Sales Tax Act, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Subaida (supra) would not apply. It is also submitted that the amnesty scheme provided as per G.O.(MS) No. 108/2008/TD dated 26.05.2008 could not have been extended to the writ petitioner, since the sale was confirmed on 09.08.2007. That apart, it was also submitted that merely because amounts were deposited under the amnesty scheme, that would not lead to cancellation of the sale effected under the Act, 1968. Other contentions were also raised. 10. We have heard the learned Senior Government Pleader Sri. Aswin Sethumadhavan for the appellants, Sri. Arun V.G, Sri. K.B. Pradeep and Sri Varghese Kuriakose for the respondents/writ petitioners, and perused the pleadings and materials on record. 11. The respective counsel have addressed their arguments basically relying upon the legal issues discussed above. In order to arrive at a logical conclusion, we feel it appropriate that the relevant provisions of law are discussed. Section 50 of Act, 1968 deals with 'bidding on behalf of Government'. Sub-Section (1) thereto specifies that when an immovable property is put up for sale, at the time and place specified in the notice under sub-Section (2) of Section 49 for the recovery of arrears of public revenue due on land, if there be no bid or if the highest bid be insufficient to cover the said arrears and those subsequently accruing due upto the date of sale, together with interest and cost of process, the officer conducting the sale shall postpone the sale to another date which shall not be later than 60 days from the date of first sale and give notice of the subsequent sale under sub-Section (4) of Section 49. 12. Sub-Section (2) delineates that when the property put up for sale on the date to which it was postponed under sub-Section (1) at the time and place specified in the notice, if there be no bid, the officer conducting the same may purchase the property on behalf of the Government for 10 paise. 12. Sub-Section (2) delineates that when the property put up for sale on the date to which it was postponed under sub-Section (1) at the time and place specified in the notice, if there be no bid, the officer conducting the same may purchase the property on behalf of the Government for 10 paise. However, sub-Section (4) inter alia specifies that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act after the confirmation of the sale, all the right, title and interest of the defaulter, purchased on behalf of the Government shall be deemed to have vested in the Government from the date of purchase and if the defaulter is in actual possession of the property or if he is entitled to possession, the Collector or the authorised officer shall, immediately after the confirmation of sale, take possession of the property. 13. Section 49 of Act, 1968 makes a clear cut procedure for conducting the sale, which reads thus: 49. Procedure for sale of immovable property.-Immovable property attached under this Act may be sold in accordance with the following provisions, namely:- (1) The sale shall be by public auction to the highest bidder. The time and place of sale shall be fixed by the Collector or the authorised officer having jurisdiction over the village in which the property is situate. (2) Previous to the sale, the Collector or the authorised officer as the case may be, shall issue a notice thereof in English and in Malayalam and also in the language of the locality where such language is not Malayalam, specifying- (i) the name of the defaulter; (ii) the position and extent of the land and of his building and other known improvements thereon ; (iii) the amount of revenue assessed on the land, or upon its different sections; (iv) the amount for the recovery of which the sale is ordered ; (v) the proportion of the public revenue due during the remainder of the current financial year; and (vi) the time, place and conditions of sale. The notice shall be duly served and published at least thirty days before the date of sale. The notice shall be duly served and published at least thirty days before the date of sale. (3) A sum of money not less than fifteen per cent of the bid amount of the immovable property shall be deposited by the person declared to be the purchaser with the officer conducting the sale immediately after such declaration and where the remainder of the purchase money is not paid within thirty days of the date of the sale, the money so deposited shall be liable to forfeiture. (4) The officer conducting the sale may, in his discretion, adjourn the sale to a specified day and hour, recording his reasons therefor. If the date to which the sale is so adjourned is within sixty days of the original sale, notice of the adjourned sale shall be published in the taluk and village offices concerned, in the office of the local authority within whose jurisdiction the property is situate and also on some conspicuous part of the immovable property brought to sale. If the date of the adjourned sale is beyond sixty days of the original sale, fresh notice shall be served and published as if it were the original sale. (5) where the purchaser refuses or omits to deposit the said sum of money or to complete the payment of the remaining purchase money, the property shall be re-sold at the expenses and hazard of such purchaser, and the amount of all loss and expense which may attend such refusal or omission shall be recoverable from such purchaser in the same manner as arrears of public revenue due on land. Where the immovable property is sold at the second sale for a higher price than at the first sale, the difference shall be the property of the defaulter. (6) All persons bidding at a sale shall be required to state whether they are bidding on their own behalf or as agents, and in the latter case to deposit a written authority signed by their principals. If such requisition be not complied with, their bids shall be rejected.” 14. On a reading of sub-Section (4) there is no iota of doubt that if the date of the adjourned sale is beyond 60 days of the original sale, fresh notice shall be served and published as if it were the original sale. If such requisition be not complied with, their bids shall be rejected.” 14. On a reading of sub-Section (4) there is no iota of doubt that if the date of the adjourned sale is beyond 60 days of the original sale, fresh notice shall be served and published as if it were the original sale. Admittedly, the sale was adjourned twice and it was on the third occasion, on 20.12.1999, the property was bought in by the Government for Re.1. The case projected by the writ petitioner is that even though a notice was served on him, which was undated, there was no publication of the notice consequent to which there were no bidders. It is an admitted fact that there was no publication of the notice in the manner provided under law. This we say because, Section 75 of Act, 1968 deals with the mode of publication of notices etc., which reads thus: 75. Mode of publication of notices, etc.-(1) Where any notice, order or list is required to be published under this Act, the publication shall, unless it is expressly provided otherwise, be made as follows:- (i) by affixture of a copy of the notice, order or list- (a) where it relates to immovable property, on a conspicuous part of the property ; or (b) where it relates to movable property, on a conspicuous part of the premises from where the property was attached; and (ii) by affixture of a copy of the notice, order or list on the office of the village in which, and on the office of the local authority within whose jurisdiction, the attachment or sale takes place. (2) The Collector or the authorised officer may, in his discretion, publish any notice, order or list in the gazette or in one or two newspapers having circulation in the area in which the attachment or sale takes place or in both. 15. The contention put forth by the learned Senior Government Pleader was that publication of the notice in newspapers or Gazette is not a mandatory requirement, since sub-Section (2) of Section 75 of Act, 1968 itself makes it clear that there is a discretion available to the Collector or the authorised officer and nobody can compel the authority to carry out publication in newspapers or gazette. 16. We have evaluated the rival submission made across the Bar. 16. We have evaluated the rival submission made across the Bar. It is an admitted fact that amounts were due from the writ petitioners to the Government as well as other statutory authorities; however, the properties were purchased by the Government on its behalf alone, and not on behalf of the Government and the requisitioning authority jointly. The Act, 1968 would apply to any specified institutions only when the Government in contemplation of Section 71 of Act, 1968 notifies in the Gazette declaring that the provisions of the Act shall be applicable for the recovery of amounts due from any person or class of persons to any specified institutions or any class or classes of institutions and thereupon, all the provisions of the Act, 1968 shall be applicable to such recovery. Therefore, a substantial portion of the dues demanded, admittedly was not a due of the Government; but the recovery was made by the Government for and on behalf of the specified institutions namely Kerala Abkari Workers Welfare Fund authority and the Kerala Toddy Workers Welfare Fund authority also. 17. Viewed in that manner, when the Government, by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 50(2) of the Act 1968 bought the property for Re.1, it should have been purchased for and on behalf of the Government against its dues as well as on behalf of the other requisitioning authorities. This is exactly the question considered in Subaida Beevi (supra). The relevant portion of the judgment reads thus: Going by the scheme of the Act, we are of the view that when a notification is issued under Section 71, the provisions of the Act apply mutatis mutandis to the recovery of the amounts due to the said institution. If that be so, in Section 50(2), the words, 'on behalf of the Government' should be read as 'on behalf of the institution concerned'. Therefore, if there was no bidders, the Revenue Recovery Officer could have purchased the property on behalf of the second respondent Bank only. But, in this case, it was purchased on behalf of the State, for Re.1. So, the entire proceedings were vitiated. Therefore, the quashing of the proceedings and the directions issued by the learned Single Judge are sustained, though for a different reason. But, in this case, it was purchased on behalf of the State, for Re.1. So, the entire proceedings were vitiated. Therefore, the quashing of the proceedings and the directions issued by the learned Single Judge are sustained, though for a different reason. The reasoning of the learned Judge that Section 50 (2) will not apply to recovery proceedings for the institution covered by the notification under Section 71, is not tenable. The said provision also applies mutatis mutandis to the recovery proceedings for such institution. The view taken by the learned Judge in Varkey v. State of Kerala (supra), is in tune with the scheme of the Act. The observation of the learned Judge in Ayisha Teacher v. District Collector (supra), concerning the scope of Section 50, vis-a-vis the revenue recovery proceedings initiated at the requisition of an institution covered by Section 71 of the Act, does not lay down the correct legal position. The view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Canara Bank v. Thankappan ( 1989 (2) KLT 74 ), though not directly applicable to the facts of the case, supports the view that the financial institution will not lose the property, if the Government fail to find a purchaser for it. In the result, the Writ Appeal is dismissed, subject to the clarifications mentioned above.” 18. Taking into account the law laid down by the Division Bench, we have no doubt in our mind that the learned single Judge was right in holding that the purchase made by the Government was not in accordance with law. The next question that emerges for consideration is as to the nature of publication of the notice in contemplation of Section 49(4) of the Act, 1968. On an analysis of Section 49(4) r/w Section 75(2) of the Act, 1968, it is clear that definite procedures are prescribed for conducting the sale of the property. 19. Even though the learned Senior Government Pleader addressed arguments to the effect that the Collector or the authorised Officer has the discretion to decide as to whether the notice is to be published in the gazette or in one or two newspapers having circulation in the area in which the attachment or sale takes place or in both, we are unable to agree with the said contention for the reason that the publication is mandatory as per Section 49(4) of Act, 1968. In no other provision other than Section 75(2) of Act, 1968, the manner in which the publication to be done is prescribed or rather the publication is defined so as to gather a different meaning other than the one discussed above. 20. Therefore, a harmonious construction of Sections 49(4) and 75(2) of Act, 1968 is required to be made so as to ascribe a purposeful meaning to the terminology “ publication”, as intended by the legislature, and make the provisions operational practically, and render justice to the affected party, and accordingly, we are of the clear opinion that the discretion has to be exercised by the statutory authority in accordance with the stipulations contained under the provisions of law by making suitable publication so as to attract public attention. This is more so, since in our view, the District Collector or the authorised officer is provided with the discretion to make any publication choosing between the Gazette and in one or two newspapers. If that was not the intention of the legislature, then the option would not have been available in sub-Section (2) of Section 75 as to the manner in which the publication is to be made, that is, in the Gazette or in one or two newspapers. Which thus also means, sub-Section (2) of Section 75 has to be construed strictly to protect the interest of the writ petitioners, who are the owners of the properties in order to secure maximum price in the bid, and unless and until sufficient publication is made the bid conducted would be an empty formality, which is not the intention of the legislature. 21. Therefore, more than everything, the purpose for which the provision was incorporated in the statute has to be given the utmost credence and relevance so as to translate the true intention of the legislature. To put it otherwise, a court considering such an issue has always a duty imbibed in it to find out the true intention of the makers of law so as to render justice to the needy in accordance with law. It is also well settled that when a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation, the court has to choose the one that represents the true intention of the legislature. It is also well settled that when a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation, the court has to choose the one that represents the true intention of the legislature. This is more so when Article 300A of the Constitution of India confers a Constitutional right on the citizens, that they shall not be deprived of their right to property save by authority of law. 22. The issue, according to us, is no more res integra, since a Division Bench of this Court in P. Gopalakrishnan v. The State of Kerala and others [2006 KHC 366] had occasion to consider the issue and held that sale was illegal due to non compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 49 r/w Section 75 of Act, 1968. It was further found therein that the discretion under Section 75(2) of the Act, 1968 has to be exercised by the authorities depending upon the facts of each case and each case has to be dealt with in a just and equitable manner, apart from holding that sale may be vitiated, if there is failure to exercise the discretion. Paragraph 7 of the judgment is relevant to the context and it reads thus: “7. Revenue sale is conducted not only to wipe off the revenue dues but also to see that maximum price is fetched to the defaulter since in a revenue sale the interests of the intending purchaser, the defaulter and the mortgagee have to be safeguarded. Duty is cast on the officials to safeguard not only the interests of the Revenue but also the defaulter so as to fetch the maximum amount. Discretion conferred under S.75(2) has to be exercised by the authorities depending upon the facts of each case and the case has to be dealt with in a just and equitable manner. Revenue authorities should know that the defaulter is in distress and between devil and deep sea. Defaulter in a given case would not be in a position to repay the amount due to various reasons, such as labour unrest, lack of raw materials, unfavourable market Conditions and host of other reasons. Defaulter in all situations may not be a cheat or swindler. Since revenue authorities are dealing with the properties of Somebody else it is highly necessary that an attempt should be made by them to get maximum price for the property.” 23. Defaulter in all situations may not be a cheat or swindler. Since revenue authorities are dealing with the properties of Somebody else it is highly necessary that an attempt should be made by them to get maximum price for the property.” 23. In our view, the proposition so laid down has a very close, intimate and intrinsic connection to the appeals at hand, because the writ petitioner/first respondent in Writ Appeal 976 of 2014 had a case that there was no proper publication of the notice in accordance with Section 49(4) of the Act, 1968. When a specific plea was raised in the writ petition, the Government had a duty to establish before the learned single Judge that publication was made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 1968. So also, a learned single Judge of this Court in Mahadevan Pillai v. Kerala financial corporation [ 1997 (2) KLT 46 ) considered the very same question as to the manner in which the discretion has to be exercised by the authority under the Act, 1968 and held that in the matter of sale of extensive land, publication in notice board is not sufficient and the discretion conferred under Section 75(2) of Act, 1968 should be exercised, and the auction shall be published in the newspaper. It was also held that, it is only the manner of publication to be made as provided under sub-Section (2) of Section 75 of Act, 1968, the Collector or the authorised authority has the discretion. Taking into account the above said legal and factual aspects, we are of the considered opinion that the learned single Judge was right in holding that the State Government was not legally correct in conducting the sale of the properties in question, and consequently issuing the appropriate directions. 24. We are also of the view that the amounts due were apparently paid by the defaulters during the pendency of the writ petition or thereafter. It is also clear from the record of proceedings that the amnesty scheme has been extended by the Government upto 31.12.2013 and therefore, we do not find any force in the contention advanced by the learned Senior Government Pleader that the scheme was not available to be extended to the writ petitioners. It is also clear from the record of proceedings that the amnesty scheme has been extended by the Government upto 31.12.2013 and therefore, we do not find any force in the contention advanced by the learned Senior Government Pleader that the scheme was not available to be extended to the writ petitioners. We also agree with respect to the finding of the learned Single Judge that there was undue delay of seven years in confirming the bid in favour of the appellants. Needless to say, Writ Appeals fail and accordingly, they are dismissed.