ORDER : 1. The petitioner seeks transfer of a proceeding on the allegation of bias against the Presiding Officer of the Family Court. 2. The respondents 1 and 2 in the transfer petition the wife and daughter of the petitioner have instituted O.P. No. 2364/2017 and M.C. No. 119/2016 before the Family Court, Ernakulam (in short ‘Court’) seeking a decree for return of money, gold ornaments and maintenance from the petitioner. 3. The petitioner asserts in the transfer petition that he has lost faith, trust and confidence in the Court because the Presiding Officer is prejudiced. The Presiding Officer is not ready to either hear the submissions or look into the precedents pointed out by his counsel. The petitioner apprehends that there will be no meritorious disposal of the cases. On 7.7.2021, when the counsel for the respondents insisted for a consideration of an application through the virtual court, the Presiding Officer directed the counsel and the parties to be present in the physical court on the same day at 1.00 p.m. Then the Presiding Officer pressurised the petitioner to pay the arrears of maintenance. When his counsel tried to oppose the direction, the Presiding Officer adjourned the cases to 12.07.2021 but observed that “if you are sticking onto your earlier stand even now, I will show you.” The observation was unwarranted and reveals that the Presiding Officer is biased. After the sitting was over, an office staff made enquiries about the 1st respondent. The petitioner told the staff that the 1st respondent had left. The staff said that the Presiding Officer wanted to meet the 1st respondent in the chambers, which surprised the petitioner. Meeting a party to a dispute in the chambers, without notice to the other side, was unfair. The petitioner is constrained to believe that something seriously prejudicial to him dehors the merits of the case is bound to happen. In Rajnesh vs. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324 the Honourable Supreme Court has observed that in maintenance cases the applicants should file a concise affidavit disclosing their assets, which has not been complied with by the respondents. The Court is not paying heed to the noncompliance of the above direction. On 12.7.2021, when the cases were called in the virtual court, the Presiding Officer again directed both parties to be present in the physical court. The Court is not paying heed to the noncompliance of the above direction. On 12.7.2021, when the cases were called in the virtual court, the Presiding Officer again directed both parties to be present in the physical court. The Presiding Officer was reluctant to hear the submission of the petitioner and insisted him to bring his counsel who was laid up. The Presiding Officer declared in the open court that she had not called the 1st respondent to meet her in the chambers, but later in the virtual court she admitted that she had enquired about the 1st respondent to explore the possibility of a settlement. The observations, acts and omissions of the Presiding Officer are neither judicial nor judicious. Hence O.P. No. 2364/2017 may be transferred to the Family Court, Muvattupuzha. 4. This Court had called for a report from the Presiding Officer. By communication dated 3.9.2021, the Presiding Officer has, inter-alia, stated as follows: “When the matters came up for hearing on 7.7.2021 specific orders were passed by this Court in M.P. No. 355/2021 filed by the respondent for summoning a witness and an Advocate Commissioner was appointed to inspect the joint bank locker of the couple. On that day, submissions were made from both sides to further explore the possibility of an amicable settlement in the matter and both sides requested the matter to be considered in chamber counselling on a further date. That time regular pre-adalath talks were being chaired by Smt. N. Leelamani, former Judge, Family Court, in respect of family court cases. Due to pressure of work, a chamber counselling on a near date was found impossible and instead, I thought it better to refer the parties for pre-adalath talks. So after retiring to chamber and on ascertaining that Smt. Leelamani was still conducting pre-adalath talk session, I sent my staff attached to pre-adalath matters to verify whether the parties left the premises so as to send them for pre-settlement talk on that day itself. As I was told that one of the parties has left the court premises, the matter could not be referred for pre-adalath talks on that day. This is what actually happened on 7.7.2021. As I was told that one of the parties has left the court premises, the matter could not be referred for pre-adalath talks on that day. This is what actually happened on 7.7.2021. The enquiry made by my staff about the presence of parties for enabling settlement talk by the Judicial member is twisted and misinterpreted by the respondent in such a way that I have called his wife, the petitioner to my chamber. There was no occasion for me to call any of the parties to my chamber and it is not needed at all. I did not do any act or omission either non-judicious or non-judiciary as alleged. In fact, it was the respondent/complainant who once sought permission to meet me in chamber when I very specifically directed the Commissioner to complete the recording of evidence and to submit report. Since he is a party litigant in the given case, permission was not accorded to him.” 5. Heard; Sri. N.J. Mathews, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. S. Sreekumar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents. 6. Sri. N.J. Mathews vehemently argued that the materials on record reveal that the Presiding Officer is biased. He reiterated the contentions in the transfer petition and drew the attention of this Court to Annexure-A10 application, wherein the petitioner had sought to recall RW-2 “a Bank Manager” to produce certain documents and tender oral evidence. The Court without considering the prayer in the application, directed an Advocate Commissioner to inspect the locker and prepare an inventory, on condition that the petitioner pays Rs. 5,000/- as commission batta on the same day itself i.e. 7.7.2021. On 12.7.2021, the application was dismissed by Annexure A-17 order for non-payment of the commission batta. Even though the counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was not liable to pay maintenance, the Presiding Officer was obstinate in her stand. The contradictory statements made by the Presiding Officer on 7.7.2021 and 12.07.2021 have given the petitioner an impression that the Court is proceeding in a preconceived manner. Hence the case may be transferred. 7. Sri. S. Sreekumar opposed the transfer petition and contended that the petitioner’s intention is to procrastinate the proceeding and evade payment of maintenance to the respondents. The respondents are in abject poverty and are finding it difficult to pull on with their lives. Hence the case may be transferred. 7. Sri. S. Sreekumar opposed the transfer petition and contended that the petitioner’s intention is to procrastinate the proceeding and evade payment of maintenance to the respondents. The respondents are in abject poverty and are finding it difficult to pull on with their lives. The maintenance case was filed on 30.03.2016 and the original petition was filed on 05.12.2017. The cases were ordered to be jointly tried. An Advocate Commissioner was appointed to record the evidence. Trial in the cases commenced on 13.02.2019 with the 1st respondent filing her proof affidavit. Her cross-examination began on 23.2.2019 and was completed on 17.9.2019 i.e. after seven posting dates spanning seven months. The 2nd respondent was also cross-examined on 19.10.2019 and 18.1.2020, and the respondents’ evidence was closed. Thereafter, the petitioner was cross examined on 9.12.2020, 13.1.2021, 25.1.2021 and 30.3.2021. In the meantime on 11.01.2021, a Bank Manager was examined as RW-2. The Advocate Commissioner surrendered the warrant due to the non-cooperation of the petitioner. The petitioner has not sought for enlargement of time to pay the commission batta or review Annexues-A11 and A17 orders, which have become final. It is more than two and half years since the trial has commenced. The Presiding Officer is now proceeding with the trial on day to day basis following the special list system and the case flow management rules, as directed by this Court in Shiju Joy A. vs. Nisha, ILR 2021 (2) Ker. 227. The Presiding Officer had stated that coercive proceedings would be initiated against the petitioner for non-payment of the interim maintenance as ordered by this Court in Annexure-A6 judgment. The transfer petition is a last ditch camouflaged attempt; to get the cases transferred from the present Court, so that the petitioner can evade payment of the arrears of interim maintenance and put the respondents to inconvenience, that too after browbeating the Presiding Officer. The insinuations made against the Presiding Officer are unwarranted. Hence the transfer petition may be dismissed. 8. The pleadings and materials on record indicate that the trial commenced on 13.02.2019 and the respondents’ evidence was closed on 18.01.2020. RW-2 was examined on 11.01.2021. Although the petitioner was cross examined on four posting dates, the recording of his evidence is not completed. It is alleged that the petitioner’s evidence was abruptly closed on 06.07.2021. 8. The pleadings and materials on record indicate that the trial commenced on 13.02.2019 and the respondents’ evidence was closed on 18.01.2020. RW-2 was examined on 11.01.2021. Although the petitioner was cross examined on four posting dates, the recording of his evidence is not completed. It is alleged that the petitioner’s evidence was abruptly closed on 06.07.2021. On 07.07.2021, that the petitioner filed Annexure A-10 application to summon additional documents and recall RW-2. On the same day, the Court appointed an Advocate Commissioner to obtain the documents, on deposit of commission batta, but the petitioner failed to comply with the condition. Inevitably, the Court dismissed the application on 12.07.2021. The petitioner has not challenged the orders. 9. It is well settled, in a host of precedents, that the power to transfer proceedings under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure is discretionary in nature. 10. In Jitendra Singh vs. Bhanu Kumari and Others, (2009) 1 SCC 130 , the Honourable Supreme Court observed thus: “9. The purpose of Section 24, CPC is merely to confer on the Court a discretionary power. A Court acting under section 24, CPC may or may not in its judicial discretion transfer a particular case. Section 24 does not prescribe any ground for ordering the transfer of a case. In certain cases it may be ordered suo motu and it may be done for administrative reasons. But when an application for transfer is made by a party, the Court is required to issue notice to the other side and hear the party before directing transfer. To put it differently the Court must act judicially in ordering a transfer on the application of a party.” 11. In Kulwinder Kaur alias Kulwinder Gurucharan Singh vs. Kandi friends Education Trust and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 659 the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows: “14. Although the discretionary power of transfer of cases cannot be imprisoned within a strait jacket of any cast-iron formula unanimously applicable to all situations, it cannot be gainsaid that the power to transfer a case must be exercised with due care, caution and circumspection. Reading Ss.24 and 25 of the Code together and keeping in view various judicial pronouncements, certain broad propositions as to what may constitute a ground for transfer have been laid down by Courts. Reading Ss.24 and 25 of the Code together and keeping in view various judicial pronouncements, certain broad propositions as to what may constitute a ground for transfer have been laid down by Courts. They are balance of convenience or inconvenience to plaintiff or defendant or witnesses; convenience or inconvenience of a particular place of trial having regard to the nature of evidence on the points involved in the suit; issues raised by the parties, reasonable apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he might not get justice in the Court in which the suit is pending; important questions of law involved or a considerable section of public interest in the litigation, ‘interest of justice’ demanding for transfer of suit, appeal or other proceeding, etc. Above are some of the instances which are germane in considering the question of transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding. They are, however, illustrative in nature and by no means be treated as exhaustive. If on the above or other relevant considerations, the Court feels that the plaintiff or the defendant is not likely to have a ‘fair trial’ in the Court from which he seeks to transfer a case, it is not only the power, but the duty of the Court to make such order.” 12. Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, reads as follows: “9. Duty of Family Court to make efforts for settlement: (1) In every suit or proceeding, endeavour shall be made by the Family Court in the first instance, where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case, to assist and persuade the parties in arriving at a settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding and for this purpose a Family Court may, subject to any rules made by the High Court, follow such procedure as it may deem fit. (2) If, in any suit or proceeding, at any stage, it appears to the Family Court that there is a reasonable possibility of a settlement between the parties, the Family Court may adjourn the proceedings for such period as it think fit to enable attempts to be made to effect such a settlement. (3) The power conferred by sub-section (2) shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of any other power of the Family Court to adjourn the proceedings.” (Emphasis given) 13. (3) The power conferred by sub-section (2) shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of any other power of the Family Court to adjourn the proceedings.” (Emphasis given) 13. Interpreting Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the Honourable Supreme Court in Anu Bhandari vs. Pradip Bhandari, (2018) 6 SCC 389 , has observed as follows: “13. Before parting with the judgment, we may hasten to observe that what has been closed is not simply twenty three cases; in the background of both the parties, they would have easily gone for many more litigations in the coming years. Under Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the Court has a duty to make an endeavour to assist and persuade the parties in arriving at a settlement. Unlike many other legislations, the Legislature has cast a duty on the Court in that regard. The jurisdiction is not just to decide a dispute, on the contrary, the court also has to involve itself in the process of conciliation/mediation between the parties for assisting them not only to settle the disputes but also to secure speedy settlement of disputes. Such timely intervention of the court will not only resolve the disputes and settle the parties peacefully but also prevent sporadic litigations between the parties.” 14. This Court interpreting Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, in Dr. Sini vs. B. Suresh Jyothi, AIR 1996 Ker. 160 has held that if any persuasion to settle a matter was made by the Court, that could only be taken as part of the business of the Court. As regards every proceeding before the Family Court, it is the duty of the presiding officer to make an earnest endeavour to settle the matter. If any such sincere effort is made by the presiding Judge, parties shall not interpret it as a coercive step to come to some terms, and on that basis, the cases pending before one Court cannot be transferred to another Court, especially when the parties on either side reside in the same city and the Court is nearby to their residence. 15. In Jain Paul Kuriakose vs. Asha Babu, 2012 (4) KLJ 651 this Court held as follows: “15. Since the family matters are sensitive in character the Judges of the Family Court have to play a greater participatory role. 15. In Jain Paul Kuriakose vs. Asha Babu, 2012 (4) KLJ 651 this Court held as follows: “15. Since the family matters are sensitive in character the Judges of the Family Court have to play a greater participatory role. Parties will have to be called to the Chambers at times and this is only to achieve the object contemplated by the statute. Going through the report submitted by the Family Court Judge, I do not think that she would indulge in any type of illegal practices. Attempts to settle the matter by the court or mediators could only be taken as a part of business of the court. Such sincere efforts by the Presiding Officer cannot be branded as prejudicial by the parties. As observed by this Court in Balachandran vs. Meena, 1999 (1) KLT 769 , Family Courts Act constitutes the Judge to some extent also a conciliator of the dispute. In that process the Judge is forced to talk to the parties and try to bring them together. There is nothing wrong in the respondent's request to have the conciliation talk in the Chambers of the Judge. The very request of the respondent to advance the case and to post the same for counselling reveals her wish to have an early verdict, that too, through the path of peace and harmony. It appears that it is not palatable to the petitioner.” (Emphasis given) 16. The above view has again been reiterated by this Court in Vishal G. Nair vs. Sreedevi P.S. 2019 (4) KLT 836 . 17. The petitioner has in unequivocal words alleged bias against the Presiding Officer. 18. While dealing with transfer of cases under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the ground of bias, the Honourable Supreme Court in Maneka Sanjay Gandhi and Another vs. Rani Jethmalani, (1979) 4 SCC 167 , has held in the following manner: “2. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the court to consider when a motion for transfer is made is not the hypersensitivity or relative convenience of a party or easy availability of legal services or like mini-grievances. Something more substantial, more compelling, more imperilling, from the point of view of public justice and its attendant environment, is necessitous if the Court is to exercise its power of transfer. Something more substantial, more compelling, more imperilling, from the point of view of public justice and its attendant environment, is necessitous if the Court is to exercise its power of transfer. This is the cardinal principle although the circumstances may be myriad and vary from case to case. We have to test the petitioner's grounds on this touchstone bearing in mind the rule that normally the complainant has the right to choose any court having jurisdiction and the accused cannot dictate when the case against him should be tried. Even so, the process of justice should not harass the parties and from that angle the court may weigh the circumstances.” 19. Again dealing with the above subject, in R. Balakrishna Pillai vs. State of Kerala, (2000) 7 SCC 129 , the Honourable Supreme Court held as follows: “3.......It is true that one of the principles of administration of justice is that justice should not only be done but it should be seen to have been done. However, a mere allegation that there is the apprehension that justice will not be done in a given case is not sufficient. Before transferring the case court has to find out whether the apprehension appears to be reasonable. To Judge the reasonableness of the apprehension, the state of mind of the person who entertains the apprehension is no doubt relevant but that is not all. The apprehension must appear to the court to be reasonable, genuine and justifiable. In the present day scenario, if these types of applications are entertained, the entire judicial administration would be polluted with frivolous petitions for various reasons.” 20. Almost on the same lines in the afore cited decisions, the Honourable Supreme Court in Harita Sunil Parab vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Others, (2018) 6 SCC 358 has reiterated the proposition of law on transfer of a case on the ground of bias as follows: “8. The apprehension of not getting a fair and impartial enquiry or trial is required to be reasonable and not imaginary, based upon conjectures and surmises. No universal or hard and fast rule can be prescribed for deciding a transfer petition which will always have to be decided on the facts of each case.” 21. This Court in Berely vs. Xavier and Another, 1986 KLT 1078 has observed thus: “13. No universal or hard and fast rule can be prescribed for deciding a transfer petition which will always have to be decided on the facts of each case.” 21. This Court in Berely vs. Xavier and Another, 1986 KLT 1078 has observed thus: “13. This Court has noticed an increasing tendency to file such transfer petitions on the basis of unfounded allegations against Criminal Courts. Sessions Judges and Magistrates had occasion to complain that they are facing considerable difficulties in the conduct of trials. Very often they are told to their face “you may dismiss the petition. I will go to the High Court” (In this case also, the defence counsel told the Sessions Judge that when he makes a particular averment in the transfer petition before the High Court, the Sessions Judge should not deny it). Such actions have a demoralising effect on the criminal judiciary and seriously affect administration of criminal justice. No person, not a litigant, not a counsel, not a prosecutor, not a court should contribute anything to the demoralisation of the criminal judiciary. Apparently, threat of filing transfer petition is being held as Damocles sword against judicial officers. I see only a reaction, perhaps an avoidable one, on the part of the learned Sessions Judge to this situation. Viewed in the background of the findings recorded in the order dismissing the transfer petition, there is no doubt that the allegation of bias against the learned Sessions Judge was baseless and unfounded.” 22. The enunciation of law in the above cited precedents makes it a must that the allegation of bias shall not be based on conjectures and mystic maybes. The onus is on the person who alleges bias to substantiate that his apprehensions are reasonable, genuine and justifiable. 23. It is common knowledge that Family Courts function in a charged atmosphere, with emotions running high. Even casual observations made by Presiding Officers are misconstrued, misinterpreted and perceived as remarks passed against the litigants. That’s why the Honourable Supreme Court in Buvan Mohan Singh vs. Meena and Others, AIR 2014 SC 2875 observed as follows: “14........The Family Judge is expected to be sensitive to the issues, for he is dealing with extremely delicate and sensitive issues pertaining to the marriage and issues ancillary thereto. That’s why the Honourable Supreme Court in Buvan Mohan Singh vs. Meena and Others, AIR 2014 SC 2875 observed as follows: “14........The Family Judge is expected to be sensitive to the issues, for he is dealing with extremely delicate and sensitive issues pertaining to the marriage and issues ancillary thereto. When we say this, we do not mean that the Family Courts should show undue haste or impatience, but there is a distinction between impatience and to be wisely anxious and conscious about dealing with a situation. A Family Court Judge should remember that the procrastination is the greatest assassin of the lis before it. It not only gives rise to more family problems but also gradually builds unthinkable and everestine bitterness. It leads to the cold refrigeration of the hidden feelings, if still left. The delineation of the lis by the Family Judge must reveal the awareness and balance. Dilatory tactics by any of the parties has to be sternly dealt with, for the Family Court Judge has to be alive to the fact that the lis before him pertains to emotional fragmentation and delay can feed it to grow. We hope and trust that the Family Court Judges shall remain alert to this and decide the matters as expeditiously as possible keeping in view the objects and reasons of the Act and the scheme of various provisions pertaining to grant of maintenance, divorce, custody of child, property disputes, etc.” (Emphasis given) 24. The controversy in the case at hand revolves on the incidents that allegedly transpired on 07.07.2021 and 12.07.2021. 25. The petitioner contends that on 7.7.2021, the Presiding Officer pressurised him to pay the arrears of maintenance. When his counsel opposed the direction, the Presiding Officer threatened the counsel. Then an office staff made enquiries about the 1st respondent, to meet the Presiding Officer in the chambers. On 12.7.2021, the Presiding Officer stated that she enquired about the 1st respondent to refer the parties for conciliation. On the contrary, the Presiding Officer has stated that, on 07.07.2021, both parties requested her to conduct a chamber counselling, but she thought it fit to refer the parties for conciliation which has now been misinterpreted as bias. 26. The respondents have filed the above cases nearly 5 years back. On the contrary, the Presiding Officer has stated that, on 07.07.2021, both parties requested her to conduct a chamber counselling, but she thought it fit to refer the parties for conciliation which has now been misinterpreted as bias. 26. The respondents have filed the above cases nearly 5 years back. Despite this Court passing Annexure-A6 judgment dated 31.08.2016, directing the petitioner to pay interim maintenance to the respondents at the rate of Rs. 25,000/- per mensum, not a single rupee has been paid till date. Instead the petitioner has raised untenable objections to Annexure-A7 execution petition filed by the respondents, to realise an amount of Rs. 4,80,000/- due to them towards arrears of interim maintenance. I really fail to understand what has prevented the Court from enforcing Annexure-A6 judgment passed by this Court five years back and to act as directed in Buvan Mohan Singh (supra). 27. The trial commenced on 13.02.2019 i.e. 2½ years back, but the cases have not reached anywhere. This case is a classic example why the Family Courts have to follow the special list system as directed in Shiju Joy A. (supra). 28. It is noticed that this Court had also in Annexure-A6 judgment specifically directed the Family Court to refer the parties to mediation, in the event of both sides making a request for the same. 29. It is stated that, on 07.07.2021, both parties made a request to the Presiding Officer to hold a chamber counselling. The Presiding Officer thought it fit to refer the parties to a former Judge, who holds pre-adalath talks within the court complex. After confirming the availability of the former Judge, the staff enquired whether the 1st respondent was present in Court. I do not find anything wrong in the procedure adopted by the Court to refer the parties for conciliation because the same was directed by this Court in Annexure- A6. Likewise, Section 9 of the Family Courts Act and the precedents referred to above mandate that the Presiding Officer shall at any time of the proceeding explore the possibilities of a settlement. It is the above enquiry that has irked the petitioner and been blow out of proportion. The petitioner has not substantiated whether the Presiding Officer has actually spoken to the 1st respondent in her chambers between 07.07.2021 to 12.07.2021. Even otherwise this Court in Dr. It is the above enquiry that has irked the petitioner and been blow out of proportion. The petitioner has not substantiated whether the Presiding Officer has actually spoken to the 1st respondent in her chambers between 07.07.2021 to 12.07.2021. Even otherwise this Court in Dr. Sini and Jain Paul Kuriakose (supra) has held that talking to a party in the chamber by the Presiding Officers of Family Courts is part of business. 30. It is noted that all through the last five years the petitioner had reposed faith and trust in the Court. It was only due to the alleged two incidents on 07.07.2021 and 12.07.2021 that the petitioner cries out the foul of bias. 31. The allegation of bias has to be dealt with extreme caution and circumspection because its truth and falsity is divided by a narrow margin. There must appear to a real likelihood of bias and not mere surmises or morbid suspicions, to transfer a case on the above ground as observed in Menaka Sanjay Gandhi, R. Balakrishna Pillai, Harita Sunil Parab and Berely (supra). An allegation of bias against a Presiding Officer is a matter of grave concern and a serious issue. If the allegation is true, it calls for immediate transfer of the case and with consequences to follow. If it is not, it has to be sternly dealt with an iron hand, otherwise all and sundry will start casting aspersions against the Presiding Officers, without any foundation or basis, which will shatter the confidence of the Presiding Officer and rattle the justice delivery system. To accept an allegation of bias, without substantial material puts the credibility and the independence of judiciary at stake. 32. On an evaluation of the factual matrix based on the touchstone of the above extracted legal principles; the report of the Presiding Officer; the antecedents of the petitioner, particularly his non-compliance of Annexure-A6 judgment; and the allegation of bias being raised after five years, that too at the fag end of the trial, I am unable to draw any inference of a reasonable apprehension or bias. The aspersions are without any bona fides or substantial material, but only a ruse to further protract the proceeding, avoid the Court and cause inconvenience to the respondents. The transfer petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with cost of Rs. The aspersions are without any bona fides or substantial material, but only a ruse to further protract the proceeding, avoid the Court and cause inconvenience to the respondents. The transfer petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with cost of Rs. 15,000/- to be deposited by the petitioner before the Family Court within a period of two weeks from today, to be paid to the respondents.