JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsels for the petitioners, Sri Yatindra, Sri Pankaj Kumar Tyagi, Sri Sanjay Kumar Singh, Sri Harshvardhan Gupta, Sri Ram Vilas Yadav, Sri Amit Shukla, Sri Santosh Kumar, Sri Ashok Kumar, Sri Syed Nadeem Ahmad learned counsels for the Basic Education Officers, Sri Durga Singh who appears for the State Project Director, Samagra Shiksha Abhiyan and Sri Bipin Bihari Pandey learned Chief Standing Counsel alongwith Sri Sanjay Chaturvedi for the State respondents. 2. This batch of writ petitions have been clubbed and heard for final disposal collectively with the consent of parties. A. KASTURBA GANDHI BALIKA VIDYALAYA 3. All the petitioners were engaged by the respondents in residential schools established under the Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya Scheme[KGBV] launched by the Union Government. In August 2004, the Union Government launched a scheme for setting up of residential schools upto the upper primary level for girls belonging predominantly to the SC, ST, OBC and minorities in difficult areas. The scheme provided for the establishment of schools in educationally backward blocks. Priority was to be accorded to the establishment of these schools in areas having a concentration of SC, ST, OBC, minorities, tribal population and where enrollment of girls was found to be lagging. Areas with low female literacy and areas with a large number of small and scattered habitations in which educational facilities were nonexistent were also to be identified for the purposes of establishment of schools under the aforesaid scheme. With effect from 01 April 2008, the criteria for educationally backward block was revised to include those blocks where rural female literacy was below 30% and town/cities having minority concentration. Initially the scheme was run as a separate initiative of the Union Government till it came to be merged with the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan[SSA] with effect from 01 April 2007. With the promulgation of the Right to Education Act, 2009 [RTE] and the adoption of the framework for implementation of SSA being revised, the scheme and its objectives were revised to bring it in tune and harmony with the right and entitlement of children as envisaged under the RTE. In the State of U.P., the U.P. Education For All[UPEFA] society came to be formed in 1993 to oversee the field of Basic Education. The KGBV scheme is presently being administered by this entity. B. THE SCHEME AND POLICY DIRECTIVES 4. In the State of U.P., the U.P. Education For All[UPEFA] society came to be formed in 1993 to oversee the field of Basic Education. The KGBV scheme is presently being administered by this entity. B. THE SCHEME AND POLICY DIRECTIVES 4. The Scheme is based on two basic models (i) schools with a hostel for 100 girls and (ii) schools with hostel for 50 girls. Various Government Orders and directives of the Union Government have come to be issued from time to time in order to ensure a uniform implementation of the scheme throughout the country. The aforesaid Government Orders and directives apart from laying down norms for infrastructure and facilities in those residential schools also lay in place various stipulations relating to issues such as curriculum and the appointment of teachers and other staff. In terms of the policy directives the schools are to be managed by a Warden along with a complement of support staff and instructions are to be imparted by full time and part time teachers. For the purposes of the present batch of writ petitions, the directives and orders issued from time to time may be viewed commencing from the Government Order dated 29 July 2013. For the purposes of selection of teaching and non-teaching staff, the aforesaid Government Order provided for the constitution of a District Selection Committee. For the purposes of the present batch of writ petitions, the directives and orders issued from time to time may be viewed commencing from the Government Order dated 29 July 2013. For the purposes of selection of teaching and non-teaching staff, the aforesaid Government Order provided for the constitution of a District Selection Committee. The Government Order while prescribing the nature of staff and the subjects to be taught provided thus: - ^^2- inks dk fooj.k% dLrwjck xka/kh ckfydk fo|ky; ds 'kS{kf.kd o f'k{k.kksŸkj dfe;ksa ds p;u esa inks dk fu/kkZj.k fuEukuqlkj izLrkfor gS%& ØŒlaŒ in dk uke inksa dh la[;k ekWMy&1 ¼100 ckfydkvks gsrq½ ekMy 2 ¼50 ckfydkvksa gsrq½ 1- okMZu 1 1 2- Qqy Vkbe Vhpj 4 3 3- ikVZVkbe Vhpj 4 3 4- ,dkamVsaV 1 1 5- jlksb;k 1 1 6- lgk;d jlksb;k 2 1 7- pkSdhnkj 1 1 8- Pkijklh 1 1 dqy ;ksx 15 12 bu inks ds lkis{k Warden-cum-teacher dks lfEefyr djrs gq;s ekMWy&1 dLrwjck xkW/kh ckfydk fo|ky;ksa esa fo"k;okj f'k{kdks dh O;oLFkk fuEuor dh tk;sxh %& Xkf.kr¼ihŒlhŒ,Œ½ 01 foKku¼ihŒlhŒchŒ½ 01 lkekftd fo"k; ¼Hkwxksy] bfrgkl ,oa ukxfjd 'kkL=½ 01 fganh] laLd`r 01 Vaxzsth 01 MnwZ 01 dEI;wVj 01 LdkmV xkbM ,oa 'kkfjfjd f'k{kk] dyk Øk¶V ,oa laxhr 02 blh izdkj ekWMy&2 ds dLrwjck xk¡/kh ckfydk fo|ky;ksa es fo"k;okj f'k{kdksa dh O;oLFkk fuEuor dh tk;sxh %& xf.kr¼ihŒlhŒ,eŒ½ 01 foKku¼ihŒlhŒchŒ½ 01 Lkkekftd fo"k;¼Hkwxksy] bfrgkl ,oa ukxfjd 'kkL= 01 Hkk"kk 02 dEI;wVj 01 LdkmV xkbM ,oa 'kkfjfjd Øk¶V ,oa laxhr 01 Setting forth the details with respect to the curriculum and the qualification of staff, the Government Order provided as follows: - ^^csfld f'k{kk ifj"kn }kjk mPp izkFkfed Lrj ij fu/kkZfjr ikB;Øe ds lHkh fo"k; ;Fkk fgUnh] vaxsth] laLd`r@mnwZ] xf.kr¼vadxf.kr] chtxf.kr] T;kfefr½ lkekftd fo"k;¼bfrgkl] Hkwxksy RkFkk ukxfjd 'kkL=½] dyk@laxhr@okf.kT;] x`g f'kYi] 'kkfjfjd f'k{kk] [ksy rFkk ;ksxklu] LdkmfVax ,.M xkbfMax] uSfrd f'k{kk] i;kZoj.kh; f'k{kk rFkk dEi;wVj f'k{kk vkfn ds fy, fo"k;okj f'k{kdksa dk p;u bl izdkj fd;k tk;sxk fd LkHkh fo”k;ks dk v/;kiu xq.koŸkiwjd gks rFkk ikB; lgxkeh fØ;kvks dk lapkyu Hkh izHkkoh ढ+Xk ls gksA okMZu ftl fo"k; dh gksxh ml fo"k; gsrq vyx ls f'k{kdk dk p;u ugha fd;k tk;sxkA p;u lfefr vuqeU; inks ij p;u ds le; fo"k;ks dk /;ku j[ksxhA ekWMy&1 ds fo|ky; es xf.kr ,oa foKku gsrq izLrkfor 02 f'k{kdks es ls ;Fkk laHko 01 iw.kZdkfyd f'k{kd rFkk 01 va'kdkfyd f'k{kd {ks= es fLFkr u gks rks LdkmV&xkbM ,oa 'kkjhfjd f'k{kk dyk dkV ,oa laxhr ds fy, izLrkfor 02 f'k{kdksa esa ls ;Fkk laHko ¼1 iw.kZdkfyd f'k{kd rFkk 01 va'kdkfyd f'k{kd gksxkA½ 3- vagZrk% okMsZu ,oa f'k{kd ds inksa ds fy;s fu/kkZfjr ;ksX;rk mPp izkFkfed Lrj dh VhŒlhŒVhŒbZŒ ls ekU; chŒ,MŒ rFkk mlds led{k ,yŒVhŒ bR;kfn izf'k{k.k dks lfEefyr fd;k tk;sxkA dEI;wVj f'k{kd ds fy, izf'kf{kr Lukrd gksuk vfuok;Z gSA izf'k{k.k mikf/k ds varxZr ,uŒlhŒVhŒbZŒ ls ekU; chŒ,MŒ rFkk mlds led{k ,yŒVhŒ bR;kfn izf'k{k.k dks lfEefyr fd;k tk;sxkA dEI;wVj f'k{kd ds fy, izf'kf{kr Lukrd gksuk vfuok;Z gSA izf'k{k.k mikf/k ds varZxr ,uŒlhŒVhŒbZŒ ls ekU; chŒ,MŒ rFkk mlds led{k ,yŒVhŒbR;kfn izf'k{k.k lfEefyr gSA blds vfrfjDr dEi;wVj f'k{k.k gsrq ihŒthŒMhŒlhŒ,Œ@chŒlhŒ,Œ@chŒ,lŒlhŒ dEi;wVj lkabl vFkok Lukrd lfgr MhŒvksŒbZŒ,ŒlhŒlhŒ ;k le{k laLFkk ls ^vks ysoy@, ysoy fMIyksek vkfn 'kSf{kd ;ksX;rk Hkh okafNr gksxhA dEi;wVj f'k{kd ftl fo"k; ls Lukrd gksxkA ml fo"k; gsrq vyx ls f'k{kd p;fur ugha fd;k tk;sxkA dyk] ØkV ,oa laxhr vkfn fo”k;ksa ds fy, 'kSf{kd ;ksX;rk Lukrd mikf/k lfgr izf'k{k.k mikf/k gksxh rFkk x`g foKku ds f'k{kd dk in dyk] ØkV ,oa laxhr ds in ds varxZr gh ekuk tk;sxkA chŒihŒ,MŒ] lhŒihŒ,MŒ] MhŒihŒ,MŒ rFkk O;k;ke jRu vkfn mikf/k;k¡ dsoy 'kkjhfjd f'k{kk ds v/;kiu gsrq ekU; gksxh fdUrq 'kkjhfjd f'k{kk in ij p;u gsrq chŒihŒ,MŒ lhŒihŒ,MŒ rFkk MhŒihŒ,MŒ vH;kfFkZ;ksa gsrq VhŒbZŒVhŒ vfuok;Z ugha gksxhA^^ In terms of the scheme, all appointments of teachers, be it full time or part time, was to be on contractual basis for a period of 11 months and 29 days. Those contracts were renewable subject to the authorities being satisfied with the work and conduct of teachers. Dealing with the issues of renewal and termination of contract, the Government Order made the following provisions: - ^^8- uohuhdj.k % 'kSf{kd l= esa dLrwjck xka/kh ckfydk fo|ky; es dk;Zjr 'kS{kf.kd ,oa f'k{k.ksŸkj dfe;ks dk lsok vuqca/k 11 ekg 29 fnu ds fy, fd;k tk;sxkA rkRi;Z ;g gS fd vxys o”kZ lafonk uohuhdj.k ds ,d fnu dk varjky j[kk tk;sxkA dk;Zjr f'k{kdks@f'k{k.ksŸkj deZpkfj;ksa ds dk;Z ,oa O;ogkj dk okf”kZd ewY;kadu okMsZu }kjk fd;k tk;sxk rFkk okMsZu ds dk;Z ,oa vkpj.k dk okf”kZd ewY;kdau tuinh; lapkyu lfefr ds lnL; lfpo }kjk fd;k tk;sxkA Loa;lsoh laLFkk@efgyk lek[;k }kjk lapkfyr fo|ky;ksa esa dk;Zjr okMsZu ds dk;Z ,oa vkpj.k dk okf"kZd ewY;akdu laLFkk ds vf/kd`r inkf/kdkjh }kjk fd;k tk;sxk ,oa vk[;k lnL; lfpo] tuinh; p;u lfefr ds ek/;e ls ftykf/kdkjh ds vuqeksnukFkZ izLrqr dh tk;sxhA ;fn dk;Zjr okMsZu@f'k{kdks@f'k{k.ksŸkj deZpkfj;ksa dk dk;Z ,oa O;ogkj larks"ktud ik;k tkrk gS] rks vxys l= ds fy, mudh lafonk dk ftykf/kdkjh ds vuqeksnuksijkar uohuhdj.k fd;k tk;sxkA lh dehZ dh lsok,a lUrks"ktud ugha ik;s tkus dh n'kk es ewY;kadudrkZ vf/kdkjh }kjk lacf/kr dehZ dks viuk i{k izLrqr djus dk I;kZIr volj miyC/k djkus ds mijkar izkIr mŸkj ds vk/kkj ij i=koyh esa mu ifjfLFkfr;ksa dk lk{; lfgr Li"V vkdyu fd;k tk;sxkA rFkk ;fn lafonk dk uohuhdj.k ugha f;k tkuk gS rks ;qfDr;qDr izLrko ftykf/kdkjh ds le{k izLrqr fd;k tk;sxkA lsok vuqca/k esa ;g izkfo/kku Hkh fd;k tk;s fd ;fn lsok,a vuqi;qDr ik;h tkrh gS rks mUgs ,d ekg dks uksfVl nsdj lsokvksa dks lekIr dj fn;k tk;sxkA xEHkhj ifjfLFkfr;ksa@foŸkh; vfu;ferrk@xaHkhj vuq'kklughurk dh fLFkfr esa fcuk dksbZ uksfVl ds ;fn lsok lekIr djus dh vko';drk izrhr gksrh gS rks ftyk csfld f'k{kk vf/kdkjh }kjk iq"V izek.kks lfgr dk;Zokgh gsrq izLrko ftykf/kdkjh ds vuqeksnukFkZ izLrqr fd;k tk;sxkA mDr lEkLr dk;Zokgh ftykf/kdkjh dh vuqefr ls dh tk;sxhA dLrwjck xka/kh ckfydk fo|ky; es p;fur 'kS{kf.kd ,oa f'k{k.kksŸkj dfeZ;ksa ls izfro"kZ lafonk uohuhdj.k gsrq vuqcU/k i= Hkjk;k tk;sxkA lsok vuqca/k ds uohuhdj.k dh dk;Zokgh izfro"kZ 30 vizSy ls izkjEHk djrs gq, 30 ebZ rd iw.kZ dh tk;sxhA dk;Z ewY;kadu ds vk/kkj ij vuqca/k lekIr gksus dh n'kk esa fjDr in ij p;u dh dk;Zokgh uohu l= vkjaHk gksus ds iwoZ dh tk;sxhA^^ The aforesaid basic pattern was reiterated in the Government Order of 30 June 2015. More recently on 14 July 2020, a fresh Government Order came to be issued. Based on various inputs which were received by the State Government, it was noted that various irregularities appeared to have been committed in the selection and appointment of teachers. For instance, it was noted that in many instances more than one teacher had come to be engaged for the same subject. It was further found that appointments had come to be made without adhering to the requirements of curriculum as prescribed by the Basic Education Board for upper primary institutions. It was also noted that in various institutions appointment had been made without bearing in mind the clarifications issued by the Ministry of Human Rights Development in the Union Government on 24 March 2014 with reference to Sections 19 and 25 of the RTE Act 2009. It was also noted that in various institutions appointment had been made without bearing in mind the clarifications issued by the Ministry of Human Rights Development in the Union Government on 24 March 2014 with reference to Sections 19 and 25 of the RTE Act 2009. Upon noticing the aforesaid, that Government Order while dealing with the issue of more than one teacher having been engaged to impart instructions in one subject, made the following provisions: ^^¼1½ dsŒthŒchŒohŒ es ,d fo"k; ds ,d ls vf/kd f'k{kd@f'kf{kdk dk p;u@lafonk dh x;h gSaA okMsZu@iw.kZdkfyd f'kf{kdk&dLrwjck xak/kh vkoklh; ckfydk fo|ky;ks es okMsZu ,oa iw.kZdkfyd f'kf{kdk dk in efgyk vH;FkhZ gsrq fu;r gSA budh 'kSf{kd ;ksX;rk izf'kf{kr Lukrd FkhA mŒizŒ 'kklu ds i=kad dsŒthŒchŒohŒ@3&2@1916@2013&14 fnukad 29&7&2013 }kjk 'kSf{kd ;ksX;rk mPp izkFkfed Lrj dh VhŒbZŒVhŒ ,oa izf'kf{kr Lukrd fu/kkZfjr dh x;h gSA dLrwjck xka/kh vkoklh; ckfydk fo|ky; csfld f'k{kk ifj"kn }kjk lapkfyr mPp izkFkfed fo|ky;ksa esa fu/kkfjZr ikB;Øe ds le:i gSA vr% fu%'kqYd vkSj vfuok;Z cky f'k{kk dk vf/kdkj vf/kfu;e] 2009 dh /kkjk 19 ,o 25 es of.kZr eku ,oa ekudks dh vuqlwph ds vkyksd es of.kZr fo"k;ks esa okMsZu de f'kf{kdk ,oa iw.kZdkfyd f'kf{kdk dh uohu lafonk dh tk;sA ;fn fdlh dLrwjck xk¡/kh vkoklh; ckfydk fo|ky; esa ,d fo"k; ds ,d ls vf/kd iw.kZ dkfyd f'kf{kdk ;k okMZu dk;Zjr gS rks 'kklu ds i= fnukad 29&7&2013 }kjk fu/kkZfjr vgZrk /kkfjr djus okyh f'kf{kdkvks dh dsŒthŒchŒohŒ esa lsok] vof/k@vuqHko ds vk/kkj ij ladfyr lwph rS;kj dh tk;sA mDr lwph esa mPp vuqHko /kkfjr djus okyh vH;kFkhZ dh lECkfU/kr dsŒthŒchŒohŒ esa inLFkkiu@uohu lafonk dh tk;s] ;fn lEcfa/kr fo"k; dk tuin esa lapkfyr vU; fdlh dsŒthŒchŒohŒ es in fjDr gks rks vojksgh Øe esa ladfyr lwph ds vuqlkj lEcf/kr okMsZu@f'kf{kdk dks lek;ksftr fd;k tk;s mDr tuinh; lfefr d izLrko ds Øe esa ftykf/kdkjh ds vuqeksnuksijkar uohu lafonk@inLFkkiu fd;k tk;sxkA^^ Dealing with the issue of curriculum, the Government Order noted:- (iii) dsŒthŒchŒohŒ es f'k{kd@f'kf{kdk dks eq[; fo"k;ksa ;Fkk xf.kr] foKku] lkekftd fo"k;] Hkk"kk ¼fgUnh ,oa laLd`r½ ,ao vxzsth dk inLFkkiu@uohu lafonk okMsUk@iw.kZdkfyd f’kf{kdk dks ikB; lgxkeh fo"k;ks ;Fkk dEiw;Vj LdkmV xkbM ,oa 'kkjhfjd f'k{kk dyk ØkV ,oa lxahr fo"k;ks inLFkkiu@uohu lafonk ds in ij fd;k x;k gSA mYys[kuh; gS fd fu%'kqYd vkSj vfuok;Z cky f’k{kk dk vf/kdkj vf/kfu;e] 2009 dh /kkjk 19 ,oa 25 eku ,oa ekudks dh vuqlwph es fuEuor O;oLFkk mfYyf[kr gS %& NBh ls vkBoha d{kk ds fy, 1- de ls de izfr d{kk ,d f'k{kd] bl izdkj dk gksxk fd fuEufyf[kr izR;sd ds fy, de ls de f'k{kd gks& (i) foKku ,oa xf.krA (ii) lkekftd v/;;uA (iii) Hkk"kkA 2- izR;sd iSrhla ckydks ds fy, de ls de ,d f'k{kdA 3- tgkW ,d lkS ls vf/kd ckydksa dk izos'k fn;k x;k gS ogk& (i) ,d iw.kZdkfyd iz/kku v/;kid fuEufyf[kr ds fy, va'kdkfyd f'k{kd%& ¼v½ dyk f'k{kk ¼vk½ LokLF; vkSj 'kfjfjd f'k{kkA ¼b½ dk;Z f'k{kkA^^ By a Government Order of 11 December 2020, the bifurcation of part time and full time teachers across subjects was provided for in the following terms:- ^^mijksDr inks ds lkis{k uohu p;u ekWMy&1 ds dLrwjck xka/kh ckfydk fo|ky;ksa es fo"k;okj O;oLFkk fuEuor dh tk;sxh%& fo"k; Ikn ekWMy&1 gsrq inks adh la[;k iw.kZdkfyd mnwZ va'kdkfyd xf.kr ¼ihŒlhŒ,eŒ oxZ ls izf'kf{kr Lukrd ,oa mPp izkFkfed Lrj dh VhŒbZŒVhŒ½ iw.kZdkfyd 01 & & foKku ¼tsMŒchŒlhŒ oxZ ls izf'kf{kr Lukrd ,oa mPp izkFkfed Lrj dh VhŒbZŒVhŒ½ iw.kZdkfyd 01 & & Hkk"kk ¼fgUnh ,ao laLd`r ls Lukrd ,ao mPp izkFkfed Lrj dh VhŒbZŒVhŒ½ iw.kZdkfyd 01 & & lkekftd fo”k; ¼Hkwxksy] bfrgkl ,oa ukxfjd 'kkL= esa ls fdlh ,d fo"k; ls½ iw.kZdkfyd 01 & & izf'kf{kr Lukrd ,oa mPp izkFkfed Lrj dh VhŒbZŒVhŒ vxzasth ¼vaxszth ls Lukrd ,oaa mPp izkFkfed Lrj dh VhŒbZŒVhŒ½ iw.kZdkfyd 01 & & mnwZ&chŒ,Œ fo"k; ls rFkk ,yŒVhŒ ;k chŒVhŒ ;k chŒVhŒ ;k chŒ,MŒ ;k vU; led{k f'k{kk vFkok f'k{k.k es fMxzh ;k fMIyksek mnwZ & 01 & dEi;wVj izf'kf{kr Lukrd va'kdkfyd & & 01 Lukrd xkbM ,Ok 'kfjfjd f'k{kk&chŒihŒ,MŒlhŒihŒ ,M vkfn mikf/k va'kdkfyd & & 01 dyk] Øk¶V ,oa laxhr@x`g f'kYi v'kadkfyd & & 01 dqy in 05 01 03 mijksDRk inks ds lkis{k uohu p;u ekWMy&2 ds dLrwjck xka/kh ckfydk fo|ky;ksaa esa fo"k;okj O;oLFkk fuEuor~ dh tk;sxh %& fo"k; Ikn ekWMy&1 gsrq inks dh la[;k iw.kZdkfyd mnwZ va'kdkfyd xf.kr¼ihŒlhŒ,eŒ oxZ ls izf'kf{kr Lrj dh VhŒbZŒVhŒ½ iw.kZdkfyd 01 & & foKku¼tsMŒchŒlhŒ oxZ lsZ izf'kf{kr Lukrd ,oa mPp izkFkfed Lrj dh VhŒbZŒVhŒ½ iw.kZdkfyd 01 & & foKku ¼tsMŒchŒlhŒ oxZ ls izf'kf{kr Lukrd ,oa mPp izkFkfed Lrj dh VhŒbZŒVhŒ½ iw.kZdkfyd 01 & & Hkk"kk ¼fgUnh&laLd`r ,oa vaxsth esa ls U;wure ,d oxZ esa izf'kf{kr Lukrd ,oa mPp izkFkfed Lrj dh VhŒbZŒVhŒ½ iw.kZdkfyd 01 & & lkekftd fo"k; ¼Hkwxksy] bfrgkl ,oa ukxfjd 'kkL= esa ls fdlh ,d fo"k; ls izf'kf{kr Lukrd ,oa mPp izkFkfed Lrj dh VhŒbZŒVhŒ½ iw.kZdkfyd 01 & & mnwZ&chŒ,Œ mnwZ fo"k; ls rFkk ,yŒVhŒ ;k chŒVhŒ ;k vU; led{k f'k{kk vFkok f'k{k.k esa fMxzh ;k fMIyksek mnwZ & 01 & dEI;wVj izf'kf{kr Lukrd va'kdkfyd & & 01 LdkmV xkbM ,oa 'kkfjfjd f'k{kk&chŒihŒ,MŒlhŒihŒ,M ,aoa MhŒih Œ,MŒ vkfn mikf/k va'kdkfyd & & 01 dyk] Øk¶V ,oa laxhr@x`g f'kYi va'kdkfyd & & 01 dqy in 04 01 03 3. The directions as contained in the aforesaid Government Order presently hold the field and have also been circulated by the State Director constituted by the UPEFA society under cover of its letter of 04 January 2021. The Government Orders noted above while dealing with the issue of qualification provided that for the post of Warden-cum-Full Time Teacher a candidate must hold a TET certificate for the upper primary level as well as a graduation degree such as B.Ed. or other qualification recognised as equivalent thereto by the NCTE. Those Government Orders further prescribed separate qualifications for a teacher who may be selected and appointed for teaching the subjects of Computer, Art, Craft and Music. For the aforesaid category of teachers, it was clearly provided that they must hold a graduation degree as well as a training qualification duly recognised. The Government Order of 29 July 2013 additionally specified that the subject of Home Science would be treated as being part of Art, Craft and Music. The aforesaid Government Order also envisaged the establishment of KGBVs where instructions in Urdu language may also be imparted. Urdu as a subject was to be taught in KGBVs which were situate in a location which had a minority population of 20% or more. The Government Order of 17 August 2013 prescribing the qualifications for an Urdu teacher made the following provisions: - ^^¼d½ Hkkjr esa fof/k }kjk LFkkfir fdlh fo'ofo|ky; ls Lukrd dh mikf/k ;k ljdkj }kjk mlds led{k ekU;rk izkIr dksbZ mikf/k] ftlesa ,d fo"k; ds :i es mnwZ jgh gksA ijarq dksbZ vH;FkhZ tks mnwZ esa mi;qDr vgZrk ugha j[krk gS] fu;fqDr ds fy;s ik= gksxk] ;fn vH;FkhZ mnwZ] fo"k; es LukrdksŸkj mikf/k j[krk gksA ¼[k½ ljdkj }kjk mnwZ v/;kiu ds fy;s izf'k{k.k nsus gsrq y[kuÅ] vkxjk eokuk ftyk esjB vkSj ldyMhgk ftyk pUnkSyh esa LFkkfir fdlh izf'k{k.k dsUnzks esa ls fdlh ,d dsUnz ls csfld v/;kid izek.k i= ;k ljdkj }kjk mlds le{k ekU;rk izkIr dksbZ vU; izf'k{k.k vgZrk ;k csfld v/;kid izek.k i= ¼chŒVhŒlhŒ½] f}o"khZ; chŒVhŒlhŒ¼mnwZ½ vkSj mŒizŒ ljdkj ;k Hkkjr ljdkj }kjk lapkfyr v/;kid ijh{kk mŸkh.kZ fd;k gksA^^ 4. When these writ petitions came to be preferred before the Court, one of the contentions, which was raised by the respondents, was with respect to their maintainability. When these writ petitions came to be preferred before the Court, one of the contentions, which was raised by the respondents, was with respect to their maintainability. It was principally contended that since the appointment of the petitioners was purely contractual, a writ petition challenging either an order of termination or variation in the terms of appointment would not lie. Those submissions were voiced based on the decision rendered by the Full Bench of the Court in Roychan Abraham v. State of U.P. and Others, [ 2019 (3) ADJ 391 (FB)] and of the Division Bench in Rajesh Bhardwaj V. Union of India, [ 2019(2) ADJ 830 ]. 4. Before, however, proceeding to deal with the aforesaid objections, it would be apposite to briefly notice the facts of each case. Writ-A No.4845 of 2021. 5. The petitioner challenges an order of 13 November 2020 pursuant to which she has been asked to exercise an option whether she would be willing for the renewal of her contract as a part time teacher in the subject of Art, Craft and Music. The petitioner was initially appointed as a Warden-cum-Full Time Teacher based on a graduation degree in which her major was Home Science. The petitioner was initially appointed as a Warden-cum-Full Time Teacher based on a graduation degree in which her major was Home Science. The writ petition also refers to the order of 14 July 2020 which while delineating compulsory subjects provided:- “(II) csfld f'k{kk ifj"kn }kjk lapkfyr mPp izkFkfed fo|ky;ks esa fu/kkZfjr ikB;Øe ls brj fo"k; /kkfjr djus okys f'k{kd@f'kf{kdk dk inLFkkiu@uohu lafonk dh x;h gS] dk l?ku ijh{k.k dj fy;k tk;s ,oa fu% 'kqYd vkSj vfuok;Z cky f'k{kk dk vf/kdkj vf/kfu;e] 2009 dh /kkjk 19 ,oa 25 esa of.kZr eku ,oa ekudks dks vuwlwph ,oa jkT; ifj;kstuk dk;kZy; ds i= fnukad 13-08-2018 ,oa 06-08-2019 ds vkyksd esa csfld f'k{kk ifj"kn }kjk lapkfyr mPp izkFkfed fo|ky;ks esa fu/kkZfjr ikB;Øe ds vuqlkj gh dLrwjck xka/kh ckfydk fo|ky;ks gsrq ikB;Øe@fo"k; ds f'k{kd mijksDr ekudkuqlkj mDr tuinh; lfefr ds izLrko ds Øe esa ftykf/kdkjh ds vuqeksnuksijkUr uohu lafonk@inLFkkiu fd;k tk;sxkA (III) dsŒthŒchŒohŒ es f'k{kd@f'kf{kdk dk eq[; fo"k;ksa ;Fkk xf.kr] foKku] lkekftd fo"k;] Hkk”kk ¼fgUnh ,oa laLd`r½ ,oa vxzsth dks inLFkkiu@uohu lafonk okMsZu@Qqy VkbZ f'kf{kdk es u djds va'kdkfyd ds in ij rFkk okMsZu@iw.kZdkfyd f'kf{kdk dks ikB; lgxkeh fo"k;ksa rFkk dEi;wVj LdkmV xkbM ,Ok 'kkjhfjd f'k{kk dyk ØkV ,oa laxhr fo"k;ks inLFkkiu@uohu lafonk ds in ij fd;k x;k gSA mYys[kuh; gS fd fu%'kqYd vkSj vfuok;Z cky f'k{kk dk vf/kdkj vf/kfu;e 2009 dh /kkjk 19 ,o 25 esa of.kZr eku ,oa ekudksa dh vuwlwph esa fuEuor~ O;oLFkk mfYyf[kr gS%& NBh ls vkBoh d{kk ds fy, 1 de l de izfr d{kk ,d f'k{kd] bl izdkj dk gksxk fd fuEufyf[kr izR;sd d fy, de ls de ,d f'k{kd gks& ¼1½ foKku ,oa xf.krA ¼2½ lkekftd v/;;uA ¼3½ Hkk"kkA 2- izR;sd iSrhal ckydksa ds fy, de ls de ,d f'k{kdA 3- tgka ,d lkS ls vf/kd ckydks dks izos'k fn;k x;k gS ogk¡ ¼1½ ,d iw.kZdkfyd iz/kku v/;kid] ¼2½ fuEufyf[kr ds fy, va'kdkfyd f'k{kd ¼v½ dyk f'k{kkA ¼vk½ LokLFk; vkSj 'kkjhfjd f'k{kkA ¼b½ dk;Z f'k{kkA^^ 6. By the aforesaid Government Order, Home Science as has been noted above, came to be discontinued as a primary subject and became part of Art, Craft and Music. Although the contract of the petitioner was renewed permitting her to teach Hindi, the respondents upon noticing the provisions made in the directive of the State Director of 26 August 2020 restraining continuance of teachers by permitting change in subjects terminated her contract. Although the contract of the petitioner was renewed permitting her to teach Hindi, the respondents upon noticing the provisions made in the directive of the State Director of 26 August 2020 restraining continuance of teachers by permitting change in subjects terminated her contract. By way of the impugned directive she has now been asked to exercise a choice of whether she would be willing to continue as a part time teacher in the subject Art, Music and Craft. Writ-A No.4571 of 2021. 7. In this petition also, the petitioner assails an order of 19 November 2020 whereby the petitioner, who was initially selected and appointed as a Warden, has been downgraded to a part time teacher in the subject of Art, Craft and Music. Initially she was selected and appointed to teach the subject Home Science. Writ-A No.4882 of 2021. 8. The petitioner challenges the order of the respondents refusing to renew her contract of engagement. The petitioner had initially been engaged as a part time teacher in the subject of Music. Insofar as her training qualifications were concerned, she had relied upon a certificate of Sangeet Prabhakar issued by the Prayag Sangeet Samiti, Allahabad. The respondents have taken the position that the aforesaid training qualification is not recognised. Consequently the impugned decision has come to be made for the contract of the petitioner not being renewed. Writ-A No.5728 of 2021. 8. The petitioner, who holds the degrees of B.Com, M.Com and B.Ed., was engaged to teach the subject of Computer. By a communication of 22 February 2021 the respondents have held that her contract is not liable to be renewed since she does not possess the qualifications prescribed for teaching the aforesaid subject. It becomes relevant to note that the petitioner was appointed as a full-time teacher in Computers based on a Diploma in Computer Applications appearing at Page-53 of the paperbook. However she did not possess the O level certificate as required and prescribed to be an essential qualification. Writ-A No.5914 of 2021. 9. The petitioner who was engaged as an Urdu teacher, challenges the order of 13 January 2021 by which her engagement has come to be discontinued upon the respondents finding that in the concerned block the population of minorities was less than 20%. Writ-A No.5914 of 2021. 9. The petitioner who was engaged as an Urdu teacher, challenges the order of 13 January 2021 by which her engagement has come to be discontinued upon the respondents finding that in the concerned block the population of minorities was less than 20%. Although learned counsel has relief upon an extract from an unspecified webpage to challenge the aforesaid conclusion, the respondents have proceeded on the basis of the certification apprising them of the minorities there being below 20% in the concerned location. Writ-A No.6966 of 2021. 10. The petitioner here was appointed as a Computer Operator. He was engaged through a service provider and placed to discharge duties in connection with the KGBV scheme under the respondents. His engagement admittedly was through an outsourcing agency. It was in the aforesaid background that the respondents contend that apart from the engagement being contractual, there was no privity of contract between the petitioner and the State so as to warrant this Court entertaining the writ petition. Writ-A No.8595 of 2021. 11. The petitioner challenges the order of 02 February 2021 passed by the District Basic Education Officer rejecting her objections to the engagement of the fifth respondent. The respondents have rejected that objection holding that although both the fifth respondent and the petitioner hold the requisite qualifications, since the fifth respondent had been engaged for a longer length in time, her absorption is liable to be upheld in terms of the provisions made under the Government Order of 29 July 2013. The provisions of the aforesaid government order were neither questioned nor assailed. Writ-A No.6716 of 2021. 12. The petitioner who was engaged as an Urdu Teacher challenges the validity of the decision of the Basic Education Officer discontinuing her engagement on the ground that she did not have Urdu as one of the subjects at the Graduation level. The aforesaid reasoning was assailed on the ground of the same being in violation of a Government Order of 05 September 2006 which had provided that for engagement as an Urdu teacher it would be essential for the candidate to have studied that language in two out of the three examinations of High School, Intermediate and Graduation. The aforesaid reasoning was assailed on the ground of the same being in violation of a Government Order of 05 September 2006 which had provided that for engagement as an Urdu teacher it would be essential for the candidate to have studied that language in two out of the three examinations of High School, Intermediate and Graduation. The respondents on the other hand rest their case on the government order of 17 August 2013 the relevant part whereof has been extracted hereinabove and which had amended the government order of 05 September 2006. Writ-A No.8587 of 2021. 13. The petitioner who was engaged as a Full Time Teacher-cum-Warden challenges the order of 19 October 2020 by which the respondents have held that renewal cannot be granted since she did not have Science as a subject at the graduation level. 14. The facts of individual petition noticed above evidence that the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is sought to be invoked in principally the following three situations. A-Termination of contract. B- Downgradation from a full time to a part time teacher. C-Variation of the terms of the contract. C. THE MAINTAINABILITY OF THE WRIT PETITIONS 15. The principal objection which is taken by the State respondents is that since the terms and conditions of service of the petitioners are governed purely by contract, no writ petition would lie in light of the decisions rendered in Rajesh Bhardwaj and of the Full Bench in Roychan Abraham. The submission essentially was that a contract for personal service cannot be enforced. It was submitted that if it be the contention that the termination has been affected in violation of the provisions made in the contract, the only remedy available to the petitioners would be to bring an action for damages for wrongful termination. It was contended that the engagement of the petitioners was under a scheme formulated by the Union Government and governed solely by the provisions made in various Government Orders and directives referred to above. It was in the aforesaid backdrop that it was argued that the writ petitions would not be maintainable and that in any case it was liable to be dismissed with the reliefs as prayed for being refused. 16. It was in the aforesaid backdrop that it was argued that the writ petitions would not be maintainable and that in any case it was liable to be dismissed with the reliefs as prayed for being refused. 16. Before proceeding to deal with the ratio of Roychan Abraham and Rajesh Bhardwaj, it would be apposite for the Court to note the judgment of the Full Bench rendered in Smt. Sheela Devi and another vs. State of U.P. and others, [ 2010 (5) ADJ 86 (FB)]. The Full Bench was constituted to consider whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would be maintainable at the behest of an Angadwadi worker appointed on a temporary basis by the State upon payment of honorarium. The Full Bench took note of the Integrated Child Development Service Program run under the auspices of the Union Government. It found that the engagement of Angadwadi workers was under the provisions of the aforesaid scheme with those workers being deployed at various Angadwadi centers established throughout the country. After noticing various decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with the maintainability of a writ petition directed against an action of the Government or a body discharging a public function, the Full Bench held thus:- “26. The above decisions of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates that the ambit and scope of Article 226 has been liberalised, widened and expanded by the Courts. A petition is maintainable if the petitioner seeks relief in accordance with law and his real grievance is against the action or an order passed by a statutory authority or an authority vested with performance of public functions. In short a writ petition would always be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order passed by any person in discharge of public duty or by public authority i.e., an officer of the Government.” 17. It then proceeded to observe in paragraph 44 as follows: - “44. The issue is not as to whether the appellants/petitioners would succeed in the writ petitions and get the desired relief but is altogether different as to whether the petition is maintainable or the appellants/petitioners are entitle to invoke the writ jurisdiction. It then proceeded to observe in paragraph 44 as follows: - “44. The issue is not as to whether the appellants/petitioners would succeed in the writ petitions and get the desired relief but is altogether different as to whether the petition is maintainable or the appellants/petitioners are entitle to invoke the writ jurisdiction. In our opinion in view of the above discussion such a writ petition is maintainable and the appellants/petitioners are justified in invoking the extraordinary remedy on the grounds permissible for judicial review, though it may ultimately result in dismissal on merits.” The Full Bench ultimately recorded the following conclusions: - “54. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we answer the question referred to us in favour of the appellants/petitioners and hold that the Anganwadi workers though appointed under a scheme of the Government notwithstanding that they are not holders of civil posts are entitle to invoke the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order terminating their services passed by the CDPO, a Government functionary on grounds permissible for judicial review.” 18. It becomes pertinent to note that in Smt. Sheela Devi while noticing the terms of the appointment of Angadwadi workers, the Full Bench noted that although their appointment was temporary and based on the payment of an honorarium, those workers were entitled to continue till the age of 60 years subject to being found fit. The engagement of these workers was thus not based purely on a contract of service which provided that the engagement was terminable with notice. As was noted by the Full Bench, these workers were entitled to continue till they attained the age of 60 years unless the project itself came to be abandoned. 19. Even before Rajesh Bhardwaj came to be decided, a Division Bench in Ram Prasad Vs. State of U.P. and others, [2018 SCC OnLine All 5886] came to consider an issue whether a contractual employee of UPSRTC could claim regularization. Noticing that the aforesaid contractual engagement was not governed by any statutory regulations framed by the Corporation, the Division Bench held as follows:- “12. Even otherwise, appellant's appointment was contractual hence it could not be enforced in a Court of law and that too in a writ petition. Noticing that the aforesaid contractual engagement was not governed by any statutory regulations framed by the Corporation, the Division Bench held as follows:- “12. Even otherwise, appellant's appointment was contractual hence it could not be enforced in a Court of law and that too in a writ petition. In other words, when right to continue is not based either on the statute or the Constitution or otherwise in law, then a writ of mandamus compelling the authorities to continue appellant in employment cannot be issued since for issuance of writ of mandamus, condition precedent is the existence of a legal right upon the aggrieved person and a legal obligation corresponding upon the authorities concerned. In Uma Devi (Supra), Apex Court, considering the question as to when a writ of mandamus can be issued by the Court directing employer either to absorb the employee in permanent service or to allow him to continue, has held: “In order to that a mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce it.” (emphasis added) 13. Even otherwise, enforcement of contract of personal service in a writ jurisdiction is not permissible except of certain limited circumstances. In Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889 , drawing distinction between employment under a contract and status, it was held that there is no vested contractual right in regard to terms of service where employment is one of the status. The origin of Government service is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case. But once appointed to the post or office, the Government servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by Government. In other words, legal position of a Government servant is more one of status than of contract. The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. The relationship between the Government and the Servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. The relationship between the Government and the Servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. In the language of jurisprudence, status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. 14. Thus, in the cases where appointment and conditions of service are governed by statute, the relationship is that of status and not mere a contract. However, in other cases, it is purely a contract of service resulting in a relationship of ordinary master and servant. In the present case, it cannot be said that the appellant's employment is that of a status since it is not governed by statutory provisions in any manner. It is purely and simply an ordinary contract of service between master and servant. In such cases, where the contract of service is not governed by statutory provisions, it is well-settled that contract of service cannot be sought to be enforced by seeking reinstatement or continuance in employment since such a relief is barred under the Specific Relief Act. In Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation, Lucknow v. C.K. Tyagi, (1969) 2 SCC 838 : AIR 1970 SC 1244 , considering question as to when such a relief is granted, Court observed: “Under the common law the Court will not ordinarily force an employer to retain the services of an employee whom he no longer wishes to employ. But this rule is subject to certain well-recognised exceptions. It is open to the Courts in an appropriate case to declare that a public servant who is dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 continues to remain in service, even though by doing so the State is in effect forced to continue to employ the servant whom it does not desire to employ. Similarly under the Industrial Law, jurisdiction of the Labour and Industrial Tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker whom he does not desire to employ, is recognised. Similarly under the Industrial Law, jurisdiction of the Labour and Industrial Tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker whom he does not desire to employ, is recognised. The Courts are also investigated with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the a act the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute…” 20. In Sonu Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and others, [2019 SCC OnLine 4740], the Division Bench considered the issue of whether a contractual employee could invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issuance of a prerogative writ for being continued in service. Rejecting the aforesaid prayer as made, the Division Bench held thus: - “24. Even otherwise, enforcement of contract of personal service in a writ jurisdiction is not permissible except of certain limited circumstances. The appellant's appointment was not in a Department of Government. Instead he was engaged by a private agency constituted for the purposes of implementation of a scheme launched for a fixed period. The scheme launched by Government is under an executive order. It does not have status of a statute or statutory order. The nature of engagement of appellant, therefore, is not to be governed by status but is like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. 25. In Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889 , drawing distinction between employment under a contract and status, it was held that there is no vested contractual right in regard to terms of service where employment is one of the status. The origin of Government service is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case. But once appointed to the post or office, the Government servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by Government. In other words, legal position of a Government servant is more one of status than of contract. The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. The relationship between the Government and the Servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. The relationship between the Government and the Servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. In the language of jurisprudence, status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. 26. Thus, in the cases where appointment and conditions of service are governed by statute, the relationship is that of status and not mere a contract. However, in other cases, it is purely a contract of service resulting in a relationship of ordinary master and servant. In the present case, it cannot be said that the appellant's employment is that of a status since it is not governed by statutory provisions in any manner. It is purely and simply an ordinary contract of service between master and servant. In such cases, where the contract of service is not governed by statutory provisions, it is well-settled that contract of service cannot be sought to be enforced by seeking reinstatement or continuance in employment since such a relief is barred under the Specific Relief Act.” 20. The aforesaid view of the Court that a contract of a personal service which is not imbued with any statutory flavour cannot be enforced and that the writs as prayed for in cases of termination cannot be granted has consistently held the field. The view as expressed in the aforesaid decisions was reemphasized by the Division Bench in Rajesh Bhardwaj in the following terms:- “30. Now we come to Questions-(2), (3) and (4), which, in our view, can be dealt with together. In the present case, terms and conditions of employment, applicable to petitioner are not challenged that such terms and conditions are arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of Constitution read with Section 23 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1872") being unfair, unreasonable or unconscionable, and against public policy. The order of termination is challenged on the ground that petitioner has not been given adequate opportunity of defence and termination is in violation of principles of natural justice. The order of termination is challenged on the ground that petitioner has not been given adequate opportunity of defence and termination is in violation of principles of natural justice. It is not in dispute that terms and conditions are not governed by any Statute or statutory provision or by any provision made under any authority of Statute. Petitioner being in the Cadre of Manager, his terms and conditions are also not governed by Standing Orders made by Employer with respect to employees governed by provisions of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1946"). In these circumstances, in the cases like petitioner, consistently it has been laid down that employment is simply a part of contract. If employment is terminated or contract of service is terminated, Court shall not grant relief of reinstatement, i.e. specific performance of contract of personal service, as it is barred by the provisions of Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1963") and, therefore, no remedy under Article 226 shall be available since employee, if complains about wrongful termination of service, then must avail remedy in common law by claiming damages. 31. As we have already said that CUPGL even if taken to be a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of Constitution, this by itself would not mean that petitioner can claim status of a Government Servant or holding a post governed by 'status'. Nature of engagement/ appointment of petitioner is not to be governed by 'status' but by a 'contract of service' entered into between master and servant. A distinction between an appointment under a contract and status was noticed and explained by Supreme Court in Roshan Lal Tandon Vs. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1889 . Court held that when a matter is governed by status, the employee has no vested contractual rights in regard to the terms of service but where employment is purely in the realm of a simple contract of employment, it is strictly governed by terms and conditions of employment settled between the parties. To remind the difference between 'status' and 'contractual appointment', we may take up case of a Government Servant. Origin of employment in a Government department is contractual. To remind the difference between 'status' and 'contractual appointment', we may take up case of a Government Servant. Origin of employment in a Government department is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case but once appointed to the post or office, the person appointed, i.e., Government Servant, acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both the parties but same are governed by Statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by employer, i.e., the Government. Legal position of a Government Servant, thus, is more one of 'status' than of a 'contract'. The hallmark of 'status' is that attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties must be by public law and not by mere agreement of parties. Relationship between Government (employer) and Government Servant (employee) is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. In the language of jurisprudence, 'status' is a condition of membership of a group, whereof powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. Thus, where appointment and conditions of service are governed by Statute, relationship of 'employer' and 'employee' is that of 'status' and not a mere contract. However, in other cases, it is purely a contract of service resulting in a relationship of ordinary master and servant. 32. In the present case also, relationship of employment between petitioner and CUPGL is purely and simply an ordinary contract of service which is not governed by any statute or statutory provision. In such cases, a contract of service cannot be sought to be enforced by Court of law by giving relief of reinstatement or continuance in employment as this relief is barred under Act, 1963. ” 21. The Full Bench of the Court in Roychan Abraham was called upon to consider the correctness of another decision of three learned Judges of the Court rendered in M.K. Gandhi and others Vs. Director of Education, [2005 (4) ESC 2265]. In M.K. Gandhi, the Full Bench had held that the employees of an educational institution whose services were governed solely by non-statutory byelaws could not maintain a writ petition. The Full Bench in M.K. Gandhi held that a private educational institution was not State. Director of Education, [2005 (4) ESC 2265]. In M.K. Gandhi, the Full Bench had held that the employees of an educational institution whose services were governed solely by non-statutory byelaws could not maintain a writ petition. The Full Bench in M.K. Gandhi held that a private educational institution was not State. The decision in M.K. Gandhi, when taken in appeal to the Supreme Court, was upheld to the aforesaid extent. A further direction which had come to be issued therein namely for the CBSE taking further steps against the concerned institution was set aside. In Roychan Abraham, the Full Bench elaborately noticed the various decisions rendered by the Supreme Court as well as this Court with respect to bodies which discharge a public function or perform a public duty. Upon noticing the body of precedent which had grown on the subject, the Full Bench observed as follows: - “37. In State of U.P. and another vs. Johri Mal, the Supreme Court held that for a public law remedy enforceable under Article 226, the action of a person or the authority need to fall in the realm of public law. The question is required to be determined in each case. "The legal right of an individual may be founded upon a contract or a statute or an instrument having the force of law. For a public law remedy enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions of the authority need to fall in the realm of public law -be it a legislative act or the State, an executive act of the State or an instrumentality or a person or authority imbued with public law element. The question is required to be determined in each case having regard to the nature of and extent of authority vested in the State. However, it may not be possible to generalize the nature of the action which would come either under public law remedy or private law field nor is it desirable to give exhaustive list of such actions." 38. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have direct nexus with the discharge of public duly. It is undisputedly a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have direct nexus with the discharge of public duly. It is undisputedly a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have intervened in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by statutory provisions or the employer had the status of 'State' within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element. ” 22. As is evident from the aforesaid extract, the Court in Roychan Abraham also reiterated the settled position that breach of contracts without having any public element as an integral part thereof cannot be questioned in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court further noticed that wherever Courts had intervened they had done so upon finding that either the service conditions were regulated by statutory provisions or where the employer had the status of State and where it was found that the action as complained of had a public law element. The Full Bench then went on to observe that while it was true that even a private institution imparting education is amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution by virtue of the fact that it discharges a public function, that the decision in M.K. Gandhi must be understood as confined to the facts of the case. It was noted that M.K. Gandhi essentially answered the question whether a writ petition would be maintainable for violation of non-statutory byelaws and for enforcement of a private contract. The Court went on to observe that M.K. Gandhi cannot be understood as having propounded the principle that private educational institutions do not render a public function. Ultimately it was held that the decision in M.K. Gandhi did not merit being reviewed. 23. More significant for our purposes is the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramakrishna Mission and another Vs. Kago Kunya and others, [ (2019) 16 SCC 303 ]. In the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court held: - “29. Ultimately it was held that the decision in M.K. Gandhi did not merit being reviewed. 23. More significant for our purposes is the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramakrishna Mission and another Vs. Kago Kunya and others, [ (2019) 16 SCC 303 ]. In the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court held: - “29. More recently in K.K.Saksena v International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, another two judge Bench of this Court held that a writ would not lie to enforce purely private law rights. Consequently, even if a body is performing a public duty and is amenable to the exercise of writ jurisdiction, all its decisions would not be subject to judicial review. The Court held thus: “43. What follows from a minute and careful reading of the aforesaid judgments of this Court is that if a person or authority is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, admittedly a writ petition under Article 226 would lie against such a person or body. However, we may add that even in such cases writ would not lie to enforce private law rights. There are a catena of judgments on this aspect and it is not necessary to refer to those judgments as that is the basic principle of judicial review of an action under the administrative law. The reason is obvious. A private law is that part of a legal system which is a part of common law that involves relationships between individuals, such as law of contract or torts. Therefore, even if writ petition would be maintainable against an authority, which is “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution, before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the Court has to satisfy that action of such an authority, which is challenged, is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law.” 30. Thus, even if the body discharges a public function in a wider sense, there is no public law element involved in the enforcement of a private contract of service. “34. Thus, contracts of a purely private nature would not be subject to writ jurisdiction merely by reason of the fact that they are structured by statutory provisions. The only exception to this principle arises in a situation where the contract of service is governed or regulated by a statutory provision. “34. Thus, contracts of a purely private nature would not be subject to writ jurisdiction merely by reason of the fact that they are structured by statutory provisions. The only exception to this principle arises in a situation where the contract of service is governed or regulated by a statutory provision. Hence, for instance, in K K Saksena (supra) this Court held that when an employee is a workman governed by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it constitutes an exception to the general principle that a contract of personal service is not capable of being specifically enforced or performed.” 24. The aforesaid decisions were noticed by this Court in Ram Niwas Sharma Vs. Union of India and others, [ (2020) 4 ADJ 166 ] and the legal position summarized as follows:- “15. It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to invoke this Courts powers conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a ''public function'' or ''public duty'' be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service. 17. As has been lucidly explained, contracts of a purely private nature even though entered by bodies which may perform a public function would not be subject to judicial review. The only exception would be where such contracts are governed or regulated by statute. In the present case it is the undisputed position that the byelaws and the service conditions which apply are non statutory. They are deprived of any statutory ordainment. Such a contract, as noted above, would remain a pure private contract of service. The only exception would be where such contracts are governed or regulated by statute. In the present case it is the undisputed position that the byelaws and the service conditions which apply are non statutory. They are deprived of any statutory ordainment. Such a contract, as noted above, would remain a pure private contract of service. In that view of the matter the writ petition challenging the termination of such a contract would not be maintainable.” 25. A learned Judge of the Court in Bruce Henderson Vs. State of U.P. and 9 others, [Writ A No.4789 of 2020 decided on 10 September 2020] dealt with the question of whether a writ petition would lie against an order of termination passed by a private educational institution. After noticing the various decisions rendered by the Court including the ones noted hereinabove, the learned Judge insofar as the question of maintainability is concerned, held thus:- “The Full Bench has taken into consideration the judgments relied upon by the parties before me and being bound by the Full Bench, I hold that the writ petition would lie against the institution being St. Marks School and College, Jhansi. Thus, the preliminary objection raised by the respondent is rejected and following the Full Bench judgment I hold that the writ petition is maintainable. Now, the matter shall be heard with regard to the merits of the averments that may be raised by the petitioner. The preliminary issue is decided accordingly.” 26. However dealing with whether the Court could interfere with the order of termination on merits, the learned Judge held as follows:- “The counsel for the respondents have placed before this Court a judgment by this Court dated 28.1.2020 passed in Writ-A No. 29911 of 2012 (Rajesh Kumar Srivastava and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others), wherein a similar challenge was made to the contract of personal service by a privately managed unaided educational institutions. This Court after considering the entire gamut of cases held that challenge to a contract of personal service breached by a privately managed unaided educational institutions can be agitated in remedies available under common law rights as none of the exceptions noticed by the Apex Court in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College Vs. Lakshmi Narain and Others; (1976) 2 SCC 58 are made out. Lakshmi Narain and Others; (1976) 2 SCC 58 are made out. Thus, no writ can be issued by this Court to allow the petitioner to continue in employment in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The facts of the present case are also similar to those in Writ-A No. 29911 of 2012. There is no issue that the Institution in question is not a privately managed unaided educational institutional institutions, that being the case, respectfully following the judgment dated 28.1.2020 of this court in Writ-A No. 29911 of 2012, Rajesh Kumar Srivastava (Supra), the petitioner is not entitled for issuance of a writ, as prayed for.” 27. The aforesaid decision was upheld by the Division Bench of the Court in Bruce Henderson Vs. State of U.P. and 9 others, [Special Appeal Defective No.1033 of 2020 decided on 13 April 2021] with the following observations. “Hon'ble Supreme Court in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and others Vs. Lakshmi Narain and others reported in AIR 1976 SC 888 in quite unambiguous terms held that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be granted. The only exceptions are the employees having status of civil servant, workman under Industrial Disputes Act or not any other labour legislation or where violation is in mandatory obligation under a statute. No such eventuality exists in the case in hand.” D. THE PETITIONERS STAND 28. For the petitioners, submissions were ably advanced by Sri J.P. Singh and other learned counsels who principally submitted that since the issue was one of employment under the State, the preliminary objection was liable to be rejected. The Court before proceeding further may briefly notice the following decisions on which reliance was placed by Sri J.P. Singh in support of his submission that the writ petition would be maintainable. Learned counsel firstly pressed in aid the decision of the Supreme Court in K.Krishnamacharyulu And Others v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering And Another, [ (1997) 3 SCC 571 ]. In paragraph-4 of the report the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision held thus: - “4. It is not in dispute that executive instructions issued by the Government have given them the right to claim the pay scales so as to be on a par with the government employees. In paragraph-4 of the report the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision held thus: - “4. It is not in dispute that executive instructions issued by the Government have given them the right to claim the pay scales so as to be on a par with the government employees. The question is when there is no statutory values issued in that behalf, and the institution, at the relevant time, being not in receipt of any grant-in-aid; Whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable? In view of the long line of decisions of this Court holding that when there is a interest created by the Government in a institution to impart education, which is a fundamental right of the citizens, the teachers who impart the education get an element of public interest in the performance of their duties. As a consequence, the element of public interest requires regulation of the conditions of service of those employees on a par with government employees. In consequence, are they also not entitled to the parity of the pay scales as per the executive instructions of the Government? It is not also in dispute that all the persons who filed the writ petition along with the appellant had later withdrawn from the writ petition and thereafter the respondent-Management paid the salaries on a par with the government employees. Since the appellants are insisting upon enforcement of their right through the judicial pressure, they need and seek the protection of law. We are of the view that the State has obligation to provide facilities and opportunities to the people to avail of the right to education. The private institutions cater to the need of the educational opportunities. The teacher duly appointed to a post in the private institution also is entitled to seek enforcement of the orders issued by the Government. The question is as to which forum one should approach. The High Court has held that the remedy is available under the Industrial Disputes Act. When an element of public interest is created and the institution is catering to that element, the teacher, being the arm of the institution, is also entitled to avail of the remedy provided under Article 226; the jurisdiction part is very wide. It would be a different position, if the remedy is a private law remedy. When an element of public interest is created and the institution is catering to that element, the teacher, being the arm of the institution, is also entitled to avail of the remedy provided under Article 226; the jurisdiction part is very wide. It would be a different position, if the remedy is a private law remedy. So, they cannot be denied the same benefit which is available to others. Accordingly, we hold that the writ petition is maintainable. They are entitled to equal pay so as to be on a par with government employees under Article 39(d) of the Constitution.” 29. As would be evident from a reading of the aforesaid decision and the paragraphs extracted above, the principal question there was whether the petitioners were entitled to claim pay scales equivalent to and at par with government employees. Their claim before the High Court was rejected with the observation that it would be open to those teachers to institute proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act. The view so taken was faulted by the Supreme Court upon noticing that the executive instructions which had been issued by the government did give those petitioners the right to claim pay scales at par with other government employees. Additionally, the Court noted the rights conferred on the petitioners to claim equal pay on the basis of Article 39(d) of the Constitution. The aforesaid decision answered the issue in favour of the petitioners principally based on the fact that executive instructions did confer on them the right to claim parity in pay. Additionally the Supreme Court recognised the constitutional right inhering in the petitioners to claim equal pay. 30. Sri Singh then drew the attention of the Court to the judgment in Gridco Limited And Another v. Sri Sadananda Doloi & Others, [Civil Appeal No. 11303 of 2011]. Gridco again was a matter which dealt with the contractual engagement of employees whose appointments were admittedly governed by the Gridco Officers Service Regulations 1996. This is evident from the following extract of that decision:- “14. There is one other aspect to which we must advert before we part with the question of nature of appointment offered to the respondent. The appointment order issued in favour of the respondent specifically stated that the respondent will be governed by the GRIDCO Officers Service Regulations, 1996. This is evident from the following extract of that decision:- “14. There is one other aspect to which we must advert before we part with the question of nature of appointment offered to the respondent. The appointment order issued in favour of the respondent specifically stated that the respondent will be governed by the GRIDCO Officers Service Regulations, 1996. With the coming into force of the said Regulations, the respondent was redesignated as Chief General Manager, HR which was in terms of the Regulations, a post in the Executive Grade of E-10. This re-designation was not at any stage questioned by the respondent. On the contrary it was he who had prayed for amendment of clause (2) of the appointment letter to bring the same in tune with para 13(3) of the GRIDCO Officers Service Regulation. Para 13(3) of the Regulations reads as: "13(3): The appointment to grades above E-9 shall be on a contract basis initially for a period of 3 years and renewable thereafter for such period(s) as the Board or the Committee of the Board may prescribe until the Officer attains the age of superannuation as provided in these Regulations." 15. The above makes it manifest that an appointment to the post in category E-10 could be made only on a contractual basis. The Regulations do not envisage a regular appointment at E-10 level to which the respondent stands appointed on the terms of the contract of employment. That being the case it is difficult to see how the said appointment could be treated to be a regular appointment when the Rules did not permit any such appointment. We may mention to the credit of learned senior counsel who appeared for the respondent that although at one stage an attempt was made to argue that the appointment of the respondent was regular in nature, that line of argument was not pursued further and in our opinion, rightly so having regard to what we have said above. Such being the case the question of the so called unequal bargaining power of the parties did not have any relevance or role to play in the facts and circumstances of the case. Question No.1 is answered accordingly. Re: Question No.2 .” 31. It was in the aforesaid backdrop and noticing that the contractual engagement was in fact traceable to statutory regulations that the Supreme Court observed :- “26. Question No.1 is answered accordingly. Re: Question No.2 .” 31. It was in the aforesaid backdrop and noticing that the contractual engagement was in fact traceable to statutory regulations that the Supreme Court observed :- “26. A conspectus of the pronouncements of this court and the development of law over the past few decades thus show that there has been a notable shift from the stated legal position settled in earlier decisions, that termination of a contractual employment in accordance with the terms of the contract was permissible and the employee could claim no protection against such termination even when one of the contracting parties happened to be the State. Remedy for a breach of a contractual condition was also by way of civil action for damages/compensation. With the development of law relating to judicial review of administrative actions, a writ Court can now examine the validity of a termination order passed by public authority. It is no longer open to the authority passing the order to argue that its action being in the realm of contract is not 33 open to judicial review. A writ Court is entitled to judicially review the action and determine whether there was any illegality, perversity, unreasonableness, unfairness or irrationality that would vitiate the action, no matter the action is in the realm of contract. Having said that we must add that judicial review cannot extend to the Court acting as an appellate authority sitting in judgment over the decision. The Court cannot sit in the arm chair of the Administrator to decide whether a more reasonable decision or course of action could have been taken in the circumstances. So long as the action taken by the authority is not shown to be vitiated by the infirmities referred to above and so long as the action is not demonstrably in outrageous defiance of logic, the writ Court would do well to respect the decision under challenge.” 32. Sri Singh then placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka And Others, [ (2018) 12 SCC 61 ] and Maharashtra Chess Association v. Union of India & Others, Civil Appeal No. 5654 of 2019. Bharati Reddy dealt with a question of whether a writ petition challenging the election of an Adhyaksha could be maintained having regard to the bar placed by Article 243-O of the Constitution. Bharati Reddy dealt with a question of whether a writ petition challenging the election of an Adhyaksha could be maintained having regard to the bar placed by Article 243-O of the Constitution. Dealing with the aforesaid issue the Supreme Court observed as follows:- “11. We do not find any merit in this contention. We are of the view that a voter in a particular panchayat cannot be rendered remediless if he is aggrieved by the election of the Adhyaksha of the Panchayat. In Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala and Anr. (1973) 4 SCC 225 , a thirteen Judge Bench of this Court held that Article 368 of the Constitution does not enable the Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. The basic structure of the Constitution could not be altered by any constitutional amendment and it was held in unambiguous terms that one of the basic features is the existence of constitutional system in judicial review. This view was followed by a Constitution Bench in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. (1980) 3 SCC 625 . In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 , a seven Judge Bench of this Court has held that jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and tribunals may perform a supplementary role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and Article 32 of the Constitution of India. It has been held as under: “78. ... We, therefore, hold that the power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded.” 12. In I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1 , a Bench of nine Judges has again held that power of judicial review is the part of the basic structure of the Constitution. In I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1 , a Bench of nine Judges has again held that power of judicial review is the part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The power to amend cannot be equated with the power to frame the Constitution. “It is thus clear that power of judicial review under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is an essential feature of the Constitution which can neither be tinkered with nor eroded. Even the Constitution cannot be amended to erode the basic structure of the Constitution. Therefore, it cannot be said that the writ petition filed by Respondents 6 to 9 under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. However, it is left to the discretion of the court exercising the power under Articles 226/227 to entertain the writ petition.” 33. As is evident from the aforesaid extracts, Bharati Reddy is essentially an authority for the proposition that the power of judicial review is an essential feature of the Constitution and that the mere existence of an alternative forum cannot be solely determinative of whether the High Court should entertain a writ petition. Maharashtra Chess Association again deals with the question of whether the High Courts must necessarily desist from invoking its constitutional powers merely because an alternative forum for adjudication exists. Dealing with the aforesaid issue the Supreme Court held: - “13. While the powers the High Court may exercise under its writ jurisdiction are not subject to strict legal principles, two clear principles emerge with respect to when a High Court’s writ jurisdiction may be engaged. First, the decision of the High Court to entertain or not entertain a particular action under its writ jurisdiction is fundamentally discretionary. Secondly, limitations placed on the court’s decision to exercise or refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction are self-imposed. It is a well settled principle that the writ jurisdiction of a High Court cannot be completely excluded by statute. If a High Court is tasked with being the final recourse to upholding the rule of law within its territorial jurisdiction, it must necessarily have the power to examine any case before it and make a determination of whether or not its writ jurisdiction is engaged. Judicial review under Article 226 is an intrinsic feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. …. 21. Judicial review under Article 226 is an intrinsic feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. …. 21. The mere existence of alternate forums where the aggrieved party may secure relief does not create a legal bar on a High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction. It is a factor to be taken into consideration by the High Court amongst several factors. Thus, the mere fact that the High Court at Madras is capable of granting adequate relief to the Appellant does not create a legal bar on the Bombay High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction in the present matter.” 34. As is manifest from the above, both Bharati Reddy and Maharashtra Chess Association, strictly speaking, do not deal with the question which confronts this Court at all. 35. Sri Singh lastly placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of the Court rendered in the matter of Dr. Vandana Vahistha v. State of U.P. And Others, [ 2018(4) ADJ 819 (FB)]. Vandana Vahistha was a matter where the service of a Lecturer appointed in a B.Ed. College was terminated by an order of the Committee of Management. However, it becomes pertinent to note that the Court found that the appointment of the appellant there was governed by the provisions of the U.P. State Universities Act 1973 in the same fashion and to the same extent as any other teacher appointed in an affiliated college. The Court noted that the 1973 Act made no distinction between a teacher of an affiliated college whether in a department receiving grant-in-aid or one constituted under a self-financing scheme. It also noted that the appointment of the appellant there had been duly approved by the Vice Chancellor in accordance with the provisions made in the Act. The order of termination was set aside upon the Division Bench finding that it had come to be made in violation of Section 35(2) of the Act. The Court struck down the impugned action upon it finding that termination had come to be affected in violation of the provisions of statute. E. CONCLUSIONS ON MAINTAINABILITY 36. At the outset and before the Court proceeds to deal with the legal question which is raised, it becomes necessary to note that the petitioners here do not assail their contracts as being unconscionable or opposed to public policy. E. CONCLUSIONS ON MAINTAINABILITY 36. At the outset and before the Court proceeds to deal with the legal question which is raised, it becomes necessary to note that the petitioners here do not assail their contracts as being unconscionable or opposed to public policy. They also do not assail the validity of the government orders or circulars which circumscribe these contracts. This aspect assumes significance since the challenge to the impugned orders would have to be evaluated bearing the aforesaid in mind. 37. The Court firstly notes that the contention of the respondents that the writ petitions would not be maintainable, is perhaps misdirected and in any case too broadly stated. In the considered view of the Court what essentially falls for consideration is not an issue of maintainability but whether a prerogative writ would issue in light of the nature of the challenge that is raised. All the writ petitioners assail actions of respondents who are undisputedly State. The impugned actions have been taken in the course of implementation of a scheme which seeks to extend and implement the constitutional promise of providing elementary education. It would be too late in the day for the Court to shut its eyes to the well-established principle that all actions of the State are liable to be tested on the constitutional principle of fairness. Consequently, the Court finds itself unable to countenance the broadly stated proposition that the writ petitions would not be maintainable per se. 38. The issue which principally falls for consideration is whether the termination of these contracts or the variation of the terms of engagement would warrant a writ being issued to either grant reinstatement or other appropriate relief and if so in which exceptional situations. As was aptly stated by the Supreme Court in Ramkrishna Mission, the question of whether the termination of an appointment not governed by statute could form the subject matter of a writ petition would arise notwithstanding the decision having been taken by a state functionary or a body which even though not answering the description of State, performs a public function or discharges a public duty. 39. 39. In the considered view of the Court, the key to understanding the legal principles propounded in Rajesh Bharadwaj, Roychan Abraham or Ramkrishna Mission is to foremost bear in mind that those decisions dealt with the question of a termination simpliciter of contractual appointments which were not governed by any statutory rule or regulation. The only known and established exceptions to the universal principle of a contract of personal service not being enforceable is where such a contract is regulated and controlled by statute or law. The three well known and repeatedly articulated exceptions to a contract of service not being specifically enforceable are (a) where a civil servant is removed from service in violation of Article 311 or a law made under Article 309 of the Constitution (b) where a workman is removed in violation of protections accorded by industrial legislation and (c ) where an employee of a body is dismissed in breach of a statute or a statutory rule. It is only in the aforementioned three exceptional circumstances that Courts can enter declarations of the termination being void or invalid and direct reinstatement. Even as the functions of the State became more varied and pervasive and it went forth discharging those functions through various forms of entities, the jurisprudence that developed on this question remained consistent and unwavering. The precedents following an undeviating thread have stuck to the three exceptions noticed above. Consequently it must be held that the contractual engagement of the petitioners when viewed exclusively from the standpoint of the terms laid down in the individual agreements would bind parties and judicial review of action taken pursuant thereto would have to be tested on the cornerstone of the “trinity exceptions” noted above. 40. However, there is one seminal distinguishing feature which imbues these engagements compelling the Court to enter the following caveat. The contractual engagement of the petitioners would have been liable to be tested solely on the aforesaid principles but for the fact that their engagement is also controlled and governed by executive orders, circulars and policy statements issued by the respondents from time to time. The contractual engagement of the petitioners would have been liable to be tested solely on the aforesaid principles but for the fact that their engagement is also controlled and governed by executive orders, circulars and policy statements issued by the respondents from time to time. These orders whether made in the exercise of executive power of the State or the mere expression of policy by an authority which is State, an adjunct thereof or a body which discharges a public function or performs a public duty would bind those authorities to the same extent as any statutory rule, regulation or a code of conduct enforceable in law. A public authority must be held bound to act in accordance with the rules of conduct adopted by it when it interacts with citizens of the State. It is this distinguishing feature that would confer a right on the petitioners here to assail and question the actions of the respondents notwithstanding the fact that their engagement is contractual. The executive orders and circulars issued by the respondents govern and control a whole gamut of activities relating to KGBV including the selection and appointment of teachers and staff, their terms of engagement, curriculum and pattern of instructions. The Court in Roychan Abraham aptly noted the following principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Johri Mal:- “For a public law remedy enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions of the authority need to fall in the realm of public law -be it a legislative act of the State, an executive act of the State or an instrumentality or a person or authority imbued with public law element.” 41. The Court thus comes to the definitive conclusion that the limited ground on which the action instituted by the petitioner and the challenge to the impugned orders is liable to be tested is whether the same falls foul of the provisions of the various executive orders and directives issued from time to time. The Court holds that it is within this narrow confine alone that the impugned actions are liable to be tested. The Court holds that it is within this narrow confine alone that the impugned actions are liable to be tested. To put it in other words, the challenge to orders of termination or variation in the terms of engagement would have to be established and found to be in violation of a provision or stipulation contained in those executive orders or circulars issued by the respondents so as to warrant a writ being issued notwithstanding their employment being otherwise and principally governed by the terms of the individual contracts. F. THE CHALLENGE ON MERITS 42. While the various orders issued from time to time by the respondents in connection with KGBV have been noticed in some detail in the preceding parts of this decision, it would be appropriate to briefly deal with the provisions made in those orders insofar as the issues of termination, non-renewal and variation of terms of engagement are concerned. 43. These orders issued either by the State or UPEFA deal with various facets of the engagement and appointment of teachers and staff in KGBV. These include subjects such as: - (a) Staff Structure (b) Scale of honorarium payable (c) Curriculum (d) Selection process of Wardens, Teachers and other staff members (e) Essential Qualifications for appointment in KGBV (f) Renewal of existing contracts (g) Assessment of the quality of work discharged by existing staff (h) Disengagement of existing staff based on performance appraisal 44. It would be apposite to firstly deal with the issue of disengagement of existing staff and termination of contracts. The Government Orders and the Circulars issued by UPEFA have consistently followed a process of performance appraisal from the inception of the scheme. That process which has essentially remained unchanged over the years is reiterated in the latest Circular of the State Project Director dated 4 January 2021. The Court consequently proposes to deal with the relevant clause as contained in the aforementioned Circular. Clause 8 of that Circular firstly notes that all contractual engagements are to be for a period of 11 months and 29 days. It then stipulates that the contracts of existing Wardens, teachers and other staff may be renewed provided their work and conduct is found to be satisfactory. The work of annually appraising the performance of existing staff is entrusted to the Block Development Officer. It then stipulates that the contracts of existing Wardens, teachers and other staff may be renewed provided their work and conduct is found to be satisfactory. The work of annually appraising the performance of existing staff is entrusted to the Block Development Officer. If the conduct of the teacher alongwith the educational progress of pupils be found satisfactory, the contract may be renewed subject to the approval of the District Magistrate. 45. Clause 8 then provides that if the services rendered by a teacher be found to be unsatisfactory, the assessing authority would provide adequate opportunity to that person to submit an explanation and upon consideration of the justification proffered frame a recommendation for the consideration of the District Magistrate. That leaves the District Magistrate to take further action on the question of renewal. Clause 8 then prescribes that each contract will incorporate a clause to the effect that in case the services of any teacher or staff be found to be unsatisfactory, the contract would be terminable upon a notice of 1 month. It further provides that in cases where serious infractions or acts of misconduct or financial irregularities are noticed or found, it would be open to the competent authority to draw up a detailed recommendation for the consideration of the District Magistrate for termination of the contract. In addition, Clause 8 leaves it open to the authority to initiate criminal prosecution in that regard. 46. Having noticed the scheme of Clause 8 it becomes pertinent to note that significantly it neither contemplates nor puts in place an adjudicatory mechanism enabling teachers or staff members to assail or question a performance appraisal or a recommendation for non-renewal of a contract. It also does not oblige the District Magistrate to conduct proceedings in which a staff member may have an opportunity to question or assail a recommendation for disengagement or represent against the proposed consequential action that the District Magistrate may take. In the considered opinion of this Court the provisions made in Clause 8 requiring the assessing authorities to frame detailed proposals and recommendations in respect of disengagement and non-renewal only subserves the objective of eschewing arbitrariness and infusing the process with a degree of probity. Those provisions simply put in place a salutary check on the exercise of power by the respondents and ensuring that a degree of objectivity infuses the aforesaid process. Those provisions simply put in place a salutary check on the exercise of power by the respondents and ensuring that a degree of objectivity infuses the aforesaid process. However, the Court fails to discern any intent in Clause 8 of conferring a right on a staff member to question a decision to not renew a contract of employment during the decision making process except to the extent provided in that clause itself. If Clause 8 were to be read contrary to the above, it would amount to recognizing a right inhering in a contractual employee to compel an employer to renew and perpetuate a contract of personal service. Such a right has never been recognised under our jurisprudence relating to contractual engagement. It would additionally introduce the principle of enforcement of personal contracts of service which is otherwise impermissible in law. Ultimately Clause 8 proceeds essentially on the employer being satisfied that the work and conduct of the employee does not warrant a renewal of the contract. Such an interpretation would also be in line with the principles of loss of confidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Kailash Singh Vs. Mayo College, [(2018) 18 SCC 216]. 47. It also becomes relevant to note that the executive orders and circulars which came to be issued from inception provided for the appointment of full time and part time teachers for individual subjects. The subjects which are considered to be primary and compulsory were to be taught by full time teachers while secondary subjects were to be taught by part time teachers. In order to ensure that instructions in compulsory subjects were imparted by trained and qualified teachers, essential qualifications were prescribed accordingly. These qualifications have been duly spelt out in the Government Orders of 14 July 2020 and 11 December 2020. As these two orders would establish, full time teachers were to be engaged to teach the subjects of Maths, Science, Language (Hindi and Sanskrit), Social Studies and English. The subjects of Physical Education, Computers and Art/Craft/Music and Woodcraft (a consolidated subject) were to be taught by part time teachers. The essential qualifications for teachers to be engaged to teach compulsory subjects required them to possess a Graduate Training qualification in the concerned stream together with a TET certificate recognised for upper primary classes. The subjects of Physical Education, Computers and Art/Craft/Music and Woodcraft (a consolidated subject) were to be taught by part time teachers. The essential qualifications for teachers to be engaged to teach compulsory subjects required them to possess a Graduate Training qualification in the concerned stream together with a TET certificate recognised for upper primary classes. These orders further ordained that no separate teacher for a compulsory subject may be hired where the selection of a Warden had come to be made based on her credentials establishing her to be competent to impart instructions in that field. The subject of Home Science came to be merged in “Art/Craft/Music and Woodcraft” and persons who had been initially engaged as full-time teachers based on a qualification held in the subject of Home Science were to be adjusted accordingly. 48. A major review of the selections and appointments made in KGBV came to be undertaken pursuant to the issuance of the Government Order of 14 July 2020. Upon noticing the various irregularities which had sullied the selection and appointment process, the respondents initiated an in depth review and for placement of existing teachers based on the qualifications held by them. The Court fails to find that action to be tainted either by arbitrariness or any illegality. A teacher who otherwise does not possess the qualification prescribed for a full-time teacher and is ineligible to teach a compulsory subject cannot possibly assert a right to be retained full time. If the Court were to uphold such a claim or recognise such a right it would have a debilitating impact on the economics and effectiveness of a significant scheme formulated by the respondents aimed at providing educational opportunities of an appropriate standard and quality to the girl child. Additionally, the Court holds that assertion of claims like the present must be balanced against the paramount objective of providing qualitative education to girls. The right of employment as asserted by the petitioners if not subordinate must at least give way to the right of education conferred on the child under our Constitution. 49. In any case, the Court fails to recognise an inherent right in the petitioners to be continued as full time teachers even though their initial engagement was on the basis of their educational qualifications to teach a subject which is no longer earmarked or treated as a compulsory or primary topic. 49. In any case, the Court fails to recognise an inherent right in the petitioners to be continued as full time teachers even though their initial engagement was on the basis of their educational qualifications to teach a subject which is no longer earmarked or treated as a compulsory or primary topic. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that the provisions made in the various Government Orders were never assailed or questioned before the Court as being constitutionally invalid. It is in light of the aforesaid conclusions that the individual writ petitions are taken up for consideration. G. DECISION ON THE WRIT PETITIONS 50. The Court in light of the aforesaid conclusions thus proceeds to deal with the individual writ petitions. (I) Writ A. No. 4845 of 2021 51. Undisputedly the petitioner was selected and appointed based on her being qualified to teach the subject of Home Science. That subject as noted above is no longer in the list of compulsory subjects and has been merged with Art, Music and Craft. In terms of the provisions made in the various executive orders and directives issued from time to time, the aforementioned subject is to be taught by a part time teacher. Although the contract of the petitioner was initially renewed permitting her to teach Hindi, the same came to be terminated in light of the directive of the State Director dated 26 August 2020 restraining the continuance of teachers by permitting change in subject. Neither the aforesaid directive nor the primary policy documents of 14 July 2020 and 11 December 2020 are assailed by the petitioner. The Court does not find a semblance of a legal right inhering in the petitioner to compel the respondents to continue her as a Warden or full-time teacher. The action of the respondents is not shown to be in contravention of any provision made in the government orders and executive instructions issued from time to time. Acceptance of the submission as addressed on behalf of the petitioner would amount to the Court by way of a prerogative writ commanding the respondents to modify the terms of the contract and rewrite the policy decisions taken by them and that too at the behest of a petitioner whose engagement from its inception rested on a contract. The writ petition would thus merit dismissal. Ordered accordingly. (II) Writ A No. 4882 of 2021 52. The writ petition would thus merit dismissal. Ordered accordingly. (II) Writ A No. 4882 of 2021 52. The respondents orally contended that the training qualification held by the petitioner is unrecognized. The petitioner has however placed on the record a document issued by the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board which evidences that the aforesaid certificate is duly regonized. Additionally the Court notes that the petitioner had music as a subject at the graduation level. However the order impugned spells out no reason why the training qualifications held by the petitioner are not liable to be recognized. 53. In view of the aforesaid, this writ petition would have to be heard separately with the respondents explaining the reasons for non renewal of the contract of the petitioner. Consequently, let a counter affidavit be filed by the respondents within three weeks. List thereafter. (III) Writ A. No. 4571 of 2021 54. This writ petition which again has been preferred by a teacher who was initially engaged by virtue of her qualification to teach Home Science, assails the action of the respondents downgrading her to the status of a part time teacher to impart instructions in the subject of Art, Music and Craft. For reasons aforenoted, this writ petition too stands dismissed. (IV) Writ A No. 5728 of 2021 55. Admittedly the petitioner does not possess the O level certificate so as to be recognised as being qualified to teach the subject of Computers. Under the relevant orders, the subject of Computers was to be taught by a part time teacher. However and for reasons unknown, the petitioner was engaged and her contract renewed periodically as a full time teacher. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition must fail. It shall stand dismissed. (V) Writ A. 5914 of 2021 56. The engagement of the petitioner as an Urdu teacher has been discontinued upon it being found that the population of minorities in the location is less than 20%. Although the petitioner relies upon a website extract appearing at page 25 of the paperbook to challenge the aforesaid, the Court notes that no material or evidence in support of the authenticity of the data appearing therein has been placed on the record. Even the origins and the address of the web portal are not disclosed. Although the petitioner relies upon a website extract appearing at page 25 of the paperbook to challenge the aforesaid, the Court notes that no material or evidence in support of the authenticity of the data appearing therein has been placed on the record. Even the origins and the address of the web portal are not disclosed. The petitioner has also not challenge the prescription of Urdu teachers being engaged only in those areas where the population of minorities is at least 20%. In view of the above, the writ petition shall stand dismissed. (VI) Writ A No. 6966 of 2021 57. Quite apart from the fact that the petitioner was engaged by an outsourcing agency and private entity, Sanjari Corporate Services, the Court finds no right inhering in the petitioner to command the respondents to renew his contractual engagement. The writ petition shall stand dismissed. (VII) Writ A No. 8595 of 2021 58. The challenge to the appointment of the private respondent by the petitioner has been rejected by the respondents on the ground that the said respondent had a longer length of service rendered in the KGBV than the petitioner. For resolution of such competing claims the respondents have placed reliance on the provisions made in the executive orders and directions issued from time to time. The petitioner has not challenged the criteria as evolved and adopted by the respondents in this regard. Although it was contended that the fifth respondent was not qualified for the post, her Bachelor’s Degree which stands appended at page 33 of the paperbook establishes that she obtained a B.A. degree with Hindi, Sanskrit, Sociology and Hindi Language as her subjects. The challenge on this score also consequently fails. The writ petition is dismissed. (VIII) Writ A No. 6716 of 2021 59. The petitioner is aggrieved by the decision of the respondents to discontinue her engagement upon it being found that she did not have Urdu as a subject at the Graduation level. While the petitioner relies upon a government order of 5 September 2006, to contend that as long as she had Urdu as a subject in two out of the three examinations of High School, Intermediate and Graduation, the Court finds itself unable to accept that contention for the following reasons. While the petitioner relies upon a government order of 5 September 2006, to contend that as long as she had Urdu as a subject in two out of the three examinations of High School, Intermediate and Graduation, the Court finds itself unable to accept that contention for the following reasons. Firstly that government order related to the appointment of teachers in primary schools established by the Basic Education Board and does not pertain to KGBV. Secondly the respondents have placed for the consideration of the Court the government order of 17 August 2013 which clearly stipulates that a candidate would be entitled to be appointed as an Urdu teacher provided she can establish that she had studied that subject at the graduation level. In view of the aforesaid, the Court finds no merit in the writ petition which shall stand dismissed. (IX) Writ A No. 8587 of 2021 60. According to the respondents the petitioner was engaged to impart instructions in the subject Science. However, as her testimonials would establish, she was not qualified to either teach that subject or be engaged for the aforesaid purpose. The Court consequently finds no merit in the writ petition which shall stand dismissed. 61. The batch of writ petitions shall stand disposed of in the above terms except Writ-A No. 4882 of 2021.