JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel and Sri Rajesh Yadav, learned counsel who appears for District Basic Education Officer. 2. This petition has been preferred seeking the following reliefs :- “i. issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 28.04.2021 passed by respondent No.3 i.e. District Basic Education Officer Baghpat, District Baghpat regarding the appointment of the petitioner on the post of Assistant Teacher (Annexure No.8 to the writ petition). ii. issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent No.3 i.e. District Basic Education Officer Baghpat, District Baghpat to appoint the petitioner on the post of Assistant Teacher on the basis of her eligibility. …..” 3. The petitioner had participated in a recruitment exercise initiated by the respondents for appointment of Assistant Teachers. The selection process was undertaken against 69,000 vacancies. The petitioner also sought the extension of the benefits of reservation by virtue of belonging to a backward class. However, in support of the aforesaid she submitted a caste certificate which bore the name of her husband. On 04 December 2020, the respondents had issued a clarification providing that all caste certificates must be issued and bear a date prior to the cut-off date namely 28 May 2020. Additionally, it was provided that it should be ensured that the caste certificate bears the name of the parent of the applicant. On 04 December 2020, the respondents had issued a clarification providing that all caste certificates must be issued and bear a date prior to the cut-off date namely 28 May 2020. Additionally, it was provided that it should be ensured that the caste certificate bears the name of the parent of the applicant. The relevant stipulations in the order of 04 December 2020 read thus :- ^^¼1½ csfld f'k{kk ifj"kn }kjk vkosnu i= izLrqr djus dh fu/kkZfjr dh x;h vfUre frfFk fnukad 28&05&2020 rd fuxZr fd;s x;s fuokl izek.k i= ,oa tkfr izek.k i= dks gh Lohdkj fd;k tk;sA ¼2½ ek0 mPpre U;k;ky; us oylEek iky cuke dksphu fo'o&fo|ky; 1996 S.C.C. 545 ,oa jkes'k HkkbZ nHkkj uk;dk cuke xqtjkr jkT; ,oa vU; flfoy vihy ua0654@2012 esa ;g Lohdkj fd;k gS fd fdlh efgyk dk nwljh tkfr esa 'kknh dj ysus ek= ls mldh tkfr dk LVsVl ugha cny tk;sxk] cfYd ftl tkfr esa mlus tUe fy;k gS] ogh ekuh tk;sxhA vr% ,slh efgyk vH;FkhZ ftlds }kjk izLrqr tkfr izek.k i= ds vk/kkj ij vkj{k.k dk ykHk izkIr djrs gq, p;u izkIr fd;k x;k gS] mldk p;u fujLr dj fn;k tk;sA ¼3½ fuokl izek.k i= vU; izns'k dk gksus dk izdj.k ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds vkns'k ls vPNkfnr gS rFkk bl lEcU/k esa 'kklukns'k la[;k&588@68&5&2019] fnukad 07&06&2019 fuxZr gSA bl lEcU/k esa mDr 'kklukns'k ds vkyksd esa dk;Zokgh dh tk;sA** 4. When the petitioner initially appeared at the counselling session, she was apprised that the caste certificate submitted by her along with the online application would be treated as invalid since it bore the name of her husband and she was accordingly directed to obtain a fresh caste certificate. That caste certificate came to be issued in her name on 02 June 2020. Upon noticing the aforesaid facts, the respondents taking into consideration the government orders of 31 March 2021 and 04 May 2021 have held that since the caste certificate had come to be issued after 28 May 2020 and a direction had been issued for according closure to the selection process initiated in 2019, the candidature of the petitioner could not be processed further. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the original caste certificate which was submitted by the petitioner as well as the caste certificate obtained now show that both her husband as well as her father belong to the same backward class. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the original caste certificate which was submitted by the petitioner as well as the caste certificate obtained now show that both her husband as well as her father belong to the same backward class. It was in this context submitted that the insistence of the respondents upon the petitioner obtaining a caste certificate in the name of her father was clearly superfluous and in any case could not have resulted in the denial of extension of reservation benefits to the petitioner. It was further submitted that the petitioner pursuant to the advice given by the respondents had applied for the grant of a fresh caste certificate bearing the name of her father on 19 May 2020. However, according to the petitioner, the respondents themselves delayed the issuance of that certificate which ultimately came to be issued on 02 June 2020. In view of the aforesaid it was submitted that the petitioner cannot be held liable for the delay on the part of the respondents. Learned counsel has lastly placed reliance upon a judgment rendered by a learned Judge in Bindresh Singh vs. State of U.P. and others [2021 (1) ADJ 269] to submit that bearing in mind the social objectives underlying the grant of reservation, the respondents were obliged to consider the candidature of the petitioner and therefore prays for the impugned order being set-aside. 6. Dealing with the significance of requiring a caste certificate bearing the name of the parent of a candidate, this Court in Suman vs. State of U.P. and others [Writ-A No.8312 of 2021 decided on 3.8.2021] held thus :- “Insofar as the OBC certificate bearing the name of the husband of the petitioner is concerned, the Court finds that the stipulation of the caste certificate bearing the name of a parent serves a salutary and significant purpose. Caste as is well settled is determined by birth. The identification of a person as belonging to a particular caste or social class has an unbroken and undeviating connect with the family of the individual. The candidate must therefore necessarily establish that he or she was born into a family which belongs to a backward class duly recognised as such by the appropriate government. The identification of a person as belonging to a particular caste or social class has an unbroken and undeviating connect with the family of the individual. The candidate must therefore necessarily establish that he or she was born into a family which belongs to a backward class duly recognised as such by the appropriate government. A certificate bearing the name of the parent thus serves the purposes of enabling the respondents to ascertain and verify the actual caste of the holder thereof as existing at the time of birth. While it is well settled that benefits of reservation cannot be obtained by virtue of marriage, the Court may only extract the following passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in Sobha Hymavathi Devi v. Setti Gangadhara Swamy :- "10. What then remains is the fact that the appellant though assigned the caste of her father Murahari Rao, namely, the Sistu Karnam community, had married a tribal belonging to the Bhagatha community. On the basis of this marriage, it is argued that she must be taken to have acquired membership in the community of her husband and consequently treated as a member of that community. It is in that context that the decision in Horo [ (1972) 1 SCC 771 : AIR 1972 SC 1840 ] was relied on. It is also contended that the decision in Horo [ (1972) 1 SCC 771 : AIR 1972 SC 1840 ] related to an election dispute and consequently, the ratio of that decision should govern the present case. We have already indicated that there is nothing to show that the marriage of the appellant with Appala Raju was sanctioned or approved by the elders of the Bhagatha community or the Panchayat concerned or was in tribal form or that the formalities attending such a tribal marriage were observed and the marriage was performed after obtaining the approval of the elders of the tribe. Even otherwise, we have difficulty in accepting the position that a non-tribal who marries a tribal could claim to contest a seat reserved for tribals. Article 332 of the Constitution speaks of reservation of seats for Scheduled Tribes in Legislative Assemblies. The object is clearly to give representation in the legislature to Scheduled Tribe candidates, considered to be deserving of such special protection. Article 332 of the Constitution speaks of reservation of seats for Scheduled Tribes in Legislative Assemblies. The object is clearly to give representation in the legislature to Scheduled Tribe candidates, considered to be deserving of such special protection. To permit a non-tribal under cover of a marriage to contest such a seat would tend to defeat the very object of such a reservation. The decision of this Court in Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University [ (1996) 3 SCC 545 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 772 : (1996) 33 ATC 713 ] supports this view. Neither the fact that a non-backward female married a backward male nor the fact that she was recognised by the community thereafter as a member of the backward community, was held to enable a non-backward to claim reservation in terms of Article 15(4) or 16(4) of the Constitution. Their Lordships after noticing Bhoobum Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry [(1865) 10 MIA 279] and Lulloobhoy Bappoobhoy Cassidass Moolchund v. Cassibai [(1879-80) 7 IA 212 : ILR 5 Bom 110] held that a woman on marriage becomes a member of the family of her husband and thereby she becomes a member of the caste to which she has moved. The caste rigidity breaks down and would stand as no impediment to her becoming a member of the family to which the husband belongs and to which she gets herself transplanted. Thereafter, this Court noticed that recognition by the community was also important. Even then, this Court categorically laid down that the recognition of a lady as a member of a backward community in view of her marriage would not be relevant for the purpose of entitlement to reservation under Article 16(4) of the Constitution for the reason that she as a member of the forward caste, had an advantageous start in life and a marriage with a male belonging to a backward class would not entitle her to the facility of reservation given to a backward community. The High Court has applied this decision to a seat reserved in an election in terms of Article 332 of the Constitution. The High Court has applied this decision to a seat reserved in an election in terms of Article 332 of the Constitution. We see no reason why the principle relating to reservation under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) laid down by this Court should not be extended to the constitutional reservation of a seat for a Scheduled Tribe in the House of the People or under Article 332 in the Legislative Assembly...…" Reiterating the aforesaid position in law in Sunita Singh v. State of U.P., the Supreme Court succinctly observed:- 5. There cannot be any dispute that the caste is determined by birth and the caste cannot be changed by marriage with a person of Scheduled Caste. Undoubtedly, the appellant was born in "Agarwal" family, which falls in general category and not in Scheduled Caste. Merely because her husband is belonging to a Scheduled Caste category, the appellant should not have been issued with a caste certificate showing her caste as Scheduled Caste. In that regard, the orders of the authorities as well as the judgment of the High Court cannot be faulted. Regard must be had to the fact that in Sunita Singh, the Supreme Court was dealing with a caste certificate which came to be issued based on the caste of the husband. It was in the aforesaid backdrop that it held that the caste certificate was invalid. It is thus evident that it was to avoid such situations and claims that the respondents insisted upon the caste certificate bearing the name of the parent of the candidate. The aforesaid stipulation has neither been challenged by the petitioner nor can it be described as being arbitrary or superfluous. The Court additionally shudders to imagine the enormous burden that would stand placed upon a recruiting body before whom caste certificates such as the one produced by the petitioner here were placed in support of claims for extension of reservation benefits. In all such cases, the recruiting agency would then have to independently verify the family origins of each such candidate in order to ascertain whether the individual was born in a social class to which benefits under Article 16 of the Constitution stand conferred. Ms. Archana Singh, learned counsel, apprises the Court that the present recruitment was undertaken to fill up 69,000 posts of Assistant Teachers. Learned counsel informs the Court that 146060 candidates participated in the selection process. Ms. Archana Singh, learned counsel, apprises the Court that the present recruitment was undertaken to fill up 69,000 posts of Assistant Teachers. Learned counsel informs the Court that 146060 candidates participated in the selection process. The facts as noticed above underscore the enormity of the avoidable and unnecessary obligation which would stand placed on the recruitment agency. In fact, placing such an onus on the recruiting body may also have a deleterious effect on the paramount requirement of completing a selection process connected with appointment to public posts within a defined timeline. The Court in view of the aforesaid facts is of the considered view that there is no justification for such an additional responsibility being legally foisted upon the respondents.” 7. Having noticed the salutary and significant objective which underlies the requirement of a caste certificate bearing the name of a parent, the Court further takes note of the last date as reiterated under the Government Order dated 04 December 2020. That reemphasized that all candidates would have to furnish and obtain a caste certificate by 28 May 2020. That stipulation was clearly breached with the petitioner submitting a caste certificate issued after the said date. The significance of a cut-off date as fixed by respondents in a large scale public examination was duly emphasized and underlined by a Full Bench of the Court in Gaurav Sharma vs. State of U.P. and others [ 2017 (5) ADJ 494 ] in the following terms :- “The second aspect which must necessarily be noted is the significance of a last date prescribed in an advertisement and its impact. A last date comes to be prescribed in an advertisement or recruitment notice to seek certain well established objectives. It firstly puts all prospective candidates on notice with regard to the eligibility qualifications that the employer desires a particular candidate to hold. The prescription of the last date also acts as information to the prospective candidates to test and ascertain whether they are eligible to participate in the selection process. There are therefore, upon the prescription of such a last date in the advertisement no shifting timelines or uncertainty. The prescription of such a condition in the advertisement also eschews any arbitrary action and denudes the authority from wielding a discretion which may be abused. There are therefore, upon the prescription of such a last date in the advertisement no shifting timelines or uncertainty. The prescription of such a condition in the advertisement also eschews any arbitrary action and denudes the authority from wielding a discretion which may be abused. One may in this connection usefully refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rakesh Kumar Sharma Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and others which noticed the earlier precedents on the subject and observed as follows:………” 8. As is manifest from the aforesaid principles as enunciated in Gaurav Sharma, the relevance of a cut-off date is not just to test the eligibility of all candidates but also ensures that a definitive date is fixed by which all prospective candidates may ensure compliance with the terms and conditions of the advertisement. The last date so prescribed cannot be one which may shift or be amended based on the requests of individual candidates. If that were permitted, it may not only derail the entire recruitment process but also raise the spectre of allegations being made of illegal exercise of discretion by the recruitment agency. 9. Significantly the aforesaid observations do not appear to have been brought to the attention of the learned Judge who rendered judgment in Bindresh Singh. The decision of the Full Bench was brushed aside with the learned Judge simply observing that it did not apply to the facts of that case. In Bindresh, the learned Judge proceeded to draw sustenance from the decision in Ram Kumar Gijoriya [ (2016) 4 SCC 754 ] a decision which was duly noticed by the Full Bench in Gaurav Sharma and explained as follows :- 19. We then proceed to address the second question framed for our consideration and which pertains to the correctness or otherwise of the judgment of the Division Bench in Arvind Kumar Yadav. As noted above, the sheet anchor of the case of the appellant and the writ petitioners was the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Kumar Gijroya. We then proceed to address the second question framed for our consideration and which pertains to the correctness or otherwise of the judgment of the Division Bench in Arvind Kumar Yadav. As noted above, the sheet anchor of the case of the appellant and the writ petitioners was the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Kumar Gijroya. It becomes relevant to note that in the said case, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the correctness of a judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court which had overturned a judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the said Court who had followed two earlier precedents to hold that the candidature of a Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes candidate could not be turned down only on the ground that the caste certificate was submitted after the last date prescribed in the advertisement. The two prior precedents which the Delhi High Court considered were Pushpa v. Government (NCT of Delhi), 2009 SCC OnLine Del 281, and Tej Pal Singh v. Government (NCT of Delhi), 1999 SCC OnLine Del 1092. In the appeal of Ram Kumar Gijroya, the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court following the two precedents referred to above had directed the respondents therein to accept the OBC certificate of the appellant. One of the significant and distinguishing features of Ram Kumar Gijroya, which immediately springs to light is that the advertisement did not prescribe a cut off date at all. The requirement of submitting the OBC certificate was introduced only by a notice issued by the Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board while declaring the final results. 24. We are therefore of the considered view that the Division Bench in Arvind Kumar Yadav rightly noted the distinct factual backdrop in which Ram Kumar Gijroya came to be rendered. The aspect of there being no consideration of the impact of a negative stipulation in an advertisement in the said judgment of the Supreme Court clearly escaped the Division Benches which pronounced judgments in Pravesh Kumar and Shubham Gupta.” 10. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds itself unable to tread the line as adopted in Bindresh. 11. In any case the Court bears in mind the element of public interest and the imperatives bearing upon the respondents to ensure that a public examination and selection process is brought to an end within specified timelines. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds itself unable to tread the line as adopted in Bindresh. 11. In any case the Court bears in mind the element of public interest and the imperatives bearing upon the respondents to ensure that a public examination and selection process is brought to an end within specified timelines. It was these factors which were emphasized in the government orders of 31 March 2021 and 04 May 2021. For all the aforesaid reasons, the Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned orders. 12. The writ petition fails and shall stand dismissed.