JUDGMENT : Since common and akin issues are involved and both the appeals arise against the judgment and decree passed in O.S. 51/07 dated 29.10.2011 by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Virajpet, (‘Trial Court’ for short) the same are clubbed, heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 3. The subject matter of these appeals are the properties described in ‘A’ and ‘B’ Schedule of the suit schedule properties. The plaintiffs filed O.S. No.51/2007 before the Trial Court seeking the relief of partition of the suit schedule properties declaring that the plaintiffs have 1/7th share each in the suit schedule properties; directing the defendants to deliver possession of the same to the plaintiffs; directing them to pay mesne profits from the date of the suit. 4. Plaint averments are that the plaintiffs are coparceners and members of the joint family of Late H.L.Chikke Gowda @ Chikkaiah, s/o Late Lakkaiah. Plaintiffs 1 to 3 and defendants 1 to 3 are the children of late H.L.Chikke Gowda who died intestate on 16.11.1992, leaving behind the plaintiffs and the defendants 1 to 4. Defendant No.4 is the widow of H.L.Chikke Gowda; defendant No.5 is the purchaser of item No.10 of ‘A’ schedule; defendant No.6 is purchaser of item No.11 of ‘A’ schedule who is the son of defendant No.1. It was contended that ‘A’ schedule properties except 1, 4, 7 and 11 are the properties held by late Chikke Gowda which he got from his ancestors to his share during his life time. Defendants 1 to 4 had no independent income. The income derived from ‘A’ schedule properties was the only source of their livelihood. 5. It was contended that defendant No.1 purchased item No.1 of ‘A’ schedule from out of the income of the joint family property on 7.8.1977; defendant No.2 purchased item Nos. Defendants 1 to 4 had no independent income. The income derived from ‘A’ schedule properties was the only source of their livelihood. 5. It was contended that defendant No.1 purchased item No.1 of ‘A’ schedule from out of the income of the joint family property on 7.8.1977; defendant No.2 purchased item Nos. 4 and 7 of ‘A’ schedule on 30.6.1999 and 17.4.1999 respectively from out of the income of joint family property; item No.11 of ‘A’ schedule was allotted by the local authority to defendant No.1, the value of which was paid by defendant No.1 out of the joint family income; Defendant No.5 is said to have purchased item No.10 of ‘A’ schedule property, which was the ancestral property of Late Chikkaiah, on 15.3.2007 being fully aware of the fact that the said property was the ancestral property. It is further stated that defendant No.6, who is the son of defendant No.1, purchased item no.11 of ‘A’ schedule through a registered sale deed dated 23.8.2001 from defendant No.1, knowing fully well that it was a joint family property. It was stated that the sale consideration was paid by defendant no.1 from out of the joint family income. 6. In respect of ‘B’ schedule properties, it was averred that the same were acquired by defendants 1 and 2 out of the joint family income. 7. Plaintiffs contended that they are coparceners and members of the joint family of Late H.L.Chikke Gowda and they are in deemed joint possession of the suit schedule properties having 1/7th share each over the suit schedule properties. Defendants having refused the demand made by the plaintiffs for partition and to deliver 1/7th share to each of them, plaintiffs were constrained to file the suit. 8. On service of summons, defendants 1 to 4 and 6 appeared through their respective learned counsel and filed written statement. Defendant No.5 remained absent and hence, he was placed ex parte. A common written statement was filed by defendants 1 to 4 and 6 admitting that item Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 to 10 were the ancestral properties of Late Chikkaiah, but he had no claim or right on item Nos.1, 4, 7 and 11 and they belong to defendants 1 to 3 in their right, being their self acquisitions. It was contended that item No.11 is the self-acquired property of defendant No.6. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 to 10 were the ancestral properties of Late Chikkaiah, but he had no claim or right on item Nos.1, 4, 7 and 11 and they belong to defendants 1 to 3 in their right, being their self acquisitions. It was contended that item No.11 is the self-acquired property of defendant No.6. The plea of the plaintiffs that item nos. 1, 4, 7 and 11 were purchased out of joint family income was denied. The defence set up was that the said properties were purchased out of their own labour, efforts and from their independent business and income earned subsequent to division of properties effected by Late Chikkaiah in the year 1981. Similarly, defendants denied that schedule ‘B’ properties were acquired by defendants 1 and 2 out of joint family income. Admitting the sale of item no.10 of ‘A’ schedule to defendant No.5, it was contended that the same was not an ancestral property and the defendants 1 to 3 had absolute rights to alienate the said property which is valid and proper in the eye of law. 9. The primary defence set up by the defendants was that the suit properties were partitioned in the year 1981 as per the Mahazar of partition dated 12.5.1981, for which plaintiff No.1 was the scribe. Thus, it was contended that the plaintiffs have never been in joint possession of the suit schedule properties and their claim of coparcenery right over the suit schedule properties is wholly misconceived. The marriages of plaintiffs 1 to 3 were performed on a grand scale and each of them had been given about 200 grams gold and over Rs.1.00 lakh cash and all other facilities by Late Chikkaiah. Further, it was contended that plaintiff No.1 has acquired a residential site during the lifetime of Chikkaiah and 50% of the sale consideration of the said property of more than Rs.50.00 lakhs was paid by Late Chikkaiah. Therefore, the plaintiffs can never be a part of the joint family as claimed and have no right or claim over any of the suit schedule properties nor can they seek the relief of partition. 10. Therefore, the plaintiffs can never be a part of the joint family as claimed and have no right or claim over any of the suit schedule properties nor can they seek the relief of partition. 10. As regards item No.1, it was contended that the said property was purchased before the family division made in 1981 and it was the self acquisition of defendant No.1 who was doing business in paddy and by-products independently from 1975 from a young age of 13 years. He even purchased a huller mill from one B.S.Rajashekar under a registered deed dated 06.09.1997 and set up a mill. It was further contended that the marriage reception of plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 was held together. Some differences arose between Chikkaiah and defendant No.1 with regard to his marriage alliance, plaintiff No.1 and her people joined hands with Chikkaiah to reject the alliance and get the marriage cancelled. Defendant No.1 as a sane person insisted to go ahead with the marriage without hurting anybody’s feeling and he was compelled by Chikkaiah and plaintiff No.1 to sign a Muchalike on 17.8.1979 as a condition for participating and conducting the marriage of defendant No.1 by Late Chikkaiah. Under such compelled circumstances, the said Muchalike was made and the signature of defendant No.1 was obtained. It was stated that defendant No.1 had made a condition that within two years, a final division of the properties shall be made by the father Chikkaiah, which was accepted by all the family members. Accordingly, as agreed, an oral division of the suit properties was made. In such division, item No.1 was given to the share of defendant No.1 for maintenance of the parents and also for the marriage of unmarried daughters. It was alleged that plaintiff No.1 with an oblique motive, has projected only the Muchalike of 1979 suppressing the memo of partition dated 12.5.1981. 11. As regards item Nos. 4, 7 and 11, it was contended that they are the self-acquired properties of the defendants. Item No.7 was not allotted by any local authority as alleged and the said item was purchased by the second defendant from his income. The purchase of item no.11 by defendant no.6 cannot be questioned by the plaintiffs as they have no claim or right over it. Item No.7 was not allotted by any local authority as alleged and the said item was purchased by the second defendant from his income. The purchase of item no.11 by defendant no.6 cannot be questioned by the plaintiffs as they have no claim or right over it. It was contended that on the basis of the family division in the year 1981, defendant Nos.1 to 4 have made huge investments and raised loans to develop their shares over a period of 26 years which was very much within the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The suit was bad for non-inclusion of the alleged acquisitions including the site property at Bengaluru for seeking a partition by the plaintiffs. Thus, on these grounds, the defendants contended that a false suit has been filed by the plaintiffs to harass them and accordingly prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 12. Based on the pleadings, issues were framed by the Trial Court and subsequently two additional issues have been framed. They are extracted hereunder:: ISSUES 1. Whether plaintiffs prove that, suit ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties are the joint family properties of them and defendants 1 to 4 and they have been deemed to be in joint possession of the same? 2. Whether plaintiffs prove that, they have got 1/7th share in the suit schedule properties? 3. Whether defendants 1 to 4 prove that, suit schedule item No.1, 4, 7 and 11 properties are the self acquired properties of defendant No.1 to 3? 4. Whether defendants further prove that, suit schedule item No.11 is the self-acquired property of defendant No.6? 5. Whether defendants prove that, all the properties of Late Chikkegowda were partitioned in the year 1981, later on reduced into writing under the Memorandum of partition dated 12.5.1981? 6. Whether defendants prove that, just prior to his death, Chikkegowda orally made division in the item No.10 of the suit schedule properties before the villagers in the year 1991 and gave equal shares to defendant No.1 to 3? 7. Whether defendants prove that, ,defendant No.5 is a bonafide purchaser of item No.10 of the suit schedule property for value? 8. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to reliefs sought for? 9. What decree or Order? Additional issue framed on 13.1.2008 1. Whether the Court fee paid on the plaintiff is proper and sufficient? Additional issue framed on 15.3.2010 2. 7. Whether defendants prove that, ,defendant No.5 is a bonafide purchaser of item No.10 of the suit schedule property for value? 8. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to reliefs sought for? 9. What decree or Order? Additional issue framed on 13.1.2008 1. Whether the Court fee paid on the plaintiff is proper and sufficient? Additional issue framed on 15.3.2010 2. Whether the defendants prove that the right of the plaintiff to enforce right of the partition of the suit properties is barred by law of limitation in view of the alleged division made in 1981, as the is/was within their knowledge? 13. Plaintiff No.1 has examined herself as PW-1 and one more witness. Exs. P1 to P16 were marked on behalf of the plaintiffs. Defendant No.1 was examined as DW-1; defendant no.4 (widow of Late Chikkaiah) was examined as DW-2; defendant No.3 was examined as DW-11 and other witnesses were examined as DW-3 to DW-10 and DW-12. Exs. D.1 to D.68 were marked on behalf of defendants. 14. On appreciating the oral and documentary evidence placed on record, the Trial Court answered issue Nos.1, 2, 8, and additional issue No.1 in the affirmative; issue Nos. 3 to 7 and additional issue No.2 were answered in the negative. The Trial Court decreed the suit allotting 1/7th share each to all the plaintiffs and directing them to file separate applications under Order XX Rule 1, CPC for mesne profits claimed. 15. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, defendant Nos.1 and 6 have filed RFA. No.399/2012 whereas defendant Nos.2, 3 and 4 have filed RFA. No.1745/2012. 16. Learned counsel, Sri G.Balakrishna Shastry appearing for the appellants in RFA. No.399/2012 argued that the finding of the Trial Court that the defendants have failed to prove the partition made by their father, Chikke Gowda in the year 1981 is opposed to the oral and documentary evidence on record as could be seen from the following: (i) partition of the year 1981 was evidenced by a written document, Ex.D2 styled as Memorandum of Partition scribed by PW-1. PW-1 has admitted that Ex.D2 was in her handwriting and she has written the same as per the draft brought by her father; (ii) PW-1 has admitted that the corrections found in the said exhibit were drawn by her. PW-1 has admitted that Ex.D2 was in her handwriting and she has written the same as per the draft brought by her father; (ii) PW-1 has admitted that the corrections found in the said exhibit were drawn by her. Ex.D2 was signed by the defendants; (iii) Ex.D2 shows that all the movables were divided; the immovable properties such as item Nos.3 and 9 were also divided between defendant Nos.1 to 3. 17. Learned counsel submitted that the Trial Court grossly erred in disbelieving Ex.D2 on the ground that PW-1 has affixed the date as 14.5.1981, whereas defendant No.1 has affixed date as 12.5.1981. Learned counsel submitted that said document would demonstrate that in the year 1981, Late Chikkaiah had effected a partition between the three sons and the defence taken in the written statement in this regard stands established. Plaintiffs had not even whispered about Ex.D2 in their plaint. The Trial Court committed a palpable error in holding that Ex.D2 cannot be looked into, as the same was not registered. He further argued that indeed, Ex.D2 does not speak about the partition made under the said document. On the other hand, it records particulars of division made already between the three sons earlier to the date of recording the same. He contended that defendant No.1 has examined independent witnesses to prove that he was carrying on a business in paddy and documentary evidence was placed to substantiate the same. 18. Learned counsel further argued that Ex.P15 would establish that item No.10 was alienated by defendant Nos. 1 to 3 in favour of defendant No.5 and the said property was owned by defendant Nos.1 to 3 absolutely and the plaintiffs had no rights whatsoever. This item No.10 was equally divided between defendant Nos.1 to 3. Item No.11 was the self-acquired property of defendant No.6. He submitted that dehors the oral and documentary evidence placed on record to establish these aspects, the Trial Court failed to appreciate the same and proceeded to allot 1/7th share each to the plaintiffs. In the alternative, learned counsel submitted that by notional partition, plaintiffs would be entitled to 1/28th share each in the suit schedule properties as the father Chikke Gowda died prior to 09.09.2005. 19. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants in RFA. No.1745/2012 has adopted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants in RFA. No.399/2012. 20. In the alternative, learned counsel submitted that by notional partition, plaintiffs would be entitled to 1/28th share each in the suit schedule properties as the father Chikke Gowda died prior to 09.09.2005. 19. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants in RFA. No.1745/2012 has adopted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants in RFA. No.399/2012. 20. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Others ( AIR 2020 SC 3717 ), submitted that a plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as a statutorily recognized mode of partition. In the absence of registration of Ex.D2 and the oral partition recorded thereunder, no credential value could be given to the said document and the defence set up by the defendants. In view of the amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which confers the status of coparcener on the daughter, the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/7th share each in the suit schedule properties. The Trial Court having meticulously examined the oral and documentary evidence, has arrived at a finding that item Nos.1, 4, 7 and 11 of ‘A’ schedule properties and ‘B’ schedule properties were purchased by the defendants 1 to 3 out of the income from joint family property and the defendants have failed to prove that it was their self-acquisition. Thus, he sought for dismissal of the appeal. 21. We have considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 22. The points that arise for our consideration are: 1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for partition of the suit schedule properties? 2) Whether the defendants prove that the item Nos.1, 4, 7 and 11 of ‘A’ schedule properties and ‘B’ schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of defendants 1 to 3? 3) Whether the Trial Court was justified in decreeing the suit for partition and granting 1/7th share each in the suit schedule properties to the plaintiffs? 4) Whether the judgment and decree impugned is justifiable? Re: Point Nos.(1) and (2): 23. Point nos.(1) and (2) are inter-linked and hence, they are considered together. There is no dispute regarding the relationship between the parties and that item Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 to 10 are the ancestral properties of Late Chikkaiah. 4) Whether the judgment and decree impugned is justifiable? Re: Point Nos.(1) and (2): 23. Point nos.(1) and (2) are inter-linked and hence, they are considered together. There is no dispute regarding the relationship between the parties and that item Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 to 10 are the ancestral properties of Late Chikkaiah. It is also not in dispute that Chikkaiah died intestate on 16.11.1992. The main defence set up by the defendants on Ex.D2 has been turned down by the Trial Court on two counts namely, (i) prior oral partition effected was recorded on 12.5.1981 was not proved; and (ii) that the said document was not registered as per Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. 24. In the cross-examination of PW-1, she has stated that her father had brought the draft of the document-Ex.D2 and requested her to write and accordingly, she has drawn the said document. She has admitted that her name is found in the said document, but denied her signature. She has denied that the defendants 1 to 3 had subscribed their signature in her presence at the same time. She has denied the signature of ‘M.K.Poovaiah-witness’. Though she had admitted her handwriting on the document dated 18.07.1997 (Ex.D3), but denied the corrections made by her in the said document. Objections were raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs to mark the document dated 14.05.1981, and accordingly, Ex.D2 was marked subject to objections. PW-1 has admitted that the corrections carried out in the said document were in her own handwriting. 25. The Trial Court has critically analyzed Ex.D2 and observed that no details of the oral partition were mentioned in the said document which was said to have been effected prior to 1981. It has been recorded that as per the testimony of DW-2, there was no oral partition prior to drawing Ex.D2 and after drawing Ex.D2, the witnesses were called to their house and their signatures were obtained on the said document. Hence, it has been held that Ex.D2 is not a partition mahazar for recording of the partition effected earlier. If it has to be considered as a partition deed, the same not being registered, has no value in the eye of law. 26. In Ex.D2, defendant No.1 has subscribed his signature mentioning the date as 12.05.1981, whereas plaintiff no.1 has subscribed the date as 14.05.1981. If it has to be considered as a partition deed, the same not being registered, has no value in the eye of law. 26. In Ex.D2, defendant No.1 has subscribed his signature mentioning the date as 12.05.1981, whereas plaintiff no.1 has subscribed the date as 14.05.1981. We have perused the original records. Ex.D2 runs into 3 pages, the first page is on a stamp paper of the value of Rs.2/-, on the back side of the said page, number 384, K.G.Puttaraju, K.K….. (date is not visible), month and year as 10 (October) 1979 with the seal of K.K.Uttaiah and S.V. Pornampet is found. First two pages do not contain any signature. Signatures are found in the last page. The contents of the said document, is that, in the presence of the Panchayatdars, defendants 1 to 3 had divided their family properties earlier and the details of the same have been recorded. The word ‘earlier’ OTHER LANGUAGE has been inserted by way of correction but does not bear any signature. Further, it has been stated in Ex.D2 that the defendants 1 to 3 have no rights to alienate the ancestral properties; to gift the properties; to hand over the land to the Government. If they intend to go out of the family, they have to release their rights without expecting any value/consideration. In the third page of Ex.D2 (over second page), it is written as under : OTHER LANGUAGE which translates to ‘signature of the consenting parties’ as the Heading. The same appears to be inserted subsequently as the same is in a different handwriting and ink which can be seen from the naked eye and the same is written as the Heading disturbing the continuation of the matter running from the previous page. The signatures found in the said document are marked as Exs.D2 (a) to (d). On re-appreciation of the evidence, in our considered view, this document cannot be considered as Mahazar drawn recording the earlier oral partition. 27. Amended Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads thus: “6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. The signatures found in the said document are marked as Exs.D2 (a) to (d). On re-appreciation of the evidence, in our considered view, this document cannot be considered as Mahazar drawn recording the earlier oral partition. 27. Amended Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads thus: “6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. — (1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall,— (a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son; (b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son; (c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son, and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force in, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition. (3). x x x x x x (4). x x x x x x (5) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before the 20th day of December, 2004. Explanation. —For the purposes of this section “partition” means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition effected by a decree of a court.” Section 6 of the Act was amended with effect from 09.09.2005. Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 makes it clear that no invalidation shall be made to any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which have taken place before 20.12.2004. Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 makes it clear that no invalidation shall be made to any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which have taken place before 20.12.2004. Sub-Section (5) and the Explanation thereto would make it clear that for the purposes of this Section, “partition” means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 or partition effected by a decree of a Court. The defendants have made unsuccessful attempts to take shelter under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act, by relying upon Ex.D2, but failed to prove it as Mahazar, drawing the oral partition effected earlier to 12.5.1981. Moreover, as aforesaid, Ex.D2 is not signed by the parties at each page. All the parties of the joint family have not joined in executing Ex.D2. Inconsistency is apparent inasmuch as the dates found in the document. D1’s signature bears the date 12.05.1981 whereas, “14.05.1981” is found below the alleged signature of plaintiff No.1. Even on this reason, it cannot be construed as a valid document. 28. The correction shown in the third page (last page) shows the correction of Rs.438/-alone. Except suit property Survey Nos.24/9 and 109, no other properties of ‘A’ schedule are mentioned. This certainly creates a doubt about the oral partition effected and the same drawn as mahazar in Ex.D2. There being no whisper about the other properties, Ex.D2 cannot be construed as the partition mahazar of the entire properties of Late Chikke Gowda. 29. Ex.P11 is the document (Muchalike Patra) executed by defendant No.1 on 11.3.1979. This document would indicate that no division of the ancestral properties was effected in the family of Late Chikke Gowda @ Chikkaiah and all the three sons along with Chikke Gowda were enjoying the joint family properties and defendant No.1 has declared that he has set up a rice mill and flour mills after purchasing the property (item No.1 of ‘A’ schedule) in his name from the income of the joint family property; he has purchased one motor cycle which has been purchased from the income of the joint family property; in the said properties, Chikke Gowda, Krishna and Ekanthraj are having equal rights along with defendant No.1. Defendant No.1 has admitted the execution of Ex.P11. Defendant No.1 has admitted the execution of Ex.P11. However, the defence set up by defendant No.1 was that in his marriage alliance, objection was raised by Chikkaiah which was supported by plaintiff No.1, in order to sort out the differences and to proceed with the marriage, he was forced to sign a Muchalike (Ex.P11) as a condition for participating and conducting his marriage by his father. DW-1 in his evidence has categorically admitted the execution of Muchalike-Ex.P11. In the cross-examination, he has deposed that pursuant to the Ex.P11, he had filed an application for separate Jamabandi to the Revenue Department and such documents are with him. But no such documents were produced. The defence that Ex.P11 was executed by defendant no.1 due to the compelling circumstances but not voluntarily, is not proved. However, the same was not cancelled albeit alleged partition effected pursuant to the said document. He admits in his cross-examination that the partition effected in the year 1981 as per Ex.D2 was between his father, sisters, brothers and himself. The property shown in Ex.P11 is allotted to his share in Ex.D2, neither any property was allotted to the daughters nor any amount was agreed to be paid to them in Ex.D2. Thus, the oral and documentary evidence regarding Ex.P11 would prove that there was no prior partition before executing Ex.D2. The defence of compelling circumstances taken by defendant no.1 is not satisfactorily proved. 30. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vineeta Sharma (supra) has observed that the right to claim partition is a significant right and a coparcener is one who can claim partition. A daughter had no right in coparcenery property prior to 09.09.2005 which is a vital change brought about by the statute. A coparcener enjoys a right to seek severance of status. Under Section 6 (1) and (2) of the Act, the rights of a daughter are pari paso with that of the son. Hence, in view of the aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to claim partition in the coparcenery property, though they are married daughters. 31. The controversy now rests upon, with respect to item Nos. 1, 4, 7 and 11 of ‘A’ schedule. Item no.1 was purchased by defendant no.1 through a registered sale deed 07.08.1977 (Ex.P12). 31. The controversy now rests upon, with respect to item Nos. 1, 4, 7 and 11 of ‘A’ schedule. Item no.1 was purchased by defendant no.1 through a registered sale deed 07.08.1977 (Ex.P12). Item No.4 had been purchased by defendant no.1 through a registered sale deed dated 30.06.1999 (Ex.P13), item no.7 was purchased by defendant no.2 through a registered sale deed dated 17.04.1999 (Ex.P14). As regards item no.10, it has been deposed by DW-1 that his father had orally made a partition before villagers in the year 1991 allotting equal share to defendant nos.1 to 3 prior to his death. Item no. 11 is a residential site transferred from defendant no.1 to defendant no.6 (son of defendant no.1) through the registered sale deed dated 20/23.08.2001. 32. Defendant No.1 has placed reliance on Ex.D7-business licence, Ex.D8-registration Certificate under Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (‘KST Act’ for short), Ex. D9-certificate issued under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, Ex. D10-professional tax document and Ex.D12-licence granted by Gram Panchayat to prove that he was carrying on paddy business. DW-7, Sri B.S.Sheenappa has stated that defendant No.1 was a trader in paddy business since 1975 and he was trading with him. Another witness, DW-3, Commercial Tax Officer, was examined to substantiate the plea taken that he was a registered dealer under the provisions of the KST Act and was engaged in paddy business. 33. DW-2, Smt.Gowramma, widow of Late Chikkaiah was examined, but her testimony could not support the case of the defendants since she has feigned ignorance about the crucial points. The relevant portion of her evidence is extracted hereunder: OTHER LANGUAGE She has categorically admitted that there was no oral partition prior to Ex.D2. The oral evidence of DW-3 and DW-7 would not prove the source of income earned by the defendant No.1 for purchasing item No.1 when it goes against his own statements made in Ex.P11. Similarly, the documentary evidence from Exs.D1 to D68 would not demonstrate the self-acquisition of the properties at item nos.1, 4, 7, 11 of ‘A’ schedule and the ‘B’ schedule properties as pleaded by the defendants. No independent source of income of defendant no.2 is proved to consider item no.7 as his self-acquisition. Ex.P11 would clearly indicate that defendant no.1 had no independent income and he has acquired item nos. No independent source of income of defendant no.2 is proved to consider item no.7 as his self-acquisition. Ex.P11 would clearly indicate that defendant no.1 had no independent income and he has acquired item nos. 1 and 4 of ‘A’ schedule and the ‘B’ schedule properties utilizing the joint family income and the same stand established in the evidence of DW-1 and DW-2. 34. This Court is of the opinion that the clinching evidence on record virtually supports the case of the plaintiffs. As per Ex.P15 dated 15.03.2007, defendant nos.1 to 3 have alienated the property to defendant no.5 wherein, it is clearly stated that the said property measuring 1 acre 29 guntas in Survey No.103/1 of Ravanduru Hobli, Dorekere Village, was their ancestral property and it stands in the joint names of defendant nos.1 to 3 in the revenue records. The same is reflected in the RTC extract-Ex.P10. It is evident that this property was not included in Ex.D2. The defence set up was that this property was got partitioned orally in the year 1991 and the said property was allotted equally to defendant nos.1 to 3. Again this defence runs counter to Ex.D2-memorandum of partition of the year 1981. Oral partition in the year 1991 pleaded by the defendants inspires no confidence to believe either Ex.D2 or the oral partition in the year 1991 relating to item no.10 of A’ schedule. Moreover, defendant no.5 has not appeared before the Court to prove that he was a bona fide purchaser. 35. Though it was stoutly contended by the defendants that item no.11 was standing in the name of defendant no.6 and the plaintiffs have no right over the said property, no iota of evidence has been placed by defendants to prove the earnings of defendant no.6 during 2001, i.e. about his employment and income. On preponderance of probabilities, we find no hesitation to hold that defendant no.1 has purchased the said item no.11 of ‘A’ schedule property in the name of defendant no.6. 36. Ex.P11 clearly establishes that ‘B’ schedule properties were purchased from the joint family property as admitted by DW-1 in the said document. The defence of compelling circumstances does not inspire any confidence in the absence of cancellation of the said documents. The evidentiary value of that document cannot be turned down in the absence of contradictory evidence. 36. Ex.P11 clearly establishes that ‘B’ schedule properties were purchased from the joint family property as admitted by DW-1 in the said document. The defence of compelling circumstances does not inspire any confidence in the absence of cancellation of the said documents. The evidentiary value of that document cannot be turned down in the absence of contradictory evidence. There is no clinching evidence to prove the self-acquisition of the property as claimed by the contesting defendants. 37. As aforesaid, Ex.D2 not being proved to be a mahazar of recording the earlier partition, cannot be accepted as a memorandum of partition for want of registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 as rightly held by the Trial Court. Re: point No.(3) 38. The Trial Court has granted 1/7th share each to the plaintiffs considering the relevant provisions of law which were holding the field at the time of passing of the judgment. Now, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vineeta Sharma (supra), the law is well settled. The Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 129 of the said judgment, summarizing the legal principles, has held thus: “129. Resultantly, we answer the reference as under: (i) The provisions contained in substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confer status of coparcener on the daughter born before or after amendment in the same manner as son with same rights and liabilities. (ii) The rights can be claimed by the daughter born earlier with effect from 9.9.2005 with savings as provided in Section 6(1) as to the disposition or alienation, partition or testamentary disposition which had taken place before 20th day of December, 2004. (iii) Since the right in coparcenary is by birth, it is not necessary that father coparcener should be living as on 9.9.2005. (iv) The statutory fiction of partition created by proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as originally enacted did not bring about the actual partition or disruption of coparcenary. The fiction was only for the purpose of ascertaining share of deceased coparcener when he was survived by a female heir, of Class-I as specified in the Schedule to the Act of 1956 or male relative of such female. The provisions of the substituted Section 6 are required to be given full effect. The fiction was only for the purpose of ascertaining share of deceased coparcener when he was survived by a female heir, of Class-I as specified in the Schedule to the Act of 1956 or male relative of such female. The provisions of the substituted Section 6 are required to be given full effect. Notwithstanding that a preliminary decree has been passed the daughters are to be given share in coparcenary equal to that of a son in pending proceedings for final decree or in an appeal. (v) In view of the rigor of provisions of Explanation to Section 6(5) of the Act of 1956, a plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as the statutory recognised mode of partition effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 or effected by a decree of a court. However, in exceptional cases where plea of oral partition is supported by public documents and partition is finally evinced in the same manner as if it had been affected by a decree of a court, it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral evidence alone cannot be accepted and to be rejected outrightly.” 39. In the light of the settled legal principles as aforesaid, the provisions of the substituted Section 6 of the Act are required to be given full effect. The case on hand does not come within the exceptional cases where plea of oral partition is supported by document and partition is finally evinced in the same manner as if it had been effected by a decree of a Court. A plea of partition not substantiated by further evidence as enumerated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vineeta Sharma (supra), requires to be rejected outrightly. 40. On re-appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, we find no perversity or illegality in the judgment and decree impugned. 41. In the result, both the appeals stand dismissed.