JUDGMENT : The petitioner, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, engaged in the transmission of the cable TV signals to the subscribers throughout the State, has filed this writ petition seeking to quash Ext. P1 communication dated 20.06.2012 issued by the Secretary, Palakkad Municipality—first respondent, whereby it was informed that the Municipal Council, as per its decision dated 26.03.2012 in the budget proposal, has decided to impose an amount of Rs. 20/- towards fees for each cable connection provided to the customers by the operators with effect from 01.04.2012 and accordingly, the Secretary has directed the petitioner to pay the fees along with 12.36% of the amount towards service tax on or before 10th day of every month, failing which 1% penal interest was threatened to be recovered; and to declare that the respondent Municipality has no power or authority to levy or collect any fee from the petitioner in respect of the cable TV connection provided to the subscribers within the area of Palakkad Municipality. 2. The paramount contention advanced by the petitioner is that Ext. P1 notice and the decision of the Municipal Council—second respondent, to levy and collect fee of Rs. 2. The paramount contention advanced by the petitioner is that Ext. P1 notice and the decision of the Municipal Council—second respondent, to levy and collect fee of Rs. 20/-is ultra vires, without authority of law and is in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the same is unconstitutional and void; that the respondent Municipality is a statutory body created under the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994 ('Act, 1994" for short) and its power and functions are provided in the said Act and that the respondent Municipality cannot exercise any power not provided under the Act; that there is absolutely no provision in the Act to levy a compulsory impost by way of licence fee on the cable TV operators; that in the absence of any statutory provision the Municipal Council authorising the Secretary of the Municipality to levy licence fee as a compulsory impost is in violation of Article 265 of the Constitution of India and therefore, unconstitutional, ultra vires and void; that the Municipality cannot usurp the power of the Central Government in respect of the regulation and control of the cable TV networks and business of cable operators, which are regulated by the Cable TV Act, enacted by the Parliament; and that, it is impermissible and ultra vires for a Municipality to levy, or even the State to make any law to levy any licence fee on cable operators in respect of the cable TV network falling within the legislative power of the Union Government under list I of the Constitution of India. 3. 3. Though the writ petition is of the year 2012 and a stay was granted against Ext P1 as early as on 27.07.2012, respondents have cared to file a statement only on 2nd February, 2021, in which it is stated that the Budget of the Palakkad Municipality for the year 2012-2013 was presented before the second respondent Municipal Council on 26.03.2012 in order to raise the revenue of the Municipality considering the fact that they were passing through a precarious financial position; that during the course of budget, a proposal was submitted to levy fees from the cable TV operators at the rate of Rs.20/-per connection; that as per the decision of the Council, notices similar to one impugned in the writ petition was issued to 6 cable operators, including the petitioner and the petitioner alone had come forward to challenge the said notice pointing out that the same is without any authority of law: and that the petitioner is only challenging a notice and not the decision of the Council of the Municipality, and therefore, it seeks dismissal of the writ petition. 4. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner Sri. S. Ramesh Babu assisted by Adv. Sri. Saji Varghese, and Sri. Binoy Vasudevan, learned Standing Counsel appeared for the Palakkad Municipality, and perused the pleadings and materials on record. 5. The paramount contention advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner was relying upon Articles 243 and 265 of the Constitution of India, and Section 230 of the Act, 1994. Article 243X deals with the power to impose taxes by, and funds, of, the Municipalities, which inter alia stipulates that the Legislature of a State may, by law authorise a Municipality to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject to such limits; and to assign to a Municipality such taxes, duties, tolls and fees levied and collected by the State Government for such purposes and subject to such conditions and limits. Article 265 of Part XII of the Constitution of India, deals with finance, property, contracts etc. and it specifies that no tax shall be levied or collected except by the authority of law. 6. Article 265 of Part XII of the Constitution of India, deals with finance, property, contracts etc. and it specifies that no tax shall be levied or collected except by the authority of law. 6. Therefore, on a conjoint reading of the aforesaid Articles, it is clear that in order to impose a tax, the State Government would have to make a law authorising the Municipality to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject to such limits; and assign to a Municipality such taxes, duties, tolls and fees levied and collected by the State Government for such purposes and subject to such conditions and limits, which virtually means, without a law Municipality is prevented from levying and collecting any tax or fees under any nomenclature. Apparently, bearing in mind the powers conferred by the Constitution of India, as per Articles 243X and 265 of the Constitution of India, Section 230 is incorporated in the Act, 1994 to deal with taxation and finance. Section 230(i) makes it clear that every Municipality may levy; (a) a property tax; (b) a profession tax; (c) a tax on animals and vessels; (d) a show tax; (e) a tax on advertisements; (f) a tax on timber brought into the municipal area; and (g) a duty on certain transfers of immovable property in the shape of an additional stamp duty, subject to the rules framed by Government. However, sub-Section (2) thereto provides that the Municipality may, for the purpose of providing any specific civic service or amenity, levy a surcharge on any tax other than profession tax levied by the Municipality; provided that no surcharge shall be levied if a tax or cess is already being levied for the same purpose. 7. Of course, the Municipality is vested with powers to levy service cess on sanitation, water supply, street light and drainage in all places for providing such new services at the rate fixed by the Council of the Municipality, subject to the minimum rate prescribed for such services. 8. 7. Of course, the Municipality is vested with powers to levy service cess on sanitation, water supply, street light and drainage in all places for providing such new services at the rate fixed by the Council of the Municipality, subject to the minimum rate prescribed for such services. 8. Section 231(1) empowers the Council of a Municipality to pass any resolution determining to levy a tax by specifying the rate at which and the date from which any such tax shall be levied, provided that in the case of property tax, the rate and date from which they shall come into force shall be fixed as per Section 233 of Act, 1994 and the Rules made thereunder. Other consequential provisions are contained under Section 231. The relevant and important point is that as per Section 230 of Act, 1994, the State Government has delineated the enumeration of the taxes and duties, which are entitled to be levied by the Municipality. Therefore, the Municipality cannot traverse beyond the scope of the enumeration of the taxes and duties contained under Section 230 of the Act, 1994. Which thus means, the power of the Municipal Council conferred under Section 231 (1) of Act, 1994 is circumscribed by Section 230 of the Act, 1994 and whatever resolution passed by the Municipal Council shall be confined to the enumeration of the taxes and the duties prescribed under Section 230 and nothing more than that. 9. Now see, Section 232 of Act, 1994 dealing with notification to be issued by the Municipality of new taxes, which would give a clear insight to the reason that may have persuaded the Municipal Council to levy the fees in question, basically thinking that the said provision is an omnibus power to levy the impost, irrespective of the other provisions of Section 230 of the Act. It stipulates that where a Council determines under Section 231 to levy any tax for the first time or at a new rate, the Secretary shall, forthwith, publish in the prescribed manner the rate at which, the date from which and the period of levy, if any, for which such tax shall be levied. 10. On a reading of Ext. It stipulates that where a Council determines under Section 231 to levy any tax for the first time or at a new rate, the Secretary shall, forthwith, publish in the prescribed manner the rate at which, the date from which and the period of levy, if any, for which such tax shall be levied. 10. On a reading of Ext. P1 impugned notice, it is quite clear and evident that the Municipal Council has relied upon Section 232 of Act 1994 to impose the fees, which provision is, in fact, guided by Section 230 of Act, 1994. In my considered opinion, Section 232 of the Act, 1994 cannot be read in isolation. But, on the other hand, it will have to be read together with Sections 230 and 231 of the Act, 1994, and on a reading together of all those provisions, there can be no doubt that the power conferred on the Municipality to levy tax shall have to be confined to the authorisation under law given by the State Government as per Section 230 of Act, 1994. To put it otherwise, the Municipal Council is not conferred with any powers to levy any fee or taxes delineated from the power to impose the taxes conferred under Section 230 of the Act, 1994. 11. In order to understand the true implications of levy of tax on various counts, it would be worthwhile to refer to Articles 110(2) and 199(2) of the Constitution of India. The said Articles deal with the definition of money bills to be presented before the Parliament and the State Legislatures. Clause (2) of Article 110 specifies that a Bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill by reason only that it provides for the imposition of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or payment of fees for licences or fees for services rendered, or by reason that it provides for the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax by any local authority or body for local purposes. 12. Article 199(2) is a typical provision to Article 110(2) of the Constitution of India. 12. Article 199(2) is a typical provision to Article 110(2) of the Constitution of India. On a reading together of all these provisions along with other provisions discussed above, it is clear that unless and until the State Government enumerates the nature of tax and the duties that can be levied, the Municipal Council is not at liberty to impose any such levy of fees, and if done it would be nothing but without any authority of law and ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution. The discussion made above would make it clear that the levy of fee in question detached from the taxes and fees enumerated under law has no legal basis to muster the Constitutional sanction. The issue is no more res integra, since the Apex Court had occasion to consider the issue in a number of binding precedents. 13. In Dhrangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and others [ (1973) 2 SCC 345 ], the Apex Court had occasion to consider Section 60(a)(b) and (c) of the Bombay District Municipalities Act, 1901 in regard to the levy of octroi by Municipality and its subsequent enhancement. After analysing the provisions of the State Municipal Laws, it was held that failure to comply with any mandatory provision prescribing the procedure for imposing a tax would vitiate the tax and therefore, it was held that the procedure for imposing a tax have not been complied with and accordingly, the imposition of tax was held to be illegal. 14. In Consumer Online Foundation v. Union of India [2011(2) KLT Suppl. 41 (SC)], the Apex Court considered the question of the levy and collection of fee by lessees of airports and it is held that in the absence of Rules, the Airport authority cannot levy and collect fee. 15. 14. In Consumer Online Foundation v. Union of India [2011(2) KLT Suppl. 41 (SC)], the Apex Court considered the question of the levy and collection of fee by lessees of airports and it is held that in the absence of Rules, the Airport authority cannot levy and collect fee. 15. In Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Sharadkumar Jayantikumar Pasawalla and others [ (1992) 3 SCC 285 ], the Apex Court had considered the validity of a fiscal provision in a regulation framed under the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976; and as to whether the delegated authority has any power to make any regulations on the basis of any implied, incidental or ancillary authority derived from the words 'or otherwise' contained under Section 91(1)(a) in respect of the development fee and held that imposition of fee must be passed on the specific statutory provision and not on any implied, incidental or ancillary authority, taking into account the imperatives contained under Article 265 of the Constitution of India. It was further held therein that the Development Authority cannot impose any betterment fee or development fee, even though such fee was essential for the development activities and has been imposed with reference to development affected. 16. In HMH Limited and another v. Administrator, Bangalore City Corporation and another [(1989) 4 SSCC 640], the Apex Court considered the octroi levied on goods brought for sale or consumption or use within the Municipal limits, wherein it was held that realisation of tax or money without the authority of law is bad under Article 265 of the Constitution of India. 17. In Hindustan Zinc Limited v. Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission [ (2015) 12 SCC 611 ], the issue considered was in respect of imposing renewable energy obligation upon captive electricity generating companies such as appellants therein and other obligated entities to purchase minimum amount of electricity from renewable sources and to pay surcharge in case of shortfall in meeting the renewable energy obligation, and it is held that fee can only be imposed for the service rendered and there should be an element of “quid pro quo” therein. 18. 18. In Tata iron and Steel Company Ltd and another v. State of Bihar and others [ (2018) 12 SCC 107 ], the Apex Court had occasion to consider the imposition of fee on drawing of river water for industrial purposes and as to the validity of the fees in the absence of any authority of law vis-a-vis Article 265 r/w Article 366(28) of the Constitution of India and rendered the judgment after an elaborate survey and analysis of the law laid down by the Apex Court in its various judgments. For convenience and brevity, paragraphs 18 to 22 are extracted hereunder: 18. The expressions “taxes” and “duties” are to be found in many provisions [See Articles 265, 266, 268, 269, 270, 271, Entries 82 to 91 of List I and Entries 46 to 63 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.] of the Constitution. The expression “fee” finds a place in Articles 110(2) [ “110. (2) A Bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill by reason only that it provides for the imposition of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or payment of fees for licences or fees for services rendered, or by reason that it provides for the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax by any local authority or body for local purposes.”(emphasis supplied)] and 199(2), which are in pari materia. Both the articles recognise the existence of two kinds of fees. Fees for licences and fees for services. Each one of the three lists contained in the Seventh Schedule have entries which employ the expression “fees” (Entry 96 of List I, Entry 66 of List II and Entry 47 of List III). Article 366 contains definitions of various expressions employed in the Constitution. Article 366(28) defines the expression “taxation”— “366. (28) “taxation” includes the imposition of any tax or impost, whether general or local or special, and “tax” shall be construed accordingly;” (emphasis supplied) 19. The expressions “fee” and “duty” are not defined under the Constitution. Article 366(28) employs another expression “impost”. What are the legal contours of each one of these expressions i.e. “tax”, “impost”, “duty” and “fee” fell for the consideration of this Court from time to time. 20. This Court in CIT v. McDowell and Co. Ltd. [CIT v. McDowell and Co. The expressions “fee” and “duty” are not defined under the Constitution. Article 366(28) employs another expression “impost”. What are the legal contours of each one of these expressions i.e. “tax”, “impost”, “duty” and “fee” fell for the consideration of this Court from time to time. 20. This Court in CIT v. McDowell and Co. Ltd. [CIT v. McDowell and Co. Ltd., (2009) 10 SCC 755 ] held: (SCC p. 763, paras 21-22) “21. “Tax”, “duty”, “cess” or “fee” constituting a class denotes to various kinds of imposts by State in its sovereign power of taxation to raise revenue for the State. Within the expression of each specie each expression denotes different kind of impost depending on the purpose for which they are levied. This power can be exercised in any of its manifestation only under any law authorising levy and collection of tax as envisaged under Article 265 which uses only the expression that no “tax” shall be levied and collected except authorised by law. It in its elementary meaning conveys that to support a tax legislative action is essential, it cannot be levied and collected in the absence of any legislative sanction by exercise of executive power of State under Article 73 by the Union or Article 162 by the State. 22. Under Article 366(28) “Taxation” has been defined to include the imposition of any tax or impost whether general or local or special and tax shall be construed accordingly. “Impost” means compulsory levy. The well-known and well-settled characteristic of “tax” in its wider sense includes all imposts. Imposts in the context have following characteristics: (i) The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty. (ii) “Law” in the context of Article 265 means an Act of legislature and cannot comprise an executive order or rule without express statutory authority. (iii) The term “tax” under Article 265 read with Article 366(28) includes imposts of every kind viz. tax, duty, cess or fees. (iv) As an incident of sovereignty and in the nature of compulsory exaction, a liability founded on principle of contract cannot be a “tax” in its technical sense as an impost, general, local or special.” (emphasis supplied) 21. A nine-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana [Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 1 ], quoted the above mentioned statement of law with approval. A nine-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana [Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 1 ], quoted the above mentioned statement of law with approval. Therefore, it is now well settled that the expression “fee” is also comprehended in the expression “tax” for the purpose of Article 265 and even for the collection of a “fee”, authority of law (i.e. legislative support) is mandatorily required under the Constitution. 22. In view of the abovementioned authoritative pronouncement, we need not examine the various ancillary submissions made on behalf of the respondent State relying upon various judgments [Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab, (1980) 1 SCC 416 ; MCD v. Mohd. Yasin, (1983) 3 SCC 229 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 154; Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P., (1983) 4 SCC 353 and State of H.P. v. Shivalik Agro Poly Products, (2004) 8 SCC 556 ] of this Court rendered prior to judgment in Jindal Stainless case [Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 1 ] that the expression “tax” occurring in Article 265 does not take within its sweep the expression “fee”. 19. Having appreciated the factual and legal circumstances and the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court as above, I am of the considered opinion that the Municipal Council was not at liberty to levy a fee, which it is not entitled to, in the absence of any power conferred under Section 230 of the Act, 1994, even in order to tide over any financial crisis or exigencies. It is emphatic and clear from Ext. P1 communication that the fee levied by the Municipal Council would not come under any of the taxes specified under Section 230 of the Act, 1994, since the term “fee” would include a tax or any other impost in comprehension of Article 265 of the Constitution of India. 20. The provisions of the Constitution of India also make it clear that the Municipality cannot levy any fees, taxes, impost, octroi etc. outside the scope of the powers conferred on it under the provisions of the Act, 1994. 21. 20. The provisions of the Constitution of India also make it clear that the Municipality cannot levy any fees, taxes, impost, octroi etc. outside the scope of the powers conferred on it under the provisions of the Act, 1994. 21. Even though the learned Standing Counsel for the Municipality has raised a contention that the petitioner has only challenged the communication issued by the Secretary of the Municipality, in consequence to the decision taken by the Municipal Council on 26.03.2012, I am unable to agree with the same, since the petitioner has sought for a declaration that the decision so taken by the Council is illegal and arbitrary. 22. Moreover, the decision taken by the Municipal Council is not under dispute and therefore, even if the decision of the Municipal Council is not produced in the writ petition and has not sought for quashing the same, the declaration sought for would suffice the situation. Therefore, the writ petition is allowed. Accordingly, I quash Ext.P1 communication dated 20.06.2012 issued by the Secretary of the Palakkad Municipality directing the petitioner to pay the levy of Rs. 20/- as decided by the Municipal Council, and further declare that the decision of the Municipal Council dated 26.03.2012 to levy the fee of Rs. 20/- towards each cable connection provided by the petitioner is illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional, and therefore, not liable to be executed against the petitioner.