ORDER : Satyen Vaidya, J. By way of instant petition, petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs :- “b. Quash the decision of rejection of the technical bid of the petitioner qua the tender in question (Annexure P-2) and direct the respondents to consider the financial bid of the petitioner along with others.” 2. Respondent No. 1 invited online bids through invitation for bids (IFB) dated 12.8.2021 on items rates through electronic tendering system in two cover systems for work “construction of regulated market Sub Yard at Kunihar with estimated costs of Rs.1,94,24,095/-. 3. Petitioner submitted his bid in accordance with IFB, but was declared technically non-responsive on opening of technical bids on 06.09.2021 for the reason that he did not submit the work done certificate in accordance with the requirements of condition number 6.10 of schedule “F” to the tender documents. Petitioner has assailed his rejection primarily on the ground that respondent No.1 have interpreted Clause No. 6.10 of schedule “F” to the tender document in most irrational and arbitrary manner, thereby causing serious prejudice to the rights of the petitioner. As per petitioner, he has been ousted from the tender process for violation of such condition which never was part of the tender document. He had duly complied with all the terms and conditions of the tender documents, still his bid was declared technically non-responsive. 4. In response, respondents No. 1 and 2 have categorically submitted that petitioner did not fulfill the work done condition as stipulated in schedule: “F”, clause No. 6.10. The work done certificates submitted by petitioner with his bid were not compliant with requirements of aforesaid clause. According to respondents, the purport and meaning of Clause 6.10 of schedule “F” was that the work should have been commenced and completed within five years, preceding the date of tender. It has been contended that the petitioner could submit only one certificate of work completed within prescribed five years period, but such work had commencement date as 07.12.2015 i.e., prior to the stipulated period of five years. Rest of the certificates submitted by petitioner were found to be pertaining to works, though commenced within stipulated period of five years, but not completed till the submission of bid. 5. Rest of the certificates submitted by petitioner were found to be pertaining to works, though commenced within stipulated period of five years, but not completed till the submission of bid. 5. The official respondents have further submitted that out of total seven number of bids received in response to IFB, four were found technically responsive, hence only technically responsive bids were subjected to financial evaluation. The bid of Respondent No.3 Shri Sunil Kumar was found lowest with quoted price of Rs. 1,71,74,164.91/-. Further process of awarding the work to “L-1” is stated to be withheld on account of pendency of this petition. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record of the case. 7. Clause 6.10 of schedule “F” of the tender document reads as under :- “Similar nature work done certificate of last five years with commencement and completion date (without liquidated damage or compensation). Work in progress will not be entertained. One work not less than 40% (Forty percent) of the estimated costs.” 8. The entire controversy in the instant case revolves around the interpretation of above noticed Clause 6.10. According to the petitioner, there was no requirement, as per said Clause, to furnish a certificate of work done which necessarily should have commenced and ended within a period of five years immediately preceding the date of IFB, on the other, the official respondents have interpreted the said Clause to mean that the work done, as per said Clause, should have been commenced and completed within stipulated period of five years. 9. The tender jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts, in the matters of “Public Contracts”, by now is well settled and restricted only to oversee and protect from arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fide. These principles have been evolved by Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time by exposition of law. In the conspectus of the aforesaid principles, it was observed in Michigan Rubber v. State of Karnataka (2012) 8 SCC 216 , as under: “23. From the above decisions, the following principles emerge : (a) the basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. These actions are amenable to the judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. These actions are amenable to the judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. If the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into consideration the national priorities; (b) fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the purview of the executive and courts hardly have any role to play in this process except for striking down such action of the executive as is proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the Government acts in conformity with certain healthy standards and norms such as awarding of contracts by inviting tenders, in those circumstances, the interference by Courts is very limited; (c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document and awarding a contract, greater latitude is required to be conceded to the State authorities unless the action of tendering authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of its statutory powers, interference by Courts is not warranted; (d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders have to be laid down to ensure that the contractor has the capacity and the resources to successfully execute the work; and (e) If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding contract, here again, interference by Court is very restrictive since no person can claim fundamental right to carry on business with the Government.” 10. Keeping in mind the restricted jurisdiction of this court in Government tenders, we proceed to examine the issues raised in the instant petition. 11. We are also not oblivious to the settled legal position that while interpreting the tender documents precedence has to be given to the interpretation of the employer who is the author of the documents, the only caveat being that such interpretation should not be perverse or malafide. Reference in this respect can be made to: - A. Afcons Infrastructure Limited vs. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Limited and another, (2016) 16 SCC 818 , in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “15. We may add that the owner or the employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. We may add that the owner or the employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. The constitutional Courts must defer to this understanding and appreciation of the tender documents, unless there is mala fide or perversity in the understanding or appreciation or in the application of the terms of the tender conditions. It is possible that the owner or employer of a project may give an interpretation to the tender documents that is not acceptable to the constitutional Courts but that by itself is not a reason for interfering with the interpretation given.” B. In Bharat Cooking Coal Limited and others vs. Amar Dev Prabha and others, (2020) 16 SCC 759 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “28. The scope of judicial review in tenders has been explored in-depth in a catena of cases. It is settled that constitutional courts are concerned only with lawfulness of a decision, and not its soundness. Phrased differently, Courts ought not to sit in appeal over decisions of executive authorities or instrumentalities. Plausible decisions need not be overturned, and latitude ought to be granted to the State in exercise of executive power so that the constitutional separation of powers is not encroached upon. However, allegations of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety would be enough grounds for courts to assume jurisdiction and remedy such ills. This is especially true given our unique domestic circumstances, which have demonstrated the need for judicial intervention numerous times. Hence, it would only be the decisionmaking process which would be the subject of judicial enquiry, and not the end result (save as may be necessary to guide determination of the former). 52. The High Court ought to have deferred to this understanding, unless it was patently perverse or mala fide. Given how BCCL’s interpretation of these clauses was plausible and not absurd, solely differences in opinion of contractual interpretation ought not to have been grounds for the High Court to come to a finding that the appellant committed illegality.” 12. Clause 6.10, as noticed above of schedule “F” of the tender document prescribes submission of a work done certificate which should be of similar nature to the work proposed under the tender. Clause 6.10, as noticed above of schedule “F” of the tender document prescribes submission of a work done certificate which should be of similar nature to the work proposed under the tender. The use of expression “work done” in the aforesaid clause implies that certificate should be for completed work as the expression “done” would not normally be used for a work under progress. This interpretation further gets corroboration from the sentence used in clause 6.10, “work in progress will not be entertained.” 13. Further requirement of the said Clause 6.10 is that the certificate should be providing the dates of commencement and completion of the work and such work should not be less than 40% of the estimated costs of tendered document. The plain reading of above noted clause thus nowhere implies and connotes that the work done also should have necessarily commenced within five years preceding the IFB. Thus, the interpretation provided by the official respondents and thereby declaring the technical bid of petitioner as non-responsive cannot be sustained being unreasonable and hence arbitrary. 14. In order to earn right of precedence, it is incumbent upon the employer or author to show that terms of documents sought to be interpreted are sufficiently unambiguous. Incorporation of confusing or ambiguous terms in a tender document can leave the potential handle in the hands of employer to maneuver the things according to its whims. While interpreting a particular Clause of the tender document, the intent and purpose of such Clause is to be seen in the context and backdrop of entire document. Clause 26.5 of the general Rules of the directions contained in the tender document reads as under :- “26.5 WORK DONE CERTIFICATE & WORK IN HAND CERTIFICATE: (only if required in tender document) THE WORK DONE & WORK IN HAND MAY BE FILLED UP IN THE REQUIRED PERFORMA SHOWN IN GENERAL RULES NO. 19. MINIMUM AMOUNT OF WORK DONE SHOWN SCHEDULE ‘F’ AND THESE ALONGWITH THE WORK DONE CERTIFICATE OF COMPETENT AUTHORITY MAY BE UPLOADED AS pdf DOCUMENT.” Thus, plain reading of Clause 26.5 does not make it mandatory that the work done certificate as per Clause 6.10 of schedule “F” should be necessarily for work which had been both commenced and completed within five years preceding the date of tender. 15. 15. In these circumstances, in our view, the interpretation coined by the official respondents is arbitrary as it does not have any nexus with the purpose sought to be achieved. At the most, the requirement of, above noticed, clause 6.10 is to assess the capability and capacity as also the experience of the bidder and the absence of work not commenced but completed within five years preceding date of tender cannot be said to be prejudicial either to the work or public interest. 16. In the light of the above discussion, the petition is allowed. Rejection of the bid of the petitioner by declaring it technically non-responsive is held to be bad in law and the same is quashed and set aside. Respondents No. 1 and 2 are directed to re-assess the financial bids of all the technically qualified bidders including the petitioner. 17. The writ petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending application(s), if any.