JUDGMENT : Sangeeta Chandra, J. 1. Heard Sri Ghufran Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Sudeep Seth, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Pankaj Kumar Verma, learned counsel appearing for landlord. 2. This writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 20.10.2020 passed by opposite party no. 1/ Additional District Judge, Court no. 2, Barabanki in Small Causes Revision No. 1 of 2019. 3. It is the case of the petitioners that the petitioners were the initially tenant of one shop situated at Malgodam Road, Haidergarh, District Barabanki of Sri Baldev Prasad Khare. Thereafter wife of petitioner no. 1 bought the shop in question from the grandson of Beldav Prasad Khare, the original landlord. The mother of respondent nos. 2 and 3 filed a suit for eviction before the Civil Judge (J.D.), Court No. 13, Barabanki on the ground that she is the owner of the disputed shop without disclosing the source of title and also mentioning the wrong boundaries of the tenanted premises.Petitioners appeared and filed the written statement denying the ownership of plaintiff and saying that they are not the tenants of the shop but had bought the property for Rs.50,000/- from Sri Arind Khare, the legal heir of the earlier owner and landlord. The opposite party no. 2 admitted the existence of saledeed dated 16.01.2013 executed by Arivind Khare, grandson of Sri Baldev Prasad Khare in favour of the wife of petitioner no. 1 when they filed the Suit for cancellation of sale-deed before learned Civil Judge (S.D.) Court no. 20, Barabanki. The Said suit is pending for disposal where the petitioner had filed written statement and order of maintenance of status quo has been passed therein on 08.03.2017. 4. It is the case of the petitioners, as argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioner no. 1 was doing parivi of SCC case and he became ill and was unable to contact his lawyer and the SCC Suit proceeded ex parte on 25.09.2017 and was ultimately decreed on 18.12.2017. 5. It has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that respondent nos.2 and 3 was duty bound to reveal before the Small Causes Court about the proceedings of Regular Suit no. 27 of 2015 and interim order granted therein on 08.03.2017 passed for maintenance of status quo. 5. It has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that respondent nos.2 and 3 was duty bound to reveal before the Small Causes Court about the proceedings of Regular Suit no. 27 of 2015 and interim order granted therein on 08.03.2017 passed for maintenance of status quo. However, they concealed the interim order from the learned trial court as a result whereof the SCC suit was decreed in their favor. 6. It has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that SCC suit was not maintainable as the Court of Small Causes has no power to decide the intricate question of title and ownership and once the title and ownership was denied and tenancy was also specifically denied then SCC Court had no jurisdiction to decide the case. Also an interim order had been passed in Regular Suit No. 27 of 2015 and the suit for cancellation of sale-deed of was pending before civil court. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance Section 23 of the provisions of Small Causes Court Act (herein after referred to as ‘Act’). To substantiate his arguments, it has been submitted that respondent nos. 2 has initiated criminal proceedings by filing an F.I.R. under Sections 406,419,420, 452,504, 506 I.P.C. Police Station Kotwali, against petitioner no. 1 and wife of petitioner no. 1 Smt. Sita Singh, who had bought the property in question. This fact shows that there was technical question of fact involving ownership and civil and criminal litigation were going on. The Small Causes Court should have returned the plea under section 23 of the Act. 8. It has been submitted that after the suit was decreed ex-parte, execution case was filed by respondent no. 2 and 3 and on receipt of summons of the execution case on 22.01.2019, the petitioners moved an application under Order IX Rule 13 of C.P.C. alongwith application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and also moved a separate application under Section 17 of the Act praying for recall of the order. It has been submitted that learned trial court after hearing the parties rightly allowed the three applications in favour of the petitioner on 06.09.2019.Thereafter petitioners deposited an amount of Rs.21161/-on 07.09.2019. However, respondent nos. It has been submitted that learned trial court after hearing the parties rightly allowed the three applications in favour of the petitioner on 06.09.2019.Thereafter petitioners deposited an amount of Rs.21161/-on 07.09.2019. However, respondent nos. 2 and 3 filed SCC Revision No. 1 of 2019 which was allowed on hyper technical ground without considering the facts that SCC Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass the decree ex parte. 9. It has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that opposite party no. 1 has failed to appreciate that it was not a simple tenant and landlord dispute, rather it was a dispute relating to title and declaration as to who was the real owner of the property in question. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also argued that opposite party no. 1 failed to appreciate the provisions of Section 17 of the Act when it opined that application under section 17 of the Act should be moved within 30 days from the date of knowledge of decree passed ex-parte, and the decreetal amount alongwith interest should be deposited before under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. application is considered by the learned trial court. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by coordinate Bench of this Court in SCC Revision No. 39 of 2016 (Shakeel Ahmad Vs. Zameer Ahmad Siddiqui and another) decided on 05.04.2016 wherein this Court considered the provisions of Section 17 of the Act and also the law settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kedar Nath Vs. Mohan Lal Kesarwari and others AIR 2002 SC 582 wherein the Court had interpreted the scope of the proviso of sub- section (1) of Section 17 read with provision of Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. as well as Section 20 (2) of the U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 and held that the proviso is mandatory, the application seeking to set aside decree or review must be accompanied by a deposit of decretal amount in Court. The application for dispensation of deposit can be filed upto the date of filling the application for setting aside the decree, and the proviso does not provide for extension of time. The application for dispensation of deposit can be filed upto the date of filling the application for setting aside the decree, and the proviso does not provide for extension of time. The court considered that the Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. application had been moved by the tenant/ revisionist for setting aside ex parte decree before depositing the decretal amount as provided under Section 17 of the Act, therefore, Misc Case No. 2C of 2008 was rejected. However since the parties had agreed before the revisonal court. The Court had directed that if the revisionist deposits entire decreetal amount, the application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. may be considered in accordance with law. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon a judgment rendered by me in the matter under Article 227 No. 4089 of 2018 (Smt. Sushma Agarwal Vs. District Judge, Agra and others ) decided on 30.05.2018 wherein this Court after considering the Division Bench’s judgment of Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Makhija and others Vs. M/s SKS and Co. and others, 2000 (3) ARC 117 observed that it is duty of the applicant to calculate the correct decretal amount as per the decree and Court is not required to get the decretal amount calculated for the applicant. The Court can ignore the shortfall in deposit of a negligible amount on the principle of deminiuis. The Court had observed the bonafide intent of the tenant had undoubtedly been established in depositing the decreetal amount alongwith cost and interest and in compliance of the Section 17 of the Act and it is the relevant factor that has to be considered by the Court while allowing the application under Section 17 of the Act and the section itself was added to avoid possibility of a litigant taking advantage of recall application being moved without first establishing his bonafide to pursue the litigation further, and to avoid the decree holder from being prejudiced due to the pendency of the litigation. The tenant cannot be non-suited on a hyper technical ground. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner to substantiate his arguments that subsequent event ought to have been brought to the notice of the learned Small Causes Court has referred the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumar Vs. The tenant cannot be non-suited on a hyper technical ground. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner to substantiate his arguments that subsequent event ought to have been brought to the notice of the learned Small Causes Court has referred the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumar Vs. Kesho Ram, AIR 1992 SC 700 wherein para-4 it has been observed that the normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtained at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception that whenever subsequent documents of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the molding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a ‘cautious cognizance’ of the subsequent changes to mold the relief. 14. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents however, has pointed out the plaint in suit filed by Gulab Devi mother of respondent no. 2 wherein Smt. Gulab Devi has stated clearly that she had bought tenanted premises on 29.06.2009 and became its owner and landlord and the tenant had not given any rent to her till the date of filing of SCC suit for eviction in August, 2012. It has also been stated in the plaint that notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served upon the tenant on 16.08.2012 till date they did not deposit any rent in favour of landlady. In the plaint, it was also stated that that defendant no. 1/Pradeep Kumar Singh was initially tenant but later on he sub-let the shop in question to defendant no. 2/ Ram Gopal Singh. 15. It has been argued by Sudeep Senth that in the written statement that was fled by defendant They stated in para-15 that the owner and landlord of the shop in question was initially Babu Baldev Prasad Khare Advocate, and after his death his son and grand sons became owners of the property and defendant no. 2 had bought the property from Arvind Khare son of late Satyadav Prasad Khare for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- and that before sale-deed was executed, defendant no. 1 was the tenant of the property in question and that plaintiff/ Smt. Gulab Devi was not landlord or owner of the disputed shop. 2 had bought the property from Arvind Khare son of late Satyadav Prasad Khare for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- and that before sale-deed was executed, defendant no. 1 was the tenant of the property in question and that plaintiff/ Smt. Gulab Devi was not landlord or owner of the disputed shop. The written argument was filed by both the defendants jointly on 21.05. 2013, while the saledeed they had relied upon was executed by Sri Arvind Khare on 16.01.2013 after filing of the SCC Suit in August, 2012. The sale-deed was made out by Sri Arvind Khare in favour of Sita Singh, wife of defendant no. 1,and not in favour of defendant no. 2 and a misleading reply had been given in the written statement filed by the defendant nos. 1 and 2 in SCC Suit. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2 and 3 has also referred to a Will executed by Sri Baldev Prasad Khare dated 16/17.12.1985 in favour of his five sons and daughter of Krishna Dev Khare and his sister Sobha Srivastava children of Baldev Prasad Khare had inherited the disputed shops. It has been argued that sale deed of respondent no. 2 and 3 is of a prior date i.e. 29.06.2009, whereas sale deed of the petitioners is of a later date i.e. 16.01.2013. 17. It has been argued by Sri Sudeep Seth that a perusal of the application filed under section 17 of the Act as well as an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. filed by the petitioner on 15.03.2018 would show that the knowledge of the ex parte decree dated 18.10.2017 was derived by the petitioners on 22.01.2018 or when the summons of execution case was served upon them on 18.01.2018 However, the petitioners did not file any application for recall nor deposit the amount under Section 17 of the Act within 30 days from the knowledge of ex parte decree. They waited till 15.03.2018 to file three applications simultaneously. Respondent nos. 2 and 3 raised an objection regarding maintainability of the application under Section 17 of the Act before the Small Causes Court which also noticed that shortfall was there in the amount that the petitioners had offered to deposit, yet the application was allowed. They waited till 15.03.2018 to file three applications simultaneously. Respondent nos. 2 and 3 raised an objection regarding maintainability of the application under Section 17 of the Act before the Small Causes Court which also noticed that shortfall was there in the amount that the petitioners had offered to deposit, yet the application was allowed. In the order passed by District Judge had correctly appreciated the law with regard to Section 17 of the Act and Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. on the basis of judgment rendered by this Court by a Division Bench in Raj Kumar Makhija and others (supra) and Vijay Kumar Agarwal Vs. Subhash Chandra and another, 2018 (141) RD 273 and also the Supreme Court’s Judgment rendered in Parimal Vs. Veena, AIR 2011 SC 1150 that ‘sufficient cause’ has to be shown for condonation of delay and allowing the application for recall. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that on the basis of provisions of Article 123 of the Schedule attached to the Limitation Act, that limitation for filing an application for setting aside ex parte decree, is 30 days and, therefore, application under Section 17 of the Act should also be filed within 30 days from the date either of the decree, or from the date of knowledge of ex parte decree. 19. It has been submitted that petitioners did not deposit the decretal amount alongwith interest as directed by learned Small Causes Court in decree dated 18.10.2017.They only offered to deposit through challan the decretal amount regarding arrears of rent to the tune of Rs. 14400/- and cost of litigation to the tune of Rs. 4800/- i.e. total Rs.19200/- without taking into account 12% interest incurred thereon from the date of decree till the date of offer to deposit. Learned counsel has read out various paragraphs of the Judgment of Raj Kumar Makhija and others (supra) and also of the judgment rendered by by this Court in Vijay Kumar Agarwal (supra) to say that there is limitation of 30 days of filing of application under Section 17 of the Act which has to be respected. 20. He has also argued that learned District Judge was considering only the legality of the order dated 06.09.2019, allowing the application under Section 17, Order IX Rule 13 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 20. He has also argued that learned District Judge was considering only the legality of the order dated 06.09.2019, allowing the application under Section 17, Order IX Rule 13 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act. He was not supposed to go into the merit of the decree and the decree was also not challenged before the writ petition. The arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to merit of their case and that the learned trial court should have returned the plaint under section 23 of the Act are irrelevant the controversy being decided by this Court in this writ petition. 21. Learned counsel for the respondents has also pointed out that sufficient cause as has been explained in the judgment rendered in the case of Parimal and others (supra) judgments of this Court relating to of bonafide attempt by the defendant who appeared later and they do not give any relaxation to a defendant, who having knowledge of the proceedings deliberately avoids appearing in the case. He has pointed out from the Medical Certificate issued by doctor concerned to the petitioner no. 1 on page 91 and page 93 of the paper book that they have been issued referring to future dates and also that this fact has been considered by the District Judge to come to the conclusion that medical certificates are apparently fabricated documents. 22. Learned counsel for the respondents have also pointed out that in regular suit filed for cancellation of sale-deed the defendants continued to appear. The petitioner no. 1 in fact appeared on three dates during the time when he was allegedly ill in between 16.07.2017 to 14.01. 2018. 23. In Parimal versus Veena AIR 2011 Supreme Court 1150 Supreme Court was considering a case where summon was tried to be served upon the wife of the Appellant twice. Each time the process server reported that she read the summons but refused to accept it. The court thereafter directed publication in the newspaper which was sent to her address. The newspaper was placed on record and not rebutted by the wife in any manner. After service by publication as well as by affixation the case was proceeded ex parte in the divorce proceedings. The marriage was dissolved by the Learned trial court. Two years after passing of the decree the appellant got married. He had children from the second marriage. After service by publication as well as by affixation the case was proceeded ex parte in the divorce proceedings. The marriage was dissolved by the Learned trial court. Two years after passing of the decree the appellant got married. He had children from the second marriage. After expiry of four years of passing of the ex parte decree the wife moved an application under Order IX rule 13 of the CPC along with an application under Section 5 of the Indian limitation Act for condonation of delay in moving the same. The trial court examined the issues at length and came to the conclusion that the respondent wife had miserably failed to establish the grounds taken by her in her application to set aside ex parte decree. The application was rejected. However the Delhi High Court allowed the First Appeal. Against such order, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered the language of Order IX Rule 13 and the proviso thereof and then observed in paragraphs 8,9 and 12 as follows:- “8. Shri M.C. Dhingra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the service stood completed in terms of statutory provisions of CPC by the refusal of the respondent to take the summons. Subsequently, the registered post was also not received by her as she refused it. It was only in such circumstances that the trial court entertained the application of the appellant under Order 5 Rule 20 CPC for substituted service. The summons were served by publication in the daily newspaper National Herald published from Delhi which has a very wide circulation and further service of the said newspaper on the respondent wife by registered post. The High Court committed a grave error by taking into consideration the conduct of the appellant subsequent to the date of decree of divorce which was totally irrelevant and unwarranted for deciding the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. More so, the High Court failed to take note of the hard reality that after two years of the ex parte decree the appellant got married and now has two major sons from the second wife. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the judgment impugned is liable to be set aside. 9. More so, the High Court failed to take note of the hard reality that after two years of the ex parte decree the appellant got married and now has two major sons from the second wife. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the judgment impugned is liable to be set aside. 9. On the contrary, Ms Geeta Dhingra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent wife has vehemently opposed the appeal, contending that once the respondent wife made the allegations of fraud and collusion of the appellant with the postman, etc. as he succeeded in procuring the false report, the burden of proof would be upon the appellant and not upon the respondent wife to establish that the allegations of fraud or collusion were false. The conduct of the appellant even subsequent to the date of decree of divorce i.e. not disclosing this fact to the respondent wife during the proceedings under Section 125 CrPC, disentitles him from any relief before this Court of equity. No interference is required in the matter and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 12. It is evident from the above that an ex parte decree against a defendant has to be set aside if the party satisfies the court that summons had not been duly served or he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. However, the court shall not set aside the said decree on mere irregularity in the service of summons or in a case where the defendant had notice of the date and sufficient time to appear in the court. The legislature in its wisdom, made the second proviso mandatory in nature. Thus, it is not permissible for the court to allow the application in utter disregard of the terms and conditions incorporated in the second proviso herein.” It then observed that the Delhi High Court should not have interfered in the Trial Court order and allowed the appeal. 24. The legislature in its wisdom, made the second proviso mandatory in nature. Thus, it is not permissible for the court to allow the application in utter disregard of the terms and conditions incorporated in the second proviso herein.” It then observed that the Delhi High Court should not have interfered in the Trial Court order and allowed the appeal. 24. In Rajkumar Makhija (supra), the Division Bench of this Court was considering whether the proviso to section 17 of the Provincial Small causes Court Act completely bars any rectification or removal of a bona fide error after the expiry of the period of limitation when substantial compliance by way of deposit of the decretal amount and furnishing security has been made within the period of limitation particularly when Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 has been made applicable to Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 25. The Division Bench was considering a case where the cash amount deposited by the applicant towards pendante lite and future damages covered only 117 months whereas the actually 125 months rent was liable to be deposited under the Proviso to Section 17 of the Act. The amount was found to be short for eight months. The case of the applicant was that monthly rent was Rs.700/- but the ex-parte decree had wrongly decided the rate of pendente lite and future rent as Rs.1000 per month. The court observed on the basis of judgement rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Kedarnath versus Mohanlal Kesarwani (supra) that the defendant did not file any application for permission to furnish security instead of cash deposit. The defendant applicant deposited rent at the rate of Rs.700/- per month along with the cost of the suit. The Court considered the language of the Proviso to Section 17 of the Act and observed that the applicant must either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree, or in pursuance of the judgement give a security for the performance of the decree for compliance with the judgement as the Court may on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed. 26. 26. The Division Bench observed that a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Ram Bharose versus Ganga Singh 1931 ALJR 1049, was considering a case where the application was accompanied with security bond which was large enough to cover the decretal amount. The Court held that the application was filed within time and the order for furnishing the security was passed after 30 days, the proviso to section 17 stood complied with. However where shortfall in cash deposit was not accompanied with any application for depositing security large enough to cover the decretal amount, such an application should be rejected as the proviso to section 17 of the act is mandatory. The Supreme Court in the case of Kedarnath (supra) had observed the Objects and Reasons of the 1935 Amendment to the Act, and observed that the proviso was couched in such language which could not be treated to be directory. The Court observed that the proviso does not provide for the extension of time by which an application for dispensation of deposit in cash may be filed along with an application for furnishing security, however, it should be filed at any time up to the time of presentation of the application for setting aside ex parte decree, or for review, and the Court may treat it as a previous application. The obligation of the applicant is to move a previous application for dispensation. It is then for the Court to make a prompt order. The compliance of the proviso has to be made by a person within a specified time, that is prior to the filing of the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The applicant is required to deposit the entire amount due under the decree and also to apply for furnishing security which will cover the entire decretal amount in case of any shortfall. If there is a shortfall, the consequence would be that the proviso to section 17 which is mandatory has not been complied and the application would be rejected. The court also considered the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to late deposit of the decretal amount. It observed in paragraph 22 that it does not apply to such deposit. The proviso to section 17 talks about filing of a previous application for furnishing security prior to the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The court also considered the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to late deposit of the decretal amount. It observed in paragraph 22 that it does not apply to such deposit. The proviso to section 17 talks about filing of a previous application for furnishing security prior to the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The period for limitation for filing such application has been provided under the said proviso. 27. The Division Bench considered the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Naseeruddin and others versus Sitaram Aggarwal JT 2003 (2) SC 56, and observed that a similar controversy was being dealt with by the Supreme Court and while considering the Rajasthan Rent Control Act it was observed that if there is a provision giving power to the court to extend the prescribed period of limitation and condone the delay in default of payment of rent, the court can condone the delay, but not otherwise. A clear line of distinction has been drawn between the provisions providing applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the deposits and the legal provisions bereft of applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act, to such deposits. It was held that where the statute does not provide either for extension of time or to condone the default in depositing the rent within the stipulated period, the court does not have power to do so. Where the Statute prescribes a specific period within which the deposit has to be made, provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be extended if the default takes place. The Court observed that there is no provision under section 17 of the Act conferring power on the Court to condone the delay in complying with its conditions. It is not correct to say that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would still be available to such person who has committed default in making the full deposit and the Court can condone the delay in making the deposit. It is not correct to say that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would still be available to such person who has committed default in making the full deposit and the Court can condone the delay in making the deposit. The Court considered the argument raised regarding substantial compliance of the proviso to section 17 of the Act but observed that as per the language of the proviso if the deposit made by the tenant falls short of amount required to be deposited, the tenant will be deprived of the benefit, even if shortfall in such deposit was because of tenant’s ignorance or without any malafide intention. There being a shortfall of the amount required to be deposited, the application for setting aside the ex parte decree will not be maintainable, for want of compliance of the proviso to section 17 of the Act. In such a case even the bonafides of the tenant are not relevant. What is required to be seen is the amount that is not paid or deposited on the due date. If the amount is found to be small, which is of no Consequence, the Court would be justified in ignoring the said mistake by extending the doctrine of ‘de minimis non curat lex’ to such a case. As to what is the case deserving to benefit of the aforesaid Rule is again a question of fact to be decided on a case to case basis. The Court considered that the applicant before it had taken a conscious decision to deposit the amount at a lower rate, than the amount specified in the ex-parte degree itself. This being so, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that there was a compliance of the proviso to section 17 of the Act in any manner, or it is a case of bonafide mistake or mistake in calculation. The applicant had a duty to calculate the correct decretal amount as per the decree and the Court was not required to get the decretal amount calculated for the applicant. 28. In the instant writ petition the decretal amount had to be deposited along with 12% interest incurred thereon from the date of decree till the date of offer to deposit. 28. In the instant writ petition the decretal amount had to be deposited along with 12% interest incurred thereon from the date of decree till the date of offer to deposit. The writ petitioners had deposited Rs.19,200 only and had made no application to the court saying that they were ready and willing to deposit security for any amount which was further found due on them. The Munsarim put up a report that the amount that was offered by way of application by the tenants was short by two thousand rupees. The application should have been rejected on this ground alone. 29. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the order impugned, this Court is of the opinion that learned District Judge has correctly appreciated the fact as well as the law, and there is no legal and factual infirmity in the order impugned. 30. The writ petition is dismissed as devoid of merit. 31. Costs made easy.