JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred against the order dated 19.5.2017 passed by the Trial court, whereby the application filed by the petitioners-non applicants no. 1 to 3 (for short, ‘the non applicants’) for amending/framing the issues has been dismissed. Also under challenge is the order dated 8.8.2016 passed by the Trial Court, whereby the trial court exercising the jurisdiction suo-moto deleted the issues, which were inadvertently framed on 5.5.2016 and posted the matter for final arguments instead of evidence. 2. Facts of the case are that the applicants filed an application under Section 38 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 (for short, ‘the Act of 1959’) with regard to an alleged irregularity in the Adarsh Hitkarini Trust (for short, the Trust’) before Assistant Commissioner (Ist), Devasthan Department, who passed an order dated 3.7.2013 directing the applicants to file an application under Section 40 of the Act of 1959 before the District Judge, seeking a direction for proper management of the Trust. Accordingly, the applicants filed an application under Section 40 of the Act of 1959 before District Judge, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur. On 5.5.2016, issues were framed by the District Judge and the matter was posted for applicants’ evidence. Thereafter the case was transferred to Addl. District Judge No.10, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur, who taking into consideration the fact that the application was filed under Section 40 of the Act of 1959 and in view of the provisions thereof neither issues were required to be framed nor evidence was required to be taken, vide his order dated 8.8.2016 deleted the issues, which were inadvertently framed on 5.5.2016 and instead of applicants’ evidence, posted the matter for final arguments. Subsequently on 20.2.2017, the non applicants filed an application under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC seeking to amend/frame the issues, which came to be dismissed by the said Court vide its order dated 19.5.2017. Hence, this writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners-non applicants submits that on 5.5.2016, the District Judge framed as many as 5 issues and the applicants sought time to lead evidence. Thus, the applicants had agreed that framing of the issues was necessary in order to decide the application under Section 40 of the Act of 1959. Hence, this writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners-non applicants submits that on 5.5.2016, the District Judge framed as many as 5 issues and the applicants sought time to lead evidence. Thus, the applicants had agreed that framing of the issues was necessary in order to decide the application under Section 40 of the Act of 1959. Without filing any application by the applicants and merely on the basis of oral submissions, the trial court vide its order dated 8.8.2016 exercised the jurisdiction suo moto and deleted the issues which were framed on 5.5.2016, that too after a period of more than 3 months. The learned counsel further submits that once the parties had agreed to adopt a particular procedure for inquiry and even acted thereupon, it was not open for one of the parties to deviate therefrom or to call upon the trial court and that too, orally to recall the previous order. Similarly, it was not proper for the trial Court to have proceeded to recall its earlier order by re-writing a second order. She further submits that for conducting inquiry under Section 40 of the Act of 1959, District Judges frames the issues and the said practice has been adopted in number of cases. 4. In support of her contentions, she has placed reliance on the following judgments: (i) Jagjeet Singh Lyallpuri (dead) through legal representatives and Others Versus Unitop Apartments and Builders Ltd. reported in (2020) 2 Supreme Court Cases 279 (ii) Gopal Singh Versus State Cadre Forest Officers' Assn. and Ors. reported in (2007) 9 SCC 369 . (iii) Leeladhar Versus Bherubagh Jain Tirth and others (decided by the Coordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur vide judgment dated 18.3.2009 in SBCMA No. 903/2001) (iv) Shyam Kanwar & Anr. Versus Laccha Ram & Ors. (S.B. First Appeal No. 595/2018). 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the applicants submits that the application was filed under Section 40 of the Act of 1959, to which provisions of CPC with regard to framing the issues do not apply. It is the discretion of the Court while conducting an inquiry under Section 40 of the Act of 1959. The order dated 8.8.2016 was passed by the trial court exercising the jurisdiction suo-moto deleting the issues, which were framed on 5.5.2016. It is the discretion of the Court while conducting an inquiry under Section 40 of the Act of 1959. The order dated 8.8.2016 was passed by the trial court exercising the jurisdiction suo-moto deleting the issues, which were framed on 5.5.2016. The said order dated 8.8.2016 was passed in the presence of learned counsel for both the parties. The order dated 8.8.2016 was not challenged immediately thereafter and it has been challenged in this writ petition (filed on 3.7.2017) only after passing the order dated 19.5.2017 by the trial court, whereby observation was made that the order dated 8.8.2016 had not been challenged. They further submit that two orders passed by the trial court cannot be challenged in one writ petition. They further submit that when the issues had already been deleted by the trial court vide order dated 8.8.2016, the application under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC filed by the non applicants for amending/framing the issues was not at all maintainable. Thus, the application has rightly been dismissed by the trial court. Hence no interference therewith is required by this Court. 6. In support of their contentions, they place reliance on the following judgments: (i) Narain Lal and ors. Versus Prabandhkarini Committee Digamber Jain Atishya Kstratia Shri Mahavirji Village Bargava and Ors. (Civil Misc. Appeal No. 55 and 71 of 1980) - MANU/RH/0001/1985 7. Heard. Considered. 8. In the case of Jageet Singh Lyallpuri (Dead) through legal representatives and others (supra), it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court: "We are of such opinion for the reason that the procedure to be followed in arbitration proceedings was settled by a separate order dated 28.11.2009 during the course of the proceedings before the learned Arbitrator. Thereafter the award was passed only on 13.01.2010. Though the respondent was represented by their learned counsel and the order dated 28.11.2009 was passed while recording the proceedings of that day, neither any application had been filed before the learned Arbitrator to recall the said order and provide opportunity to tender evidence or cross examine, nor was a challenge raised by initiating any other proceedings, before the award was passed. It is only subsequent to the award being passed such contention is being raised as an afterthought, which in such event cannot be accepted. It is only subsequent to the award being passed such contention is being raised as an afterthought, which in such event cannot be accepted. That apart, the agreement being entered into on 14.12.1996 and the work not having progressed subsequent to March,1999 was not seriously in dispute and in that circumstance based on the affidavit, the admitted documents have been taken note of by the learned Arbitrator due to which the non cross-examination in any event has not prejudiced the respondent herein. One aspect of the matter no doubt was with regard to the claim that was put forth by the appellant herein that a cancellation agreement dated 26.10.2004 was entered into and the security deposit of Rs. 40 Lakhs and the advance of Rs. 23 Lakhs has been repaid to Mr. S. Surinder Singh which was disputed by the respondent. On that aspect the learned Arbitrator in any event has concluded that the said payment if any cannot be considered as a payment made to the respondent company but has been received by Mr. Surinder Singh who had made gain unto himself. In such event since the respondent has not filed the affidavit of Mr. Surinder Singh disputing the same, it is an interse matter to claim from Mr. Surinder Singh and therefore, the non cross-examination on that aspect also has not resulted in any prejudice. Be that as it may, as already taken note of, the procedure to be followed in the arbitral proceedings has been agreed to by the parties. Hence the respondent cannot be heard to complain as and when it suits them." 9. In the case of Gopal Singh (supra), it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under: "40. The learned counsel for the State also pointed out that there was no necessity whatsoever on the part of the Tribunal to review its own judgment. Even after the microscopic examination of the judgment of the Tribunal, we could not find a single reason in the whole judgment as to how the review was justified and for what reasons. No apparent error on the face of the record was pointed, nor was it discussed. Thereby, the Tribunal sat as an appellate authority over its own judgment. Even after the microscopic examination of the judgment of the Tribunal, we could not find a single reason in the whole judgment as to how the review was justified and for what reasons. No apparent error on the face of the record was pointed, nor was it discussed. Thereby, the Tribunal sat as an appellate authority over its own judgment. This was completely impermissible and we agree with the High Court (Justice Sinha) that the Tribunal has travelled out of its jurisdiction to write a second order in the name of reviewing its own judgment. In fact the learned counsel for the appellant did not address us on this very vital aspect." 10. Although in the cases of Leeladhar (supra) and Shyam Kanwar (supra), issues were framed, but it was not held therein that requirement of framing the issues was necessary. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, in my considered view, the judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioners-non applicants do not apply to the facts of the instant case. 11. In the case of Narain Lal & Ors. Versus Prabandhkarini Committee Digamber Jain reported in AIR 1985 (Raj.) 1 , relied upon by the counsel for the applicants, a Coordinate Bench of this Court held as under: "....While exercising its limited jurisdiction under Section 40, the district Court cannot sit in judgment as to whether by issuing a direction to a particular person, like the appellants in the instant case, to file an application before the district Court, for direction in respect of the management and administration of a particular public trust, the Assistant Commissioner had committed an error of jurisdiction or not. One tribunal of limited jurisdiction, like the district Court under Section 40 of the Act, cannot be allowed to adjudge the validity or otherwise of the decisions of another tribunal like the Assistant Commissioner. All that the district Court may concern itself in that behalf is with the existence or otherwise of the order of the Assistant Commissioner and not with its legal validity or otherwise. All that the district Court may concern itself in that behalf is with the existence or otherwise of the order of the Assistant Commissioner and not with its legal validity or otherwise. One the district court is satisfied that the Assistant Commissioner has issued a direction under Section 38 of the Act requiring a particular person to apply to the district Court for directions regarding the administration of a particular public trust, the district Court gets the jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry into the application in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The district Court would obviously be guilty of failure to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 40 if it were to dismiss the application on the short ground that the Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to direct the making of the said application to it. It is therefore abundantly clear that the jurisdiction and powers conferred on a district Court under Section 40 of the Act are entirely different both qualitatively and quantitatively, from its jurisdiction and powers under Section 92 CPC. While dealing with an application under Section 40 of the Act, the district Court cannot arrogate to itself all the powers and plenary jurisdiction of a civil Court trying a suit of a civil nature. Though the district Court has been invested with wide powers of choosing its own method of enquiry into the application under Section 40, it is precisely on account of that informality of procedure or lack of it that one is led to the irresistible conclusion that the district Court while acting under Section 40 is acting as a tribunal of limited jurisdiction rather than a civil court of plenary jurisdiction trying a suit of a civil nature." 12. Indisputably vide order dated 8.8.2016, the District Court deleted the issues which were framed on 5.5.2016 and instead of applicants’ evidence, posted the matter for final arguments. The said order dated 8.8.2016 was passed in presence of learned counsel for both the parties, which was not challenged at the relevant point of time. It is only after passing the order dated 19.5.2017 by the trial court that the said order dated 8.8.2016 has also been challenged in the present writ petition. The said order dated 8.8.2016 was passed in presence of learned counsel for both the parties, which was not challenged at the relevant point of time. It is only after passing the order dated 19.5.2017 by the trial court that the said order dated 8.8.2016 has also been challenged in the present writ petition. In my considered view, after the issues were deleted and the matter was posted for final arguments, the non applicants filed an application under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC seeking to amend the issues, which was at all not maintainable. 13. Under Section 40 of the Act of 1959, summary inquiry is required to be conducted by the District Judge. Since the application under Section 40 of the Act of 1959 is not to be tried as a suit, there was no necessity to frame the issues and for this reason, the trial Court has rightly deleted the issues vide order dated 8.8.2016 which were framed on 5.5.2016 and rightly dismissed the application of the non applicants vide order dated 19.5.2017. 14. I am in agreement with the finding arrived at by the Court below while passing the impugned orders. 15. This writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The power under Article 227 of the Constitution is to be exercised in cases of jurisdictional error, apparent perversity, patent illegality or manifest injustice, which is not the situation here in this case. 16. Thus, I find no force in this writ petition and the same being bereft of any merit, is liable to be dismissed, which stands dismissed accordingly. 17. Consequent upon the dismissal of the writ petition, ex-parte interim order dated 5.7.2017 is vacated and the stay application and all pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed accordingly.