JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel assisted by Mr. Vipul Poddar, the learned vice counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mrs. Darshana Poddar Mishra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State and Mr. Jitendra Tripathi, the learned counsel for the respondent no.3. 2. This writ petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard. 3. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for quashing the reasoned order dated 21.01.2019 whereby the claim of the petitioner for acceptance of her joining has been rejected. The further prayer is made for reinstatement of the petitioner in service on the post of Joint Director (IEC), Jharkhand State AIDS Control Society. Pursuant to the advertisement published in the newspaper under the signature of Under Secretary (Administration), Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India for appointment on the post of Joint Director (Information, Education and Communication) for as many as 20 States including the State of Jharkhand, the petitioner applied for the post of Joint Director (IEC) having the essential qualification. The petitioner was found eligible for appointment on the post of Joint Director and was called for interview vide letter dated 28.04.2008 issued from the National AIDS Control Organization, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to appear before the interview Board at Chhatisgarh State AIDS Control Society, Raipur on 06.05.2008. The petitioner appeared in the interview Board and she was declared successful. She was appointed on the post of Joint Director (IEC), Jharkhand State AIDS Control Society vide letter dated 04.08.2008 on contractual basis for monthly salary of Rs.30,000/- per month. The appointment of the petitioner was initially for one year and finally renewed in terms of the agreement after one year. The petitioner and the Project Director, Jharkhand AIDS Control Society entered into an agreement/contract for service of the petitioner as contained in Annexure-4 dated 08.08.2018. The petitioner's service was again renewed for two years by the agreement dated 03.07.2009. The appointment of the petitioner was initially for one year and finally renewed in terms of the agreement after one year. The petitioner and the Project Director, Jharkhand AIDS Control Society entered into an agreement/contract for service of the petitioner as contained in Annexure-4 dated 08.08.2018. The petitioner's service was again renewed for two years by the agreement dated 03.07.2009. The petitioner was working as consultant (civil society mainstreaming) on contractual basis vide letter dated 25.01.2008 pursuant to the advertisement published in the newspaper dated 14.12.2007 and the petitioner was also working additionally as Joint Director (IEC). The petitioner's appointment was terminated vide letter dated 04.09.2009. It was challenged by the petitioner in W.P.(S)No.4399 of 2009 and the impugned order was quashed and the respondents were directed to allow the petitioner to discharge her duty on the post of Joint Director(IEC) and to consider to pay the arrear of salary of the petitioner. The said order was taken before the Division Bench by the respondents in LPA No.37 of 2017 which was disposed of by order dated 25.07.2018 in terms of paragraph no.06 of the said order, which is quoted hereinbelow: “6. In view of the aforesaid direction, it appears that the State can always take a decision about the payment of arrears and remuneration for the period of contract. Extension of contract is the prerogative of one of the parties to the contract. There cannot be a compulsory extension of contract, otherwise the very spirit of Section 13 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 will be violated patently. This aspect of the matter shall be kept in mind, while deciding the claim of respondent no.1 (original petitioner), as per the direction given by the learned single Judge dated 30th September, 2016 in W.P.(S) No. 4399 of 2009. This decision will be taken by the respondent authorities as early as possible, preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.” 4. Thereafter the respondents have passed the reasoned order dated 21.01.2019 whereby the case of the petitioner has not been accepted and the reasoned order has been passed. The application for acceptance of joining was rejected. 5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel assisted by Mr. Thereafter the respondents have passed the reasoned order dated 21.01.2019 whereby the case of the petitioner has not been accepted and the reasoned order has been passed. The application for acceptance of joining was rejected. 5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel assisted by Mr. Vipul Poddar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner assailed the impugned reasoned order on the ground that the Division Bench has already directed the respondent to consider the case of the petitioner and pursuant thereto the reasoned order has been passed which is erroneous. He submits that three grounds have been taken in the impugned order for rejecting the claim of the petitioner which are not founded. He submits that three grounds may be taken and one of the ground is about fixed tenure which is not maintainable in view of the fact that the appraisal form of the petitioner is there whereby two years' extension has been recommended and this has not been considered so far. He further submits that so far the educational qualification is concerned, that has also been not considered. He invites the attention of the Court the Annexure-R/1 of the rejoinder and submits that the educational qualification of the petitioner has been discussed therein and she was having Bachelor of Journalism and Mass Communication from Ranchi University and a certificate to that effect has been issued by the Registrar, Ranchi University that this is equivalent to one year P.G. Diploma in Mass Communication for employment purpose. He submits that other qualifications have already been disclosed in the said annexure. He submits that second ground is also not tenable. So far of the third ground of rejection of the case is concerned, which is with regard to audit report, he submits that this is also not applicable in the case of the petitioner in view of the fact that the petitioner is not having any power to pass any order for financial movement, for that Mr. Sinha, the learned counsel draws attention of the Court to the memorandum of association and the rules and regulations. By way of referring the power and function of the Project Director, he submits that it is clear that the petitioner has got no role for any financial movement. Sinha, the learned counsel draws attention of the Court to the memorandum of association and the rules and regulations. By way of referring the power and function of the Project Director, he submits that it is clear that the petitioner has got no role for any financial movement. By way of referring clause 16(ii) and 16(iii) with regard to maintenance of fund and by way of referring to this document, he submits that procedure is prescribed therein as to how the payment has to be made. For five lakhs payment, the procedure is there and above five lakhs the procedure is prescribed. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the third ground is also not tenable. He vehemently relied in the case of “Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P.”, (1991) 1 SCC 212 and submits that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere even in the contractual employment if there is arbitrariness on the part of the respondent. He refers to paragraph no.34 of the said judgment, which is quoted hereinbelow: “34. In our opinion, the wide sweep of Article 14 undoubtedly takes within its fold the impugned circular issued by the State of U.P. in exercise of its executive power, irrespective of the precise nature of appointment of the Government Counsel in the districts and the other rights, contractual or statutory, which the appointees may have. It is for this reason that we base our decision on the ground that independent of any statutory right, available to the appointees, and assuming for the purpose of this case that the rights flow only from the contract of appointment, the impugned circular, issued in exercise of the executive power of the State, must satisfy Article 14 of the Constitution and if it is shown to be arbitrary, it must be struck down. However, we have referred to certain provisions relating to initial appointment, termination or renewal of tenure to indicate that the action is controlled at least by settled guidelines, followed by the State of U.P., for a long time. This too is relevant for deciding the question of arbitrariness alleged in the present case.” 6. However, we have referred to certain provisions relating to initial appointment, termination or renewal of tenure to indicate that the action is controlled at least by settled guidelines, followed by the State of U.P., for a long time. This too is relevant for deciding the question of arbitrariness alleged in the present case.” 6. So far as assessment and audit report are concerned, for that he relied in the case of “Larsen and Toubro Limited v. State of Jharkhand and Others”, (2017) 13 SCC 780 and placed reliance on paragraph nos.26 and 27 of the said judgment, which are quoted hereinbelow: “26. It is also pertinent to understand the meaning of the word “information” in its true sense. According to Oxford Dictionary, “information” means facts told, heard or discovered about somebody/something. The Law Lexicon describes the term “information” as the act or process of informing, communication or reception of knowledge. The expression “information” means instruction or knowledge derived from an external source concerning facts or parties or as to law relating to and/or having a bearing on the assessment. We agree that a mere change of opinion or having second thought about it by the competent authority on the same set of facts and materials on the record does not constitute “information” for the purposes of the State Act. But the word “information” used in the aforesaid section is of the widest amplitude and should not be construed narrowly. It comprehends not only variety of factors including information from external sources of any kind but also the discovery of new facts or information available in the record of assessment not previously noticed or investigated. Suppose a mistake in the original order of assessment is not discovered by the assessing officer, on further scrutiny, if it came to the notice of another assessor or even by a subordinate or a superior officer, it would be considered as information disclosed to the incumbent officer. If the mistake itself is not extraneous to the record and the informant gathered the information from the record, the immediate source of information to the officer in such circumstances is in one sense extraneous to the record. It will be information in his possession within the meaning of Section 19 of the State Act. If the mistake itself is not extraneous to the record and the informant gathered the information from the record, the immediate source of information to the officer in such circumstances is in one sense extraneous to the record. It will be information in his possession within the meaning of Section 19 of the State Act. In such cases of obvious mistakes apparent on the face of the record of assessment, that record itself can be a source of information, if that information leads to a discovery or belief that there has been an escape of assessment or under-assessment or wrong assessment. 27. There are a catena of judgments of this Court holding that assessment proceedings can be reopened if the audit objection points out the factual information already available in the records and that it was overlooked or not taken into consideration. Similarly, if audit points out some information or facts available outside the record or any arithmetical mistake, assessment can be reopened.” 7. Per contra, Mrs. Darshana Poddar Mishra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State of Jharkhand the Mr. Jitendra Tripathi, the learned counsel for the respondent no.3 (National AIDS Control Organization) submit that the petitioner was appointed on contractual basis which is not a regular appointment. She submits that it is well settled proposition that a contractual employee is required to be governed in terms of the agreement. She draws the attention of the Court to the appointment letter contained in Annexure-3 and submits that only for one year the appointment was there however renewal is there subject to approval of NACO after performance appraisal after completion of one year. She submits that the appraisal form relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of the year 2008-09 and in the said appraisal form two years extension was recommended under the scheme of NRHM. She submits that this will not rescue the petitioner. She submits that so far public employment is concerned, compliance of Article 14 and 16 is mandatory. She further submits that if the appointment is not governed by any statute and rule and only on the contract basis, the person working on contract basis has got no right for extension. To buttress her argument, she relied in the case of “State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Sandhya Tomar and Another”, (2013) 11 SSC 357. She further submits that if the appointment is not governed by any statute and rule and only on the contract basis, the person working on contract basis has got no right for extension. To buttress her argument, she relied in the case of “State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Sandhya Tomar and Another”, (2013) 11 SSC 357. Paragraph no.9 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow: “9. There can be no dispute with respect to the settled legal proposition that in the event that a person is not appointed on a regular basis, and if his service is not governed by any statutory rules, he shall be bound by the terms and conditions that have been incorporated in his appointment letter. (Vide State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar.) In such an eventuality, there can be no reason with respect to why the terms and conditions incorporated in the appointment letter should not be enforced against such an employee. In the instant case, Respondent 1 was temporarily appointed in a project and thus, she had at no point of time, been appointed on a regular basis, owing to which, she cannot claim any lien with respect to the said post.” 8. She further submits that advertisement for any post wherein certain qualification is prescribed that requires to be followed and the petitioner is not having the said qualification. So far as it requires to P.G. Diploma in Mass Communication. She submits that in that view of the matter this Court may not examine this aspect of the matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. To buttress her this argument, she relied in the case of “Yogesh Kumar and Others v. Govt. of NCT, Delhi and Others”, (2003) 3 SCC 548 . Paragraph no.8 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow: “8. This last argument advanced also does not impress us at all. Recruitment to public services should be held strictly in accordance with the terms of advertisement and the recruitment rules, if any. Deviation from the rules allows entry to ineligible persons and deprives many others who could have competed for the post. Merely because in the past some deviation and departure was made in considering the BEd candidates and we are told that was so done because of the paucity of TTC candidates, we cannot allow a patent illegality to continue. Deviation from the rules allows entry to ineligible persons and deprives many others who could have competed for the post. Merely because in the past some deviation and departure was made in considering the BEd candidates and we are told that was so done because of the paucity of TTC candidates, we cannot allow a patent illegality to continue. The recruitment authorities were well aware that candidates with qualification of TTC and BEd are available yet they chose to restrict entry for appointment only to TTC-pass candidates. It is open to the recruiting authorities to evolve a policy of recruitment and to decide the source from which the recruitment is to be made. So far as BEd qualification is concerned, in the connected appeals (CAs Nos. 1726-28 of 2001) arising from Kerala which are heard with this appeal, we have already taken the view that BEd qualification cannot be treated as a qualification higher than TTC because the nature of the training imparted for grant of certificate and for degree is totally different and between them there is no parity whatsoever. It is projected before us that presently more candidates available for recruitment to primary school are from BEd category and very few from TTC category. Whether for the aforesaid reasons, BEd qualification can also be prescribed for primary teachers is a question to be considered by the authorities concerned but we cannot consider BEd candidates for the present vacancies advertised as eligible. In our view, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court was fully justified in coming to the conclusion that BEd candidates were rightly excluded by the authorities from selection and appointment as primary teachers. We make it clear that we are not called upon to express any opinion on any BEd candidates appointed as primary teachers pursuant to advertisements in the past and our decision is confined only to the advertisement which was under challenge before the High Court and in this appeal.’ 9. She further submits that the case of ‘Yogesh Kumar and Others’ (supra) was further considered by the Hon’ble High Court in the case of “Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank and Another v. Anit Kumar Das”, 2020 SCC Online SC 897, paragraph no.18 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow: “18. She further submits that the case of ‘Yogesh Kumar and Others’ (supra) was further considered by the Hon’ble High Court in the case of “Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank and Another v. Anit Kumar Das”, 2020 SCC Online SC 897, paragraph no.18 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow: “18. In the case of Yogesh Kumar (supra), it is observed and held by this Court that recruitment to public service should be held strictly in accordance with the terms of Advertisement and the recruitment rules, if any. Deviation from the rules allows entry to ineligible persons and deprives many others who could have competed for the post.” She submits that deviation from the rules for certain period, will not rescue the petitioner. She submits that the case of ‘Kumari Srilekha Vidyarthi’ relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable as there is no arbitrariness by the respondent State. She further submits that so far the cases relied by the petitioner are concerned, that requires to be considered in the facts and circumstances of the present case. She submits that those cases are not helping the petitioner. She relied in the case of ‘J.S. Luthra Academy and Another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others’, (2018) 18 SCC 65. 10. Mr. Tripathi, the learned counsel for the respondent State submits that the NACO has got no role and he submits that the appointment is approved by the NACO and it is within the domain of the State of Jharkhand to consider the extension of the petitioner. 11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner was appointed on contract basis. The terms of the appointment is disclosed in the appointment letter dated 04.08.2008 wherein it is clearly stated that the contractual appointment is only for one year which can however be renewed with the approval of the NACO after performance appraisal of completion of one year. Agreement of contract of service is on the record as Annexure-4 and the termination is at clause-H which says that the petitioner comes under improper conduct and JSACS may terminate this agreement with the permission of the Chairman and without any compensation. Agreement of contract of service is on the record as Annexure-4 and the termination is at clause-H which says that the petitioner comes under improper conduct and JSACS may terminate this agreement with the permission of the Chairman and without any compensation. The appraisal form contained at page -60 which has been relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of the year 2008-09 and suggests about extension for two years in NRHM. The memorandum of understanding says that any dispute between the signatory and JSACS will be decided by the Chairman and its decision shall be final in the matter. The Division Bench in the earlier round of litigation while directing the respondent State to consider the case of the petitioner has given much emphasis on the spirit of section 13 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 wherein it has been observed that there cannot be compulsory extension of the contract. Pursuant thereto the reasoned order has been passed. On perusal of Annexure R/1 to the rejoinder and the certificate of Ranchi University at page 20 it transpires that the petitioner was a Bachelor of Journalism and Mass Communication court however, in other line it has been said that this may be considered equivalent to one year P.G. Diploma in Mass Communication for employment purpose. This Court is not examining this aspect of the matter that whether the petitioner was having the same qualification as required under the said advertisement or not. This aspect of the matter has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘J.S. Luthra Academy and Another’ (supra). The cases relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in ‘Larsen and Tourbo’ case is concerned, that was with regard to assessment not previously noticed or investigated. This aspect of the matter can be agitated by the petitioner before the competent authority with regard to audit report. This judgment was dealt with in sales tax and VAT Act. This judgment is not helping the petitioner. This aspect of the matter can be agitated by the petitioner before the competent authority with regard to audit report. This judgment was dealt with in sales tax and VAT Act. This judgment is not helping the petitioner. So far as ‘Kumari Srilekha Vidyarthi’ case relied by the petitioner is concerned, there is no doubt that if arbitrariness is proved and the Court comes to the conclusion and it is required to be interfered, the Court may interfere but in the facts and circumstances of the present case and looking to the earlier judgment of the Division Bench particularly Section 13 of the Indian Contract Act, arbitrariness has not been proved in the case in hand. The ‘Kumari Srilekha Vidyarthi’ case is not rescuing the petitioner. It is well settled proposition of law that the judgment needs to be read in the facts and circumstances of that case. It is well settled proposition of law that a particular judgment needs to be read in the facts and circumstances of that case. A reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of Orissa Versus Sudhanshu Sekhar Misra and Others, reported in AIR 1968 SC 647 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered Earl of- Halsbury, which is at page 651 of the said judgment quoted herein below for ready reference: “On this topic this is what Earl of- Halsbury. LC said in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495. “Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood, (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition @pageSC652 that may seem to follow logically from it. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition @pageSC652 that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.'' 12. The services of the petitioner was not governed by any statutory rules and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner’s service is being governed by the contract of service and the terms of the appointment is being governed by the said agreement. 13. In view of the above discussions and going through the materials on record, no relief can be extended to the petitioner. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. 14. I.A. etc. is also dismissed.