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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body
2021 DIGILAW 851 (MP)
Karnel Singh v. Puran
2021-12-31
MANU SHRIVASTAVA
body2021
vkns'k 1- ;g fuxjkuh eŒçŒ Òw&jktLo lafgrk] 1959 ¼ftls vkxs la{ksi esa lafgrk dgk tk,xk½ dh èkkjk 50 d¢ vUrxZr vij vk;qDr] pacy laÒkx }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 30-9-2010 d¢ fo#) çLrqr dh xà gSA 2- çdj.k d¢ rF; la{ksi esa bl çdkj gSa fd vkosnd us uk;c rglhynkj ohjiqj rglhy fot;iqj d¢ le{k lafgrk dh èkkjk 168] 169 ,oa 190 d¢ varxZr vkosnu bl ckor çLrqr fd;k fd xzke fdUuiqjk rglhy fot;iqj fLFkr Òwfe losZ Øekad 13@9 jdck 3 chÄk ,oa 14@jdck 7 chÄk dqey 10 chÄk vkjkth ¼ftls vkxs la{ksi esa ç'ukèkhu Òwfe dgk tk,xk½ lEor 2045 esa mld¢ }kjk 50]000@& #i, nsdj e©f[kd iV~Vs ij yh Fkh] ftlls og 15 xquk yxku vnk dj pqdk gS rFkk rÒh ls fujarj [ksrh djrk vk jgk gS] vr% mls ç'ukèkhu Òwfe dk ÒwfeLokeh Ĩf"kr fd;k tk,A uk;c rglhynkj us vkosnu ij çdj.k Øekad 7@2000&01@v&6 ntZ dj vkns'k fnukad 3-8-2001 ls ç'ukèkhu Òwfe dk vkosnd d¢ i{k esa ukekarj.k Lohdkj fd;k x;kA mDr vkns'k d¢ fo#) vukosnd Øekad 1 }kjk dysDVj ';¨iqj d¢ le{k fuxjkuh çLrqr dh xÃA dysDVj us çdj.k iathc) dj vkosnd d¨ fnukad 30-4-2003 d¨ dkj.k crkv¨ u¨fVl tkjh fd;k x;k] ftld¢ fo#) vkosnd }kjk vij vk;qDr] pacy laÒkx d¢ le{k fuxjkuh çLrqr dh xÃA vij vk;qDr d¢ vkns'k fnukad 31-10-2005 ls fuxjkuh fujLr dh xÃA vij vk;qDr }kjk çdj.k fujkÑr g¨us d¢ i'pkr~ dysDVj U;k;ky; esa iqu% lquokà çkjaÒ dh xÃA lquokà mijkar dysDVj }kjk vkns'k fnukad 5-2-2010 ls uk;c rglhynkj dk vkns'k fnukad 3-8-2001 fujLr fd;k x;kA dysDVj d¢ vkns'k d¢ fo#) vkosnd }kjk vij vk;qDr] pacy laÒkx d¢ le{k fuxjkuh çLrqr dh xÃ] t¨ vij vk;qDr d¢ vkns'k fnukad 30-9-2010 ls fujLr dh xÃA vij vk;qDr] pacy d¢ blh vkns'k ls ifjosfnr g¨dj ;g fuxjkuh bl U;k;ky; esa çLrqr dh xà gSA 3- vkosnd d¢ fo}ku vfÒÒk"kd }kjk eq[; :i ls rdZ çLrqr fd;k x;k fd vukosnd us 50]000@& #i, ysdj vkosnd d¨ ç'ukèkhu Òwfe 3 lky d¢ e©f[kd iV~Vs ij nh FkhA vukosnd iV~Vs d¢ vkèkkj ij ukekarj.k gsrq lger FksA blh vkèkkj ij vkosnd dk ukekarj.k Lohdkj fd;k x;k FkkA ;g Òh rdZ fd;k x;k fd dysDVj çdj.k Loeso fuxjkuh esa ugha ys ldrs gSaA uk;c rglhynkj d¢ vkns'k d¢ fo#) vihy çLrqr dh tkuh pkfg, FkhA dysDVj 1 o"kZ d¢ i'pkr~ çdj.k Loeso fuxjkuh esa ugha ys ldrk gS] tcfd bl çdj.k esa vkns'k 2001 dk Fkk v©j dysDVj }kjk o"kZ 2004 vFkkZr 3 o"kZ i'pkr~ çdj.k Loeso fuxjkuh esa fy;k x;k gSA rglhy U;k;ky; dk vfÒys[k miyCèk ugha g¨us ij ;g ugha ekuk tk ldrk fd og vkns'k gS gh ughaA dysDVj ,oa vij vk;qDr }kjk vkosnd d¢ fo#) euekus rjhd¢ ls dk;Zokgh dh xà gSA mud¢ }kjk fuxjkuh Lohdkj dh tkdj vèkhuLFk U;k;ky; dysDVj ,oa vij vk;qDr dk vkns'k fujLr fd, tkus dk vuqj¨èk fd;k x;kA 4- vukosnd Øekad 2 yxk;r 4 d¢ fo}ku vfÒÒk"kd }kjk eq[; :i ls rdZ fd;k x;k fd vukosnd d¨ Òw&nku varxZr iV~Vk çkIr gqvkA ,slh fLFkfr esa] uk;c rglhynkj vkosnd d¨ ÒwfeLokeh vfèkdkjh çnku ugha dj ldrs FksA lekt d¢ det¨j ox¨Z d¢ Ñf"k Òwfe èkkjd¨a d¢ mèkkj nsus oky¨a d¢ Òwfe gM+ius lacaèkh dqpkdj¨a ls ifj=k.k rFkk eqfDr vfèkfu;e] 1976 d¢ vuqlkj dysDVj }kjk dk;Zokgh dj vukosnd d¨ iqu% ÒwfeLokeh ntZ djus d¢ vkns'k fn, x, gSaA vfèkdkfjrkfoghu vkns'k d¨ laKku esa ysus d¢ fy, le;&lhek dk caèku ugha gSA uk;c rglhynkj }kjk ikfjr =qfViw.kZ vkns'k d¨ fujLr djus esa dysDVj }kjk mfpr dk;Zokgh dh xà gSA vij vk;qDr }kjk Òh dysDVj d¢ vkns'k d¨ mfpr ekuk gSA mud¢ }kjk fuxjkuh fujLr fd, tkus dk vuqj¨èk fd;k x;kA 5- mÒ;i{k d¢ fo}ku vfÒÒk"kd x;k }kjk çLrqr rd¨Z d¢ ifjçs{; esa vèkhuLFk U;k;ky;¨a d¢ vfÒys[k¨a dk voy¨du fd;k x;kA 61- çdj.k esa fopkj.kh; eqn~nk ;g gS fd D;k fopkj.k U;k;ky; uk;c rglhynkj d¨ vkosnd i{k d¨ e©:lh Ñ"kd v©j ÒwfeLokeh Ĩf"kr djus dk vfèkdkj Fkk fd ughaA uk;c rglhynkj }kjk ;g vkns'k lafgrk dh fuEufyf[kr èkkjkv¨a d¢ vkèkkj ij ikfjr fd;k x;k gS %& ¼d½ çFker% lafgrk dh rRle; ykxw èkkjk 168¼1½ fuEukuqlkj m}r gS %& ^^168- iV~Vs & ¼1½ mu ekey¨a esa d¢ flok; ftud¢ fd fy, mièkkjk ¼2½ esa micaèk fd;k x;k gS] d¨Ã Òh ÒwfeLokeh mld¢ [kkrs esa lekfo"V fdlh Òwfe d¨ rhu o"kZ dh fdlh ØeorÊ dkykofèk d¢ n©jku ,d o"kZ ls vfèkd le; d¢ fy, iV~Vs ij ugha nsxkA^^ ¼mYys[kuh; gS fd lafgrk esa o"kZ 2018 esa fd, x, la'k¨èku ls Åij mfYyf[kr èkkjk 168¼1½ la'k¨fèkr dh xà gSA½ ¼[k½ lafgrk dh rRle; ykxw èkkjk 168¼1½ d¢ Åij mYysf[kr lacafèkr Òkx d¨ lafgrk dh rRle; ykxw èkkjk 169 d¢ lkFk iढk tkuk pkfg,] ftldk çklafxd Òkx fuEukuqlkj gS%& ^^169- vukfèkÑr iV~Vk] vkfn & ;fn d¨Ã ÒwfeLokeh & ¼,d½ vius [kkrs esa lekfo"V fdlh Òwfe d¨ èkkjk 168 d¢ mYyaÄu esa fdlh dkykofèk d¢ fy, iV~Vs ij ns nsrk gS] ;k & r¨ e©:lh Ñ"kd d¢ vfèkdkj ¼d½ mi;qZDr ¼,d½ d¢ ekeys esa] iV~Vsnkj d¨ ,slh Òwfe esa rnqifj ç¨nÒwr g¨ tk,axsA^^ ¼mYys[kuh; gS fd lafgrk esa o"kZ 2018 esa fd, x, la'k¨èku ls Åij mfYyf[kr èkkjk 169 foy¨fir dj nh xà gS½ ¼x½ tc fdlh O;fDr d¨ ,d ckj Åij mYysf[kr èkkjkv¨a d¢ vkèkkj ij e©:lh Ñ"kd d¢ vfèkdkj çkIr g¨ tkrs gSa] rc lafgrk dh èkkjk 190¼2d½ d¢ vuqlkj ÒwfeLokeh vfèkdkj çkIr g¨ tkrs gSaA lafgrk dh èkkjk 190¼2d½] t¨ eŒçŒ vfèkfu;e Øekad 24 lu~ 1961 }kjk t¨M+h xÃ] fuEukuqlkj gS %& ^^tgka ÒwfeLokeh dh Òwfe mièkkjk ¼1½ esa fofufnZ"V e©:lh Ñ"kd ls fÒUu e©:lh Ñ"kd }kjk èkkfjr gS] ogka ml e©:lh Ñ"kd d¨ ,slh Òfwe d¢ lacaèk esa ÒwfeLokeh d¢ vfèkdkj-----------ç¨nÒwr g¨ tk,axsA^^ 6-2- rglhynkj }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 30-9-1999 esa oLrqr% n¨ fu.kZ; 'kkfey gSa %& ¼d½ lafgrk dh èkkjk 168¼1½ v©j 169 d¢ rgr e©:lh Ñ"kd Ĩf"kr djukA ¼[k½ rRi'pkr] lafgrk dh èkkjk 190¼2d½ d¢ rgr ÒwfeLokeh vfèkdkj çnku djukA 6-3- bl çdj.k esa fopkj.kh; fcUnq ;g gS fd D;k jktLo U;k;ky; d¢ ikl dCts d¢ vkèkkj ij e©:lh Ñ"kd Ĩf"kr dj ÒwfeLokeh vfèkdkj çnku djus dh vfèkdkfjrk gSA 6-4 bl lacaèk esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; }kjk 1978 jkŒ fuŒ 12 jkoyk fo#) nsfÙk;k ,oa vU; esa fuEufyf[kr U;k; n`"Vkar çfrikfnr fd;k x;k gS %& ''4.
The lower appellate Court felt that under section 257 (O) of the M.R. Land Revenue Code the claims by an occupancy tenant for conferral of the rights of Bhumiswami fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Tribunal under section 190 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code. Section 190 of the Code no doubt expoweres the Revenue Tribunal to confer the rights of a Bhumiswami; but it contemplates that these rights could only be conferred on an occupancy tenant but whether a person claiming the rights of a Bhumiswami is an occupancy tenant or not, is not within the jurisdiction or Revenue Tribunal to determine under section 190 of the Code. That question therefore will be for the civil Court to decide and section 257 (O) of the Code will therefore not come into operation restricting jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit for declaration of title.'' (Emphasis added) blh çdkj] ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; }kjk 1991 jkŒ fuŒ 114 luoy ,oa vU; fo#) y{ehckà ,oa vU; esa fuEufyf[kr U;k; n`"Vkar çfrikfnr fd;k x;k gS%& ''27. In the Instant case the real dispute between the parties centers round the question whether the defendants No. 1 and 3 had acquired the status of occupancy tenents in respect of the suit lands. There is no provision in the Code which empowers any Revenue officer to determine the status of occupancy tenant. Section 190 which deals with conferral of Bhumiswami rights on occupancy tenants can operate only when the person who claims to have acquired Bhumiswami rights under section 190 of the Code is admittedly an occupancy tenant. But that is not the situation in the present case. ....... 33. In the instant case defendants No. 1 and 3 claimed to have acquired status of occupancy tenants and consequently the status of Bhumiswami in respect of the sult-lands under section 190 of the Code. The jurisdiction for deciding such a claim is vested in the civil Court and not in the Revenue Authority and the decision in the case of Rawala (supra) is on all force applicable to the facts of the instant case. As.
The jurisdiction for deciding such a claim is vested in the civil Court and not in the Revenue Authority and the decision in the case of Rawala (supra) is on all force applicable to the facts of the instant case. As. such, it is held that the civil suit filed by the plaintiff challenging the defendants, claims of status as occupancy tenant in respect of the suit-land, is maintainable.'' (Emphasis added) blh çdkj] ekuuh; eŒçŒ mPp U;k;ky; }kjk foeyk ckà p©èkjh fo#) c¨MZ vkWQ jsosU;w ,oa vU; ¼ekuw@,eih@0860@2008 % 2009 vkj ,u 242½ esa fuEufyf[kr U;kf;d fl)kar çfrikfnr fd;k x;k gS %& ''The core question that arises for consideration is whether in a case-where the status of the claimant as occupancy tenant is disputed, the revenue authorities can examine the merits of the claim and record a finding about the status as occupancy tenant and pass an order conferring the Bhumiswami rights under section 190 of the Code ? Section 190 of the code deals with conferral of Bhumiswami right on occupancy tenant. Under section 190 Bhumiswami rights can be conferred on occupancy tenant but status of a person as occupancy tenant cannot be decided. Therefore, section 190 can be attracted only when the status of a person as occupancy tenant is not in dispute. Section 190 of the Code reads as under: 190. Conferral of Bhumiswami rights on occupancy tenants (1) Where a Bhumiswami whose land is held by an occupancy tenant belonging to any of the categories specified in sub-section (1) of section 185 except in items (a) and (b) of clause (i) thereof fails to make an application under sub-section (1) of section 189 within the period laid down therein, the rights of a Bhumiswami shall accrue to the occupancy tenant in respect of the land held by him from such Bhumiswami with effect from the commencement of the agricultural year next following the expiry of the aforesaid period. (2) Where an application is made by a Bhumiswami in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 189, the rights of Bhimiswami shall accrue to the occupancy tenant in respect of the land remaining with him after resumption if any allowed to the Bhumiswami with effect from the commencement of the agricultural year next following the date on which the application is finally disposed of.
(2-A) Where the land of a Bhumiswami is held by an occupancy tenant other than an occupancy tenant referred to in sub-section (1) the rights of a Bhumiswami shall accrue to the occupancy tenant in respect of such land- (a) In the case of occupancy tenants of the categories specified in items (a) and (b) of clause (i) of sub section (1) of section 185, with effect from the commencement of the agricultural year next following the commencement of the Principal Act; (b) In any other case with effect from the commencement of the agricultural year next following the date on which the rights of an occupancy tenant accrue to such tenant. (3) Where the rights of a Bhumiswami accrue to an occupancy tenant under sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub-section (2-A) such occupancy tenant shall be liable to pay to his Bhumiswami compensation equal to fifteen times the land revenue payable in respect of the land in five equal annual installments, payable under section 188 for the corresponding year falls due, and if default is made in payament, it shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that if from any cause the land revenue is suspended or remitted in whole or in part in any area in any year, the annual instalment of compensation payable by an occupancy tenant holding land in such area in respect of that year shall be sruspernded and shall become payable one year after the last of the remaining instalments. (4) Any occupancy tenant may at his option pay the entire amount of compensation in a lump sum and where an occupancy tenant exercises this option, he shall be entitled to a rebate at the rate of ten percent. (5) The amount of compensation, whether paid in lump sum or in annual instalments, shall be deposited in such manner and form as may be prescribed by the occupancy tenant with the Tahsildar, for payment to the Bhumiswami. (6) Where the rights of a Bhumiswami in any land accrue to an occupancy tenant under this section, he shall be liable to pay the land revenue payable by the Bhumiswami in respect of such land with effect from the date of accrual of such rights. Section 257 of the Code deals with exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue authorities and section 257 (O) provided that: 257.
Section 257 of the Code deals with exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue authorities and section 257 (O) provided that: 257. Exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities - Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time being in force, no civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of, and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters: (O) claims by occupancy tenants for conferral of the rights of Bhumiswami under section 190; Under section 257 (O) revenue authorities have exclusive jurisdiction to decide claim of occupancy tenant for conferral of Bhumiswami right but under section 257 (O) read with section 190 the status as occupancy tenant itself cannot be decided by revenue authorities. ....... Thus it can be safely held that determination of question of Bhumiswami rights lies within the province of the civil Court except in cases falling under section 257 of the Code. Section 257 (O) gives limited jurisdiction to revenue authorities to decide the claims of occupancy tenant for conferral of Bhumiswami rights, therefore, in cases where status of claimant as occupancy tenant is in dispute, section 190 of the code cannot be invoked. In the present case an application under section 190 of the Code was filed by the respondent No. 5 claiming the status of occupancy tenant on the basis of cultivation and possession as 'Munafedar' from 1977-78 to 1984-85. The petitioners had filed reply dated 18.2.85/26.3.85 to this application denying the facts stated in the aplication and denying that the respondent No. 5 remained in possession upto 1985 as 'Manafedar'. Before the Addtitional Tahsildar the matter was contested by the petitioner and the issue No. 3 was framed about attaining the status of occupancy tenant by the respondent No. 5 under section 185 of the Code. This issue was contested by the petitioner and the Tahsildar held that the respondent No. 5 obtained the status of occupancy tenant under section 185 of the Code.
This issue was contested by the petitioner and the Tahsildar held that the respondent No. 5 obtained the status of occupancy tenant under section 185 of the Code. The Tahsildar then examined the question of conferral Bhumiswami rights on the respondent No. 5 under section 190 of the Code and held the respondent No. 5 is entitled for such right on the basis of the findings about the respondents status as occupancy tenant. A perusal of the order of the Tahsildar indicates that the status of the respondent No. 5 as occupancy tenant was in dispute. The Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to go into the question and record a finding about the status of \occupancy tenant under section 185. Proper remedy in such a case was to relegate the parties to avail the remedy of civil suit. The Additional Commissioner had rightly placed reliance uppon the judgments of this Court reported in Sanwal (supra) while taking a view that in the facts of the case the revenue Court had no jurisdiction to confer the status of occupancy tenant to the respondent No. 5 Clear error of law was committed by the Board of Revenue in reversing the order of the Additional Commissioner while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. The Board of Revenue has not noted the judgments of this Court which were relied upon by the Additional Commissioner.
The Board of Revenue has not noted the judgments of this Court which were relied upon by the Additional Commissioner. The order of the Board of Revenue cannot be sustained since view taken by the Board of Revenue on this issue is contrary to the judgment of this Court.'' (Emphasis added) 6-5 mij¨ä U;kf;d m)j.k¨a esa jktLo U;k;ky; d¢ vfèkdkj¨a d¢ lacaèk esa fu"d"kZ fudkys x, gSa] t¨ bl çdkj gSa %& ¼d½ jktLo U;k;ky; lafgrk dh èkkjk 190 d¢ rgr ÒwfeLokeh vfèkdkj çnku dj ldrs gSa] tSlk fd lafgrk dh èkkjk 257 dh rRle; ykxw dafMdk ¼.k½ ¼ftls Åij mYysf[kr U;kf;d m)j.k esa èkkjk 257 ¼0½ dgk x;k gS½ esa çkoèkkfur gSA voy¨duh; gS fd lafgrk esa o"kZ 2018 esa fd, x, la'k¨èku d¢ ekè;e ls lafgrk dh èkkjk 257 dh dafMdk ¼.k½ foy¨fir dj nh xà gS] ftl dkj.k rRi'pkr jktLo U;k;ky;¨a d¨ lafgrk dh èkkjk 190 d¢ rgr ÒwfeLokeh vfèkdkj çnku djus dh vfèkdkfjrk ugha jgh gSA tgka rd o"kZ 2018 d¢ la'k¨èku ls iwoZ dh fLFkfr gS] tSlk fd bl çdj.k esa gS] jktLo U;k;ky; lafgrk dh èkkjk 190 d¢ rgr ÒwfeLokeh vfèkdkj d¢oy mlh fLFkfr esa çnku dj ldrs gSa tc O;fDr d¢ e©:lh Ñ"kd g¨us d¢ lacaèk esa d¨Ã fookn u g¨A cfYd o"kZ 2018 d¢ la'k¨èku d¢ iwoZ] lafgrk dh èkkjk 257 dh dafMdk ¼.k½ d¢ dkj.k e©:lh Ñ"kd d¢ vkèkkj ij ÒwfeLokeh vfèkdkj çnku djus dk vfèkdkj O;ogkj U;k;ky; d¨ ugha FkkA ¼[k½ jktLo U;k;ky;¨a d¨ fdlh O;fDr d¨ e©:lh Ñ"kd Ĩf"kr djus d¢ vfèkdkj çkIr ugÈ gSa] ;g vfèkdkj ek= O;ogkj U;k;ky; d¨ gh çkIr gSaA 6-6 ;g ekeyk fcYdqy Åij mYysf[kr foeyk ckà p©èkjh fo#) jktLo e.My o vU; ¼ekuw@,eih@0860@2008 % 2009 vkjŒ ,uŒ 242½ tSlk gh gS] ftlesa lacafèkr dk e©:lh Ñ"kd g¨uk fookfnr g¨us d¢ mijkar Òh uk;c rglhynkj }kjk e©:lh Ñ"kd g¨us dk fu.kZ; fy;k x;k v©j rnqijkar ÒwfeLokeh vfèkdkj Òh çnRr fd, x,A ,slh fLFkfr esa] uk;c rglhynkj }kjk O;ogkj U;k;ky; dh 'kfDr;¨a dk ç;¨x fd;k x;k gS] D;¨afd uk;c rglhynkj d¨ vukosnd i{k d¨ e©#lh Ñ"kd Ĩf"kr djus dk d¨Ã vfèkdkj çkIr ugha FkkA ;fn O;ogkj U;k;ky; }kjk vukosnd i{k d¨ iwoZ ls e©#lh Ñ"kd Ĩf"kr fd;k tk pqdk g¨rk] rc fuf'pr gh lafgrk dh èkkjk 190 v©j rRle; ykxw èkkjk 257 dh dafMdk ¼.k½ d¢ rgr uk;c rglhynkj mUgsa ÒwfeLokeh Ĩf"kr dj ldrs FksA 7- orZeku çdj.k esa uk;c rglhynkj }kjk tkjh vkns'k fnukad 3-8-2001 d¢ fo#) dysDVj }kjk Loeso fuxjkuh dh dk;Zokgh çkjaÒ djrs gq, fnukad 30-4-2003 d¨ dkj.k crkv¨ u¨fVl tkjh fd;k x;k gSA 7-1 çdj.k esa Loeso dk;Zokgh dc çkjaÒ dh tk ldrh gS] bld¢ lEcUèk esa 2010 jkŒ fuŒ 409 j.kohj flag o ,d vU; fo#) eŒçŒ 'kklu esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; dh [k.MihB }kjk foLr`r funsZ'k tkjh fd, x, gSaA mDr d¢ vuqlkj] Loeso dk;Zokgh jktLo U;k;ky; }kjk dh xà voSèkkfudrk ;k vfu;ferrk dh tkudkjh çkIr g¨us d¢ vfèkdre 180 fnol esa djus dk çkoèkku fuEukuqlkj çfrikfnr fd;k x;k gS %& ''That suo moto powers can be exercised by the revisional authority envisaged under section 50 of the code within a period of 180 days from the date of the knowledge of illegality, impropriety and irregularity of the proceedings committed by any revenue officer subordinate to it even if the immovable property is Government land or having some public interest.'' (Emphasis added) mDrkuqlkj 180 fnu¨a dh fuèkkZfjr le; lhek fookfnr vkns'k ls ugha] vfirq ç'ukèkhu voSèkkfudrk ;k vfu;ferrk dh tkudkjh çkIr g¨us ls gSA ;g ;qfDr;qDr gh gS D;¨afd cgqèkk jktLo U;k;ky; }kjk voSèkkfudrk ;k vfu;ferrk lEcfUèkr jktLo vfèkdkjh }kjk tkucw>dj futh O;fDr d¨ vuqfpr ykÒ igqapkus d¢ fy, dh tkrh gSA ,sls esa 180 fnol dh le; lhek voSèkkfudrk ;k vfu;ferrk ls ugha] vfirq voSèkkfudrk ;k vfu;ferrk dh tkudkjh çkIr djus ls gh g¨ ldrh gSaA orZeku çdj.k esa vukosnd Jh iwju }kjk Lo;a dysDVj d¢ le{k vkosnu çLrqr dj uk;c rglhynkj }kjk dh xà voSèkkfudrk ;k vfu;ferrk dh tkudkjh nh Fkh] ftl ij dysDVj }kjk laKku esa vkus ij tkudkjh fnukad ls 180 fnol d¢ fuèkkZfjr le; d¢ Òhrj fnukad 30-4-2003 d¨ çdj.k iathc) dj vkosnd d¨ dkj.k crkv¨ u¨fVl tkjh fd;k x;kA pwafd çdj.k esa gqà voSèkkfudrk o vfu;ferrk d¢ rF; laKku esa vkus d¢ j.kohjflag o ,d vU; fo#) eŒçŒ 'kklu esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; dh [k.MihB }kjk fuèkkZfjr 180 fnol dh le; lhek d¢ Òhrj gh çdj.k esa dk;Zokgh dh xà gS] ,slh fLFkfr esa bl dk;Zokgh d¨ vuqfpr ugha dgk tk ldrkA 7-2 ekuuh; lo¨ZPp U;k;ky; ,oa ekuuh; eè; çns'k mPp U;k;ky; }kjk ;g fuèkkZfjr fd;k x;k gS fd tc d¨Ã vkns'k void g¨] rc ml ij ;k ifjlhek dk caèku ykxw ugha g¨rkA 7-2-1 bl lEcUèk esa èkqjaèkj çlkn flag fo#) t; çdk'k ;wfuoflZVh ,oa vU; ¼ekuw@,llh@0381@2001 % , vkbZ vkj 2001 ,l lh 2552½ esa ekuuh; lo¨ZPp U;k;ky; }kjk void o esa Òsn d¨ fuEukuqlkj Li"V fd;k x;k gS%& 16.
The expressions 'void and voidable' have been subject matter of consideration before English Courts times without number. In the case of Durayappah v. Fernando and others [1967] 2 All Eng. LR 152, the dissolution of municipal council by the minister was challenged. Question had arisen before the Privy Council as to whether a third party could challenged by anyone, anywhere. The Court observed at page 158 thus:- ''The answr must depend essentially on whether the order of the Minister was a complete nullity or whether it was an order voidable only at the election of the council. If the former, it must follow that be council is still in office and that, if any councillor, rate payer or other person having a legitimate interest in the conduct of the council likes to take the point, they are entitled to ask the Court to declatre that the council is still the duly elected council with all the powers and duties confered on it by the Municipal Ordinance.'' 17. In the case of In re McC. (A minor) [1985] 1 AC 528, the House of Lords followed the dictum of Lord Coke in the Marshal sea Case quoting a passage from the said judgment which was rendered in 1613 where it was laid down that where the whole proceeding is coram non judice which means void ab initio, the action will lie without any regard to the precept or process. The Court laid down at page 536 thus:- ''Consider two extremes of a very wide spectrum. jurisdiction meant one thing to Lord Coke in 1613 when he said in the Marshalsea Case (1613) 10 Co. Rep. 68b: 'When a Court has jurisdiction of the cause, and proceeds inverse ordinal or erroneocusly, there the party who sues, or the officer or minister of the court who executes the precept or process of the Court no action lies against them. But whom the Court has not jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is coram non judice, and actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process..'' The Court of the Marshalsea in that case acted without jurisdiction because, its jurisdiction being limited to members of the King's household, it entertained a suit between two citizens neither of whom was a member of the King's household.
Arising out of those proceedings a party arrested ''by process of the Marshal sea'' could maintain an action for false imprisonment against, inter alias, 'he Marshal who directed the execution of the process.'' This is but an early and pethaps the most quoted example of the application of a principle illustrated by many later cases where the question whether a Court or other tribunal of limited jurisdiction has acted without jurisdiction (coram non judice) can be be determined by considering whether at the outset of the proceedings that Court had jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings at all. So much is implicit in the Lord Coke's phrase ''jurisdiction of the cause.'' . . . . . 20. De Smith, Woolf and Jowell in their treatise judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fifth Edition, Paragraph 5.44, has summarised the concept of void and voidable as follows: ''Behind the simple dichotomy of void and voidable acts (invalid and valid until declared to be invalid) lurk terminological and conceptual problems of excruciating complexity. The problems arose from the premise that it an act, order or decision is ultra vires in the sence of outside jurisdiction, it was said to be invalid, or null and void, if it is intra vires it was, of course, valid, if it is flawed by an error perpetrated within the area of authority of jurisdiction, it was usually said to be voidable; that is, valid till set aside on appeal or in the past quashed by certiorari for error of law on the face of the record.'' . . . . . 22. Thus the expressions ''void and vidable'' have been subject mattter of consideration on innumbrable occaslons by Courts. The expression ''void' has several fecets. One type of void acts. transactions, decrees are those which are wholly without jurisdiction, ab intitio void and does not take any notice of the same and it can be disregraden in collateral proceeding or otherwise.
22. Thus the expressions ''void and vidable'' have been subject mattter of consideration on innumbrable occaslons by Courts. The expression ''void' has several fecets. One type of void acts. transactions, decrees are those which are wholly without jurisdiction, ab intitio void and does not take any notice of the same and it can be disregraden in collateral proceeding or otherwise. (Emphasis added) 7-2-2 ekuuh; lo¨ZPp U;k;ky; d¢ Åij mYyf[kr vkns'k èkqjaèkj çlkn flag fo#) t; çdk'k ;wfuoflZVh ,oa vU; ¼ekuw@,llh@0381@2001 % , vkbZ vkj 2001 ,l lh 2552½ d¢ iSjk 17] 20 o 22 d¢ vuqlkj vxj {ks=kfèkdkj ls ckgj vkns'k ikfjr fd;k x;k gS] rc iw.kZ dk;Zokgh gS] v©j mDrkuqlkj o gSA bl çdj.k es Åij iSjk 6 esa mYyf[kr vuqlkj] fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk vkosnd i{k d¨ e©#lh Ñ"kd Ĩf"kr fd;k x;k v©j mDr vkèkkj ij ÒwfeLokeh vfèkdkj Òh fn, x,] tcfd ;g jktLo U;k;ky; dh vfèkdkfjrk ugha Fkh] D;¨afd ;g vfèkdkj O;ogkj U;k;ky; esa fufgr gSA mDrkuqlkj fopkj.k U;k;ky; dk vkns'k o ifj.kker% gSA 7-2-3 ekuuh; eŒçŒ mPp U;k;ky; }kjk èkesZUæ tkVo fo#) e-ç- 'kklu ,oa vU; ¼ekuw@,eih@0027@2021 % 2021 ¼1½ vkj ,u 204½ esa fuEukuqlkj ;g U;kf;d fl)kar çfrikfnr fd;k x;k gS fd okbZM vkns'k ij ifjlhek dk caèku ykxw ugha g¨rk %& 9. The primary \question emerging from rival contentions advanced by learned senior counsels is to determine the character of sale date 1.3.1994 in the eyes of law; void or voidable?. 10. The expression ''void'' and ''voidable'' have been subject matter of consideration on innumerable occasions by Courts. Law is now well settled. A transaction from its very inception being in violation of law is a nullity and, therefore, void ab initio. As a matter of fact, a declaration in that behalf is not required by a Court of law; whereas in contrast, a transaction which otherwise is good act in the eyes of law, unless; avoided is a voidable act, ie., if a suit is filed for a declaration that a document is fraudulent and/or forged and fabricated and a prarty who alleges so is obliged to prove it; seeking a declaration in that behalf in a Court of law.
In other words, where legal effect of a document cannot be taken away without setting aside the same, it cannot be treated to be void but would obviously be voidable [Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and other, (2001) 6 SCC 534 relied upon.] De Smith, Woolf and jewell in their treatise Judicial Review of Administrative Action, fifth edition, paragraph 5-044, has summarised the concept of void and voidable as follows: ''Behind the simple dichotomy of void and voidable acts (invalid and valid until declared to be invalid) lurk terminological and conceptual problems of excruciating complexity. The problems arose from the premise that if an act, order or declsion is ultra vires in the sence of outside jurisdiction, it was said to be invalid, or null and void. If it is intra vires it was, of course, valid. If it is flawed by an error perpetrated within the area of authority or jurisdiction, it was usually said to be voidable; that is, valid till set aside on appeal or in the past quashed by certiorari for error of law on the face of the record.'' . .. . . . . The sale deed dated 1.3.1994 since has been held to be void for which no declaration in that behalf is requird from Court of law, the question of limitation as raised by learned senor counsel for the respondent No. 5 is of no consequence and pales into insignificance. Hence, rejected. (Emphasis added) 7-2-4- ekuuh; eè; çns'k mPp U;k;ky; vkWxsZukbts'ku ¼ekuw@,eih@0007@1976 % 1976 ts ,y ts 18½ esa fuèkkZfjr fd;k x;k gS fd ;fn d¨Ã vkns'k vfèkdkfjrk&foghu gS] rc mld¢ lacaèk esa ifjlhek dk caèku ykxw ugha g¨xk% .....our finding that the order, dated 4.4.1972, passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was without jurisdiction and that the Appelate Tribunal was bound to decide the question on merits. In this view of the matter, neither the question of limitation nor the question of delay arises and we cannot allow an order without jurisdiction to remain on record for a mere technically.
In this view of the matter, neither the question of limitation nor the question of delay arises and we cannot allow an order without jurisdiction to remain on record for a mere technically. (Emphasis added) 7-2-5- bl çdj.k esa rglhynkj dk vkns'k {ks=kfèkdkj jfgr vkns'k Fkk tSlk fd Åij iSjk 6 esa Li"V fd;k x;k gSA iSjk 7-2-1 o 7-2-2 d¢ vkèkkj ij og vkns'k okbZM gSA Åij iSjk 7-2-3 d¢ vuqlkj] okbZM vkns'k ij ifjlhek dk caèku ykxw ugha g¨rkA Åij iSjk 7-2-4 esa fuèkkZfjr fd;k x;k gS fd vfèkdkfjrk&foghu vkns'k d¢ laca/k esa ifjlhek dk caèku ykxw ugha g¨xkA 7-3 Åij iSjk 7-1 o 7-2 d¢ vkèkkj ij fopkj.k U;k;ky; d¢ vkns'k d¢ fo#) Loeso fuxjkuh dh dk;Zokgh çkjaÒ fd, tkus ij ifjlhek d¢ lacaèk esa fopkj fd, tkus dh vko';drk ugha gSA 8- vkosnd d¢ fo}ku vfÒÒk"kd }kjk ;g rdZ çLrqr fd;k x;k fd dysDVj çdj.k d¨ Loeso fuxjkuh esa ugha ys ldrs Fks v©j vukosnd d¨ vihy djuh pkfg, FkhA ekuuh; lo¨ZPp U;k;ky; d¢ Åij iSjk 7-2-1 esa mfYyf[kr vkns'k d¢ iSjk 16 d¢ vuqlkj okbZM o 'kwU; vkfn dgÈ Òh laKku esa fy;k tk ldrk gS] tSlk bl çdj.k esa dysDVj }kjk fd;k x;k gSA 9- çdj.k d¢ lacaèk esa vkosnd }kjk ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky;] Xokfy;j esa fjV ;kfpdk Øekad 589@2006 nk;j dh xà gSA ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; dk vkns'k oSls Òh jktLo U;k;ky;¨a ij caèkudkjh g¨xkA 10- mij¨Dr iSjk 6 ls 9 d¢ ifjçs{; esa fuxjkuh fujLr dh tkrh gSA dysDVj] ';¨iqj }kjk vkns'k fnukad 5-2-2010 ,oa vij vk;qDr }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 30-9-2010 ;Fkkor j[ks tkrs gSaA jktLo U;k;ky; dh leLr dk;Zokfg;ka ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; }kjk fjV ;kfpdk Øekad 589@2006 esa ikfjr vafre vkns'k d¢ vèkhu g¨xhA[ 2021 DIGILAW 851 (MP) · digilaw.ai ]