JUDGEMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. In a gruesome - incident five persons of a family were killed. The only person of the family, a child, who managed to escape has narrated the incident to police. On the basis of the statement of Dubraj Dorai which was recorded at about 13:00 hrs. on 24.11.2008, Muffasil (Pandrasali O.P) P.S Case No. 84 of 2008 was lodged under sections 302 and 201 r/w section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against Ghasiram Dorai Lingo Dorai @ Lenga, Tribhon Dorai (Joklo, Tipu Dorai @ Pagari Dorari, Papari Dorai @ Satari Dorai, Sandir Dorai and Baburam Haiburu and after the investigation a charge-sheet was filed against them. 2. Baburam Haiburu and Sandir Dorai were found juvenile on the date of occurrence and accordingly their cases were separated and sent to the Juvenile Board for enquiry. Tribhon Dorai @ Joklo, Tipu Dorai, Papari Dorai @ Satari Dorai, Ghasiram Dorai and Lingo Dorai @ Lenga have faced the trial on the charge under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal code for committing murder of Nirmal Dorai, Poida Dorai, Sonamuni Dorai, Ghasiram Dorai and Tribhon Dorai and under section 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code for causing disappearance of their dead bodies. 3. Ten witnesses were examined by the prosecution to prove the charge against the appellant. PW-6, the informant is the sole eye-witness in the case. The statement of PW-6 was recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C and the Judicial Magistrate who has recorded his statement has come to the Court to affirm the same. The co-villagers, namely, Jaiphal Haiburu PW-l, Kunwar Singh Haiburu PW-2, Goraka Maharana PW-3, Tumba Dorai PW-4, Buchchi Haiburu PW-5 and Patar Doari PW-7 have tendered evidence which supports the prosecution on other material aspects of the case, even though PW-1, PW-2 and PW -3 have turned hostile. PW -9, Dr. Dhirendra Kumar has conducted the post-mortem examination on 25.11.2008 and found several ante-mortem injuries on the dead body of Nirmal Dorai, Poida Dorai, Sonamuni Dorai, Ghasiram Dorai and Tribhon Dorai. In his estimation time elapsed since death was about 06 to 36 hrs. from the post-mortem examination. 4. On evaluating the evidence, the learned Sessions Judge has held that PW-6 is a reliable and trustworthy witness and his testimony is corroborated by PW-3 and PW-7. In his estimation time elapsed since death was about 06 to 36 hrs. from the post-mortem examination. 4. On evaluating the evidence, the learned Sessions Judge has held that PW-6 is a reliable and trustworthy witness and his testimony is corroborated by PW-3 and PW-7. Regarding discrepancy in the age and about the maturity of PW-6, the learned Sessions Judge has observed that minor discrepancies in the evidence would not affect the prosecution case against h appellants. 5. As a general rule the Court may act on the testimony of a single eye-witness and there is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the basis of sole testimony of an eye-witness. Section 134 of the Evidence Act says that no particular number of witnesses is required in any case for the proof of a fact. The import of section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act is that the Court may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that : "even if the case against the accused hangs on the evidence of a single eye-witness it may be enough to sustain the conviction given sterling testimony of a competent honest man, although as a rule of prudence Courts call for corroboration. It is a platitude to say that witnesses have to be weighed and not counted since quality matters more than quantity in human affair". 6. Mr. Rajan Raj, the learned counsel has argued at length on maturity of Dubraj Dorai. The testimony of Dubraj Dorai has been challenged also on the ground that when the incident took place it was dark and there was no electricity in the village, still he has identified the appellants and made escape which was impossible because there is only one way of entrance from the courtyard and most surprisingly he was not chased by the assailants. 7. In the early days there was no strict body of rules designed to exclude or include evidence of a child witness in a criminal trial. Once Bentham has said that children are “undeserving of confidence and incapable of discernment” and Sir Mathew Hale has atleast one qualification to a child's sworn evidence. 7. In the early days there was no strict body of rules designed to exclude or include evidence of a child witness in a criminal trial. Once Bentham has said that children are “undeserving of confidence and incapable of discernment” and Sir Mathew Hale has atleast one qualification to a child's sworn evidence. He has said: “…….., nor is it in itself a sufficient testimony because not upon oath, without concurrence of other proofs, that may render the thing probable". The dominant view was that a witness of any age can testify under oath and children were considered to be able to understand that they would “burn in the eternal fires of hell" if they would lie under oath. In the United States in “Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523(1895) Brewer, J. has observed that "a boy five years of age is not as matter of law absolutely disqualified as a witness". In the United Kingdom the decision in “Wallwork (1958) 42 Cr.App R 153 CA” that a child below the age of six years was not considered competent to give evidence in the Court was the law for the next 30 years. In DPP v. Hester, (1973) AC 296 Lord Morris has observed that child's testimony is of a kind requiring corroboration as children may be unable to appreciate the gulf separating truth and falsehood "owing to immaturity or perhaps to lively imaginative gift". In Canada a legislation was brought in 1893 permitting children to testify even if they could not explain the nature and consequence of an oath but only after they demonstrate their understanding of the “duty to speak the truth". 8. In almost all jurisdictions children are permitted to give evidence in a criminal trial with varying degree of restriction . In India the law is very clear and admits no ambiguity. It is found in section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act which provides that a witness shall be competent to testify unless the Court considers that he is prevented from understanding the questions put to him, or from giving rational answers by reason of tender years, extreme old age, disease whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind. From section 118 it is clear that by reason of tender age a witness is not rendered incompetent to give evidence. From section 118 it is clear that by reason of tender age a witness is not rendered incompetent to give evidence. It is for the Court to form an opinion whether the child witness is capable of understanding the questions put to him and obviously therefore the number of questions put to him would not be important and at the same time it would be just impossible to lay down a norm on formulating the questions to be put to a child witness before his testimony is recorded by the Court. This also may be kept in mind that in India it is not mandatory that a witness must be administered an oath before his evidence is recorded by the Court. The proviso to section 5 read with section 13 of the Oaths Act 1873 would make it clear that an omission to administer an oath or any irregularity entering the oath would not invalidate any proceeding or render inadmissible any evidence whatever. 9. PW-6, Dubraj Dorai is star witness for the prosecution. On 14.03.2013 his age as recorded in the deposition sheet was about 15 years. The learned Sessions Judge has put questions to him to ascertain his maturity and thereafter his statement was recorded on voir dire, though the learned Sessions Judge has not explained purpose of oath to him. He has deposed in the Court that about four years back, on a Sunday, his father, mother, grandmother and brothers were killed in the night. He has stated that he saw the accused persons committing murder of his family members. He has correctly identified the appellants who were present in the dock. He has stated that the accused persons came to his house armed with bhujali, arrow, danda, rope etc. and when Baburam Haiburn tried to strangulate him with a rope he ran away. At that time Ghasiram was assaulting his mother. He has narrated the incident to the police and stated that to take revenge because his father had sexually assaulted his aunt - who is wife of Tribhon Dorai, the accused - the accused persons have killed his entire family. 10. Dubraj Dorai has disclosed name of the accused persons before the investigating officer and in his statement under section 164 Cr.P.C which was recorded just after the occurrence he has given a similar narration of the incident in which he has lost his entire family. 10. Dubraj Dorai has disclosed name of the accused persons before the investigating officer and in his statement under section 164 Cr.P.C which was recorded just after the occurrence he has given a similar narration of the incident in which he has lost his entire family. The Judicial Magistrate who has recorded his statement has testified in the Court that he possessed sufficient maturity. In his cross-examination PW-6 has admitted that there are two rooms, two windows and a courtyard in his house; there is only one ingress and egress to and from the courtyard and; when the accused persons came he fled away through the courtyard and cannot say what had happened thereafter. The time of the occurrence has not been spoken by the witnesses and it may not be recorded with exactitude but there can be no difficulty in accepting that it was early evening in the month of November when the occurrence took place - the informant has stated in the fardbeyan that it has happened at around 18.00 PM and PW-5 has said that he could know about the occurrence after he came back from the market. It has come in the evidence that the courtyard of the house of Nirmal Dorai is a big one and the accused persons are relatives of the informant; they live in close vicinity to his house. In the incident in which thirteen persons - 7 accused and 5 dead - were involved in the ensuing mayhem escape of Dubraj Dorai from his house even though there is only one way out from the courtyard was not impossible and as a matter of fact he has made it. He has withstood the test of cross- examination and his escape, almost a miraculous escape, is not in doubt. PW-l and PW-2, the hostile witnesses, have stated about murder of five persons in the family of Nirmal Dorai and PW-3 and PW-4 have stated that dead bodies of five persons; two male two female and one child, were recovered in the forest. PW-5 and PW-3, who was also declared hostile, have stated that one child of the family of Nirmal Dorai had escaped in the incident. PW-7 has also stated that five persons in the family of Nirmal Dorai were killed and one only has survived. PW-5 and PW-3, who was also declared hostile, have stated that one child of the family of Nirmal Dorai had escaped in the incident. PW-7 has also stated that five persons in the family of Nirmal Dorai were killed and one only has survived. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit and another, (2000) 3 SCC 70 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that a child may be swayed away by what others may tell him and he may be an easy prey to tutoring and therefore testimony of a child witness must be examined carefully. But, during his cross-examination PW-6 was not given any suggestion so as to elicit any statement from him reflecting his tutoring by others. He has stated that house of his uncle Papari Dorai is near his house but no suggestion was put to him that the uncle with whom he was living has any motive or animosity towards the appellants. In his cross-examination PW-6 has admitted that his village is very large and there are two 'Tala' in the village and in the night the villagers would put off lights in their house. He has further stated that it was a dark night and there is no electricity in the village. These statements in his cross-examination would indicate that PW-6 is a truthful witness. He has revealed everything about the village and village life and there is no trace of any tutoring in his evidence. The revelations in his cross-examination which were elicited by the defence in an attempt to discredit him as an eye-witness are however not germane to the point in issue. The villagers may go early to bed and they put-off lights in the night, but these peculiar features of village life have nothing to do with his claim to be an eye-witness. Moreover, this is nobody's case that the incident has happened at bed time. There was no electricity in the village and it was a dark night when the incident had happened, but PW-6 does not say that his family had retired to bed by that time. He himself was in the courtyard with his younger brother and when the accused persons started murderous assault on his family it was not dark inside his house. He has seen the accused persons armed with lethal weapon entering his house and assaulting his mother. He himself was in the courtyard with his younger brother and when the accused persons started murderous assault on his family it was not dark inside his house. He has seen the accused persons armed with lethal weapon entering his house and assaulting his mother. For a moment we would assume that he has not seen what has happened thereafter, still, there is no doubt on involvement of the appellants in the crime. There was no intervening circumstance and the defence has not shown any material to suggest that someone else might have committed the murders. 11. The age of a child is relevant but there are innumerable instances where the Courts have accepted evidence of a child witness irrespective of his age. In Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 287 the sole eye-witness was a nine years old child whose parents, uncle and sisters were killed in the incident and even though she was not able to name four out of eight accused persons all of them were convicted for committing murder. In Prakash v. State of M.P., (1992) 4 SCC 225 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that a boy of about 14 years of age can give proper account of the murder of his brother if he had an occasion to witness the same and simply because of his tender age it will not be proper to assume that he was likely to be tutored. Plainly speaking, the discrepancy in the age of Dubraj Dorai is too insignificant and as a matter of fact the defence also did not turn to this aspect for no question relating to his age was put to Dubraj Dorai or any other witness in the cross-examination. The defence also seems to have accepted that the signature on the fardbeyan is of Dubraj Dorai - the investigating officer was never questioned on this issue. No doubt on a particular issue an accused may choose not to cross-examine a witness and simply rely upon the prosecution evidence to bring home a point in issue, however, a point which was never raised cannot be made basis to challenge the very foundation of the prosecution case, for had it been raised the prosecution would have offered an explanation. The criticism leveled by the defence on recording of fardbeyan without assistance of an interpreter should have been directed to the investigating officer whether he knows and understands “HO” language or whether the fardbeyan of Dubraj Dorai was recorded with assistance of a villager, a fact not recorded in the First Information Report. Moreover, the informant has not disowned his fardbeyan rather he has affirmed it. His statement was recorded in the Court with the help of Smt. Rahil Alda, an advocate who was appointed as interpreter and there is no challenge to his testimony on the ground that it was not correctly recorded. 12. The learned trial Judge has dissected the evidence of prosecution witnesses at length, considered contradictions in their evidence and after applying the general principles on admissibility and credibility of the evidence tendered by a witness has arrived at a conclusion that Dubraj Dorai is a reliable and trustworthy witness. PW 10 has stated that before recording statement of Dubraj Dorai under section 164 Cr.P.C, who was aged about 9 years he had put questions to him to satisfy himself about his maturity and in his cross-examination he has reaffirmed that he was satisfied with the answers given by the witness that he is capable to depose. In this context what was observed by Goddard, J. in Mohamed Sugal Esa Mamasan Rer Alalah v. King, AIR 1946 PC 3 may be well remembered that: “it is not to be supposed that any Judge would accept as a witness a person who he considered was incapable not only of understanding the nature of an oath but also the necessity of speaking the truth when examined as a witness". True, the learned Sessions Judge would not have recorded the evidence of Dubraj Dorai had he nurtured any doubt on his maturity and capacity to depose. 13. There are few other circumstances which would also indicate that looked at from any angle testimony of Dubraj Dorai is never in doubt. He is a child witness and he is intimately related to the deceased persons. Every member of his family has been killed and the massacre must have left an indelible imprint in his mind. 13. There are few other circumstances which would also indicate that looked at from any angle testimony of Dubraj Dorai is never in doubt. He is a child witness and he is intimately related to the deceased persons. Every member of his family has been killed and the massacre must have left an indelible imprint in his mind. Various researches in the field of psychology about the memory and communication capacity of children have now established that they can be reliable witnesses and children as young as four years of age can provide accurate information about the events that happened to them (Nicholas Bala, Professor of Law in Queen's University). Dubraj Dorai has no motive to falsely implicate innocent persons in the crime and he could have no motive to shield the real culprits. On the contrary through PW-6 and PW-7 the prosecution has led sufficient evidence to prove motive on the part of the appellants to commit the crime. May be motive is not decisive factor by itself and only on the basis of motive an accused cannot be convicted for a crime like murder, but no one can say that in a criminal trial motive is irrelevant. The prosecution may prove the charge without establishing motive on the part of the accused but once motive is also proved it further strengthens the prosecution's case. In Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 8 SCC 270 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that when the witnesses are stated to be interested and inimically deposed towards the accused it has to be remembered that they would not shield the real culprit and rope In innocent person. In Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that testimony of a witness can be classified into three categories namely' (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. Dubraj Dorai is a wholly reliable witness - he is a sterling witness. He has tendered such evidence which the Court without any hesitation can accept at its face value. The consistency in his statement is natural without any hesitation and truth seems to flow in his testimony. Dubraj Dorai is a wholly reliable witness - he is a sterling witness. He has tendered such evidence which the Court without any hesitation can accept at its face value. The consistency in his statement is natural without any hesitation and truth seems to flow in his testimony. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that use of expression "sterling worth" in the context of criminal jurisprudence would mean a witness worthy of credence, one who is reliable and truthful. Dubraj Dorai is one such witness. 14. Next, the conduct of Dubraj Dorai has come in for serious criticism as he did not raise cries and called others. 15. The conduct of a witness is examined in the context of facts and circumstances of the case because it is almost impossible and even unrealistic to predict behavioral pattern of a person. The human mind is most unpredictable and so may be the conduct of a child who has just seen massacre of his whole family. In Rana Pratap v. State of Haryana, (1983) 3 SCC 327 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that there is no set rule of natural reaction and therefore to discard the evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative way. In "State of Maharashtra v. Manglya Dhavu Kongil, (1972) 3 SCC 46 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the Courts have to be careful not to substitute their own norms of behavior in a given situation for the norms of behavior of a witness. A child who has just seen slaughtering of his entire family and would fear for his own life may not raise cries. He was in a state of shock and there is nothing shocking if he has not disclosed name of the assailants to the neighbors or relatives immediately. The killings must have been replayed before his eyes again and again and he was dumbstruck. It is quite a settled position in law that in similar situations different persons may react differently and merely because conduct of a witness may appear unnatural his testimony cannot be discarded. The killings must have been replayed before his eyes again and again and he was dumbstruck. It is quite a settled position in law that in similar situations different persons may react differently and merely because conduct of a witness may appear unnatural his testimony cannot be discarded. What is required to be seen is that whether there is a plausible and acceptable explanation for such unnatural conduct of the witnesses and if his testimony inspires confidence the Court can act upon his evidence without hesitation. In Prithi v. State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 536 on seeing indiscriminate firing in which his own brother was killed the witness did not inform any one and remained hiding until the police arrived and recorded his statement. In Raju v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 1 SCC 169 the witness did not report the matter to police till next day. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that conduct of the witness was not unnatural and he was reliable and trustworthy witness. In deed, this one is the most remarkable feature of the present case that the testimony of PW - would make anyone believe that he is honest and truthful. His evidence is of such sterling quality that no corroboration is required to lend credence to his testimony. 16. Ms. Amrita Sinha, the learned Amicus has contended that delay in lodging the First Information report would prove fatal for the prosecution. Mr. Rajan Raj, the learned counsel would submit that generally village Munda is the nerve center of village politics and by 18:00 PM in the evening social life in the village does not lie down, however, the village Munda has denied to have seen the occurrence and next day morning when he had gone to the police station did not disclose name of the accused persons and, in fact, no one from the village which is thickly populated has come forward to say that he has seen the occurrence. Therefore, there is a serious doubt that the real culprits have been shielded and delay in lodging the First Information Report would indicate that after due deliberations the accused persons were roped in. 17. In a criminal trial importance of prompt lodging of a First Information Report has been elnphasized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thulia Kali v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3 SCC 393 . 17. In a criminal trial importance of prompt lodging of a First Information Report has been elnphasized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thulia Kali v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3 SCC 393 . The venue of the crime is a village and the maniacal killing of five person of a family must have been a frightening experience for the villagers. The brutal killings of the entire family in itself was a caution for the others. Out of fear the villagers may not come forward to depose in the Court and that appears to be the reason why even the village Munda has remained silent and did not tell name of the accused persons to the police. The investigating officer has no animus to falsely frame the accused persons in the case and during cross-examination his credibility was not shaken. In Ram Jag v. State of U.P., (1974) 4 SCC 201 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the witnesses cannot be called upon to explain every hour's delay and a common sense view has to be taken for ascertaining whether the First Information Report was lodged after an undue delay so as to afford enough scope for manipulating the evidence. It has been held that even a long delay in filing a report of an occurrence can be condoned if the witnesses on whose evidence the prosecution relies have no motive for implicating the accused. 18. To appreciate the prosecution case the whole gamut of the prosecution evidence must be seen. The prosecution evidence goes like this. PW-1 is nephew of Nirmal Dorai, the deceased. He was declared hostile at the instance of the prosecution primarily for the reason that in his examination-in-chief he has stated that his statement was not recorded by the police. But before that, he would say that Nirmal Dorai, his wife his mother and two children were killed in his house about three years ago. H has stated that Nirmal Dorai was his uncle and the police had come to the village. PW-2 is co-villager. He has also stated that his statement was not recorded by the police and therefore he was also declared hostile. PW-3 is 'Dakua' of Munda. He has stated that five persons were murdered in the house of Nirmal Dorai and police had prepared paper (inquest-report) on which he put his thumb impression. PW-2 is co-villager. He has also stated that his statement was not recorded by the police and therefore he was also declared hostile. PW-3 is 'Dakua' of Munda. He has stated that five persons were murdered in the house of Nirmal Dorai and police had prepared paper (inquest-report) on which he put his thumb impression. He has stated that dead body of one male, two female and two children were recovered but one child of the family had escaped. He has further stated that bhujali, farsa, arrow and blood-stained soil were recovered by police from the courtyard of Nirmal Dorai and he has put his thumb impression on the paper (seizure-list). However, he was declared hostile when he said that he did not tell name of the accused persons to the police. From cross-examination of PW-l, PW-2 and PW-3 it is apparent that they have resiled from their previous statements recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. The investigating officer has stated in the Court that PW-1 made a statement before him that he has seen the appellants committing murder of Nirmal Dorai and his family with bhujali, farsa and danda and PW-2 and PW-3 had spoken about illicit relation of Nirmal Dorai with the wife of Tribhon Dorai. PW-4 is the brother of Nirmal Dorai. He has deposed about murder of five persons of the family of his brother in his house and recovery of the dead bodies from the forest. He has also stated that sabbal, farsa, bow and arrow were found and blood was spilled in the house of Nirmal Dorai. However, in his cross-examination he has stated that he does not know how Nirmal Dorai and other members of his family were killed. PW-5 is a neighbor of Nirmal Dorai. His house is three houses away from the house of Nirmal Dorai. At the time of the occurrence he had gone to market (Haat) and when he came back home he cam to know that five persons in the family of Nirmal Dorai have been killed. He has stated that one child of Nirmal Dorai had escaped and he has seen blood in his courtyard. PW-7 is Munda of the village. He has also stated that five persons of the family of Nirmal Dorai were killed but on child had escaped. He has stated that one child of Nirmal Dorai had escaped and he has seen blood in his courtyard. PW-7 is Munda of the village. He has also stated that five persons of the family of Nirmal Dorai were killed but on child had escaped. According to him next day morning PW-3 informed him that every one in the family of Nirmal Dorai was missing. He was with the police when search for the dead body was conducted and he has affirmed that PW-6 narrated the incident to the police. He is a seizure-list witness and a witness to the inquest. Regarding motive, PW-7 has a stated that Nirmal Dorai had sexually assaulted wife of Tribhon Dorai; a Panchayati was held regarding the incident of rape and; fine was imposed upon Nirmal Dorai, however he did not pay the fine. In hi cross-exanimation he stated that he does not know how the incident had happened; who had committed the crime; a rape case against Nirmal Dorai was not filed and no paper about Panchayati was prepared. PW-8 has stated that the dead bodies of Nirmal Dorai, Sonamuni Dorai, Poida Dorai and Ghasiram Dorai were found in the bushes near Jagurapa Nala at mauza Tungi about one and half kilometer from the place of occurrence in the east direction. On southern side of Nala is Jamunbera river and there is dense forest on the estern side. The dead body of Tribhon Dorai was found at about 300 yard in the west direction in the bushes of Aamlore Nala at mauza Gondai. PW-3 and PW-7 are the Inquest witnesses and Exhibit-5 to 5/4 are the Inquest reports of dead body of Nirmal Dorai, Poida Dorai, Sunamuni Dorai Ghashiram Dorai and Tribuan Dorai. PW-10 has stated that bhujali farsa, arrow and blood-stained soil and gamchha (towel) were seized by him from the place of Occurrence - the seizure witnesses PW-3 and PW-7 have stated in the Court that bhujali, farsa arrow and blood- stained soil were recovered by the police from the courtyard. In his cross-examination, the investigating officer has affirmed that he recorded fardbeyan of PW-6 in the courtyard of Nirmal Dorai and immediately thereafter collected the incriminating articles and prepared seizure-lists. The statement of Dubraj Dorai was recorded under section 164 Cr.P. on his requisition and he has identified the application and his signature on that. In his cross-examination, the investigating officer has affirmed that he recorded fardbeyan of PW-6 in the courtyard of Nirmal Dorai and immediately thereafter collected the incriminating articles and prepared seizure-lists. The statement of Dubraj Dorai was recorded under section 164 Cr.P. on his requisition and he has identified the application and his signature on that. He has however denied that the statement of PW-6 under section 164 Cr.P.C was recorded under his influence or pressure. 19. The place of murder is a village and the witnesses are rustics. So, their evidence has to be judged as such and too sophisticated an approach as compared to urban people and their conduct cannot be applied to judge testimony of a rural witness. Except PW-6, the other prosecution witnesses have professed in the Court that they have not seen the appellants committing murder, but, the reason is not far to seek. The village must have been engulfed in a state of fear and terror and that is why no wonder if the brother or the nephew or any villager could not gather courage to stand up against the appellants in the Court. The other prosecution witnesses have not given direct evidence on the occurrence but they have laid sufficient foundation for the prosecution to prove the charge of murder against the appellants. The plea of false implication of the appellants is an argument in desperation. Had this been the motive the village Munda would have named them as the accused persons when he had gone to the police station next day. 20. The medical evidence has provided considerable support to the prosecution case. The appellants were carrying bhujali, sabbal, farsa, lathi etc. and the doctor who has conducted the post-mortem has said that injuries on the deceased persons were caused by hard and sharp cutting weapon. In some cases medical evidence may corroborate the prosecution case and in some it may not but if the medical evidence suggests the weapon used in the crime which matches with the prosecution story it would to a large extent eliminate any suspicion which may have arisen on account of minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. 21. In some cases medical evidence may corroborate the prosecution case and in some it may not but if the medical evidence suggests the weapon used in the crime which matches with the prosecution story it would to a large extent eliminate any suspicion which may have arisen on account of minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. 21. PW -9 has conducted the post-mortem over the dead body of Nirmal Dorai at about 3:00 PM on 25.11.2008 and found the following injuries on his person: External: (i) Face swollen with blood clots, (ii) incised wound all left side of neck, 2”x ½” x bone deep (iii) incised wound on both lips (iv) incised wound on left eye (v) incised wound on occipital area - ½” x ½", bone deep 22. On the same day at 3:30 PM he has conducted the post-mortem over the dead body of Sonamuni and found the following injuries: External : (i) Two incised wound on right temple size- 1”x ½” , bone deep with blood clots. (ii) ½” x ½” bone deep with blood clots. (iii) incised wound on right side of scalp 2" x ½”, bone deep with blood clots. 23. He has conducted the post-mortem over the dead body of Poida Dorai at 3:40 PM and found the following injuries : External : (i) Incised wound on the left side of forehead 1 ½” x ½” bone deep (ii) incised wound on left eyebrow (iii) incised wound on scalp 1”x ½", bone deep (iv) Left hand broken 24. At 3:50 PM, he conducted the post-mortem over the dead body of Ghasirarn Dorai and found the following injuries: Rigor Mortis- Upper limbs present, lower limbs-absent External: (i) Sharp cut wound, 2” x ½” x ½”, on the left side of neck (ii) incised wound, ½" x ¼”, bone deep on nose (iii) incised wound on left eyebrow, ½” x ¼” , bone deep. (iv) incised wound on both lips. 25. At 4:00 PM he has conducted the post-mortem over the dead body of Tribhon Dorai and found two incised wounds one on the middle of head and the other on the right side of ear - skull was fractured. 26. PW-9 has opined that all the injuries on the deceased persons were ante-mortem and in ordinary course of nature sufficient to cause death. 26. PW-9 has opined that all the injuries on the deceased persons were ante-mortem and in ordinary course of nature sufficient to cause death. The attack on the victim was brutal and caused by sharp cutting weapons like bhujali, farsa etc. as spoken by the informant can be seen from the medical evidence. 27. There is one principle in criminal law that the prosecution should disclose individual roles played by the accused persons in the occurrence because it is not necessary that all those who have participated in the occurrence were motivated by a common intention. The argument is that one or two appellants who were carrying rope, danda and arrow cannot be convicted for murder. 28. When two or more persons have consented to do an act under common intention the principle of criminal vicarious liability under section 34 IPC that when a criminal act is done by several persons on in furtherance of the common intention of all each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone, is attracted. Section 34 is a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence by itself. It embodies principle of joint criminal liability in the doing of a criminal act the essence of which is existence of a common intention. Section 34 is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult distinguish between the acts of individual members of a party who have acted in furtherance of the common intention of all and to prove exactly what role was played by each of them. 29. In C. Kimhammad v. Emperor, AIR 1924 Mad. 229 it was observed that the meaning of section 34 is that if two or more persons have individually done a thing jointly the position is the same if each of them had done it individually. But at that time the judicial opinion on applicability of section 34 IPC was sharply divided, one notable judgment being in the case of Emperor v. Kirmal Kanta Roy, (1911) ILR 41 Cal. 1072 a case in which two men acting in concert both fired at a police man on hitting and killing him and the other failing to hit him at all. Stephen J. directed acquittal of the latter who was charged under sections 302/34 IP with murder. 1072 a case in which two men acting in concert both fired at a police man on hitting and killing him and the other failing to hit him at all. Stephen J. directed acquittal of the latter who was charged under sections 302/34 IP with murder. Later, the law on the subject was authoritatively decided by the Privy Council in Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 . The appellant's argument was that: in section 34 a criminal act in so far as murder is concerned means an act which takes life criminally within Section 302 because the section concludes by saying is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act were done by himself alone. It was argued that where each of several persons does something criminal, all acting in furtherance of a common intention, each is punishable for what he has done, as if he had done it by himself. Lord Sumner has captured the appellant's argument in an illustration, that; "if three assailants simultaneously fire at their victim and lodge three bullets in his brain, all may be murderers but, if one bullet only grazes his ear, one of them is not a murderer and, each being entitled to the benefit of the doubt, all must b acquitted of murder, unless the evidence inclines in favour of the marksmanship of two or of one". Speaking for the Board, Lord Sumner has written that: Even if the appellant did nothing as he stood outside the door it is to be remembered that in crimes as in other things "they also serve who only stand and wait". 30. A common intention which necessarily implies a pre-arranged concert must be distinguished from same or similar intention. Merely because it is shown that all the accused persons carried the same intention but independently of each other it is not enough to attract application of section 34 IPC (refer Pandurung v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216 ). In Bharwad Mepa Dana and Anr. v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 289 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the principle which section 34 IPC embodies is participation in action with common intention of committing a crime and once such participation is established section 34 is at once attracted. In Bharwad Mepa Dana and Anr. v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 289 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the principle which section 34 IPC embodies is participation in action with common intention of committing a crime and once such participation is established section 34 is at once attracted. In Chinta Pulla Reddy v. State of A.P., 1993 Supp (3) SCC 134 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. In a later decision in Girija Shankar v. State of U.P., (2004) 3 SCC 793 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed, thus : "9. ……….In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of the moment; but if must necessarily be before the commission of the crime ......” 31. The intention of an accused can be gathered from the manner of occurrence, weapon held by him and whether the injury is caused on the vital part of the body. The pos-mortem report would disclose that the deceased persons were attacked mainly on vital parts of the body and the force of attack was such that skull bone of three persons were found fractured. All of them have suffered bone deep incised wounds on forehead skull, temple, neck and other occipital or facial area. The killing was brutal and the manner was horrific. All the accused persons were armed with deadly weapon and PW-6 has stated that they came together and started attacking his family members. On such facts we would simply say that there is no doubt on participation of the appellants in murder of five persons. They shared a common intention and in furtherance of the common intention they have committed murder of Nirmal Dorai, Poida Dorai, Sonamuni Dorai, Ghasiram Dorai and Tribhon Dorai. The prosecution has proved the charge under section 302/34 IPC against the appellants and we find no ground to interfere in the matter. 32. In the result, Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.1078 of 2016, Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.113 of 2017 and Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.1201 of 2016 are dismissed. 33. The prosecution has proved the charge under section 302/34 IPC against the appellants and we find no ground to interfere in the matter. 32. In the result, Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.1078 of 2016, Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.113 of 2017 and Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.1201 of 2016 are dismissed. 33. The appellants shall serve the remaining sentence awarded to them in Sessions Trial Case No.65 of 2009. 34. Let a copy of the judgment be transmitted to the Court concerned and the concerned jail superintendent through ‘Fax’. 35. Let the lower-court records be sent to the Court concerned forthwith. Appeal dismissed.