JUDGMENT : 1. The present petition has been filed for following prayers: “(A) Quash and set aside the punishment order dated 18.3.2013, Annexure-A to this petition, and (B) Quash and set aside the order dated 3.6.2014, Annexure- B to this petition, and” 2. The brief facts of the case are as under: 2.1 The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 18.03.2013 passed by the respondent authority, whereby the punishment of reduction of pay by five stages for a period of five years with future effect has been imposed upon him. The petitioner had joined the service of the respondent authority on 30.06.1997 on the post of Deputy Collector and is presently serving on the post of Additional Collector. The petitioner was issued a charge-sheet dated 12.11.2010 for the alleged misconduct inter alia stating that while serving as a Deputy Collector, he had passed few orders, which were not in accordance with law and were incorrect. It is the case of the petitioner that the charge-sheet does not contain any allegations against him with regard to extraneous consideration or mala fide motive. After the petitioner submitted his defence statement on 09.12.2010 and after holding of the disciplinary proceedings, the inquiry officer has submitted his report to the respondent authority by holding that the charges are not proved against the petitioner. 2.2 The disciplinary authority, being aggrieved with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer, issued a show-cause notice to him dated 10.08.2011 along with the copy of the report of inquiry officer. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted his reply on 05.09.2011 explaining in detail that he has not committed any misconduct. Thereafter, the impugned order has been passed imposing penalty of reduction of pay by five stages for a period of five years with future effect by the order dated 18.03.2013. By now, the petitioner has already undergone the penalty. The petitioner accordingly preferred the review application, which was also rejected. Before the impugned punishment order, the petitioner was drawing the pay of Rs.32,220/- in pay-scale of Rs.15600-39100/- with grade pay of Rs.5400/- and pursuant to the punishment order, the petitioner’s pay has been fixed at Rs.27770/- vide pay fixation order dated 19.12.2015. 3. Learned Senior Advocate Mr.G.M.Joshi has submitted that the entire proceeding, after the inquiry officer held that the charges have not proved against the petitioner, is de hors the settled law. 3. Learned Senior Advocate Mr.G.M.Joshi has submitted that the entire proceeding, after the inquiry officer held that the charges have not proved against the petitioner, is de hors the settled law. He has submitted that the show-cause notice of disagreement, which was issued to the petitioner on 10.08.2011 along with the reasons in fact, does not deal with any facts nor any reasons for disagreement with the inquiry officer’s report are conveyed and in a very cursorily manner, the findings of the inquiry officer, which are in favour of the petitioner, have been disagreed. While referring to the impugned order, the learned Senior Advocate has submitted that the same is also a non-speaking order as neither the contents of the reply to the show-cause notice are incorporated nor facts are narrated by the authority and hence, the impugned order may be quashed and set aside. 3.1 In support of his submissions, learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance on the judgements of the Apex Court in the case of Ranjit Singh Vs. Union of India and Ors., 2006 (4) S.C.C. 153 , Yoginath D. Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr., A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3734 and Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. Union of India and Ors., 1999 (7) S.C.C. 409 and has submitted that the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any misconduct while exercising the quasi-judicial power since all the orders passed by him are passed in exercising of the quasi-judicial authority. He has submitted that for bringing home the charge of misconduct, it has to be examined that any extraneous consideration has weighed upon by the officer, while passing the orders in the quasi-judicial capacity. 4. In response to the aforesaid submissions, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, while placing reliance on the affidavit filed by the respondent authority, has submitted that the disciplinary authority has all the powers to disagree with the findings of the inquiry officer and accordingly, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner since the disciplinary authority did not agree with the findings of the inquiry officer. It is submitted by him that since there is no infirmity caused in the disciplinary proceedings, the same are not required to be interfered with by this Court in judicial review. He has placed reliance on the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of B.C.Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and Ors., 1995 (6) S.C.C. 749 . It is submitted by him that since there is no infirmity caused in the disciplinary proceedings, the same are not required to be interfered with by this Court in judicial review. He has placed reliance on the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of B.C.Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and Ors., 1995 (6) S.C.C. 749 . It is submitted that the allegations are serious in nature and looking to the misconduct, the penalty may not be interfered with as it is the sole prerogative of the department to consider the misconduct of the employee and impose appropriate penalty. 5. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and also perused the documents as pointed out by them. 6. The facts, which are narrated hereinabove are not in dispute. The only issue which falls for consideration before this Court is that whether the disciplinary authority has followed the appropriate procedure, while imposing the penalty of reduction of pay by five stages for a period of five years with future effect and the same is in accordance with law enunciated by the Apex Court. It is not in dispute that the inquiry officer did not hold the charges as proved against the petitioner and a disagreement notice dated 10.08.2011 has been issued to the petitioner with the reasons of disagreement. A perusal of the disagreement notice dated 10.08.2011 reveals that the disciplinary authority has very cursorily, without narrating any facts or reasons, has disagreed with the findings of the inquiry officer report. In the considered opinion of this Court, the disagreement cannot be mere formality and the disciplinary authority is required to be give brief tentative reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the inquiry officer. 7. In the case of Ranjit Singh (supra), the Apex Court has held thus: “20. In Punjab National Bank and Others v. Kunj Behari Misra [ (1998) 7 SCC 84 ], this Court has clearly held that the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with by the Disciplinary Authority in the event he intends to differ with the findings of the Enquiry Officer observing: "The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer." 21. *** *** *** 22. In view of the aforementioned decisions of this Court, it is now well settled that the principles of natural justice were required to be complied with by the Disciplinary Authority. He was also required to apply his mind to the materials on record. The Enquiry Officer arrived at findings which were in favour of the Appellant. Such findings were required to be over turned by the Disciplinary Authority. It is in that view of the matter, the power sought to be exercised by the Disciplinary Authority, although not as that of an appellate authority, but akin thereto. The inquiry report was in favour of the Appellant but the Disciplinary Authority proposed to differ with such conclusions and, thus, apart from complying with the principles of natural justice it was obligatory on his part, in absence of any show cause filed by the Appellant, to analyse the materials on records afresh. It was all the more necessary because even the CBI, after a thorough investigation in the matter, did not find any case against the Appellant and thus, filed a closure report. It is, therefore, not a case where the Appellant was exonerated by a criminal court after a full fledged trial by giving benefit of doubt. It was also not a case where the Appellant could be held guilty in the disciplinary proceedings applying the standard of proof as preponderance of the probability as contrasted with the standard of proof in a criminal trial, i.e., proof beyond all reasonable doubt. It was also not a case where the Appellant could be held guilty in the disciplinary proceedings applying the standard of proof as preponderance of the probability as contrasted with the standard of proof in a criminal trial, i.e., proof beyond all reasonable doubt. When a final form was filed in favour of the Appellant, the CBI even did not find a prima facie case against him. The Disciplinary Authority in the aforementioned peculiar situation was obligated to apply his mind on the materials brought on record by the parties in the light of the findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer. He should not have relied only on the reasons disclosed by him in his show cause notice which, it will bear repetition to state, was only tentative in nature. As the Appellate Authority in arriving at his finding, laid emphasis on the fact that the Appellant has not filed any objection to the show cause notice; ordinarily, this Court would not have exercised its power of judicial review in such a matter, but the case in hands appears to be an exceptional one as the Appellant was exonerated by the Inquiry Officer. He filed a show cause but, albeit after some time the said cause was available with the Disciplinary Authority before he issued the order of dismissal. Even if he had prepared the order of dismissal, he could have considered the show cause as it did not leave his office by then. The expression "communication" in respect of an order of dismissal or removal from service would mean that the same is served upon the delinquent officer.” 7.1 Thus, it is well settled proposition of law that it was obligatory on the part of disciplinary authority to analyze the material on record afresh and give tentative reasons while issuing show cause notice. The Apex Court, after setting aside the orders, has remitted the matter to the disciplinary authority for consideration afresh and with the direction to afford opportunity of personal hearing to the delinquent. 7.2 In the present case, the petitioner had filed a detailed representation on 05.09.2011 to the disagreement notice and the same is found to have been referred in the impugned order however, the contentions raised by the petitioner to the showcause notice are absolutely ignored and they are not dealt with. 8. 7.2 In the present case, the petitioner had filed a detailed representation on 05.09.2011 to the disagreement notice and the same is found to have been referred in the impugned order however, the contentions raised by the petitioner to the showcause notice are absolutely ignored and they are not dealt with. 8. At this stage, I may with profit refer to the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL Vs. B.Karunakar, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1074. The Apex Court has observed thus;- “7. What emerges from the above survey of the law on the subject is as follows: Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the Inquiry Officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the Inquiry Officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the Inquiry Officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary, authority while arriving at its conclusion. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary, authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the Inquiry Officer's findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the Inquiry Officer and the representation of the employee against it. It will thus be seen that where the Inquiry Officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, Inquiry Officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. It will thus be seen that where the Inquiry Officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, Inquiry Officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee's right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings. The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a "reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him". The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry Officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. What is further, when the proviso to the said Article states that "where it is proposed after such inquiry to impose upon him any such penalty such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed", it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the Inquiry Officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to the Inquiry Officer's report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the Inquiry Officer. The latter right was always there. But before the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry Officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges.” 8.1 Thus, it is held by the Apex Court that the employee has right to make a representation against an inquiry, and it is further held that the disciplinary authority is required to consider the evidence, representation of the Investigating Officer and the representation of the employee, before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to the guilt or innocence of the charges. 9. The Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation Vs. A Masilamani, 2013 (6) S.C.C. 530 , has explained the word “consider”. The Apex Court has held thus:- “The word “consider”, is of great significance. Its dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that, there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority, should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself, should reveal such application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority, should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself, should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority, and proceed to affirm its order. (Vide: Director, Marketing, Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Santosh Kumar, (2006) 11 SCC 147 ; and Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 1771 ).” 9.1 Thus, the Apex Court, while explaining the word “consider” has held that the same connotes active application of mind and postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. It is held that the formation of the opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. In the present case, the order of punishment passed against the respondent absolute fails the strictures laid down by the Apex Court. Hence, the same preciously set aside by the Tribunal. 10. It is well settled proposition of law that the disciplinary authority is bound to apply mind to all the contentions raised in the representation made by the delinquent. The Apex Court in the case of A Masilamani (supra), has also held that once the Court sets aside the order of punishment on the ground of defective inquiry, the Court cannot order reinstatement of the employee but at the most, remit the case to the disciplinary authority to conduct the inquiry from stage of such defect. 10.1 Thus, in the present case, since the procedure followed by the disciplinary authority from the stage of disagreement is not in harmony with the law enunciated by the Apex Court, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. The judgement, upon which the learned AGP has placed reliance in the case of B.C.Chaudhary (supra) cannot rescue the State Government as the same would not apply to the facts and the issue, which are raised in the present petition. 11. Under the circumstances and in light of the aforenoted facts and observations, the impugned order is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the disciplinary authority from the stage of disagreement. 11. Under the circumstances and in light of the aforenoted facts and observations, the impugned order is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the disciplinary authority from the stage of disagreement. The disciplinary authority is directed to issue a fresh show-cause notice, in case they desire to conduct inquiry against the petitioner. The petitioner shall be given an appropriate opportunity before any final order is passed. Consequential benefits arising pursuant to the setting aside of the impugned order will depend upon the final outcome of the order passed by the disciplinary authority. In case, the disciplinary authority confirms the findings of the inquiry officer’s report of not holding the charges proved, appropriate orders granting the consequential benefits shall be passed. The entire exercise shall be conducted within a period of three (3) months from the date of receipt of the writ of the order of this Court. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.