ORDER : 1. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following substantive reliefs:- “(i) For issuing any appropriate writ, order or directions for directing respondent No. 1 to continue making supply of patrol and petroleum products in petitioner’s name to the retail out let set up in 2005 by the petitioner on NH 22 at Dharampur on Shimla-Kalka road, which was allotted to petitioner vide annexure P-1 dated 16.1.2002. (ii) For directing the respondent No. 1 to continue supplying petrol and petroleum products to the retail outlet of the petitioner as hereto before notwithstanding any dispute between petitioner and respondent No. 2 which is liable to be settled and can be settled or adjudicated upon in separate proceedings. (iii) For issuing directing to the respondents to treat the partnership deed executed between petitioner and respondent No. 2 as non existent and to treat the petitioner as sole proprietor of the petrol retail outlet on NH-22 at Dharampur on Shimla-Kalka road.” 2. The case of the petitioner is that the he had raised a Petrol Pump on his owned and possessed land pursuant to his selection by respondent No. 1 as a dealer at Dharampur. The outlet is situated at National Highway -22 in District Solan. The same was made functional by the petitioner in the name and style of M/S Jai Hind Filling Station, Dharampur, with the petitioner being its sole proprietor. Respondent is the wife of a close family friend of the petitioner. In the year 2012, she expressed interest to invest in the Petrol Pump. It was mutually decided between the petitioner and respondent No. 2 to form a partnership deed for the purpose of running the Petrol Pump, and for this purpose, market value of the land exclusively owned and possessed by the petitioner was assessed at Rs.5,00,00,000/- (Rs. Five Crores). In lieu of 40% share to be allotted to respondent No. 2 in the partnership firm, said respondent was to pay Rs.2,45,00,000/- (Two Crores and Forty Five Lac) to the petitioner by 31.03.2014. The proposal to form this partnership firm was submitted to respondent No. 1, which accepted said proposal. Thereafter, the partnership deed as per format of respondent No. 1 was formed and registered on 25.4.2013. The proposal to form this partnership firm was submitted to respondent No. 1, which accepted said proposal. Thereafter, the partnership deed as per format of respondent No. 1 was formed and registered on 25.4.2013. As per the petitioner, despite registration of the partnership deed and its acceptance by respondent No.1, the Petrol Pump continued to be operated by him as a sole proprietor and this was done with the knowledge of respondent No. 1, who did not object to the same. The partnership deed was to become workable only on the fulfillment of obligations on the part of respondent No. 2. According to the petitioner, this deed was never acted upon by the petitioner or respondent No. 1 or 2 for want of fulfillment of obligations by respondent No. 2. The partnership deed remained in abeyance and was treated as such even by respondent No. 1. An amount of Rs.2,45,00,000/-, which was to be paid by respondent No. 2, was not paid by her to the petitioner. She issued three cheques for an amount of Rs.75.00 Lac each, which were dishonoured on presentation. Respondent No. 2 did not invest in the running and operation of Petrol Pump. In the years 2006-07, unsecured loan of Rs.8.60 Lac given by respondent No. 2 on interest in favour of the petitioner was also not merged against her liability towards partnership firm. The sole proprietorship continued to repay the loan to respondent No. 2 with interest. The partnership firm which was at will of the partners, was eventually dissolved and terminated by the petitioner by issuance of notice to this effect to respondent No. 2 vide Annexure P-10, dated 112.4.2014 and vide Annexure P-11, dated 17.7.2014. The bank accounts of the firm work in the name of the petitioner in his capacity as sole proprietor. The return of the proceeds of the Petrol Pump were being reflected in the income tax returns of the petitioner only. The petitioner brought the fact of dissolution and termination of partnership deed to the notice of respondent No. 1 vide letter dated 07.06.2014 and requested for continuance of petroleum products and petrol supply in his name only. The Registering Authority was also apprised of the termination of the partnership deed, however, respondent No. 1 stopped supplying the retail outlet of the petitioner in his capacity as proprietor w.e.f. July, 2014. The Registering Authority was also apprised of the termination of the partnership deed, however, respondent No. 1 stopped supplying the retail outlet of the petitioner in his capacity as proprietor w.e.f. July, 2014. Despite requests made by the petitioner, respondent No. 1 was not continuing to supply petrol and petroleum products to the petitioner as a proprietor, and it is in this background that the petition stood filed by the petitioner praying for the reliefs already enumerated hereinabove. 3. By way of its reply filed to the writ petition by respondent No. 1, in the preliminary submissions, it stood mentioned by said respondent that Petrol Pump (MS) High Speed Diesel (HSD) Oil Retail Outlet Dealership was entered into between IOC as first party and Shri Mohinder Nath Sofat and Smt. Veena Gupta, partners of M/s Jai Hind Filling Station on 26.04.2013. Clause 62 of the agreement dated 26.04.2013 (Annexure R1/1), provided for a provision for resolving of the disputes through sole arbitration of Director (Marketing) of the Indian Oil Corporation, and therefore, according to respondent No. 1, the writ petition was not maintainable. It was further mentioned in the reply in preliminary submissions and on merit also that it stood wrongly averred by the petitonner that respondent No. 1 had stopped supplying the petroleum products to retail outlet at Dharampur and the petitioner had indeed obtained interim stay by suppressing real facts and had invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court despite the fact that the dispute inter se the petitioner and respondent No. 2 had to be resolved through arbitration in terms of partnership deed and in fact an application filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act by Veena Gupta against Mohinder Nath Sofat in this High Court which was pending adjudication. It was further mentioned in the reply that filling station in issue was one of the most popular and convenient filling station for all users and that the stopping of upliftment of supplies w.e.f. 08.07.2014, the general public was being harassed and the petitioner having obtained directions from this Court , respondent No. 1 is supplying the petroleum products to it. 4. 4. Respondent No. 2 took the defence that the writ petition was not maintainable inter alia on the ground that highly disputed questions of fact were involved in the writ petition and further that the writ petition was otherwise not maintainable as the disputes were intra private parties and were in fact now subject matter of arbitration pursuant to order dated 31.10.2014, passed in Arbitration Case No. 59 of 2014, titled as Veena Gupta vs. Mohinder Nath & another. Said respondent also took the preliminary objection that declaratory relief sought by the petitioner to the effect that the partnership deed executed between the petitioner and respondent No. 2 be held as non-existent and the petitioner be treated as sole proprietor of petrol retail outlet, was beyond the scope of jurisdiction of this Court in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. As per said respondent, a deed of partnership was entered into between the petitioner and respondent No. 2 on 25.04.2013. Before this partnership deed was entered into, the petitioner and respondent No. 2 submitted an indemnity bond to respondent No. 1. In terms of the indemnity bond Annexure R-2/B, the petitioner confirmed the change in the constitution of erstwhile sole proprietorship and the petitioner in the indemnity bond had agreed to enter into a fresh dealership agreement with respondent No. 1 on behalf of new partnership created by the petitioner and respondent No. 2. This led to creation of partnership on 26.04.2013 which partnership entered into a dealership agreement with respondent No. 1-Corporation for running the Petrol Pump in question of 26.04.2013. As per respondent No. 2, creation of partnership on 25.04.2013 and thereafter the partnership entering into a dealership agreement with respondent No. 1 on 26.04.2013 qua the Petrol Pump in question clearly belied the stand of the petitioner that the partnership in question had not come into a workable existence and the same was kept in abeyance. It was further the stand of respondent No. 2 that the bank account through which the business was to be transacted after 26.04.2013 was to be in the name of partnership firm. It was further the stand of respondent No. 2 that the bank account through which the business was to be transacted after 26.04.2013 was to be in the name of partnership firm. According to respondent No. 2, as requisite changes in terms of the indemnity bond as also partnership deed were not being done by the petitioner, therefore, respondent No. 2 was constrained to take criminal action against the petitioner and the communication appended with reply Annexure R-2/H were sent to the Corporation/ respondent No. 1, informing it about misdeeds of the petitioner as also the officials of the Corporation. Primarily on the basis of these averments, the maintainability of the petition has been assailed. 5. Accordingly, the judgment being pronounced today by this Court is on the maintainability of the present writ petition. 6. During the course of arguments, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 have relied upon the following judgments:- By the petitioner:- (i) ABL International Ltd. And Another vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Others, (2004) 3 Supreme Court Cases, 553; (ii) Rapid MetroRail Gurgaon Limited etc. vs. Haryana Mass Rapid Transport Corporation Limited & Ors. Civil Appeals Nos. 925-926 of 2021, decided on 26.03.2021; (iii) Unitech Limited & Ors. vs. Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure (TSIIC) & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 317 of 2021, decided on 17.02.2021. By respondent No. 2:- (i) National Highways Authority of India vs. Ganga Enterprises and Another,(2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 410; (ii) (2004) 9 Supreme Court Cases 786, National Textile Corpn. Ltd. and Others vs. Haribox Swalram and Others; (iii) (2006) 10 Supreme Court Cases, Noble Resources Ltd. vs. State of Orissa and Another; (iv) K.K. Saksena vs. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage and Others, (2015) 4 Supreme Court Cases 670; 7. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in ABL International Ltd. And Another vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Others, (2004) 3 Supreme Court Cases, 553, has been pleased to hold that while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that merely because some disputed questions of fact arise for consideration, the same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. 8. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Rapid MetroRail Gurgaon Limited etc. vs. Haryana Mass Rapid Transport Corporation Limited & Others, Civil Appeals Nos. 925-926 of 2021, decided on 26.03.2021has been pleased to hold in para-49 thereof as under:- “49.Clause (ii) of the order dated 20 September 2019 makes it abundantly clear that the basic purpose underlying the entrustment of the reference to the CAG was the determination of the debt due “as defined under the Concession Contract”. The High Court, it must be emphasized, was seized of a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, and its writ jurisdiction had been invoked to challenge the notices of termination issued by RMGL and RMGSL, and for ensuring that the consequence which would emanate on the expiry of the notice period of 90 days by the cessation of the metro operations could be prevented by the judicial intervention in the course of the public law jurisdiction. The issuance of a notice of termination, the consequences which would ensue, and the resolution of disputes is specifically provided in the arbitration agreement between the parties, which is an intrinsic part of the Concession Agreements. Hence, there was an evident interface between this element of public interest on the one hand and the contractual rights of the parties to the Concession Agreements on the other. However, when HMRTC and HSVP moved the High Court under Article 226, they did so in view of the impending threat which was looming large on the horizon of the rapid metro operations being brought to a standstill as a result of the proximate expiry of the notice of 90 days preceding termination. In Sanjana M. Wig vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited 6, a two judge Bench of this Court, speaking through Justice S B Sinha, has observed: “12. The principal question which arises for consideration is as to whether a discretionary jurisdiction would be refused to be exercised solely on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy which is more efficacious… 13. The principal question which arises for consideration is as to whether a discretionary jurisdiction would be refused to be exercised solely on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy which is more efficacious… 13. However, access to justice by way of public law remedy would not be denied when a lis involves public (2005) 8 SCC 242 law character and when the forum chosen by the parties would not be in a position to grant appropriate relief. […] 18. It may be true that in a given case when an action of the party is dehors the terms and conditions contained in an agreement as also beyond the scope and ambit of the domestic forum created therefor, the writ petition may be held to be maintainable; but indisputably therefor such a case has to be made out. It may also be true, as has been held by this Court in Amritsar Gas Service [ (1991) 1 SCC 533 ] and E.Venkatakrishna [ (2000) 7 SCC 764 ] that the arbitrator may not have the requisite jurisdiction to direct restoration of distributorship having regard to the provisions contained in Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; but while entertaining a writ petition even in such a case, the court may not lose sight of the fact that if a serious disputed question of fact is involved arising out of a contract qua contract, ordinarily a writ petition would not be entertained. A writ petition, however, will be entertained when it involves a public law character or involves a question arising out of public law functions on the part of the respondent.” (emphasis supplied) In the present case, the High Court was evidently concerned over a fundamental issue of public interest, which was the hardship that would be caused to commuters who use the rapid metro as a vehicle for mass transport in Gurgaon. As such, the High Court’s exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in the present case was justified since non-interference, which would have inevitably led to the disruption of rapid metro lines for Gurgaon, would have had disastrous consequences for the general public. However, as a measure of abundant caution, we clarify that ordinarily the High Court in its jurisdiction under Article 226 would decline to entertain a dispute which is arbitrable 7. However, as a measure of abundant caution, we clarify that ordinarily the High Court in its jurisdiction under Article 226 would decline to entertain a dispute which is arbitrable 7. Moreover, remedies are available under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for seeking interim directions either under Section 9 before the Court vested with jurisdiction or under Section 17 before the Arbitral Tribunal itself.” 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Unitech Limited & Ors. vs. Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure (TSIIC) & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 317 of 2021, decided on 17.02.2021, has been pleased to hold in paras 32 and 33 thereof as under:- “32. Much of the ground which was sought to be canvassed in the course of the pleadings is now subsumed in the submissions which have been urged before this Court on behalf of the State of Telangana and TSIIC. As we have noted earlier, during the course of the hearing, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Telangana and TSIIC informed the Court that the entitlement of Unitech to seek a refund is not questioned nor is the availability of the land for carrying out the project being placed in issue. Learned Senior Counsel also did not agitate the ground that a remedy for the recovery of moneys arising out a contractual matter cannot be availed of under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, to clear the ground, it is necessary to postulate that recourse to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not excluded altogether in a contractual matter. A public law remedy is available for enforcing legal rights subject to well-settled parameters. 33. A two judge Bench of this Court in ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India [ABL International] analyzed a long line of precedent of this Court8 to conclude that writs under Article 226 are maintainable for asserting contractual rights against the state, or its instrumentalities, as defined under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution. Speaking through Justice N Santosh Hegde, the Court held: “27. …the following legal principles emerge as to the maintainability of a writ petition: (a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable. Speaking through Justice N Santosh Hegde, the Court held: “27. …the following legal principles emerge as to the maintainability of a writ petition: (a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable. (b) Merely because some disputed questions of fact arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. (c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of monetary claim is also maintainable.” This exposition has been followed by this Court, and has been adopted by three- judge Bench decisions of this Court in State of UP v. Sudhir Kumar and Popatrao Vynkatrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra. The decision in ABL International, cautions that the plenary power under Article 226 must be used with circumspection when other remedies have been provided by the contract. But as a statement of principle, the jurisdiction under Article 226 is not excluded in contractual matters. Article 23.1 of the Development Agreement in the present case mandates the parties to resolve their disputes through an arbitration. However, the presence of an arbitration clause within a contract between a state instrumentality and a private party has not acted as an absolute bar to availing remedies under Article 226. If the state instrumentality violates its constitutional mandate under Article 14 to act fairly and reasonably, relief under the plenary powers of the Article 226 of the Constitution would lie. This principle was recognized in ABL International: “28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ] .) And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction.” (emphasis supplied) Therefore, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court is entitled to enquire into whether the action of the State or its instrumentalities is arbitrary or unfair and in consequence, in violation of Article 14. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is a valuable constitutional safeguard against an arbitrary exercise of state Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 ; Ram Barai Singh & Co. v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2015) 13 SCC 592 power or a misuse of authority. In determining as to whether the jurisdiction should be exercised in a contractual dispute, the Court must, undoubtedly eschew, disputed questions of fact which would depend upon an evidentiary determination requiring a trial. But equally, it is well-settled that the jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be ousted only on the basis that the dispute pertains to the contractual arena. This is for the simple reason that the State and its instrumentalities are not exempt from the duty to act fairly merely because in their business dealings they have entered into the realm of contract. Similarly, the presence of an arbitration clause does oust the jurisdiction under Article 226 in all cases though, it still needs to be decided from case to case as to whether recourse to a public law remedy can justifiably be invoked. The jurisdiction under Article 226 was rightly invoked by the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh in this case, when the foundational representation of the contract has failed. The jurisdiction under Article 226 was rightly invoked by the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh in this case, when the foundational representation of the contract has failed. TSIIC, a state instrumentality, has not just reneged on its contractual obligation, but hoarded the refund of the principal and interest on the consideration that was paid by Unitech over a decade ago. It does not dispute the entitlement of Unitech to the refund of its principal”. 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in National Highways Authority of India vs. Ganga Enterprises and Another,(2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 410, has been pleased to hold in para 6 thereof as under:- “The Respondent then filed a Writ Petition in the High Court, for refund of the amount. On the pleadings before it, the High Court raised two questions viz. (a) whether the forfeiture of security deposit is without authority of law and without any binding contract between the parties and also contrary to Section 5 of the Contract Act and (b) whether the writ petition is maintainable in a claim arising out of a breach of contract. Question (b) should have been first answered as it would go to the root of the matter. The High Court instead considered question (a) and then chose not to answer question (b). In our view, the answer to question (b) is clear. It is settled law that disputes relating to contracts cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been so held in the cases of Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Kalathil, State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. and Bareilly ‘Development Authroity v. Ajai Pal Singh. This is settled law. The dispute in this case was regarding the terms of offer. They were thus contractual disputes in respect of which a Writ Court was not the proper forum. Mr. Dave however relied upon the cases of Verigamto Naveen v. Government of H.P. and Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India. These however are cases where the Writ Court was enforcing a statutory right or duty. These cases do not lay down that a Writ Court can interfere in a matter of contract only. Thus on the ground of maintainability the Petition should have been dismissed.” 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in National Textile Corpn. These however are cases where the Writ Court was enforcing a statutory right or duty. These cases do not lay down that a Writ Court can interfere in a matter of contract only. Thus on the ground of maintainability the Petition should have been dismissed.” 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in National Textile Corpn. Ltd. and Others vs. Haribox Swalram and Others (2004) 9 Supreme Court Cases 786 has been pleased to hold as under:- “17. We are also in agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the writ petition which was filed in December 1989 was highly belated as the claim of the writ petitioners had been categorically refuted by the letter dated 7.11.1990 by the Director Finance on behalf of National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra). The petition was therefore liable to be rejected on this ground alone. That apart, the prayer made in the writ petition is for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the appellant herein to supply the goods (cloth). It is well settled that in order that a mandamus be issued to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the Statute to enforce its performance. The present is a case of pure and simple business contract. The writ petitioners have no statutory right nor any statutory duty is cast upon the appellants whose performance may be legally enforced. No writ of mandamus can, therefore, be issued as prayed by the writ petitioners.” 12. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Noble Resources Ltd. vs. State of Orissa and Another (2006) 10 Supreme Court Cases 236 has been pleased to hold as under:- “43. Ordinarily, a specific performance of contract would not be enforced by issuing a writ of or in the nature of mandamus, particularly when keeping in view the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 damages may be an adequate remedy for breach of contract.” 13. Ordinarily, a specific performance of contract would not be enforced by issuing a writ of or in the nature of mandamus, particularly when keeping in view the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 damages may be an adequate remedy for breach of contract.” 13. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in K.K. Saksena vs. International Commissioner on Irrigation and Drainage and Others, (2015) 4 Supreme Court Cases 670, has been pleased to hold in para 43 thereof as under:- “What follows from a minute and careful reading of the aforesaid judgments of this Court is that if a person or authority is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, admittedly a writ petition under Article 226 would lie against such a person or body. However, we may add that even in such cases writ would not lie to enforce private law rights. There are catena of judgments on this aspect and it is not necessary to refer to those judgments as that is the basic principle of judicial review of an action under the administrative law. Reason is obvious. Private law is that part of a legal system which is a part of Common Law that involves relationships between individuals, such as law of contract or torts. Therefore, even if writ petition would be maintainable against an authority, which is 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution, before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the Court has to satisfy that action of such an authority, which is challenged, is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law.” 14. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and also gone through the pleadings at length. 15. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to mention that when the case was listed before the Court on 30th September, 2021, the following order was passed:- “An objection has been taken with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition by the private respondent. As agreed, the Court is hearing the contentions of learned Counsel for the parties on the issue of the maintainability of the writ petition. Mr. B.C. Negi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the private respondent has made his submissions. As prayed for, list for continuation on 01.10.2021.” 16. The reliefs prayed for by the petitioner have already been enumerated hereinabove. As agreed, the Court is hearing the contentions of learned Counsel for the parties on the issue of the maintainability of the writ petition. Mr. B.C. Negi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the private respondent has made his submissions. As prayed for, list for continuation on 01.10.2021.” 16. The reliefs prayed for by the petitioner have already been enumerated hereinabove. Respondent No. 1-Indian Oil Corporation undoubtedly is “other authority” as envisaged under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and thus amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The issue herein is as to whether the dispute, which has been raised by the petitioner, will fall in the domain of Article 226 of the Constitution of India or not? The genesis of the dispute undoubtedly is the partnership deed entered into between the petitioner and the private respondent with regard to the Petrol Pump subject matter of the writ petition. There have arisen disputes between the petitioner and respondent No. 2, as a result of the partnership deed so entered into and the disputes stand referred for adjudication by way of arbitration and the matter is pending before the learned Arbitrator. That being the case, this Court is of the considered view that it will be in the interest of justice that this Court does not comment on the issues raised either by the petitioner or the private respondent with regard to the partnership deed which was entered into between the petitioner and respondent No. 2 and fallout thereof, including the allegations of the petitioner that the partnership deed was never acted upon and counter of respondent No. 2 that partnership deed was duly acted upon. These issues undoubtedly involve disputed questions of fact, which parties need to establish by way of leading cogent evidence before the learned Arbitrator who is seized of the matter. In this background, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the direction prayed for the petitioner to treat the partnership between him and respondent No. 2 as non-existent and treat the petitioner as sole proprietor of Petrol Retail Outlet, is a totally mis-conceived relief ,which, by no stretch of imagination, can be prayed for in a writ petition. In this background, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the direction prayed for the petitioner to treat the partnership between him and respondent No. 2 as non-existent and treat the petitioner as sole proprietor of Petrol Retail Outlet, is a totally mis-conceived relief ,which, by no stretch of imagination, can be prayed for in a writ petition. This Court would go a step further and observe that filing of the writ petition with said prayer is nothing but abuse of process of law as this kind of declaration between two private entities is not to be given by a writ Court. Therefore, with regard to this relief, undoubtedly, the petition is misconceived and not maintainable. 17. Now coming to reliefs No. 1 and 2 prayed for by the petitioner. If one peruses the reply, which has been filed to the writ petition by Indian Oil Corporation, i.e. respondent No. 1, a perusal thereof clearly demonstrates that it stands mentioned therein that said respondent is supplying petrol and petroleum products to the petrol pump in issue. De hors this fact, whether or not the Petrol Pump in issue is to be continued the supply of the petrol and petroleum products is a matter intra the petitioner, respondent No. 2 and respondent No. 1-Corporation, subject to the agreements entered into between them and as the entire issue is pending before the learned Arbitrator, therefore, these two reliefs can also not be gone into by this Court in the peculiar facts of the case for the reason that in the garb of these two reliefs, the petitioner cannot be permitted to run the Petrol Pump claiming that he is the sole proprietor thereof especially in view of the fact that the status of the Petrol Pump is also subject matter of the arbitration proceedings. Therefore, on these counts also, this writ petition is held to be not maintainable. 18. In fact, in the peculiar facts of this case, which, as has been argued by learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2, involves seriously disputed questions of law, this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot venture into and adjudicate the issues which the petitioner wants this Court to do. 18. In fact, in the peculiar facts of this case, which, as has been argued by learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2, involves seriously disputed questions of law, this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot venture into and adjudicate the issues which the petitioner wants this Court to do. This is well left to either a Civil Court to do the needful where the parties can lead evidence in support of their respective contentions or the learned Arbitrator who, as mentioned hereinabove, is already seized of the entire matter. Accordingly, this writ petition is held to be not maintainable and is thus dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.