JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. The instant appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order dated 19.01.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No.6494 of 2011, whereby and whereunder the order of punishment dated 16.12.2011 has been quashed with a direction to extend the consequential benefits within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition which require to be referred herein, read as under :- The brief facts of the case is that the respondent- writ petitioner had been appointed as an Assistant Engineer sometime in the year 1980 and subsequently, he was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer sometime in the year 2000. After bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bihar, he was allocated Jharkhand cadre and he gave his joining in Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand. The writ petitioner, while posting in the Road Construction Department, was deputed under the Building Construction Department, Ranchi and thereafter, in the year 2005, he was transferred to Building Division, Hazaribagh. In the year 2006, the Road Construction Department deputed the respondent-writ petitioner as Executive Engineer in the Rural Engineering Organization, Simdega. Subsequent thereto, his services were recalled by the Road Construction Department but he was again deputed in the Building Construction Department, Ranchi where he was put under suspension vide notification under Memo No.1073, dated 27.3.2008 in exercise of powers under Rule 49 (1) (a) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930. The writ petitioner challenged the order of suspension by filing W.P.(S) No.2110 of 2008 on the ground that even after lapse of three months, no proceeding has been initiated. The writ petitioner challenged the order of suspension by filing W.P.(S) No.2110 of 2008 on the ground that even after lapse of three months, no proceeding has been initiated. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 02.07.2008 with a direction upon the respondents to take appropriate decision regarding framing of charges, if they intend to initiate a departmental proceeding against the respondent-writ petitioner and to serve the memorandum of charges within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt / production of a copy of this order and to conclude it within a period of three months thereafter and if the memorandum of charges is not served on the petitioner and/or the departmental proceeding is not concluded within the stipulated period, the petitioner's suspension shall stand automatically revoked. The order of suspension dated 27.3.2008 was revoked but subsequently, the writ petitioner was again put under suspension on 01.06.2009. He again challenged his suspension order by filing W.P.(S) No.3046 of 2009 and the writ court, vide order dated 19.08.2009, stayed the order of suspension. Thereafter, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the writ petitioner on the pretext that two criminal cases being RC 17(A)/2009-R and RC 21 (A)/2009-R has been instituted by the Central Bureau of Investigation against him. The Central Bureau of Investigation after investigation submitted a report regarding the aforesaid two criminal cases, in which it has been categorically stated that nothing has been found against the writ petitioner and the cases were closed with the finding that no criminality on the part of the writ petitioner has been found and as such, the suspension was revoked. However, vide Resolution issued under Memo No.1929 (S), dated 29.03.2011, the Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi initiated proceeding for imposing minor penalty, under the provisions of Rule 55 of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and the writ petitioner was directed to report before the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer found the charges to be proved and the disciplinary authority accepted the same, imposing the punishment of censure including withholding of two annual increments with cumulative effect. The Enquiry Officer found the charges to be proved and the disciplinary authority accepted the same, imposing the punishment of censure including withholding of two annual increments with cumulative effect. The writ petitioner challenged the order of punishment by filing a writ petition being W.P.(S) No.6494 of 2011 which was allowed by the learned Single Judge of this Court by quashing the impugned order on the ground that before imposing major punishment, a second show-cause notice alongwith a copy of the enquiry report was not served upon the writ petitioner, which is the subject matter of the instant intra-court appeal. 3. Mr. Sreenu Garapati, learned counsel for the State has submitted that even accepting that second show-cause notice alongwith the enquiry report was not served upon the writ petitioner, the learned Single Judge instead of quashing the order of punishment, ought to have remitted the matter from the stage of serving of second show cause notice and, therefore, the learned Single Judge has committed error in passing the impugned order and hence, the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law. He further submits that though the provision of Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules provides four years of limitation for initiation of proceeding, but if the learned Single Judge would have remitted the matter from the stage of issuance of second show-cause notice, it would have been considered to be pending proceeding and the barrier of four years limitation as stipulated under the provision of Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules would not have come in the way but without appreciating this aspect of the matter, the learned Single Judge has quashed the impugned order without remitting the matter back for issuance of second show-cause notice. 4. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the appellant-State and perused the documents available on record as also the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 5. This Court before entering into the legality and proprietary of the impugned order, deems it fit and proper to refer some factual aspects for proper adjudication of the lis. The writ petitioner was proceeded departmentally, in which, he had been punished with the punishment of censure and withholding of two annual increments with cumulative effect. 5. This Court before entering into the legality and proprietary of the impugned order, deems it fit and proper to refer some factual aspects for proper adjudication of the lis. The writ petitioner was proceeded departmentally, in which, he had been punished with the punishment of censure and withholding of two annual increments with cumulative effect. It is not in dispute that the censure under the Service Conduct Rules comes under minor punishment but withholding two annual increments with cumulative effect comes under the purview of major punishment, therefore, the proceeding was concluded by imposing minor as well as major punishment upon the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner had challenged the order of punishment by filing writ petition, raising the issue of prejudice because of non-supply of second show-cause notice along-with the enquiry report as per the mandate of the Hon’ble Apex Court, rendered in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad Vs. B. Karunakar, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 , wherein, it has been laid down that before giving major punishment, the requirement is for issuance of second show-cause notice alongwith the enquiry report. Learned Single Judge has appreciated that aspect of the matter and expressed his reason for not remitting the matter before the Disciplinary authority from the stage of serving of enquiry report and second show-cause notice because of the provision of Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules which provides the period of limitation of four years for initiation of proceeding. Since the writ petitioner has already retired sometime in the year 2016 and therefore, the conclusion has been arrived that even if the matter would be remitted back from the stage of issuance of second showcause notice, no fruitful purpose would be served. 6. Since the writ petitioner has already retired sometime in the year 2016 and therefore, the conclusion has been arrived that even if the matter would be remitted back from the stage of issuance of second showcause notice, no fruitful purpose would be served. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants has questioned that finding about not remitting the matter before the disciplinary authority, from the stage of issuance of second show cause notice by taking the plea that there would not be question of riders of limitation of four years under the provision of Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, if this matter would have been remitted by the writ Court, it will have deemed conversion of the proceeding under Rule 49 A (1) (a) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and therefore, the period of limitation as provided under the provision of Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules is of adverse effect for initiation of fresh departmental proceeding. 7. We have considered the provision of Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, from which, it is evident that during pendency of departmental proceeding, if the delinquent employee retires, the proceeding will be deemed to have been converted under the provision of Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rule as per the judicial pronouncement as rendered by the Hon’ble Patna High Court in Shambhu Saran Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2000 (1) PLJR 665 , but the question is that whether under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ court can remit the matter contrary to the statutory provision for treating the proceeding to be pending when there is statutory bar on initiation of proceeding after lapse of the period of four years as provided under the proviso of the Rule 43 (b) of the Pension Rules. It is not in dispute that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India while issuing the writ of any nature, as stipulated under the said provision, is only required to follow the Rule of Law. There cannot be any transgression in the rule of law. If the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India transgresses the Rule of Law, the High Court will be said to have acted beyond its jurisdiction. There cannot be any transgression in the rule of law. If the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India transgresses the Rule of Law, the High Court will be said to have acted beyond its jurisdiction. The provision of rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules contains the specific bar for initiation of proceeding after lapse of the period of four years from the date of the alleged occurrence for which the delinquent employee has been charged. Admittedly, the writ petitioner was charged with the allegation of commission of irregularity while discharging his official duty sometime in the year 2009. The departmental proceeding has been terminated by imposing punishment of censure as also withholding two annual increments with cumulative effect. The Central Bureau of Investigation while submitting the final form has found that no criminality has been found against him, but the departmental proceeding has been initiated, which can be initiated even if no criminality has been found by the Investigating Agency and in view of the fact that both the proceedings either criminal or departmental is to run on two separate grounds i.e., it can also run parallel to each other. Since we have observed hereinabove that the Court while sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot transgress the period of limitation as provided under Rule 43(b) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules and, therefore, what has been submitted by taking the ground in assailing the impugned order, by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, has no force, since the writ petitioner, in the meantime, retired from service sometime in the year 2016 and from the date of the alleged occurrence, the period of four years has already lapsed, the learned Single Judge has rightly not remitted the matter before the disciplinary authority by holding that no fruitful purpose would be served due to the fact that the period of limitation of four years has already lapsed as provided under the Provisions of Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules. 8. Therefore, in our considered view, we find that specific observation referring the reason for not remitting the matter cannot be faulted with. Accordingly, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 9. Consequently, this appeal stands dismissed.