ORDER : This Review Petition seeks to recall the judgment dated 23.8.2019 whereby Review Petitioner in W.P.No.30734/2019 (GM-CPC) was disposed off granting him a period of four months for paying the deficit stamp duty & penalty concerning the subject instrument levied in terms of sections 33 & 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957; after service of notice, the respondent having appeared through his private counsel opposes the Review Petition making submission in justification of the subject judgment. 2. FACTS IN BRIEF: (a) Review Petitioner happens to be the plaintiff and the respondent is the defendant in an injunctive suit in O.S.No.295/2013; the suit has been founded inter alia on the ‘Agreement for Sale’; the admission of this instrument to evidence was objected to by the respondent on the ground of inadequacy of stamp duty paid thereon contending that it cannot be looked into for any purpose whatsoever; the learned Judge of the court below vide order dated 23.1.2019 agreed with the submission of the respondent. (b) The learned trial Judge vide order dated 10.11.2016 had found the subject instrument to be insufficiently stamped and therefore, had referred the same to the District Registrar for ascertaining the deficit duty and the consequent penalty, as well; there was some issue as to absence of name of the village concerned in the said document and ultimately, matter had landed before a Co-ordinate Bench in W.P.No.8506/2018 filed by the Review Petitioner; the said Writ Petition was allowed on 10.8.2018 directing the trial Judge to send the name of village i.e., Kavoor in Mangalore Taluka, so that the District Registrar would determine the insufficiency of stamp duty. (c) Pursuant to above impoundment order dated 10.11.2016, the Deputy Registrar submitted his Report stating that the instrument was insufficiently stamped and the deficit stamp duty was Rs.71,200/-; accordingly, the learned trial Judge levied the deficit stamp duty along with penalty at the rate of ten times thereof which in all was quantified at Rs.7,83,200/-, vide order dated 23.1.2019. (c) Pursuant to above impoundment order dated 10.11.2016, the Deputy Registrar submitted his Report stating that the instrument was insufficiently stamped and the deficit stamp duty was Rs.71,200/-; accordingly, the learned trial Judge levied the deficit stamp duty along with penalty at the rate of ten times thereof which in all was quantified at Rs.7,83,200/-, vide order dated 23.1.2019. (d) The Review Petitioner had applied for review of the said order and the same came to be rejected by the learned trial Judge by the impugned order essentially holding that the scheme of Chapter IV of the Act does not vest any discretion in the court to waive or reduce penalty which is statutorily prescribed as ten times the deficit stamp duty; challenge to this order in W.P.No.30734/2019 came to be negatived by this Court vide judgment dated 23.8.2019 which is now put in review; since some important questions of law arose, Sri. S.P. Shankar, Sr. Advocate was appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the court which he did with alacrity & grace; learned Addl. Advocate General Mr. Subramanya too assisted the court. 3. Having heard the Bar and having perused the Petition Papers, this court framed the following questions of law for consideration: (i) Whether in terms of the provisions of Chapter IV of the 1957 Act, discretion lies with the adjudicating authorities to waive or reduce the penalty which the legislature has fixed at ten times the deficit stamp duty payable on the instrument impounded... ? (ii) Whether the adjudicating authorities have discretion to grant reasonable time for the payment of deficit stamp duty on it’s quantification and the penalty thereon depending upon the circumstances of the case... ? (iii) Whether the State & it’s authorities should be notified and heard by the adjudicatory authorities if question as to inadequacy of stamp duty concerning an instrument should arise for consideration…? ? (iii) Whether the State & it’s authorities should be notified and heard by the adjudicatory authorities if question as to inadequacy of stamp duty concerning an instrument should arise for consideration…? This Court answers Question No.1 in the negative and Question Nos.2 & 3 in the affirmative for the following reasons: (a) The power to levy stamp duty by way of tax constitutionally avails to the States vide Entry 44, LIST III, SEVENTH SCHEDULE of the Constitution, is not in dispute; 1957 Act is a fiscal law enacted by the State Legislature and therefore, ordinarily its provisions which intend to levy liability on the subjects have to be strictly construed; at what rate tax has to be levied and in respect of what instruments/transactions, are a matter that lie in the exclusive domain of the legislature and therefore, Courts cannot sit in appeal over the legislative wisdom; a fiscal legislation, at times may be unjust or unreasonable; but still courts have to have deference to the popular will as expressed through the legislature; in the guise of interpretation, courts cannot meddle with such legislative measures; the arguable incongruity or harshness would not per se constitute a sufficient ground for judicial invalidation of fiscal legislations or to go for their lenient interpretation, of course, subject to all just exceptions; (b) Section 33 of the 1957 Act provides for examination of instruments for ascertaining whether proper duty is paid thereon; section 31 speaks about the persons who should pay the stamp duty; section 33 saddles the adjudicating authorities with a duty to ascertain what duty was payable on the instrument concerned and whether the duty actually paid thereon is sufficient; if there is differential deficit between the same i.e., what is paid is less than what was payable, the authorities have to impound the instrument; section 34 provides for levy of deficit stamp duty & penalty, when such an instrument is tendered in evidence; this section employs the expression "ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficit portion thereof" as the only measure of penalty; it does not leave an iota of discretion with the adjudicating authorities to waive or reduce the same. (c) Only after payment of deficit stamp duty along with ten times penalty thereof, the instrument is de-impounded and can be received in evidence; otherwise, it shall not be looked into for any purpose which obviously includes a collateral purpose, as well; the text & context of section 34 of the 1957 Act are different from that of section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908; section 49 inter alia provides for admission of unregistered documents (that are compulsorily registrable) to evidence for proving collateral transactions; the bar u/s 34 of the 1957 Act is absolute whereas the one enacted in section 49 of the 1908 Act, is relative; this is how several Benches of this court have held vide K. Amarnath Vs. Smt. Puttamma, (2000) 4 Kar LJ 55D; K. Govinde Gowda Vs. Smt. Akkayamma, ILR 2011 KAR 4719; Suman Vs. Vinayaka, (2014) 1 Kar LJ 72. (d) Learned Amicus Curiae Mr. Shankar in his usual style of acute articulation submitted that section 39 of the 1957 Act vests discretion in the Deputy Commissioner in the matter of levy of penalty, and therefore, to avoid incongruity the provisions of section 34 have to be consistently construed as leaving same discretion with the adjudicating authorities too; this contention is bit difficult to countenance because the text of section 34 and that of section 39 of the 1957 Act being apparently different, cannot be linguistically approximated to each other; if the legislature intended to vest discretion with the adjudicating authorities too, it would have said it expressly or by necessary implication; but that is not the case; as a matter of Policy, legislature has vested such a discretion with the Deputy Commissioner under section 39, whereas, it has chosen not to vest the same in the adjudicating authorities u/s 34; had such a discretion been vested in the adjudicating authorities, the likely hardship to the litigants on account of levy of penalty, could be mitigated, as is done by the Deputy Commissioners u/s 39, is beside the point. (e) After all, judiciary being a branch of the State, has to show due deference to the other co-ordinate branches, is founded on the doctrine of separation of powers which is held to be a Basic Feature of the Constitution vide Kesavananda AIR 1973 SC 1461 ; what the American constitutional jurist Mr. (e) After all, judiciary being a branch of the State, has to show due deference to the other co-ordinate branches, is founded on the doctrine of separation of powers which is held to be a Basic Feature of the Constitution vide Kesavananda AIR 1973 SC 1461 ; what the American constitutional jurist Mr. Thomas M. Cooley in his Magnum Opus "A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS" says at page 168 (First Indian Reprint, Hindustan Law Book Company), is worth reproducing: "The rule of law upon this subject appears to be, that, except where the constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as practically absolute, whether it operate according to natural justice or not in any particular case. The courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the State, unless those rights are secured by some constitutional provision which comes within the judicial cognizance. The remedy for unwise or oppressive legislation, within constitutional bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and patriotism of the representatives of the people. If this fail, the people in their sovereign capacity can correct the evil; but the courts cannot assume their rights. The judiciary can only arrest the execution of the statute when it conflicts with the constitution. It cannot run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason and expediency with the law-making power. Any legislative act which does not encroach upon the powers apportioned to the other departments of the government, being prima facie valid, must be enforced, unless restrictions upon a legislative power can be pointed out in the constitution, and the case shown to come within them." (f) The vehement submission of Mr. S.P. Shankar, learned Amicus Curiae that the Apex Court in Gangappa Vs. S.P. Shankar, learned Amicus Curiae that the Apex Court in Gangappa Vs. Fakkirappa (2019) 3 SCC 788 having examined the provisions of Chapter IV of the 1957 Act has recognized the discretion granted to the Deputy Commissioner as availing to the Courts as well, i.e., courts can levy penalty in a sum less than ten times the deficit stamp duty, is difficult to agree with; the observations of the Apex Court at paras 8, 12, 13 & 18 of the decision are appreciably summarized by the editor of the said law magazine, as under: "Section 33 requires every person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, is obliged to impound any instrument which according to him is not duly stamped. Section 34(a) envisages that when the 10 times of the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds five rupees, a sum equal to 10 times of such duty or portion is the penalty. The language of Section 34 provides a flat rate of penalty when the amount of proper duty exceeds five rupees i.e. 10 times of such duty or portion. There is no discretion vested with the authority impounding the document in the matter of collecting duty under Section 33. The word used in the proviso is "shall". Sections 33 and 34 clearly indicate that penalty imposed has to be 10 times." Even the latest decision cited by Mr. Shankar i.e., Trustees of H.C. Dhanda Trust Vs. State of M.P., AIR 2020 SC 4349 , does not come to his aid; the Apex Court recognized discretion availing to the Deputy Commissioner, is true; however, corresponding discretion cannot be discerned as a ratio laid down therein; after all, a case is an authority for the proposition that it lays down in the fact matrix of the case and not for all that which may logically follow from what is so laid down (Quinn Vs. Leathem (1901) AC 495). (g) Learned Addl. Advocate General Mr. R. Subramanya and learned Advocate Mr. P.N. Manmohan are more than justified in banking upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in Digambar Warty Vs. District Registrar, ILR 2013 KAR 2099 wherein para 36 reads as under: "36. This provision refers to the power of the Civil Court which admits the documents in evidence. The main Section is couched in the negative. P.N. Manmohan are more than justified in banking upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in Digambar Warty Vs. District Registrar, ILR 2013 KAR 2099 wherein para 36 reads as under: "36. This provision refers to the power of the Civil Court which admits the documents in evidence. The main Section is couched in the negative. Unless the instrument is duly stamped, it is inadmissible in evidence. As an exception, the proviso provides for payment of duty and penalty. In the matter of collection of duty and penalty no discretion is vested with the authority admitting such an instrument in evidence. The duty payable on the instrument is prescribed by statute. Therefore, there is no question of any discretion being vested with the authority impounding the document in the matter of collecting the duty. Once the duty payable is ascertained from the statute, no discretion is vested with the authority admitting the document in evidence, in the matter of imposition of duty and penalty. The word used in the said proviso is 'shall'. Once the duty payable is ascertained from the statute, no discretion is vested with the authority admitting the document in evidence, in the matter of imposition of duty and penalty. The word used in the said proviso is 'shall'. It is mandatory." (h) Thus, in the light of decisions of the Apex Court and of this Court referred to above, what emerges as a legal position is: inter alia under the provisions of sections 33 & 34 of the 1957 Act the adjudicating authorities such as courts, arbitrators, etc., do not have discretion to disobey the legislative command to recover the deficit stamp duty along with the prescribed “ten times penalty” thereon; they do not have any power to waive or reduce the penalty in any circumstance; however, the discretion cannot be denied to adjudicating bodies to grant a reasonable time for the payment of duty & penalty and that this discretion has to be exercised in accordance with the rules of reason & justice; Courts may grant easy installments too if a case is made out therefor; appropriate conditions for securing the payment may also be imposed; ultimately, what needs to be kept in mind is that what is payable to Caesar, the citizen should not shirk from paying; in deciding the duty & penalty and also in granting time to pay the same, it is imperative to notify and to hear the Government Counsel, whether State & its authorities are parties to the case eo nomine or not, inasmuch as, the Exchequer obviously will have stake in the matter; such a wider audience would also assist determination of the issue properly; this course of procedure would be consistent with the principles of natural justice, also. In the above circumstances, this Review Petition fails; however, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the petitioner is granted a period of six months to pay the deficit stamp duty along with the ten times penalty, if already not paid. No costs. Registry shall send a copy of this judgment to the Principal Secretary, Government of Karnataka, and to the Registrar General of this Court for circulation amongst the concerned quarters.