JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This second appeal preferred by the appellants/LRs. of original plaintiff was admitted for hearing on 15.01.2015 by formulating the following two substantial questions of law: “(i) Whether even in the admitted pleading the self acquired property can be relinquished in favour of another by virtue of Section 173 of C.G. Land Revenue Code even if beneficiary do not have share in it? (ii) Whether as against the provisions of Transfer of Property Act the immovable property can be transferred?” The parties will hereinafter be referred to as per their status given and ranking shown in the plaint before the trial Court. 2. Original plaintiff as well as defendant No. 2 both are sons of defendant No. 1 namely Gambhira, who out of his free will and desire, executed relinquishment deed dated 29.07.1985 (Ex.P/1 and Ex.D/9) in favour of his son/defendant No. 2 thereby, relinquished the suit property shown in Schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ annexed with the plaint in his favour and got it registered in accordance with the provisions of Indian Registration Act, 1908. Plaintiff filed a suit, during the lifetime of his father Gambhira and impleading him as a party/defendant No. 1 stating inter-alia that he be declared the co-owner of the suit property as the suit property is the ancestral property of the parties and decree with regard to that be granted in his favour. In alternative, averment was also made by the plaintiff that the relinquishment deed executed by his father defendant No. 1 in favour of his brother defendant No. 2 on 29.07.1985 (Ex.P/1 and Ex.D/9) is illegal and bad in law and the mutation made on that basis is also illegal, therefore, appropriate decree be granted in his favour. 3. Defendants No. 1 and 2 resisted the claim of the plaintiff stating inter-alia that the suit property is the self-acquired property of defendant No. 1 which he purchased on 24.05.1978 by his own income and as such, he can relinquish the said suit property in favour of his other son i.e. defendant No. 2, therefore, plaintiff has no right or title over the suit property and the relinquishment deed (Ex.P/1 and Ex.D/9) executed by him in favour of defendant No. 2 with the consent of his wife Patango Bai is strictly in accordance with law, as such, plaintiff's suit deserves to be dismissed. 4. 4. It is pertinent to mention here that defendant No. 1 Gambhira died during the pendency of the suit on 07.08.1993. 5. Learned trial Court, upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, dismissed the suit vide its judgment and decree dated 15.12.1988 holding that the suit property shown in Schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ of the plaint is not the ancestral property of the parties rather it is the self-acquired property of defendant No. 1 and the relinquishment deed dated 29.08.1985 (Ex.P/1 and Ex.D/9) executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 is strictly in accordance with law, as such, plaintiff does not have right or title in the suit property. In turn, the decree of the trial Court having been questioned before the first appellate Court, the appellant/plaintiff suffered the same fate as learned first appellate Court too, finding no merit in the second round of litigation after the matter being remanded from this Court, affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of both the Courts below, this second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff in which two substantial questions of law have been formulated which have been set out in the opening paragraph of this judgment. 6. Ms. Sharmila Singhai, learned counsel for the appellants/LRs. of plaintiff, would vehemently submit that since the suit property is admittedly the self-acquired property of defendant No. 1, as held by both the Courts below, therefore, he could not have executed the relinquishment deed (Ex.P/1) in favour of defendant No. 2 as release deed can only be executed in favour of a person who has some semblance of a preexisting right, title, interest over the property and a release can only enlarge an existing title, right and interest of the release and there can be no release in favour of a release who has no title, right or interest in the property. She would rely upon the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kuppuswamy Chettiar vs. ASP A. Arumugam Chettiar, AIR 1967 SC 1395 to buttress her submission. She would rely upon the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kuppuswamy Chettiar vs. ASP A. Arumugam Chettiar, AIR 1967 SC 1395 to buttress her submission. She would also submit that the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below holding that relinquishment deed (Ex.P/1 and D/9) executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 is illegal and bad in law and deserves to be set aside by answering the two substantial questions of law in favour of the plaintiff. 7. Despite service of notice, none appears on behalf of the respondents/defendants No. 1 and 2. 8. At the request of the Court, Mr. Ratan Pusty, learned counsel has readily agreed to appear as Amicus Curiae and assist the Court by making submission. He would submit that a Mitakshara father has absolute right to transfer his self-acquired property as per his wish to which no exception can be taken by his male descendants and he can even transfer the property in favour of a stranger. He would rely upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar vs. C.A. Muruganatha Mudaliar, AIR 1953 SC 495 and would also submit that since the suit property is the self-acquired property of defendant No. 1, therefore, during his lifetime, plaintiff, who had no right over the suit property, had no legal right to institute the suit as per Section 9 of CPC. A person filing a suit under Section 9 of CPC must have legal right to the property involved in the suit. However, plaintiff has no legal right in the suit property and as such, he could not have filed the suit under Section 9 of CPC. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their submissions made hereinabove and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. However, plaintiff has no legal right in the suit property and as such, he could not have filed the suit under Section 9 of CPC. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their submissions made hereinabove and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. Plaintiff filed the suit wherein he claimed the suit property to be the ancestral property of the parties and in alternative, he also pleaded that his father Gambhira i.e. defendant No. 1 could not have relinquished the suit property in favour of his brother/defendant No. 2 as according to the plaintiff, defendant No. 2 had no preexisting right in the property of their father i.e. defendant No. 1, as both the Courts below have held that suit property was the self-acquired property of defendant No. 1 which has not been questioned by in the instant appeal, as such, the said finding has become final. 11. The only part that has been challenged by the plaintiff in the instant appeal is the manner of transfer of suit property by stating that since defendant No. 2 had no existing right on the date of execution of relinquishment deed (Ex.P/1 and Ex.D/9), therefore, the said relinquishment deed executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 is illegal and bad in law, which both the Courts below have not accepted and rejected the said plea. 12. 12. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the relinquishment deed (Ex.P/1 and Ex.D/9) executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2, which states as under: R;kxi= ¼nLrcjnkjh½ e; lgefr&i= R;kx dh tkus okyh lEifr dk ewY; eqcfyx 25]000-00 :i;s fcuk ewY; fy;s ;g R;kxi= foys[k vkt fnukad 29-7-1985 dks LFkku cSdq.Biqj esa eq>s xEHkhjk ,oa eqŒ irkaxks ckbZ }kjk lEikfnr fd;k x;kA eSa xEHkhjk vkRet lhrkjke jtokj] vk;q 65 o"kZ djhc fuoklh xzke djth] rglhy cSdq.Biqj ftyk ljxqtk dk gawA esjs ikl xzke djth esa fuEufyf[kr Hkwfe gS tks esjh futh dekbZ dh gSA bl Hkwfe dk lsfVyesUV ipkZ esjs uke ls gh feyk FkkA esjs HkkbZx.k vyx jgrs Fks vkSj mUgsa] mudh cukbZ gqbZ tehu dk iV~Vk feyk FkkA esjh bl tehu esa ls dqN tehu esjs }kjk taxy dkVdj cukbZ xbZ Fkh vkSj dqN Hkwfe eSaus jkelkxj yky eqa'kh ls rFkk dqN Hkwfe Jhefr vtkSfj;k mQZ vlksrfgu ls [kjhnk FkkA ;g lc HkwriwoZ dksfj;k LVsV vFkkZr lu~ 1948 ds iwoZ dh ckr gSA bl Hkwfe esa ls flQZ ,d [kljk uEcj 710@2 jdck 0&117 gsDV;j dks eSaus lsVsyesaV ijpk ds ckn [kjhnk FkkA Hkwfe dk fooj.k xzke [kljk uEcj jdck yxku xzke djth iŒgŒuŒ rglhy cSdq.Biqj 108 0&129 gsDV;j 14&69 iSlk 205 0&024 gsDV;j 404 0&032 gsDV;j 411 0&142 gsDV;j 414 0&077 gsDV;j 420 0&045 gsDV;j 556 0&040 gsDV;j 557 0&053 gsDV;j 560 0&101 gsDV;j 632 0&162 gsDV;j 633 0&125 gsDV;j 650 0&073 gsDV;j 655 0&097 gsDV;j 683 0&243 gsDV;j 698 0&166 gsDV;j 744 0&142 gsDV;j 754@1 0&408 gsDV;j 883 0&470 gsDV;j 710@2 0&117 gsDV;j ;ksx 19 3&646 gsDV;j 14&69 iSlk esjh vk;q yxHkx 65 o"kZ dh gks xbZ gSA esjh iRuh Jherh irkaxks ckbZ Hkh djhc 60 o"kZ dh gks pqdh gSA esjs nks yM+ds rFkk nks yM+fd;ka gSA cM+h yM+dh datkyks ckbZ dh 'kknh gks xbZ gS vkSj og vius llqjky esa gSA esjh nwljh yM+dh Qqyer ckbZ dks mlds ifr us NksM+ fn;k gS vr% og esjs lkFk jgrh gSA esjk cM+k yM+dk erjk[ku vk;q djhc 48 o"kZ gSA eSaus erjk[ku dks viuh mijksDr nf'kZr Hkwfe esa ls dqN tehu igys ls gh ns j[kk gS ftl ij og [ksrh djrk gS rFkk viuk edku ,oa ckM+h cuk;k gSA erjk[ku dks viuk edku cukus ds fy;s eSaus vius iqjkus edku dk daqMh] ckal] [kiM+k Hkh fn;k FkkA bl rjg eSaus mls vyx dj fn;k gSA erjk[ku dkyjh esa ukSdjh djrk vkSj djhc nks gtkj :i;k ekfld dekrk gSA bl Ádkj og gj Ádkj ls lEiUu gSA esjs }kjk erjk[ku ¼cM+s iq=½ dks nh xbZ tehu ds ckn 'ks"k cph gqbZ tehu ij esjk iwjk gd o dCtk gSA pawfd esjk nwljk iq= Qqylk; esjh lsok vusd o"kksZ dj jgk gS rFkk esjh] esjh iRuh ,oa iq=h Qwyer ckbZ dk ikyu iks"k.k Qqylk; gh dj jgk gS vkSj og gh esjh [ksrh dh ns[kjs[k Hkh djrk gSA vr% eSaus ;g fu'p; fd;k gS fd viuh bl 'ks"k Hkwfe ftldk fooj.k uhps nf'kZr gS] dk R;kxi= vius iq= Qqylk; ds uke ij lEikfnr dj nawA bl laca/k esa esjh iRuh Hkh eq> ls lger gS og Hkh esjh uhps fy[kh Hkwfe ij] mlds tks dqN Hkh dkuwuh gd o vf/kdkj gksrs gSa mUgsa og Hkh Qqylk; ds i{k esa R;kx djus dks lger rFkk rS;kj gS rFkk vfHkLohd`fr nsrs gq;s esjh iRuh Hkh bl nLrkost ij vius gLrk{kj dj jgh gSA Qqylk; vkŒ xEHkhjk tkr jtokj fuoklh xzke djth ds i{k esa R;kx dh tkus okyh Hkwfe dk fooj.k%& xzke [kljk uEcj jdck tek xzke djth iŒgŒuŒ rglhy cSdq.Biqj ¼LVkEi Qhl dk Øekad 410803½ 108 esa ls 0&101 gsDV;j 9&37 iSlk 205 0&024 gsDV;j 405 0&032 gsDV;j 411 esa ls 0&093 gsDV;j 414 esa ls 0&049 gsDV;j 556 0&040 gsDV;j 557 0&053 gsDV;j 560 esa ls 0&065 gsDV;j 632 esa ls 0&113 gsDV;j 633 0&125 gsDV;j 650 esa ls 0&056 gsDV;j 655 esa ls 0&077 gsDV;j 683 esa ls 0&153 gsDV;j 698 esa ls 0&142 gsDV;j 744 0&142 gsDV;j 754 esa ls 0&041 gsDV;j 754 esa ls 0&049 gsDV;j 754 esa ls 0&889 gsDV;j 883 esa ls 0&320 gsDV;j 710@2 0&117 gsDV;j ;ksx 20 2&681 gsDV;j 9&37 iSlk vr% bl nLrkost ds }kjk eSa xEHkhjk viuh mijksDr nf'kZr Hkwfe vFkkZr dqy [kljk uEcj 20] jdck 2&681 gsDV;j tek 9&37 iSlk tks esjs LoRo rFkk gd dh gS] mlds leLr LoRo o gd iq= Qqylk; vkŒ xEHkhjk jtokj ds i{k esa R;kx djrk gaw vFkkZr nLrcjnkjh djrk gwaA bl tehu dk jktLo [kkrk vius uke ij vyx ls dk;e djkus dk rFkk HkwfeLokeh ds :i esa viuk uke p<+okus dk vc Qqylk; dks iwjk vf/kdkj jgsxkA vkt fnukad ls eSa bl Hkwfe dk Lokeh vius iq= Qqylk; dks djkj nsrk gawA bl lEifr ij okLrfod vf/kdkj] n[ky o dCtk Hkh eSaus Qqylk; dks lkSai fn;k gS vkSj mDr Hkwfe ls lEcf/kr jktLo dkxtkr vkfn Hkh Qqylk; dks lkSai fn;kA vc Qqylk; dks iwjk vf/kdkj gS fd og bl lEifr dks ftl dnj pkgs mi;ksx esa ykosaA vr% ;g R;kxi= vkt fnukad 29-7-1985 dks LFkku cSdq.Biqj esa vius gks'k&gok'k ls LoLFkfpr rFkk fLFkj cqf} dh fLFkfr esa fy[kokdj o lqu rFkk le> dj vius gLrk{kj dj fn;s ftlls fd Áek.k jgs vkSj le; ij dke vkosA ys[kd txeksgu yky xqIrk lgh@& txeksgu yky xqIrk cSdq.Biqj] fnukad 29-7-1985 lk{khx.k gLrk{kj R;kxdrkZ ¼vaxwBk fpUg½ ¼vaxwBk fpUg½ ¼1½ fuŒvaŒckaŒ cU/kqjke vkŒ xaxkjke dksgaj] djth fu'kkuh vaxwBk cka;k xEHkhjk cŒdŒ ¼2½ fuŒvaŒckaŒ Áselk; vkŒ xksih fcaf>;k ¼cSaxk½ lkŒ djth cŒdŒ esjs ifr }kjk fy[kr mijksDr R;kxi= ls eSa lger gwaA gLrk{kj lgernkrk fuŒvaŒckaŒ irkaxks ckbZ tkSŒ xEHkhjk ¼vaxwBk fpUg½ jtokj cŒdŒ lk{khx.k ¼1½ fuŒvaŒckaŒ cU/kqjke vkŒ xaxkjke dksgaj] djth ¼vaxwBk fpUg½ lkŒ djth cŒdŒ ¼2½ fuŒvaŒckaŒ Áselk; vkŒ xksih fcaf>;k ¼cSaxk½ ¼vaxwBk fpUg½ lkŒ djth cŒdŒ 13. A careful perusal of the aforesaid document (Exhibit D/9) would show that since defendant No. 1 desired and expressed his wish to give the suit property standing in his name in favour of his other son i.e. defendant No. 2, he executed the said relinquishment deed in favour of defendant No. 2 with the consent of his widow namely Patango Bai and Exhibit P/1-D/9 is also attested by two witnesses namely Bandhu Rai and Premsai and is also registered in accordance with the provisions of Indian Registration Act, 1908. 14. The principle argument raised on behalf of appellant/plaintiff (now his LRs.) is that since defendant No. 2, one of the sons of defendant No. 1, had no existing right, title and interest over the suit property during the lifetime of his father, suit property being the self-acquired property of defendant No. 1, therefore, there can be no release in favour of defendant No. 2 who has no interest in the suit property by way of the relinquishment deed (Ex.P/1 and Ex.D/9). 15. In the matter of Thayyil Mammo vs. Kottiath Ramunni, AIR 1966 SC 337 at page 340, it has been clearly held by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court that a registered instrument styled as a release deed releasing the right, title and interest in favour of the release for valuable consideration may operate as a conveyance, if the document clearly discloses the intention to effect a transfer. 16. The principle of law laid down in the aforesaid judgment further came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the matter of Kuppuswamy Chettiar (supra) wherein the aforesaid principle of law laid down in Thayyil Mammo (supra) was relied upon and it was held by Their Lordships in paragraph 4 as under: “4. The question is whether Ex.B1 on its true construction conveyed properties to the respondents. In T. Mammo vs. K. Ramunni, AIR 1966 SC 337 at p. 340 this Court held: “a registered instrument styled a release deed releasing the right, title and interest of the executant in any property in favour of the release for valuable consideration may operate as a conveyance, if the document clearly discloses an intention to effect a transfer.” In the present case, the release was without any consideration. But property may be transferred without consideration. Such a transfer is a gift. But property may be transferred without consideration. Such a transfer is a gift. Under S. 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a gift may be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses. Consequently, a registered instrument releasing the right, title and interest of the releasor without consideration may operate as a transfer by way of a gift, if the document clearly shows an intention to effect the transfer and is signed by or on behalf of the releasor and attested by at least two witnesses. Exhibit B1 stated that the releasor was the owner of the properties. It showed an intention to transfer his title and its operative words sufficiently conveyed the title. The instrument, on its true construction, took effect as a gift. The gift was effectively made by a registered instrument signed by the donor and attested by more than two witnesses.” Thereafter, in paragraph 6, Their Lordships clearly held that a deed called a deed of release can, by using words of sufficient amplitude, transfer title to one having no title before the transfer and rejected the contrary submission made therein. As such, the argument raised by learned counsel for the plaintiff in this count deserves to be rejected. 17. However, this issue can be considered from another angle. Plaintiff filed a suit that relinquishment deed (Ex.P/1 and Ex.D/9) executed by his father defendant No. 1 in favour of his brother defendant No. 2 is illegal and bad in law as by way of the said relinquishment deed, no title can be transferred in favour of defendant No. 2 because he had no right or title over the suit property during the lifetime of his father, reason being that the suit property was the self-acquired property of defendant No. 1. 18. Now, the question for consideration would be, whether plaintiff himself, who had no legal right over the suit property, during the lifetime of his father in his self-acquired property, can bring a suit under Section 9 of CPC for declaring the relinquishment deed (Ex.P/1 and Ex.D/9) executed by his father defendant No. 1 in favour of his brother defendant No. 2 as illegal and bad in law? 19. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 9 of CPC, which states as under: “9. 19. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 9 of CPC, which states as under: “9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred - The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.” 20. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that Section 9 of CPC confers on every person an inherent right to bring a suit of civil nature of one's choice, at one's peril, howsoever frivolous the claim may be, unless it is barred by a statute. In order to have the said right to file a suit, one must have a legal right in the suit property then only the suit can be filed under Section 9 of CPC. 21. The Allahabad High Court in the matter of Dukh Chor and Others vs. Ram Ratti and Others, (1967) 37 AWR 610 held in paragraph 4 as under: “4. Counsel contended that the Appellant are entitled to show that the gift is void for want of permission by the Settlement Officer as they had taken this plea in the lower court. I do not agree. This plea could be considered only after they had established that the property was joint and they had an interest in it. After the Court had found that they have no interest in it, their objection against the gift becomes incompetent. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the courts have jurisdiction “to try all suits of a civil nature.” The words “suits of a civil nature” mean suits enforce legal rights and the law court will not entertain suits by busy bodies with no interest to protect.” 22. Thus, plaintiff, on the date of filing of the suit seeking declaration of the relinquishment deed (Ex.P/1 and Ex.D/9) to be illegal and void on the property being the self-acquired property of his father defendant No. 1, that too in his lifetime, has no legal right over the suit property to file a suit under Section 9 of CPC. Section 9 bars a person to file a suit in a case in which he has no legal right over the suit property. Therefore, in this Court also, plaintiff's suit deserves to be dismissed as well being barred by Section 9 of CPC? 23. Section 9 bars a person to file a suit in a case in which he has no legal right over the suit property. Therefore, in this Court also, plaintiff's suit deserves to be dismissed as well being barred by Section 9 of CPC? 23. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar (supra) has clearly laid down the law with regard to the power of Mitakshara father to alienate his property even to a stranger as per his wish in paragraph 9, which states as under: “9. Quite at variance with the precept which seems to restrict the father's right of disposition over his self-acquired property in an unqualified manner and in the same way as ancestral lands, there occur other texts in the commentary which practically deny any right of interference by the sons with the father's power of alienation over his self-acquired property. Chapter 1, S.5, placitum 9 says: “The grandson has a right of prohibition if his un-separated father is making a donation or sale of effects inherited from the grandfather: but he has no right of interference if the effects were acquired by the father. On the contrary he must acquiesce, because he is dependent.” The reason for this distinction is explained by the author in the text that follows: “Consequently the difference is this: although he has a right by birth in his father's and in his grandfather's property; still since he is dependent on his father in regard to the paternal estate and since the father has a predominant interest as it was acquired by himself, the son must acquiesce in the father's disposal of his own acquired property.” Clearly the latter passages are in flat contradiction with the previous ones and in an early Calcutta case: Muddun Gopal vs. Ram Buksh, 6 WR 71(A), a reconciliation was attempted at by taking the view that the right of the sons in the self-acquired property of their father was an imperfect right incapable of being enforced at law. The question came pointedly for consideration before the Judicial Committee in the case of Rao Balwant vs. Rani Kishori, 25 Ind App 54 (PC) (B) and Lord Hobhouse, who delivered the judgment of the Board, observed in course of his judgment that in the text books and commentaries on Hindu Law, religious and moral considerations are often mingled with rules of positive law. It was held that the passages in Chap. I, Sec. 1, verse 27 of Mitakshara contained only moral or religious precepts while those in S. 5, verses 9 and 10 embodied rules of positive law. The latter consequently would override the former. It was held, therefore, that the father of a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law has full and uncontrolled powers of disposition over his self-acquired immovable property and his male issue could not interfere with these rights in any way. This statement of the law has never been challenged since then and it has been held by the various High Courts in India, and in our opinion rightly, that a Mitakshara father is not only competent to sell his self-acquired immovable property to a stranger without the concurrence of his sons: vide 6 WR 71 (Cal) (A), but he can make a gift of such property to one of his own sons to the detriment of another: vide Sital vs. Madho, 1 All 394 (C) and he can make even an unequal distribution amongst his heirs: vide Bawa Misser vs. Rajah Bishen, 10 WR 287 (Cal.) (D).” 24. Reverting finally to the facts of the present case, it is held that since the suit property was the self-acquired property of defendant No. 1 and he has relinquished the said property in favour of his other son defendant No. 2 by registered instrument Exhibits P/1-D/9 as per his free will and desire with the consent of his widow Patango Bai and in presence of two attesting witnesses, it cannot be said to be illegal and contrary to law, particularly when defendant No. 1 had the right title and interest over the suit property to deal with this property in a manner in which he wishes to as Right to Property is a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Even otherwise, plaintiff has no legal right to file the suit as the suit property was self-acquired property of his father and his father/defendant No. 1 was empowered to deal with the property and rightly relinquished it in favour of defendant No. 2. As such, both the Courts below are absolutely justified in dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff in which I do not find any perversity or illegality. Both the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of defendants and against the plaintiff. As such, both the Courts below are absolutely justified in dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff in which I do not find any perversity or illegality. Both the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of defendants and against the plaintiff. 25. The second appeal, being devoid of merits, deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. No costs. This Court also appreciates the assistance rendered by Mr. Ratan Pusty, learned counsel appearing as Amicus Curiae. 26. Decree be drawn-up accordingly.