JUDGMENT : Atul Sreedharan, J. 1. Heard. This application has been filed U/s. 439 Cr.P.C. on behalf of applicant Dinesh Rajod, in connection with Crime No. 90/2019 of the Investigating Agency: DRI, Bhopal, for offences U/s. 8/20(b)(ii)(c), 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The applicant is in judicial custody since 22/10/2019. 2. At the very outset, Ld. Counsel for the applicant has submitted that the case of the applicant is identical to that of the co-accused Dharmendra, who was granted the benefit of bail by this Court vide order dated 24/11/2020 passed in M.Cr.C. No. 14440/2020. The said order is elaborate and has taken into consideration the facts in detail while deciding the application in favour of the co-accused. For the sake of brevity, this Court adopts the factual aspects laid down in the order dated 24/11/2020 passed in M.Cr.C. No. 14440/2020. 3. However, Ld. Counsel for the respondent/DRI while opposing the application for grant of bail to the applicant herein, has argued that the applicant was travelling in the Baleno Car, which was allegedly escorting the Truck carrying the contraband article. As regards this submission, this Court has already dealt with it in M.Cr.C. No. 14440/2020 and for the reasons stated therein, has held that the said suggestion was speculative. 4. The second argument put forth by the Ld. Counsel for the DRI is that the confession of the applicant was made in the presence of independent Panchas/witnesses. However, it is not disputed that the said statement was made by the applicant after he was taken into custody by the respondent. Under the circumstances, the three Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Tofan Singh Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu would squarely apply in this case and the said confession, prima facie is to no avail. 5. The third argument put forth by the Ld. Counsel for the DRI is the principle of reverse burden, that is provided under Section 35 of the N.D.P.S. Act, which deals with the presumption of culpable mental state, would apply against the applicant herein. However, before the said presumption can be raised, the prosecution must establish the actus-reus on the part of the accused. Where that is done, the mens-rea of intention or knowledge shall be presumed. However, before the said presumption can be raised, the prosecution must establish the actus-reus on the part of the accused. Where that is done, the mens-rea of intention or knowledge shall be presumed. The said mens-rea can be rebutted by the accused by producing evidence to the effect that he never had knowledge of conscious possession. However, sub-section (2) carves out an exception to the general principles of criminal jurisprudence and provides that in such a situation, the accused has to prove the non-existence of the mental state (relating to conscious possession) beyond reasonable doubt and not merely on a preponderance of probability. 6. However, in this particular case, there is inadequate evidence to prima-facie reveal the involvement of the applicant herein though his action may come under the category of "suspicion" of his involvement in the incident. Suspicion can never take the place of legally cognizable proof whether it be a degree of prima-facie evidence or beyond reasonable doubt. 7. Ld. Counsel for the respondent/DRI has also referred to Section 30 of the Act and has argued that the act of the applicant herein would be covered under the said Section. Section 30 of the Act makes the "preparation" to commit an offence involving commercial quantity of a contraband or offences U/s. 19, 24 and 27A of the N.D.P.S. Act. There are four stages that an act must go to before it can be said to have been an offence. The first stage is "intention" to commit the offence. The second stage is "preparation" to commit an offence. The third stage is the "attempt" to commit the offence and the fourth stage is the "commission" of an offence. For obvious reasons, stage one, i.e., intention to commit the offence is never an offence, as it is impossible to prove an intention until it is connected/associated with actus-reus and it is always the action, on the basis of which the intention stands proved. The second stage is preparation, which is only an offence created by the statute and not otherwise. Thus, the preparation to commit dacoity or a preparation to commit offence with regard to coins and currency or as this case under Section 30 of the NDPS Act, would be an offence because it is so provided by the statute. The second stage is preparation, which is only an offence created by the statute and not otherwise. Thus, the preparation to commit dacoity or a preparation to commit offence with regard to coins and currency or as this case under Section 30 of the NDPS Act, would be an offence because it is so provided by the statute. Attempt to commit an offence is always an offence and commission of the offence, goes without saying would always be an offence. Section 30 of the NDPS Act reads as hereunder. Preparation.--If any person makes preparation to do or omits to do anything which constitutes an offence punishable under any of the provisions of [sections 19, 24 and 27A and for offences involving commercial quantity of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance and from the circumstances of the case] it may be reasonably inferred that he was determined to carry out his intention to commit the offence but had been prevented by circumstances independent of his will, he shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one-half of the minimum term (if any), but which may extend to one-half of the maximum term, of imprisonment with which he would have been punishable in the event of his having committed such offence, and also with fine which shall not be less than one-half of the minimum amount (if any), of fine with which he would have been punishable, but which may extend to one-half of the maximum amount of fine with which he would have ordinarily (that is to say in the absence of special reasons) been punishable, in the event aforesaid: Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a higher fine. The uniqueness of the offence of "Preparation" is that it is an inchoate offence by operation of statute while the inchoate offences of "attempt" and "abetment" have evolved through common law pronouncements. The underlined portion of section 30 [above] clearly discloses that it is applicable only where the principal offence contemplated by the accused could not attain fruition for reasons beyond his control and the accused becomes liable for punishment for having prepared to commit the offences mentioned in section 30. In the present case, admittedly, the principal offence intended has attained fruition, and therefore, the offence of preparation, prima facie appears to be inapplicable. In the present case, admittedly, the principal offence intended has attained fruition, and therefore, the offence of preparation, prima facie appears to be inapplicable. Under the circumstances, once the principal offence intended attains fruition/commission, the law does not permit of backtracking to the stage of preparation, unless the prosecution has evidence to establish that the applicant and the co-accused in the Car were preparing to commit a fresh offence under the NDPS Act, independent of the offence alleged to have been committed by the three co-accused persons who were transporting the contraband by the Truck. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that Section 30 of the NDPS Act would also not apply in the facts and circumstances of the case. 8. The fifth argument put forth by the Ld. Counsel for the DRI is that Bablu Jat, the co-accused who was travelling in the Truck was strongly associated with the applicant, in view of the several phone calls between them on the basis of C.D.R. As regards the value of the CDR is concerned, the same has already been dealt with by this Court while deciding the bail application of the co-accused in M.Cr.C. No. 14440/2020. The said argument is an allegation that the co-accused Bablu Jat was strongly associated with the applicant herein. For the sake of argument, if it is accepted that the applicant was intimately known to Bablu Jat, that itself is inadequate to raise a presumption that the applicant was also involved in the same offence. A person may have association with several people without knowing that some amongst them may be criminals and associated with the criminal activities, but where that association/acquaintance is sought to be used to incriminate another, the mere factum of acquaintance would be grossly inadequate. There must be independent evidence to show that the persons who is sought to be implicated, was associated to that person by action in the same transaction which constituted the offence, in which there is adequate prima-facie evidence against the co-accused. The CDR's would only show conversation between two numbers. 9. In this context, Ld. Counsel for the DRI has referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Santokh Singh Vs. State of NCT Delhi (Crl. Rev. P.691/2009). The CDR's would only show conversation between two numbers. 9. In this context, Ld. Counsel for the DRI has referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Santokh Singh Vs. State of NCT Delhi (Crl. Rev. P.691/2009). In that case, the accused had filed a Criminal Revision before the Delhi High Court against the order framing charges under Section 25A and Section 29 of the N.D.P.S. Act. The accused sought his discharge on the ground that there was no independent evidence against him. However, the State of Delhi contended that a co-accused by the name of Amarjit, who was arrested, disclosed that the petitioner was a financer and that there were call detail records which were traced by Investigating Agency, which showed that the petitioner was in constant touch with the co-accused from whom the contraband was recovered. 10. Ld. Counsel for the DRI has drawn the attention of this Court to para 8 of the said judgment, where the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has observed - "call records data is an unimpeachable evidence. At this stage, a perusal of the call details record creates a strong suspicion and it cannot be said that there is no evidence against the petitioner warranting his discharge." The aforesaid judgment was passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi at the stage of discharge. As regards the nature of appreciation of material on record at the stage of discharge, what has to be seen is the charge-sheet and the material filed therewith. The landmark case with regard to the appreciation of material on record at the stage of framing charges is the Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal and another, reported in (1979) 3 SCC 4 . In that judgment, the Supreme Court held that the trial Court at the stage of framing charges is not a post-office or mouthpiece of the prosecution and must necessarily sift through the charge-sheet and the material on record to assess whether a triable issue arises against the accused or not. In its endeavour, the trial Court is not required to carry a roving enquiry and conduct a mini trial, but none the less, it is expected to peruse the evidence to assess whether a "strong suspicion" arises against the accused and if satisfied, the trial Court would be justified in framing charges against the accused. In its endeavour, the trial Court is not required to carry a roving enquiry and conduct a mini trial, but none the less, it is expected to peruse the evidence to assess whether a "strong suspicion" arises against the accused and if satisfied, the trial Court would be justified in framing charges against the accused. However, if only a mere suspicion with regard to the involvement of the accused in the said offence is disclosed by the material on record along with the charge-sheet, then the trial Court would be justified in discharging the accused. The said judgment holds the field even today for its clarity and un-ambiguity. At the stage of framing charges, the Court is only required to see whether there exists a triable issue against the accused. This Court is in complete agreement with the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that at the stage of framing charges, if there is a strong suspicion against the accused, the same would be adequate to frame charges against him. However, this Court with utmost regard to the judgment of the Delhi High Court is in polite disagreement with its observation that the call records of data is an unimpeachable evidence. As stated earlier hereinabove, the call records data would only go to reflect the acquaintance between the caller and the called and in a case like the present one, may even raise a strong suspicion with regard to the involvement of the applicant in the said crime, but the same cannot be an unimpeachable evidence for the purpose of keeping an accused under incarceration, pending trial. However, call interception and its recording may be clinching evidence if the same is proved in accordance with law during trial, and would also constitute strong prima facie evidence at the time of considering a bail application. However, in this case it is only the CDR that is available with the Respondent. Under the circumstances, this argument of the Ld. Counsel for the DRI is also rejected. 11. The last argument of the Ld. Counsel for the respondent/DRI is the application of Section 54 of the Act. Section 54 of the NDPS Act raises a presumption from possession of the contraband. Under the circumstances, this argument of the Ld. Counsel for the DRI is also rejected. 11. The last argument of the Ld. Counsel for the respondent/DRI is the application of Section 54 of the Act. Section 54 of the NDPS Act raises a presumption from possession of the contraband. It provides for a presumption that unless and until the contrary is proved, the accused has committed an offence under the NDPS Act, purely on account of having been found in possession of the contraband material, which the accused is unable to account for satisfactorily. The facts circumstances in the present case clearly reveals that the applicant was not in the physical possession of the contraband. That circumstance is attributed to the other three co-accused persons who were travelling in the Truck carrying the contraband. Under the circumstances, this Section would also not be applicable against the applicant. 12. In view of what has been argued and discussed hereinabove, the application is allowed, and it is directed that the applicants herein shall be enlarged on bail upon their furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rs. Fifty Thousand) with one solvent surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court. C.C. as per rules.