JUDGMENT : The petitioner is the owner in occupation and enjoyment of 24.420 cents of landed property having a residential building, in Sy. No.254/6A/4/24 of Chengalam East Village of Kottayam Taluk, obtained as per Ext. P1 sale deed. 2. The residential building was rebuilt and the construction was completed in the year 2009-2010. According to the petitioner, the building is having a plinth area of 276.57 Square meter (sq. m.). 3. As per Section 5 of the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), building tax shall be charged on every building based on the plinth area at the rate specified in the Schedule to the Act. Section 5A of the Act (as it stood prior to 01.04.2014) provides that buildings having a plinth area of 278.7 sq. m. or more and completed on or after 01/04/1999 are liable to be levied with luxury tax of Rs.2,000/-per annum. 4. The petitioner states that, appurtenant to the said residential building, there is a temporary shed with sheet roofing and wire mesh walls for storing rubber sheets, manure and plastic covers for the use in the rubber nursery run by him. 5. The Assessing Authority, the Taluk Tahsildar, Kottayam, the 3rd respondent, passed Ext.P2 order of assessment of tax for the building under Section 9 of the Act under residential category, showing a plinth area of 301.57 sq. m. followed by Ext.P3 demand notice under Section 10 levying a building tax of Rs.6,000/-. The Assessing Authority also imposed a luxury tax of Rs.2,000/-per annum for the building under Section 5A of the Act, as per Ext. P4 proceedings. 6. Against Exts. P2, P3 and P4, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the 2nd respondent, the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO), under Section 11 of the Act. In the appeal, the petitioner contended that the Assessing Authority went wrong in determining the plinth area of the building by taking into account the temporary shed appurtenant to the petitioner's residential building. The RDO, by Ext. P7 order, rejected the appeal. 7. Against Ext.P7 order, the petitioner preferred a 1st revision petition before the District Collector, the respondent, under Section 13 of the Act. The RDO, by Ext. P7 order, rejected the appeal. 7. Against Ext.P7 order, the petitioner preferred a 1st revision petition before the District Collector, the respondent, under Section 13 of the Act. Since the petitioner could not file the revision petition within the period of 30 days stipulated under Section 13(3) of the Act, an application for condoning delay in filing the revision petition was also filed with medical certificates to show sufficient cause for not filing the revision petition within time. The District Collector, without going into the merits, rejected the revision petition by Ext.P9 order stating that the petitioner has not shown sufficient cause for not filing the revision petition within the period provided under Section 13 of the Act. The District Collector found that, though there is a delay of one year in filing the revision petition, the petitioner has explained the delay of 4½ months only and there is no proper explanation for the delay occurred thereafter. 8. Exts.P2, P3, P4, P7 and Ext.P9 order of the District Collector are challenged in the writ petition. Direction is also sought to reconsider the revision petition on merits and to direct the assessing authority to make fresh assessment as per the statutory mandates. 9. A Counter Affidavit is filed by the 3rd respondent stating that the disputed construction is part of usage area and cannot be exempted for building tax assessment. It is further averred that the revision petition was dismissed as no sufficient reason was given for condoning the delay. It is also stated that the petitioner has remitted the entire building tax and the luxury tax was remitted upto 2012-13. 10. Heard Sri.Tom Jose, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. K.M. Faisal, the learned Government Pleader for the respondents. 11. The petitioner contends that the temporary shed appurtenant to his residential building is not liable to be taken into consideration for determining the plinth area of the building for assessment of building tax as per the proviso to Section 6 of the Act and the District Collector ought to have considered the revision petition on merits as there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the revision. 12. 12. Before I proceed to consider the question as to whether the petitioner has shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay, it has to be examined whether the District Collector has power to condone the delay in filing revision petition. 13. Section 13 of the Building Tax Act, 1975 reads as under: "13. Power of revision of the District Collector. -(1) The District Collector may, either suo motu or on application by any person aggrieved, call for and examine the record of any order passed by the appellate authority or the assessing authority and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit: Provided that no such order shall be passed under this sub-section without notice to the party who may be affected by the order: Provided further that the District Collector shall not call for and examine the record of any order passed by the assessing authority. (a) if the period of thirty days specified for presentation of appeal under sub-section (3) of Section 11 has not expired; or (b) if an appeal against that order is pending before the appellate authority: Provided also that no order passed on the basis of a reference under Section 12 to the extent covered by the answer to such reference shall be subject to revision by the District Collector. (2) The District Collector shall not suo motu revise an order under sub-section (1) if that order has been passed more than three months previously. (3) An application under sub-section (1) by an aggrieved party shall be made before the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the order in question was communicated to him." (4) No application for revision under sub-section (1) by an aggrieved party shall lie unless fifty per cent of the building tax has been paid.” (emphasis supplied) Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act provides that an application under sub-section (1) of Section 13 by an aggrieved party shall be made before the expiry of 30 days from the date on which the order in question was communicated to him. There is no provision which confers power on the District Collector to extend the time to admit or entertain the revision petition after the expiration of the said period. 14. There is no provision which confers power on the District Collector to extend the time to admit or entertain the revision petition after the expiration of the said period. 14. With regard to an appeal filed against the order of assessment under Section 11 of the Act, sub-Section (3) thereof provides that the appeal shall be presented within a period of thirty days from the date of service of the notice of demand relating to the assessment or the date of service of the order, as the case may be, but the appellate authority may admit an appeal presented after the expiration of the said period if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within the said period, provided however that no such appeal shall be admitted after a period of six months from the date of service of the notice of demand relating to the assessment or the date of service of the order, as the case may be. Under Section 11, the appellate authority may admit an appeal presented after the expiration of 30 days, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within the said period and the period can be further extended by another six months from the date of service of the notice of demand/order, but not thereafter. However, there is no provision under Section 13 which empowers the revisional authority to condone delay if the revision petition is presented by an aggrieved party after the period of 30 days from the date on which the order of the assessment authority/appellate authority is communicated to him. 15. Section 4 of the Act provides that the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, appoint assessing authorities and appellate authorities for the purposes of the Act. The revisional power has been conferred on the District Collector by the primary legislation viz., Section 13. Being an authority created under the Statute to exercise revisional jurisdiction, the District Collector can only act in terms of the powers vested in him under the Statute. Though the assessing authority, the appellate authority and the revisional authority have been conferred with certain specified powers of the Civil Court under Section 17 of the Act, the proceedings concerning the assessment of building tax are quasi judicial and the authorities under the Act are performing quasi judicial functions. Though the assessing authority, the appellate authority and the revisional authority have been conferred with certain specified powers of the Civil Court under Section 17 of the Act, the proceedings concerning the assessment of building tax are quasi judicial and the authorities under the Act are performing quasi judicial functions. Limitation Act will apply only to Courts and not to quasi judicial authorities. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, cannot, therefore, be invoked for condoning the delay in filing the revision. In Ganesan v. Commissioner, Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board (2019 KHC 6530: 2019 (2) KLT 925 : (2019) 7 SCC 108 : AIR 2019 SC 2343 ), the Apex Court considered the question whether the Commissioner, Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious Endowment Board while hearing an appeal under Section 69 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 is a 'Court' and whether Section 29(2) of Limitation Act would apply to such authorities. Referring to Sections 6(7), 69 and 70 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, the Apex Court held that, the mere fact that a statutory authority is empowered to follow the procedure as nearly may be in accordance with procedure under C.P.C. to the trial of suits or hearing of appeals, the statutory authority shall not become a Court and the Commissioner is not a Court within the meaning of Section 6(7) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 and the Commissioner while hearing the appeal under Section 69 of the Act, 1959 is not entitled to condone the delay in filing appeal, since, provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall not be attracted by strength of Section 29(2) of the Act. After a survey of various decisions, the Apex Court held:- "54. The ratio which can be culled from above noted judgments, especially judgment of three-Judge Benches, as noted above, is as follows : (1) The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act, 1963 are suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed in a Court. (2) The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act are not the suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed before a statutory authority like Commissioner under Act, 1959. (2) The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act are not the suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed before a statutory authority like Commissioner under Act, 1959. (3) Operation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is confined to the suits, appeals and applications referred to in a special or local law to be filed in Court and not before statutory authorities like Commissioner under Act, 1959. (4) However, special or local law vide statutory scheme can make applicable any provision of the Limitation Act or exclude applicability of any provision of Limitation Act which can be decided only after looking into the scheme of particular, special or local law. 55. We, thus, answer question Nos.2 and 3 in the following manner : (i) The applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is with regard to different limitations prescribed for any suit, appeal or application when to be filed in a Court. (ii) Section 29(2) cannot be pressed in service with regard to filing of suits, appeals and applications before the statutory authorities and tribunals provided in a special or local law. The Commissioner while hearing of the appeal under Section 69 of the Act, 1959 is not entitled to condone the delay in filing appeal, since, provision of Section 5 shall not be attracted by strength of Section 29(2) of the Act." 16. The Statute has not conferred power on the District Collector to entertain a revision petition which is not presented before the expiry of 30 days from the date on which the order of the assessment authority/appellate authority was communicated to him. The District Collector cannot admit or entertain a revision petition presented beyond the said period even if sufficient cause is shown for not presenting the same within that period. The District Collector is not empowered to entertain a revision petition after condoning the delay on equitable grounds. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane and Others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Another [ 2013 (10) SCC 765 : 2013 KHC 4651], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is not permissible to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds if Statute does not permit the same. 17. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane and Others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Another [ 2013 (10) SCC 765 : 2013 KHC 4651], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is not permissible to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds if Statute does not permit the same. 17. The upshot of the above discussions is that the revision petition filed by the petitioner before the District Collector is not maintainable as the same is filed beyond the period provided by the Statute. In the light of Section 13(3) of the Act, even if sufficient cause is shown for not presenting the appeal within the stipulated period of 30 days, the District Collector could not have admitted and entertained the revision petition. 18. It is stated by the assessing authority that the petitioner has already paid the entire building tax as assessed and demanded. It is also stated that the luxury tax was remitted upto 2012-13. The building tax is a one time liability, whereas the luxury tax is a recurring liability, payable every year if the residential building is having a plinth area of 278.7 sq. m. or more and completed on or after 01/04/1999. This Court, in Mohamad Sadik v. Tahsildar [ 2006 (3) KLT 271 : 2006 KHC 845] held that, even if the assessee had suffered the payment of luxury tax for earlier years, he is still entitled to challenge the order of demand for levy of luxury tax under Section 5A of the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975 for the subsequent years. This Court clarified that the finding of the assessing authority concerning the plinth area of the building for assessment of building tax will not operate as res judicata to challenge the order of demand for levy of luxury tax. 19. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, in Instalment Supply (Private) Ltd and another v. Union of India others [ AIR 1962 SC 53 : 1962 KHC 420] has held that, in matters of taxation, there is no question of res judicata because each year's assessment is final only for that year and does not govern later years, because it determines only the tax for a particular period. 20. 20. Relying on the decision in Mohamad Sadik case (supra), this Court, in Namboorikandi Ahammed v. District Collector [ 2014 (4) KHC 608 : 2014 (4) KLT 272 : 2014 (4) KLJ 307 : ILR 2014 (4) Ker. 499] held that, an erroneous determination of plinth area for the purposes of building tax, that has already been completed on an assessee, cannot be the sole basis for the levy of luxury tax for all time to come in the future and it would be open to the assessee to challenge the collection of such an illegal tax by invoking his rights under Article 265 of the Constitution of India. 21. Though the statutory remedy of revision against the assessment of building tax stood foreclosed by the period prescribed thereunder, it will be open to the petitioner to challenge the determination of plinth area even at a subsequent stage when faced with a demand of luxury tax based on the plinth area of the building in question. The specific case of the petitioner before the statutory authorities was that the structure appurtenant to his residential building is not liable to be taken into consideration for determining the plinth area. This contention of the petitioner has not received due consideration at the hands of the assessing authorities. As held by this Court in Namboorikandi Ahammed case (supra), an erroneous determination of plinth area for the purposes of building tax, that has already been completed on an assessee, cannot be the sole basis for the levy of luxury tax for all time to come in the future. Accordingly, I quash Ext.P4 order of the 3rd respondent under Section 5A levying luxury tax on the residential building of the petitioner. The 3rd respondent shall consider the factual and legal contention of the petitioner that the structure appurtenant to his residential building is not liable to be taken into consideration for determining the plinth area, with notice to the petitioner. This shall be done within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment and untrammeled by Ext.P2 assessment order levying building tax under Section 9 of the Act which has become final. The liability of the petitioner to luxury tax in terms of Section 5A shall be determined based on the findings of the 3rd respondent. The liability of the petitioner to luxury tax in terms of Section 5A shall be determined based on the findings of the 3rd respondent. Such determination by the 3rd respondent will govern the luxury tax liability of the petitioner, if any, for the periods from 2009-2010 onwards, till such time as changed circumstances warrant fresh assessment. If the assessing authority finds that the building is not exigible to luxury tax, the luxury tax so far remitted by the petitioner shall be refunded. The writ petition is disposed of as above. No order as to costs.