JUDGMENT : Subhash Chand, J. 1. Heard Sri A.T. Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri N.K. Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for National Insurance Company Limited and perused the judgment and order impugned. 2. This appeal, at the behest of the claimants, challenges the judgment and award dated 17.01.2020 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Court No.4, Aligarh (hereinafter referred to as 'Tribunal') in M.A.C.P. No.318 of 2016 awarding a sum of Rs.3,20,256/-. 3. The claimants are the widow, mother, daughter and son of the deceased. The Tribunal has considered the annual income of the deceased as Rs.65,412/-. The income of the deceased was claimed as Rs.1,30,824/-per year but the Tribunal has decided that the income of the deceased would be Rs.87,216 for six months and Rs.43,608/- for another six months when the sugar mill was closed and hence has held that income would be Rs.65,412/- per year. 4. It is further submitted that the incident is of the year 2015 and at that time the deceased was in the employment of Sugar Mill, therefore, the Tribunal has erred in assessing the annual income of the deceased and has awarded less compensation to the claimant-appellants. 5. The counsel for respondent has contended that this figure cannot be clubbed together with the income of the deceased as Rs.87,216/-(for a period of six months when the mill was functional) plus Rs.43,608/- for another six months when the mill remain closed. The average income will have to be considered, which would be Rs.87,216/-. 6. The income of the deceased was Rs.87,216/- for the first six months and for the later six months when Sugar Mill was closed was Rs.43,608/- but the Tribunal has clubbed Rs.87,216/- with Rs.43,608/- and has divided the same by two, which could not have been done, the reason, even the income of the deceased cannot be said to be Rs.65,412/-per year. His income has to be added. We are adding the amount, namely, Rs.87216/- plus Rs.43,608/- as income as was paid to the deceased. The deceased was having employment and therefore as per judgment of Pranay Sethi and the judgment cited by the counsel for the appellant i.e. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Indira Srivastava, 2008 (2) SCC 763 wherein the term income has been defined in paras 18, 19 and 20, which are reproduced as under : “18. The deceased was having employment and therefore as per judgment of Pranay Sethi and the judgment cited by the counsel for the appellant i.e. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Indira Srivastava, 2008 (2) SCC 763 wherein the term income has been defined in paras 18, 19 and 20, which are reproduced as under : “18. The term 'income' in P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd Ed.) has been defined as under : "The value of any benefit or perquisite whether convertible into money or not, obtained from a company either by a director or a person who has substantial interest in the company, and any sum paid by such company in respect of any obligation, which but for such payment would have been payable by the director or other person aforesaid, occurring or arising to a person within the State from any profession, trade or calling other than agriculture." It has also been stated : 'INCOME' signifies 'what comes in' (per Selborne, C., Jones v. Ogle, 42 LJ Ch.336). 'It is as large a word as can be used' to denote a person's receipts '(per Jessel, M.R. Re Huggins, 51 LJ Ch.938.) income is not confined to receipts from business only and means periodical receipts from one's work, lands, investments, etc. AIR 1921 Mad 427 (SB). Ref. 124 IC 511 : 1930 MWN 29 : 31 MLW 438 AIR 1930 Mad 626 : 58 MLJ 337." 19. If the dictionary meaning of the word 'income' is taken to its logical conclusion, it should include those benefits, either in terms of money or otherwise, which are taken into consideration for the purpose of payment of income-tax or profession tax although some elements thereof may or may not be taxable or would have been otherwise taxable but for the exemption conferred thereupon under the statute. 20. In N. Sivammal & Ors. v. Managing Director, Pandian Roadways Corporation & Ors. [ (1985) 1 SCC 18 ], this Court took into consideration the pay packet of the deceased.” 7. The word net income will have to be considered, therefore, the argument of the respondent that the income of the deceased Rs.1,30,824/-per year cannot be considered to be the income of the deceased cannot be accepted. 8. The appellants had to be granted future loss of income, which has not been granted by the Tribunal without assigning any reason. The word net income will have to be considered, therefore, the argument of the respondent that the income of the deceased Rs.1,30,824/-per year cannot be considered to be the income of the deceased cannot be accepted. 8. The appellants had to be granted future loss of income, which has not been granted by the Tribunal without assigning any reason. The Tribunal in its judgment deducted 1/3rd for personal expenses. The deceased was working in the Sugar Mill since 1996. The salary of the deceased was Rs.14,536/-per month. The salary slip was proved by P.W.4. The crushing season of the Sugar Mill was from November to May only. The Mill when it was not working the salary was remained the same but he would be paid half of the amount. 9. The Tribunal deducted 50% of Rs.1,30,824/- as income tax, GPF, insurance, gratuity, which could not have been done as in the year 2015 the income of the deceased was Rs.1,30,824/-per year, which was non taxable income. The Supreme Court in the case of Vimal Kanwar and others Vs. Kishore Dan and others, 2013 (3) T.A.C. 6 (S.C.), 2013 (3) T.A.C. 6 (SC) held that the certain amounts cannot be deducted, hence we hold that Rs.1,30,824/- was the annual income of the deceased, to which 30% will have to be added as the deceased died at the age of 43 years (age bracket of 41-45 years will apply). He was survived by two minor children, mother and his widow, hence he deduction of 1/4th cannot be granted as requested by learned counsel for the appellant but it would have to be 1/3rd and not 1/4th. 10. The deceased died at the age of 43 years (age bracket of 41-45 years), therefore, the multiplier would be 14. 11. The Tribunal has held that the deceased too negligent also in driving the vehicle. The reasoning given by the Tribunal to hold the deceased negligent and that he had contributed to 50% of the accident is perverse, just because there was collusion of two vehicles, and that the driver of the car was having valid driving license and the registration of the vehicle was there and just because the license of the deceased was not produced before the Tribunal, it cannot mean that he was negligent. The ocular evidence of P.W.3 on the contrary goes to show that the deceased was driving his motorcycle on his correct side. Thus, the finding on facts is not only bad in law but is perverse, therefore, we hold that the Tribunal has committed an error in holding the deceased to have contributed negligence and due to which accident had taken place. The vehicle involved in the accident is Car and motorcycle. The Tribunal has given its finding just because of the fact that the driving license of the deceased was nor produced and only this fact will not permit us to hold that there was contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. 12. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, let us consider the negligence from the perspective of the law laid down. 13. The term negligence means failure to exercise care towards others which a reasonable and prudent person would in a circumstance or taking action which such a reasonable person would not. Negligence can be both intentional or accidental which is normally accidental. More particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the injured must always prove that the either side is negligent. If the injury rather death is caused by something owned or controlled by the negligent party then he is directly liable otherwise the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" meaning thereby "the things speak for itself" would apply. 14. The principle of contributory negligence has been discussed time and again. A person who either contributes or author of the accident would be liable for his contribution to the accident having taken place. 15. The Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 1818 of 2012 (Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Renu Singh And Others) decided on 19.7.2016 has held as under : "16. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 18. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 19. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 19. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands V/s. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 20. These provisions (sec.110A and sec.110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 21. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 21. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well settled and, therefore, court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew V/s. State of Punjab, (2005) 0 ACJ(SC) 1840). 22. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part the other side." emphasis added 16. The Apex Court in Khenyei Vs. New India Assurance Company Limited & Others, 2015 LawSuit (SC) 469 has held as under : "4. It is a case of composite negligence where injuries have been caused to the claimants by combined wrongful act of joint tort feasors. In a case of accident caused by negligence of joint tort feasors, all the persons who aid or counsel or direct or join in committal of a wrongful act, are liable. In such case, the liability is always joint and several. The extent of negligence of joint tort feasors in such a case is immaterial for satisfaction of the claim of the plaintiff/claimant and need not be determined by the by the court. However, in case all the joint tort feasors are before the court, it may determine the extent of their liability for the purpose of adjusting inter-se equities between them at appropriate stage. The liability of each and every joint tort feasor vis-a-vis to plaintiff/claimant cannot be bifurcated as it is joint and several liability. However, in case all the joint tort feasors are before the court, it may determine the extent of their liability for the purpose of adjusting inter-se equities between them at appropriate stage. The liability of each and every joint tort feasor vis-a-vis to plaintiff/claimant cannot be bifurcated as it is joint and several liability. In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between tort feasors for making payment to the plaintiff is not permissible as the plaintiff/claimant has the right to recover the entire amount from the easiest targets/solvent defendant. 14. There is a difference between contributory and composite negligence. In the case of contributory negligence, a person who has himself contributed to the extent cannot claim compensation for the injuries sustained by him in the accident to the extent of his own negligence; whereas in the case of composite negligence, a person who has suffered has not contributed to the accident but the outcome of combination of negligence of two or more other persons. This Court in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan & Ors. [ 2008 (3) SCC 748 ] has held that in case of contributory negligence, injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong doer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong doer separately. It is only in the case of contributory negligence that the injured himself has contributed by his negligence in the accident. Extent of his negligence is required to be determined as damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries have to be reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder : "6. 'Composite negligence' refers to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrong doers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrong-doers. In such a case, each wrong doer, is jointly and severally liable to the injured for payment of the entire damages and the injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong-doer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong-doer separately. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong-doer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong-doer separately. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence of the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stands reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. 7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of 'composite negligence' will not apply nor can there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined the extent of contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to correct the said error." 18. This Court in Challa Bharathamma & Nanjappan (supra) has dealt with the breach of policy conditions by the owner when the insurer was asked to pay the compensation fixed by the tribunal and the right to recover the same was given to the insurer in the executing court concerned if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of determination for the tribunal and the issue has been decided in favour of the insured. The same analogy can be applied to the instant cases as the liability of the joint tort feasor is joint and several. In the instant case, there is determination of inter se liability of composite negligence to the extent of negligence of 2/3rd and 1/3rd of respective drivers. The same analogy can be applied to the instant cases as the liability of the joint tort feasor is joint and several. In the instant case, there is determination of inter se liability of composite negligence to the extent of negligence of 2/3rd and 1/3rd of respective drivers. Thus, the vehicle – trailor-truck which was not insured with the insurer, was negligent to the extent of 2/3rd. It would be open to the insurer being insurer of the bus after making payment to claimant to recover from the owner of the trailor-truck the amount to the aforesaid extent in the execution proceedings. Had there been no determination of the inter se liability for want of evidence or other joint tort feasor had not been impleaded, it was not open to settle such a dispute and to recover the amount in execution proceedings but the remedy would be to file another suit or appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as follows : (i) In the case of composite negligence, plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tort feasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tort feasors is joint and several. (ii) In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tort feasors vis a vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. (iii) In case all the joint tort feasors have been impleaded and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/tribunal to determine inter se extent of composite negligence of the drivers. However, determination of the extent of negligence between the joint tort feasors is only for the purpose of their inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the other after making whole of payment to the plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied the liability of the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the apportionment/ extent of their negligence has been determined by the court/tribunal, in main case one joint tort feasor can recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings. (iv) It would not be appropriate for the court/tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tort feasors. (iv) It would not be appropriate for the court/tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tort feasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tort feasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tort feasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award." emphasis added 17. The latest decision of the Apex Court in Khenyei (Supra) has laid down one further aspect about considering the negligence more particularly composite/contributory negligence. The deceased or the person concerned should be shown to have contributed either to the accident and the impact of accident upon the victim could have been minimised if he had taken care. In this case the deceased was not the author or the co-author of the accident. On facts, the deceased was not plying the vehicle. Hence, the deduction of 50% from the compensation awarded is bad and is set aside. 18. This takes this Court to the issue of compensation. The income of the deceased in the year of accident and looking to his profession can be considered to be Rs.130,824/-per year to which as the deceased was in the age bracket of 41 to 45 years, 30% as future loss of income requires to be added in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi (Supra). As far as amount under the head of non-pecuniary damages are concerned, it should be Rs.70,000/- in stead of Rs.15,000/-. As far as multiplier is concerned, it would be 14. 19. Hence, the total compensation payable to the appellants is computed herein below : (i) Income Rs.1,30,824/- (ii) Percentage towards future prospects 30% namely Rs.39.247/- (iii) Total income Rs.130,824 + 39247 = Rs.17,0071x1/3=56690/- (iv) Income after deduction of 1/3rd Rs.113381/-(rounded up) (v) Annual income Rs.113381/- (vi) Multiplier applicable 14 (vii) Loss of dependency Rs.113381 x 14 = Rs.1587334/- (viii) Amount under non-pecuniary head 70,000/- (ix) Total compensation 16,57,334/- 20. As far as issue of rate of interest is concerned, it should be 7.5% in view of the latest decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mannat Johal and Others, 2019 (2) T.A.C. 705 (S.C.) wherein the Apex Court has held as under : "13. As far as issue of rate of interest is concerned, it should be 7.5% in view of the latest decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mannat Johal and Others, 2019 (2) T.A.C. 705 (S.C.) wherein the Apex Court has held as under : "13. The aforesaid features equally apply to the contentions urged on behalf of the claimants as regards the rate of interest. The Tribunal had awarded interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too high a rate in comparison to what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters. The High Court, after making a substantial enhancement in the award amount, modified the interest component at a reasonable rate of 7.5% p.a. and we find no reason to allow the interest in this matter at any rate higher than that allowed by High Court." 21. No other grounds are urged orally when the matter was heard. 22. In view of the above, the appeal is partly allowed. Judgment and award passed by the Tribunal shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. The respondent-Insurance Company shall calculate the compensation and deposit the amount within a period of 12 weeks from today with interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of filing of the claim petition till the amount is deposited. The amount already deposited be deducted from the amount to be deposited. INCOME TAX DEDUCTION 23. In view of the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, in the case of Smt. Hansagori P. Ladhani V/s. The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., reported in 2007 (2) GLH 291 and this High Court, total amount of interest, accrued on the principal amount of compensation is to be apportioned on financial year to financial year basis and if the interest payable to claimants in their proportion for any financial year exceeds Rs.50,000/-, insurance company/owner is/are entitled to deduct appropriate amount under the head of 'Tax Deducted at Source' as provided u/s 194A (3) (ix) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and if the amount of interest does not exceed Rs.50,000/- in any financial year, the deduction is not permissible, registry of the Tribunal is directed to allow the claimants to withdraw the amount, without producing the certificate from the concerned Income-Tax Authority. The aforesaid view has been reiterated by this High Court in Review Application No.1 of 2020 in First Appeal From Order No.23 of 2001 (Smt. Sudesna and others Vs. Hari Singh and another) and in First Appeal From Order No.2871 of 2016 (Tej Kumari Sharma v. Chola Mandlam M.S. General Insurance Co. Ltd.) decided on 19.3.2021 while disbursing the amount. 24. As far as disbursement is concerned the Tribunal before passing orders of fix deposit or investment follow the guidelines issued in A.V. Padma Vs. Venugopal, [2012 (1) GLH (SC) 442]. 25. We request the Registrar General to forward this judgment to the concerned Tribunal (Sri Narendra Singh, HJS.) whenever he is posted with a request to be more careful as he has not considered the judgments of Apex Court. 26. This Court is thankful to both the learned Advocates for getting this matter disposed of during this pandemic. 27. Let record of court below be sent back to the Tribunal concerned.