JUDGMENT : ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY, J. 1. Heard Mr. Pankaj Srivastava, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in both the cases alongwith Mr. Amit Kumar, Advocate. 2. Heard Mr. Bishwambhar Shastri, A.P.P. and Mr. Tapas Roy, A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party-State in their respective cases. 3. Both these criminal revision applications are directed against the Judgment dated 03.02.2012 passed by the learned Sessions Judge-III, Hazaribag in Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 2011 whereby and whereunder the learned appellate court dismissed the criminal appeal confirming the conviction of the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and also confirming the conviction of the petitioner-Mundrika Devi under Sections 420 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, but modified and reduced their respective sentences to the period already undergone by them in custody provided that they would pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each, in addition to the amount deposited by the investing parties. 4. The learned trial court, vide Judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated 18.05.2011 passed by the learned S.D.J.M. Hazaribag in G.R. Case No. 3277 of 2008, T.R. No. 1247 of 2011, had convicted the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and had sentenced him to undergo: (i) Rigorous Imprisonment for two years under Section 420 IPC and fine of Rs. 4,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo Simple Imprisonment for six months. (ii) Rigorous Imprisonment for one year under Section 467 IPC and fine of Rs. 3,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo Simple Imprisonment for three months. (iii) Rigorous Imprisonment for one year under Section 468 IPC and fine of Rs. 3,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo Simple Imprisonment for three months. (iv) Rigorous Imprisonment for one year under Section 471 read with Section 465 of IPC. (v) Rigorous Imprisonment for six months under Section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code. 5. The learned trial court had convicted the petitioner-Mundrika Devi under Sections 420 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and had sentenced her to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for two years under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and fine of Rs. (v) Rigorous Imprisonment for six months under Section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code. 5. The learned trial court had convicted the petitioner-Mundrika Devi under Sections 420 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and had sentenced her to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for two years under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and fine of Rs. 4,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo Simple Imprisonment for four months and Rigorous Imprisonment for six months under Section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code. All the sentences awarded to both the petitioners were directed to run consecutively and the period of detention undergone by the petitioners in custody was directed to be set off against their sentence of imprisonment. Arguments on behalf of petitioner in Cr. Rev. No. 147 of 2012 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the entire allegation is that a company, which was not entitled to enter into banking transaction, was represented by the petitioners who collected money from the depositors. 7. On the point of forgery and cheating, the learned counsel submitted that Section 463 of Indian Penal Code defines the offence of forgery, while Section 464 of IPC substantiates the same by providing an answer as to when a false document could be said to have been made for the purpose of committing an offence of forgery under Section 463 of IPC. Therefore, it can safely be deduced that Section 464 of IPC defines one of the ingredients of forgery i.e. making of a false document. Further, Section 465 IPC provides punishment for the commission of the offence of forgery. In order to sustain a conviction under Section 465 IPC, first it has to be proved that forgery was committed under Section 463 of IPC, implying that ingredients under Section 464 of IPC should also be satisfied. Therefore, unless and until the ingredients under Section 463 of IPC are satisfied, a person cannot be convicted under Section 465 of IPC by solely relying on the ingredients of Section 464 IPC, as the offence of forgery would remain incomplete. He also submitted that an offence of forgery cannot be fastened against a person who has not created it or not signed it. 8. He also submitted that an offence of forgery cannot be fastened against a person who has not created it or not signed it. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the case of Mohammed Ibrahim and Others vs. State of Bihar and Another, (2009) 8 SCC 751 and Mir Nagvi Askari vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 15 SCC 643 . 9. He further submitted that the dates of issuance of the cheques have not been discussed. The learned trial court has presumed that they were signed in advance. On this presumption, the learned trial court held that forgery has been constituted and thereby the offence under Section 467 IPC has been committed and further convicted him under Section 471 IPC on the presumption that this document has been used as genuine. 10. He submitted that there was no intention to cheat any investor. It would amount to cheating only in those cases where there was any deception played at the very inception. All the investors received due returns at initial stage. Investments, as alleged by the informant and the witnesses, have been disputed by the petitioner. The witnesses have stated that they have also deposited money with co-accused Praveen Kumar and the cards they received from Praveen Kumar do not bear signature of the petitioner. Payments and dues can be quantified only in a properly instituted civil suit. A criminal court cannot be used for executing a false claim. Accordingly, it was submitted that the ingredients of Sections 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC are not made out against the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha in the present case. 11. On the point of conspiracy, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that conspiracy cannot be assumed from a set of unconnected facts or from a set of conduct at different places and times without a reasonable link. 12. In addition to the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that investigating officer of the case has not been examined in this case. The petitioner has been deprived of his valuable right of taking contradictions of statements of the witnesses as per Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. No document of any scheme or any agreement has been proved in this case. The petitioner has been deprived of his valuable right of taking contradictions of statements of the witnesses as per Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. No document of any scheme or any agreement has been proved in this case. He submitted that neither any handwriting expert has been examined, nor any bank personnel has been examined and no independent witness has been examined in the present case. Except for the beneficiaries, no other witness has been examined. He submitted that there is no allegation that any document was forged by the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the Memorandum of Association and the Article of Association have not been exhibited, but the same have been considered by the learned trial Court. He submitted that there are several clauses which would have clarified the conduct of the petitioner which are as follows: Clause 14 of the Memorandum of Association states as follows: To draw cheques, make, accept, endorse, discount, execute and issue promissory notes, bills of exchange, bill of lading, charter parties, warrants, debentures and other negotiable and transferable instruments. Clause 35 of the Articles of Association states as follows: All Cheques, promissory notes, drafts, hundis, bills of exchange, other negotiable instruments, and all receipts of money paid to the company, shall be signed, drawn, accepted, endorsed, or otherwise executed, as the case may be, by such person and in such manner as the board shall from time to time by resolution determine. 14. He further submitted that the un-exhibited documents have been considered by the learned courts below to give a finding that the company acted beyond its aims and objects. 15. The learned counsel further submitted that no charge has been framed under Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code, but the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha has been sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for one year for offence under Section 471 read with Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code. No complaint was ever lodged by any investor before the Registrar of Companies or before any authority. He also submitted that the company was incorporated on 17.12.2003 and there was no complaint against the company for five years. There are anomalies and material discrepancies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. He also submitted that no money suit or civil litigation has ever been initiated by any of the investors. 16. He also submitted that the company was incorporated on 17.12.2003 and there was no complaint against the company for five years. There are anomalies and material discrepancies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. He also submitted that no money suit or civil litigation has ever been initiated by any of the investors. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioners has provided a chart to this Court on the basis of the evidences of the four informants, giving details of total investments made by them, payments received by them and amounts allegedly misappropriated by the company and/or the petitioners and two co-accused persons which is as under: PW No. Name of Informant/ investor Total investment by informant- investor Total payments received Total amount misappropriated by the Company/accused persons 1 Chhotu Kumar Rs. 4,65,500 Rs. 1,50,000 Rs. 3,15,500 2 Hari Prasad Rs. 5,10,000 Rs. 90,000 Rs. 4,20,000 3 Om Prakash Mehta Rs. 1,75,000 Rs. 5,000 Rs. 1,70,000 5 Surendra Prasad Mehta Rs. 2,50,000 Rs. 45,000 Rs. 2,05,000 Total Rs. 14,00,000 Rs. 2,90,000 Rs. 11,10,500 17. The learned counsel further provided another chart as per the evidence of the rest 09 prosecution witnesses, indicating the respective investments made by them, the payments received by them and the amounts allegedly misappropriated by the company and/or the petitioners and two co-accused persons, which is as under: PW No. Name of investor Total investment by the investor Total payments received Total amount misappropriated by Company/accused persons 4 Vijay Kumar Aggrawal Rs. 60,000 Rs. 25,000 Rs. 35,000 6 Abdul Kausar Rs. 1,12,500 Nil Rs. 1,12,500 7 Naresh Prasad Rs. 2,40,000 Nil Rs. 2,40,000 8 Dilip Kumar Gupta Rs. 1,20,000 Nil Rs. 1,20,000 9 Chhedi Thakur Rs. 40,000 Nil Rs. 40,000 10 Shambhu Kumar Soni Rs. 75,000 Nil Rs. 75,000 11 Jainarayan Prasad Rs. 96,000 Nil Rs. 96,000 12 Brij Kishore Kumar Rs. 47,500 Nil Rs. 47,500 13 Rajendra Prasad Mehta Rs. 2,00,000 Nil Rs. 2,00,000 Total Rs. 9,91,000 Rs. 25,000 Rs. 9,66,000 Arguments on behalf of petitioner in Cr. Rev. No. 287 of 2012 18. The learned counsel submitted that so far as petitioner-Mundrika Devi is concerned, all the points raised on behalf of the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha in Cr. Rev. No. 147 of 2012 are also relevant in her case. 2,00,000 Nil Rs. 2,00,000 Total Rs. 9,91,000 Rs. 25,000 Rs. 9,66,000 Arguments on behalf of petitioner in Cr. Rev. No. 287 of 2012 18. The learned counsel submitted that so far as petitioner-Mundrika Devi is concerned, all the points raised on behalf of the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha in Cr. Rev. No. 147 of 2012 are also relevant in her case. In addition to the above points, he submitted that although she was the Deputy Director of the Company, no witness has stated about any specific role played by her. PW-3 to PW-12 have not taken her name. PW-13 has taken her name, but he has specifically stated that she has done nothing. PWs. 1 and 2 have taken her name in general and omnibus manner and no specific conduct or allegation has been made against her. Besides above, she has not signed any of the exhibited documents. He further submitted that without discussion regarding her alleged role and conduct, she has been convicted in the present case. On the point of sentences of both the petitioners 19. The learned counsel submitted that the learned trial court directed the running of sentences consecutively, which is against settled principles of law. 20. On the point of sentences of both the petitioners, the learned counsel referred to Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and submitted that it has been held in the case of O.M. Cherian @ Thankachan vs. State of Kerala and Others, (2014) 4 Crimes (SC) 262 that in case, the court directs the sentences to run one after the other, the Court has to specify the order in which the sentences are to run. If the Court directs the running of sentences concurrently, order of running of sentences is not required to be mentioned. Discretion to order running of sentences concurrently or consecutively is judicial discretion of the Court which is to be exercised as per the established law of sentencing. The court before exercising its discretion under Section 31 of Code of Criminal Procedure is required to consider the totality of the facts and circumstances of those offences against the accused while deciding whether sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. When the prosecution is based on single transaction where it constitutes two or more offences, sentences are to run concurrently. When the prosecution is based on single transaction where it constitutes two or more offences, sentences are to run concurrently. Imposing separate sentences, when the acts constituting different offences form part of the single transaction, is not justified. 21. He further submitted that the benefit is available to the accused to have the sentences to run concurrently of several offences based on single transaction and referred to the Judgment passed in the case of V.K. Bansal vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2013) 7 SCC 211 . 22. He relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti vs. Assistant Collector of Customs (Prevention) Ahmedabad and Another, (1988) 4 SCC 183 and Manoj alias Panu vs. State of Haryana, (2014) 2 SCC 153 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recognized the basic rule of conviction arising out of a single transaction justifying the concurrent running of the sentences. He submitted that Para-10 of the Judgment passed in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti (Supra) is relevant to be noted in this regard. 23. He further submitted that the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha has already remained in custody for 3½ years out of the total sentence of imprisonment of about 5½ years as awarded by the learned trial court. 24. He further submitted that although the learned appellate court modified the sentences of the petitioners, but the modification was subject to certain payment and as per the modification, investors were supposed to be paid the amount they had invested and a further fine of Rs. 10,000/- each was to be deposited, but the same has not been complied with by the petitioners and accordingly, at best, the petitioners would have to face the sentence passed by the learned trial court. Arguments on behalf of the Opposite Party-State 25. The learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of State in Cr. Rev. No. 147 of 2012 submitted that the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha has remained in custody from 30.01.2008 to 09.04.2012 (04 years 02 months 11 days) in connection with the present case. 26. The learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of State in Cr. Rev. No. 287 of 2012 submitted that the petitioner-Mundrika Devi has remained in judicial custody from 28.05.2008 to 19.09.2008 (03 months 24 days) during trial of the case. 27. 26. The learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of State in Cr. Rev. No. 287 of 2012 submitted that the petitioner-Mundrika Devi has remained in judicial custody from 28.05.2008 to 19.09.2008 (03 months 24 days) during trial of the case. 27. The learned counsel for the State opposed the prayer and submitted that there are concurrent findings recorded by the learned courts below based on materials on record and accordingly, no interference is called for by this court in revisional jurisdiction. He also submitted that the basic ingredients of the offences for which the petitioners have been convicted are satisfied in the case. He also submitted that the learned court below has already taken a lenient view on the point of sentences and no interference is called for in this criminal revision. Findings of this Court 28. Prosecution case is based on the written report of the informant namely, Om Prakash Mehta and three others namely, Surendra Prasad Mehta, Chhotu Kumar and Hari Prasad. It was alleged that Om Prakash Mehta, Surendra Pd. Mehta, Chhotu Kumar and Hari Prasad had deposited Rs. 1,75,000/- Rs. 1,80,000/- Rs. 4,55,000/- and Rs. 3,80,000/- respectively in different schemes of the company under the name and style of Ujjwal Facility Card Private Ltd. Hazaribagh, a non-banking company in which both the petitioners were Directors and they closed their office since 24.01.2008 and were absconding. After efforts, Krisna Kant Kuswaha was caught and handed over to the Sadar P.S. where he confessed that he took money from the informant party members, but he showed helplessness to return the money. 29. On the basis of the written report of the informant and three others named in the FIR, a formal First Information Report was registered as Sadar P.S. Case No 103/2008 dated 30.01.2008. After completion of the investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet on 19.03.2008 against Krisna Kant Kuswaha under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of IPC and submitted supplementary charge-sheet on 28.06.2008 against Mundrika Devi and two co-accused persons under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of IPC. The learned C.J.M. Hazaribagh took cognizance of the offence on 27.03.2008. Thereafter, charges under the same sections were framed against both the petitioners to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The learned C.J.M. Hazaribagh took cognizance of the offence on 27.03.2008. Thereafter, charges under the same sections were framed against both the petitioners to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The trial of the other two accused namely, Praveen Kumar and Sushma Tigga, who were employees of the said Company, was separated and the present case relates only to petitioners. The company was neither made an accused in the case, nor any charge-sheet was submitted against the Company. 30. In course of trial, altogether 13 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution. PW-1 is Chhotu Kumar, PW-2 is Hari Prasad, PW-3 is Om Prakash Mehta, PW-4 is Vijay Kumar Aggrawal, PW-5 is Surendra Pd. Mehta, PW-6 is Abdul Kausar, PW-7 is Naresh Prasad, PW-8 is Dilip Kumar Gupta, PW-9 is Chhedi Thakur, PW-10 is Shambhu Kumar Soni, PW-11 is Jainarayan Prasad, PW-12 is Brijkishore Kumar and PW-13 is Rajendra Prasad Mehta. The prosecution exhibited several documents which were marked as Exhibits-1 to 16/B. All the thirteen prosecution witnesses are the victims of the case. 31. The case was instituted on the basis of the written report given jointly by Om Prakash Mehta (PW-3), Surendra Prasad Mehta (PW-5), Chhotu Kumar (PW-1) and Hari Prasad (PW-2). 32. Chhotu Kumar (PW-1) deposed that both the petitioners and two others floated a scheme by the name of Ujjwal Facility Cards having its office at Hazaribagh. Krisna Kant Kuswaha was acting as Director and his wife Mundrika Devi was acting as Deputy Director and the rest two accused were the Manager and Cashier respectively of the company. All the four persons had come to his shop and told him that if he invests Rs. 1,55,000/- they will return him Rs. 3,00,000/- in twenty months and on depositing the money they will give cards and he will get Rs. 15,000/- every month on depositing one card. Being impressed, he invested Rs. 1,55,000/- in the company and they gave him 20 cards in his name. Thereafter, he deposited two cards in a period of two months and got Rs. 30,000/- and 18 cards remained with him. He stated that all the 17 cards contain the signature of Krisna Kant Kuswaha and he exhibited the same as Exhibits-1 to 1/16. He also produced another 18 cards in the writing and signature of Sushma Tigga, the co-accused, which were exhibited as Exhibits-1/17 to 1/34. 30,000/- and 18 cards remained with him. He stated that all the 17 cards contain the signature of Krisna Kant Kuswaha and he exhibited the same as Exhibits-1 to 1/16. He also produced another 18 cards in the writing and signature of Sushma Tigga, the co-accused, which were exhibited as Exhibits-1/17 to 1/34. He deposited five cards and in turn, he received Rs. 75,000/-. Thereafter, he again deposited Rs. 1,55,000/- on 07.12.2007 in the company in the name of his wife and in return, 20 cards were given in the writing and signature of Praveen Kumar, the other co-accused, and out of 20, he deposited 03 cards and got Rs. 45,000/- and he exhibited the remaining 17 cards as Exhibits-2 to 2/16. In this way, he invested Rs. 4,65,000/- and in addition, he was also depositing Rs. 500/- per day in the daily scheme of the company. He further deposed that Hari Prasad and Om Prakash Mehta had also invested Rs. 4,35,000/- and Rs. 1,80,000/- respectively in the company. On 30.01.2008, he went to the office of the company and found it closed and thereafter, the written report was lodged. He proved the written report as Exhibit-4. He also stated that he has not yet got his money back and the accused persons have defalcated their money by hatching a conspiracy. He identified Krisna Kant Kuswaha and Mundrika Devi in court. His total investment was Rs. 4,65,500/- out of which he received back Rs. 1,50,000/- and accordingly, Rs. 3,15,500/- remained due. Mundrika Devi did not sign or deliver any document to this witness. 33. Similar allegations against both the petitioners and two other co-accused have been made by PW-2 whose total investment in the company was Rs. 5,10,000/- out of which he received back Rs. 90,000/- and Rs. 4,20,000/- remained unpaid. This witness has also supported the evidence of PW-1 by stating that all the four accused persons had met them in the shop of PW-1. This witness has also alleged that the company operated outside its area of operation. Mundrika Devi did not sign or deliver any document to this witness. 34. Thus, PWs. 90,000/- and Rs. 4,20,000/- remained unpaid. This witness has also supported the evidence of PW-1 by stating that all the four accused persons had met them in the shop of PW-1. This witness has also alleged that the company operated outside its area of operation. Mundrika Devi did not sign or deliver any document to this witness. 34. Thus, PWs. 1 and 2 have clearly deposed that all the four accused persons had jointly come to the shop of PW-1 and allured them to invest in their company and one fine morning all the accused persons were found absconding and the office of the company was found closed. Out of their total investment, part amount was repaid as mentioned in the above chart submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 35. So far as the PWs. 3 to 13 are concerned, they have made specific allegation against Krisna Kant Kuswaha and also against the other two co-accused, but no role has been attributed to Mundrika Devi except that she was the Deputy Director of the company. They have alleged that Krisna Kant Kuswaha and other two co-accused had allured them to invest money in their company. Some of these witnesses have also alleged that Krisna Kant Kuswaha and other co-accused had put their signatures differently in various documents exhibited by them and even the cheques issued by Krisna Kant Kuswaha had different signatures even when they were drawn on the same account. Some of the cheques had also bounced on account of “insufficient fund.” They have also stated that one fine morning, the office of the company was found closed and the accused persons absconded with their money. 36. In the evidence of PWs. 3 to 13, so far as Mundrika Devi is concerned, there is no allegation that she had signed any of the documents delivered to them or she had accompanied the other three accused persons in alluring PWs. 3 to 13 to invest in the company. So far as offence in connection with PWs. 3 to 13 are concerned, conviction of Mundrika Devi has been upheld by the learned appellate court only on account of the fact that she was the Deputy Director of the company. The allurement to each of the PWs. 3 to 13 are independent incidents of allurement by the other three accused persons in which Mundrika Devi had no role to play. The allurement to each of the PWs. 3 to 13 are independent incidents of allurement by the other three accused persons in which Mundrika Devi had no role to play. 37. Thus, all the 13 witnesses have supported the prosecution case and have exhibited their supporting documents, so far the as petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha is concerned. But Mundrika Devi is involved only with regard to offence in connection with PWs. 1 and 2, being a part of the team who visited the shop of PW-1 and with regard to offence in connection with PWs. 3 to 13, she has been found involved only on account of being the Deputy Director of the company, and admittedly the company is not an accused in the case. 38. After closure of prosecution evidence, statements of the petitioners were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. wherein they denied the incriminating evidences put to them and claimed to be innocent. The petitioner Krisna Kant Kuswaha was specifically put question regarding different transactions involving each of the witnesses and was also asked as to whether he was the Managing Director of the company. He admitted that he was the Managing Director and denied the other allegations. The petitioner Mundrika Devi was specifically asked about her presence in the shop of PW-1 alongwith other accused including Krisna Kant Kuswaha when the accused persons allured the investors to invest. She was also asked as to whether she was the Deputy Director of the company. She admitted that she was the Deputy Director and denied the other allegations. 39. The petitioners filed the Certificate of Incorporation of the company in the name and style of Ujjwal Facility Card Private Ltd. in their defence which has been marked as Exhibit-A without objection showing date of incorporation of the company as 17.12.2003. 40. The learned trial court considered the evidences available on record and recorded its findings in Para-22 which is quoted as under: “22. Heard both sides and also meticulously perused the evidence available on the record. So far as offence U/s 420 I.P.C. is concerned, it is clear from the evidence of all the witnesses that accused persons dishonestly induced and allured the investors to invest money in the purchase of Ujjwal Facility Cards and that too on unreasonable terms and conditions. Heard both sides and also meticulously perused the evidence available on the record. So far as offence U/s 420 I.P.C. is concerned, it is clear from the evidence of all the witnesses that accused persons dishonestly induced and allured the investors to invest money in the purchase of Ujjwal Facility Cards and that too on unreasonable terms and conditions. The accused persons by giving hoax of handsome return within a short span of time dishonestly induced the investors to invest huge sum of money in Ujjwal Facility Cards and they have been defrauded by the accused persons. From the perusal of Ext.3, 6, 11, 11/1, 11/2, 13, 13/A, 15/B it clearly comes out that the terms and conditions of investment were highly unreasonable, arbitrary and unlawful. So far as offences U/s 467, 468, 471 I.P.C. are concerned, Ext.13 series and Ext.16 series are worth mentioning. Accused Krishnakant Kushwaha is facing trial as Krishnakant Kushwaha and he has a current account No. 1110 in Canara Bank. Ext.16 and 16/A are the cheques signed by the accused as Krishna Kumar Kushwaha. The said cheques have bounced due to insufficient fund in the account for which bank certificate is also available on the record. On Ext-16 the signature by the account holder is as Krishna Kumar Kushwaha. Now if Exhibit 16 series and Exhibit 13 series are juxtaposed side by side it shows that all the cheques are of Canara Bank and account number is also the same i.e. Current account no. 1110 but in Ext.13 series signature of accused Krishnakant Kushwaha is as K.K. Kushwaha. There is absolutely no doubt about it that for one account there cannot be more than one signature. Again it is also general human conduct that first number of cheque is issued earlier and thereafter another and then another but in Ext.16 series and Ext.13 series cheques are issued in haphazard manner. Again post - dated cheques beyond ninety days have also been issued. Forgery consists of making a false document in order that it may be used as genuine with intent to commit fraud or that with the aid of it fraud may be committed. The gist of the offence U/s 467 I.P.C. is the making of a false document and section 471 I.P.C. comes into play when a person knowing a document to be forged uses it fraudulently. The gist of the offence U/s 467 I.P.C. is the making of a false document and section 471 I.P.C. comes into play when a person knowing a document to be forged uses it fraudulently. Again Ext.1 and its series and several such exhibits are just like promissory note and these are valuable security. The term payment slip is written on Exhibit 1 and its series and amount is Rs. 1500/- and the same are signed by accused Krishnakant Kushwaha. As soon as it is signed and delivered to the beneficiary it becomes a promissory note. On the back of Exhibit-1 terms and conditions are written which are unreasonable, arbitrary and unlawful. Several such payment slips were given to several beneficiaries. The intention of the forger can be fairly inferred from the contents of the forged document.” 41. The learned trial court convicted the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and convicted the petitioner-Mundrika Devi under Sections 420 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them accordingly. 42. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the Judgment of conviction as well as the order of sentence passed by the learned trial court, the petitioners jointly preferred appeal in which the learned appellate court considered the materials on record and recorded its findings in Paras-28 to 34 which is quoted as under: - “28. In the instant case under appeal prosecution has in all produced 13 witnesses including the informant in support of its case. Learned lower court has examined and discussed at length the evidence of the witnesses. All the witnesses have categorically deposed that, they have deposited money in the company and when they went to the office of the company, they found it was closed and they could not get their money in time. It is apparent from the evidence that, several cheques were issued by the company to different investing public. These cheques were deposited in the Bank of India which could not be encashed due to insufficient fund in the account of accused Krishna Kant Kushawah. 29. The witnesses have categorically stated that, they have been allured by the accused person to invest money for good return. The terms and conditions offered to every witness were different and unreasonable. Prosecution has exhibited a list of documents in support of the case. 29. The witnesses have categorically stated that, they have been allured by the accused person to invest money for good return. The terms and conditions offered to every witness were different and unreasonable. Prosecution has exhibited a list of documents in support of the case. Ext.1 to 16 clearly shows the conduct, intention and acts of the accused persons. If Ext.1 and its series are taken into consideration its a promissory note the term payment sleep is written on the Ext.1 and the amount mentioned is Rs. 50,000/-. It is signed by accused Krishna Kant Kushawah. As soon as it is signed and delivered to the beneficiaries it becomes promissory notes. On the back of Ext.1 terms and conditions unwritten which are unreasonable, arbitrary and unlawful and several such payment sleeps were given to several beneficiaries. 30. It is also reveals from the exhibit 13 and 6 series that, the appellant Krishna Kant Kushwaha had a current account No. 1110 in the Canara Bank and he has signed on the cheques in different signatures in the same account number. 31. Ext.13 to Ext.16 series are cheques of different denominations and Ext.16 & Ext.16A are the cheques signed by the accused as Krishna Kant Kushwaha and the said cheques were bounced due to insufficient fund in the account. On Ext.16 the signature of the account holder is as Krishna Kant Kushwaha and if Ext.13 and Ext.16 series are juxtaposed or put side by side it shows that, all the cheques are related to Canara Bank and the account number is also the same i.e. the current account No. 1110, but in Ext.13 series signature of accused Krishna Kant Kushwaha is mentioned as K.K. Kushwaha and it has been rightly observed by learned lower court that, there is absolutely no doubt about the fact that, for one account there cannot be more than one signature. It is also apparent that, in the course of business the first number of cheque is issued earlier and thereafter another cheques are being issued. But Ext.16 series and Ext.13 series clearly reveals that, cheques were issued in haphazard manner. Post-dated cheques beyond 90 days have also been issued. 32. It is also apparent that, in the course of business the first number of cheque is issued earlier and thereafter another cheques are being issued. But Ext.16 series and Ext.13 series clearly reveals that, cheques were issued in haphazard manner. Post-dated cheques beyond 90 days have also been issued. 32. Thus it is clear cut manifestation of the facts that, there was a forgery in document and their production for the purpose of treating them as genuine and the intention of the forgery can be convincingly inferred from the contents of the forged documents. 33. From the perusal of the documents exhibited it transpires that, Ext.13 to Ext.13/4 are the cheques of Canara Bank which was issued on different dates bears the signature “K.K. Kushwaha” whereas other cheques bearing Ext.13 and cheques Ext.16 to 16A bears the full name signature as “Krishna Kanti Kushwaha.” It has not been explained by the defence as to why for the same account number the cheques were issued on different signature. 34. In view of the facts adverted above and evidence available on record I find that, the appellant No. 1 along with his wife Mudrika Devi and few persons who were working under him went from village to village in the district of Hazaribag and asked the people to invest money in Ujjwal Facility Card Pvt. Ltd. and gave allurement that if they invest one rupee, they will get Rs. 1.50 in the nExt.month and accordingly induced many innocent people who invested their money including the informant. The sum such collected has not been returned to the poor investors till the date.” On the point of no charge framed under Section 465 IPC 43. So far as the argument on behalf of the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha that he has been convicted under Section 465 of IPC also, though no charge was framed under the same section is concerned, this Court finds that the learned trial court had convicted the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha for offence under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and has not convicted him under Section 465 of IPC. However, while sentencing, the learned trial court sentenced him under Section 471 read with section 465 of IPC. However, while sentencing, the learned trial court sentenced him under Section 471 read with section 465 of IPC. The aforesaid is of no consequence, inasmuch as, Section 465 IPC provides punishment for forgery and Section 471 IPC provides punishment for using as genuine a forged document and it has been provided that the accused shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document. It was the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha who had created the forged document and used the same as genuine and further no separate punishment has been given to the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha for offence under Section 465 of IPC and Section 471 of IPC. On the point of non-examination of the Investigating Officer of the case 44. This Court finds that formation of the company in which Krisna Kant Kuswaha was the Managing Director and Mundrika Devi was the Deputy Director is not in dispute. The specific case of the prosecution is that the victims i.e. PWs. 1 to 13 had invested in the company upon being allured by the accused persons, part amount was refunded to some of them and one fine morning, the office of the company was found closed and the accused absconded with their money. The case of the prosecution is supported by oral as well as documentary evidences on record including issuance of cheques, some of which bounced on account of insufficient funds. In some of the cheques, there were different signatures/ names of the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha, Managing Director of the company, though the cheques were drawn on the same account. The defence had availed full opportunity to cross examine the prosecution witnesses. In view of the specific nature of the evidences available on record, this Court is of the view that non-examination of the Investigating Officer of the case is not a material lacuna to the prosecution case and the same has not prejudiced the defence in any manner whatsoever. On the point of reliance by the lower courts below on the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the company, though not exhibited coupled with the fact that the company was never made an accused in the case. 45. On the point of reliance by the lower courts below on the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the company, though not exhibited coupled with the fact that the company was never made an accused in the case. 45. The learned appellate court also considered that the petitioners had exhibited the incorporation certificate of the company marked as Exhibit-A and also considered the Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of the company which were available in the records, but were never exhibited. On the basis of these two un-exhibited documents, the learned appellate court found that Krisna Kant Kuswaha and his wife Mundrika Devi were Managing Director and Deputy Director respectively of the aforesaid company and the act of the petitioners in collecting money by way of investment in the company was beyond the provisions of the memorandum of the company. The appellate court also recorded that the offending company acted in contravention of its aims and objects for which it was incorporated. 46. The petitioners have raised serious objection with regards to reliance on the Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of the company, which were available in the records, but were never exhibited. This Court is of the considered view that even if the aforesaid two documents are ignored, the basic ingredients for constituting the offence for which the petitioners have been convicted are available on record and accordingly, the aforesaid two documents have no bearing in the matter. 47. It is not in dispute that Krisna Kant Kuswaha and his wife Mundrika Devi were the Managing Director and Deputy Director respectively of the Company whose certificate of incorporation was exhibited by them as Exhibit-A. 48. Admittedly, the Company was never made accused in the case and charge-sheet was filed only against the aforesaid four persons. In spite of the fact that the company was not an accused, the learned court below held that the offending company acted in contravention of the forbidden clause and if the company acts beyond its memorandum, its acts will be ultra-vires and without any legal effect and the Directors of the company are personally liable to the company for their ultra-vires act. The appellate court referred to the term “person” as used in IPC and was of the view that person includes a company and the company cannot act on its own person, it acts through somebody whose action is the action of the company itself and thus there is organic relationship between the company and its Directors and Managers. In this background, in Para-11 and 25, it has been recorded as follows: “11. It appears from the evidence available on the record of the lower court that, at the time offence was said to be committed these two directors were in–charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. It also appears from the record that, both the accused persons entered into an agreement and they got their company incorporated and thereafter they resorted to illegal means and have not come with clean hands in business of the company and their intention is inferable by their subsequent conduct. 25. Therefore, Mundrika Devi being one of the directors of the company cannot absolve herself for every act or omissions contrary to the provisions thereof.” 49. This Court is of the considered view that the company having not been made an accused, the petitioners cannot be made criminally liable only on the ground that they were the Deputy Director (Mundrika Devi) or Managing Director (Krisna Kant Kuswaha) of the company. 50. Having held as aforesaid, it is required to be seen as to whether the conviction of the petitioners can be sustained, and to what extent, on the basis of their individual/collective acts and omissions which have been proved on record and reflecting from the concurrent finding of facts. In this respect, the questions put to the petitioners during recording their statements under section 313 of Cr.P.C. are also required to be considered. On the point of ingredients of offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120 B of IPC 51. Section 463 of IPC defines forgery; Section 464 of IPC deals with making of a false document and Explanation 1 to Section 464 provides that a man’s signature of his own name may also amount to forgery; Section 467 of IPC deals with forgery of valuable security, will etc. Section 463 of IPC defines forgery; Section 464 of IPC deals with making of a false document and Explanation 1 to Section 464 provides that a man’s signature of his own name may also amount to forgery; Section 467 of IPC deals with forgery of valuable security, will etc. Section 468 of IPC deals with forgery for the purposes of cheating; Section 470 of IPC inter-alia provides that a false document made wholly or in part by forgery is designated as a forged document and Section 471 IPC provides that whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document. 52. In the Judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ibrahim vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court analyzed and applied Sections 467 and 471 of IPC in Para-10 to 17 which are as under: “10. Section 467 (insofar as it is relevant to this case) provides that whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. Section 471, relevant to our purpose, provides that whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document. 11. Section 470 defines a forged document as a false document made by forgery. The term “forgery” used in these two sections is defined in Section 463. Whoever makes any false documents with intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that the fraud may be committed, commits forgery. 12. Section 464 defining “making a false document” is extracted below......... 13. The condition precedent for an offence under Sections 467 and 471 is forgery. The condition precedent for forgery is making a false document (or false electronic record or part thereof). 12. Section 464 defining “making a false document” is extracted below......... 13. The condition precedent for an offence under Sections 467 and 471 is forgery. The condition precedent for forgery is making a false document (or false electronic record or part thereof). This case does not relate to any false electronic record. Therefore, the question is whether the first accused, in executing and registering the two sale deeds purporting to sell a property (even if it is assumed that it did not belong to him), can be said to have made and executed false documents, in collusion with the other accused. 14. An analysis of Section 464 of the Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories: 1. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed. 2. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person. 3. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. In short, a person is said to have made a “false document” if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses. 15. The sale deeds executed by the first appellant.......... 16. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on owner’s behalf. 15. The sale deeds executed by the first appellant.......... 16. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on owner’s behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of “false documents” it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. 17. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are attracted.” 53. In the Judgment passed in the case of Sheila Sebastian vs. R. Jawaharaj, (2018) 7 SCC 581 , in Para 19 to 26, it has been held as under: “19. A close scrutiny of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that, Section 463 defines the offence of forgery, while Section 464 substantiates the same by providing an answer as to when a false document could be said to have been made for the purpose of committing an offence of forgery under Section 463 IPC. Therefore, we can safely deduce that Section 464 defines one of the ingredients of forgery i.e. making of a false document. Therefore, we can safely deduce that Section 464 defines one of the ingredients of forgery i.e. making of a false document. Further, Section 465 provides punishment for the commission of the offence of forgery. In order to sustain a conviction under Section 465, first it has to be proved that forgery was committed under Section 463, implying that ingredients under Section 464 should also be satisfied. Therefore, unless and until ingredients under Section 463 are satisfied a person cannot be convicted under Section 465 by solely relying on the ingredients of Section 464, as the offence of forgery would remain incomplete. 20. The key to unfold the present dispute lies in understanding Explanation 2 as given in Section 464 IPC. As Collin, J. puts it precisely in Dickins vs. Gill, a case dealing with the possession and making of fictitious stamp wherein he stated that “to make” in itself involves conscious act on the part of the maker. Therefore, an offence of forgery cannot lie against a person who has not created it or signed it. 21. It is observed in the case Mohd. Ibrahim and Others vs. State of Bihar and Another, (2009) 8 SCC 751 that: “.......a person is said to have made a “false document” if: (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else. (ii) he altered or tampered a document. (iii) he obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses.” 22. In Mohd. Ibrahim, this Court had the occasion to examine forgery of a document purporting to be a valuable security (Section 467 IPC) and using of forged document as genuine (Section 471 IPC). While considering the basic ingredients of both the offences, this Court observed that to attract the offence of forgery as defined under Section 463 IPC depends upon creation of a document as defined under Section 464 IPC. It is further observed that mere execution of a sale deed by claiming that property being sold was executant’s property, did not amount to commission of offences punishable under Sections 467 and 471 IPC even if title of property did not vest in the executant. 23. The Court in Mohd. It is further observed that mere execution of a sale deed by claiming that property being sold was executant’s property, did not amount to commission of offences punishable under Sections 467 and 471 IPC even if title of property did not vest in the executant. 23. The Court in Mohd. Ibrahim observed that: “......There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on owner’s behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of “false documents” it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are attracted.” 24. In Mir Nagvi Askari vs. CBI, this Court, after analysing the facts of that case, came to observe as follows: (SCC p. 687, Para 164) “164. A person is said to make a false document or record if he satisfies one of the three conditions as noticed hereinbefore and provided for under the said section. In Mir Nagvi Askari vs. CBI, this Court, after analysing the facts of that case, came to observe as follows: (SCC p. 687, Para 164) “164. A person is said to make a false document or record if he satisfies one of the three conditions as noticed hereinbefore and provided for under the said section. The first condition being that the document has been falsified with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document has been made by a person, by whom the person falsifying the document knows that it was not made. Clearly the documents in question in the present case, even if it be assumed to have been made dishonestly or fraudulently, had not been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that they were made by or under the authority of someone else. The second criteria of the section deals with a case where a person without lawful authority alters a document after it has been made. There has been no allegation of alteration of the voucher in question after they have been made. Therefore, in our opinion the second criteria of the said section is also not applicable to the present case. The third and final condition of Section 464 deals with a document, signed by a person who due to his mental capacity does not know the contents of the documents which were made i.e. because of intoxication or unsoundness of mind, etc. Such is also not the case before us. Indisputably therefore the accused before us could not have been convicted with the making of a false document.” 25. Keeping in view the strict interpretation of penal statute i.e. referring to rule of interpretation wherein natural inferences are preferred, we observe that a charge of forgery cannot be imposed on a person who is not the maker of the same. As held in plethora of cases, making of a document is different than causing it to be made. As Explanation 2 to Section 464 further clarifies that, for constituting an offence under Section 464 it is imperative that a false document is made and the accused person is the maker of the same, otherwise the accused person is not liable for the offence of forgery. 26. The definition of “false document” is a part of the definition of “forgery.” Both must be read together. 26. The definition of “false document” is a part of the definition of “forgery.” Both must be read together. “Forgery” and “fraud” are essentially matters of evidence which could be proved as a fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn from proved facts. In the case in hand, there is no finding recorded by the trial court that the respondents have made any false document or part of the document/record to execute mortgage deed under the guise of that “false document.” Hence, neither Respondent 1 nor Respondent 2 can be held as makers of the forged documents. It is the imposter who can be said to have made the false document by committing forgery. In such an event the trial court as well as the appellate court misguided themselves by convicting the accused. Therefore, the High Court has rightly acquitted the accused based on the settled legal position and we find no reason to interfere with the same.” 54. In the Judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ibrahim vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court analyzed and applied Sections 420 of IPC in Para 18 to 23 as under: “18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an offence of cheating are made out. The essential ingredients of the offence of “cheating” are as follows: (i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or by any other act or omission. (ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to either deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. (iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. 19. To constitute an offence under Section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived: (i) to deliver any property to any person. (ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security). 20. (ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security). 20. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such sale deed to allege that the vendor has cheated him by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused. 21. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or misleading representation or by any other action or omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the second accused or the second accused by reason of being the purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner. 22. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415 are not found, it cannot be said that there was an offence punishable under Sections 417, 418, 419 or 420 of the Code. A clarification 23. When we say that execution of a sale deed by a person, purporting to convey a property which is not his, as his property, is not making a false document and therefore not forgery, we should not be understood as holding that such an act can never be a criminal offence. If a person sells a property knowing that it does not belong to him, and thereby defrauds the person who purchased the property, the person defrauded, that is, the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the fraudulent act of cheating. If a person sells a property knowing that it does not belong to him, and thereby defrauds the person who purchased the property, the person defrauded, that is, the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such complaint.” 55. This Court finds that as per the evidences of the prosecution witnesses, the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha had active participation in collection of the investments in the company from the investors and the petitioner-Mundrika Devi was a part of the team only on one occasion while alluring PW-1 and 2 in the shop of PW-1, Chhotu Kumar. All the prosecution witnesses have consistently stated that they did not get their investments back from the company and the company and its officials misappropriated their investments. 56. Upon perusal of the records of the present cases, it appears that the present two petitioners i.e. Krisna Kant Kuswaha and Mundrika Devi, wife of Krisna Kant Kuswaha faced the trial for offence under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code. It further appears that the trial of other two accused persons against whom chargesheet was submitted i.e. Sushma Tigga and Pravin Kumar, who were Manager and Deputy Manager of the Company namely, Ujjwal Facility Card Private Ltd. Hazaribagh, was separated. It is not in dispute that the accused persons formed a company in the name and style of Ujjwal Facility Card Private Ltd., Hazaribagh, a non-banking Company in which the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha was the Managing Director and his wife Mundrika Devi was the Deputy Director. The allegation is that all the four accused persons collected money from various investors including the aforesaid four persons who filed the FIR i.e. PWs. 1, 2, 3 and 5. The amount deposited by them, part amount refunded to them and the balance remaining i.e. Rs. 11,10,500/- as mentioned in the aforesaid chart submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners are supported by evidences on record. It has further come in evidence that the office of the company was suddenly closed since 24.01.2008 and the accused persons absconded and later on, the petitioner Krisna Kant Kuswaha was arrested and others were also arrested/surrendered. Apart from the aforesaid four persons, there were other victims who were examined as PWs. It has further come in evidence that the office of the company was suddenly closed since 24.01.2008 and the accused persons absconded and later on, the petitioner Krisna Kant Kuswaha was arrested and others were also arrested/surrendered. Apart from the aforesaid four persons, there were other victims who were examined as PWs. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 who had invested money in the company upon allurement of the accused persons and out of them, only PW-4 received back an amount of Rs. 25,000/- and the other persons did not receive any amount back. The amount remaining balance with regards to PWs. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 was Rs. 9,66,000/- is based on the evidences on record and a chart has been already given by the learned counsel for the petitioners as mentioned above. It has also come in evidence that the accused persons had allured the investors to invest money for good return and subsequently, made partial return to some of them and suddenly closed down the company and ran away. It has also come in evidence that several cheques were issued to different investing persons and some of them when deposited, bounced due to insufficient funds. All the cheques were signed by the Managing Director of the aforesaid company namely, the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha. It has also come in evidence that there were different signatures of Krisna Kant Kuswaha in different cheques though drawn on the same bank account. A number of promissory notes were also issued under the signature of Krisna Kant Kuswaha. 57. The learned courts below have clearly held that all the witnesses have categorically deposed that they have deposited money in the company, but when they went to the office of the company, they found it closed and they could not get their money in time. From the evidences, it is also apparent that several cheques were issued under the signature of Krisna Kant Kuswaha being the Managing Director of the Company for refunding the money of various investors, but could not be encashed due to insufficient fund in the account and some of the cheques had varied signatures though drawn from the same account. Explanation 1 to Section 464 IPC clearly provides that a man’s signature of his own name may also amount to forgery. 58. Explanation 1 to Section 464 IPC clearly provides that a man’s signature of his own name may also amount to forgery. 58. In the present case, the conduct of the accused persons in the manner in which they allured the investors (PWs. 1 to 13) to invest in the name of the company; the manner in which the requisite bonds were issued which did not even contain the seal of the company; the manner in which the promissory notes/cheques were issued, inter-alia, by the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha, the Managing Director of the company; the cheques either bounced on account of insufficient funds or had different signatures of the petitioner Krisna Kant Kuswaha even when drawn from the same account; the accused persons suddenly closed the office of the company and absconded without any money left in the account of the company as the cheques had bounced, satisfy all the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 and Section 120(B) of IPC clearly establishing that the petitioners had criminal intent to deceive the investors right from very beginning. Further, there is no explanation from the side of the petitioners as to what happened to the money of the investors, who had invested in the company upon being allured by the accused persons. 59. The learned courts below have recorded categorical findings considering the materials on record that the witnesses were allured by the accused persons to invest money for good return and the terms and conditions offered to them were unreasonable and Exhibits-1 to 16 clearly show the conduct, intention and acts of the accused persons. The learned appellate court further recorded a finding based on materials on record that it is manifestly clear from the facts that there was forgery in the documents and their production for the purpose of treating them as genuine and the intention regarding forgery can be convincingly inferred from the contents of the forged documents. The learned appellate court further recorded a finding based on materials on record that it is manifestly clear from the facts that there was forgery in the documents and their production for the purpose of treating them as genuine and the intention regarding forgery can be convincingly inferred from the contents of the forged documents. This Court finds that the aforesaid materials clearly demonstrate that there are sufficient materials on record to satisfy the basic ingredients of the offences under Sections 420, 463, 464, 467, 468, 471 and Section 120 (B) of IPC as against the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha when seen in the light of the aforesaid two Judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners read with Explanation 1 to Section 464 IPC and of the offences under Sections 420 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code as against the petitioner-Mundrika Devi. 60. This Court finds that the learned courts below have recorded consistent and concurrent findings with regard to the offences committed by the petitioners and have passed well-reasoned judgments based on materials on record convicting the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and convicting the petitioner-Mundrika Devi under Sections 420 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code. 61. In view of the aforesaid findings, this Court finds no ground for re-appreciation of the evidences and coming to a different finding under revisional jurisdiction in absence any material irregularity or perversity in the impugned Judgments of conviction of the petitioners. Accordingly, the Judgment of conviction of the petitioners passed by the learned trial court and confirmed by the learned appellate court is upheld. 62. Before considering the sentences of the petitioners, it would be appropriate to consider the running of the sentences consecutively as imposed by the learned trial court in the light of the judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners and in view of the arguments placed by him on behalf of the petitioners. On the point of sentences being consecutive and not concurrent 63. On the point of sentences being consecutive and not concurrent 63. This Court finds that in the case of O.M. Cherian @ Thankachan (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that when the prosecution is based on single transaction where it constitutes two or more offences, sentences are to run concurrently and imposing separate sentences, when the acts constituting different offences form part of the single transaction, is not justified. In the cases of V.K. Bansal (supra), Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (Supra) and Manoj alias Panu, the Hon’ble Court has ruled imposition of sentences concurrently, when the prosecution is based on a single transaction. 64. This Court further finds that in the case of Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (Supra) in Para-10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also indicated the application of the exception to the single transaction rule for concurrent sentences: “10. The basic rule of thumb over the years has been the so-called single transaction rule for concurrent sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two offences under two enactments generally, it is wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is proper and legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But this rule has no application, if the transaction relating to offences is not the same or the facts constituting the two offences are quite different.” 65. In the Judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of O.M. Cherian vs. State of Kerala, (2015) 2 SCC 501 it has been held in Para-19, 20 and 21 as follows: “19. As pointed out earlier, Section 31 Cr.P.C. deals with quantum of punishment which may be legally passed when there is (a) one trial and (b) the accused is convicted of two or more offences. The ambit of Section 31 is wide, covering not only a single transaction constituting two or more offences but also offences arising out of two or more transactions. In the two judgments in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain and Manoj, the issue that fell for consideration was the imposition of sentence for two or more offences arising out of the single transaction. It is in that context, in those cases, this Court held that the sentences shall run concurrently. 20. Under Section 31 Cr.P.C. it is left to the full discretion of the court to order the sentences to run concurrently in case of conviction for two or more offences. It is in that context, in those cases, this Court held that the sentences shall run concurrently. 20. Under Section 31 Cr.P.C. it is left to the full discretion of the court to order the sentences to run concurrently in case of conviction for two or more offences. It is difficult to lay down any straitjacket approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion by the courts. By and large, trial courts and appellate courts have invoked and exercised their discretion to issue directions for concurrent running of sentences, favouring the benefit to be given to the accused. Whether a direction for concurrent running of sentences ought to be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or offences committed and the facts and circumstances of the case. The discretion has to be exercised along the judicial lines and not mechanically. 21. Accordingly, we answer the reference by holding that Section 31 Cr.P.C. leaves full discretion with the court to order sentences for two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently, having regard to the nature of offences and attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances. We do not find any reason to hold that normal rule is to order the sentence to be consecutive and exception is to make the sentences concurrent. Of course, if the court does not order the sentence to be concurrent, one sentence may run after the other, in such order as the court may direct. We also do not find any conflict in the earlier judgment in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain and Section 31 Cr.P.C.” 66. Keeping in view the aforesaid Judgment on the point of sentence, this Court finds that in the instant case, there are multiple victims and the incidents with them are distinct. The allegations are not based on single incident with multiple victims, but there are multiple incidents and multiple victims, except that with PW-1 and 2, where there is one incident of allurement at the shop of PW-1 with two victims i.e. PW-1 and 2. In the present case, this Court finds that distinct transactions are involved with different investors at different points of time, although one criminal case has been initiated in relation to those distinct transactions. Accordingly, the aforesaid judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not applicable in the present case of the petitioner Krisna Kant Kuswaha. In the present case, this Court finds that distinct transactions are involved with different investors at different points of time, although one criminal case has been initiated in relation to those distinct transactions. Accordingly, the aforesaid judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not applicable in the present case of the petitioner Krisna Kant Kuswaha. In all the incidents, petitioner Krisna Kant Kuswaha is, inter alia, the common accused. Thus, the consecutive sentences with respect to the petitioner-Krisna Kant Kuswaha does not call for any interference. 67. So far as petitioner Mundrika Devi is concerned, her role having been found only in connection with only one incident which was at the shop of PW-1, where she had accompanied the other accused persons alluring the investors and consequent investments in the company were made by PWs. 1 and 2, the consecutive running of her sentences cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and it calls for interference under revisional jurisdiction. Accordingly, the sentences of the petitioner-Mundrika Devi will run concurrently and not consecutively. On the point of sentences modified by the appellate court and repayment to the victims as directed by the appellate court in the impugned Judgment. 68. Considering the aforesaid aspects of the matter, there is role of Smt. Mundrika Devi only in connection with collection of amounts from PW-1 and PW-2. An amount of Rs. 4,65,500/- was collected from PW-1 who received repayment of Rs. 1,50,000/- and the balance amount was Rs. 3,15,500/- and an amount of Rs. 5,10,000/- was invested by PW-2 who received back an amount of Rs. 90,000/- and accordingly, Rs. 4,20,000/- remained unpaid. In such circumstances, the total amount which remained unpaid with respect to PW-1 and PW-2 is Rs. 7,35,500/- only. 69. In view of aforesaid circumstances, Mundrika Devi can at best be liable to pay 50% of Rs. 7,35,500/- which comes to Rs. 3,67,750/- apart from fine of Rs. 10,000/-. 70. The consequence of non-payment of the fine amount or the amount of the investors (victims-PW-1 to 13) is also required to be considered. 71. 7,35,500/- only. 69. In view of aforesaid circumstances, Mundrika Devi can at best be liable to pay 50% of Rs. 7,35,500/- which comes to Rs. 3,67,750/- apart from fine of Rs. 10,000/-. 70. The consequence of non-payment of the fine amount or the amount of the investors (victims-PW-1 to 13) is also required to be considered. 71. This Court finds that the learned appellate court while passing the impugned judgment though upheld the conviction of the petitioners, but modified the sentence in the following manner: “However, in order to meet the ends of justice, the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellants is reduced to the period already undergone by the accused in custody provided. They pay in addition to, the amount deposited by the investing parties, a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each.” 72. The learned appellate court dismissed the criminal appeal confirming the conviction of the petitioners, but modified and reduced their respective sentences to the period already undergone by them in custody provided that they would pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each, in addition to the amount deposited by the investing parties. 73. This Court finds that neither the amount of investing parties has been quantified by the learned appellate court, nor any time period for deposit of fine or the amount of the investing parties has been granted in the impugned order. It appears that the learned appellate court has made an endeavor to compensate the victims of the case and with respect to some of the victims, only part amount remained unpaid. This is reflecting in the aforesaid chart submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners based on the evidences on record. As per the impugned appellate Judgment, the amount of the investors is to be paid by the petitioners, but the amount has neither been quantified nor apportioned amongst the petitioners. The appellate court did not indicate as to whether the investors’ amount has to be deposited jointly and/or severally. Thus, the impugned Judgment is vague to the aforesaid extent and is required to be considered by this Court in the light of the evidences on record. 74. The appellate court did not indicate as to whether the investors’ amount has to be deposited jointly and/or severally. Thus, the impugned Judgment is vague to the aforesaid extent and is required to be considered by this Court in the light of the evidences on record. 74. In the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Mohan vs. A.K. Vijaya Kumar, (2012) 8 SCC 721 , it has been held that the idea behind directing the accused to pay compensation is to give him immediate relief as to alleviate his grievance and in terms of Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. compensation is awarded for loss or injury suffered by the person due to act of the accused for which he is sentenced and if merely an order directing compensation is passed, it would be totally ineffective. Such order of compensation could be an order without any deterrence or apprehension of immediate adverse consequences in case of its non-observance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that the compensation awarded under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. would be frustrated, if the complainant is driven to take recourse to Section 421 Cr.P.C. Order under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. must have potentiality to secure its observance and such deterrence can only be infused into the order by providing for a default sentence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that if Section 421 of Cr.P.C. puts compensation ordered to be paid by the court on par with fine so far as mode of recovery is concerned, then there is no reason why the court cannot impose a sentence in default of payment of compensation as it can be done in case of default of payment of fine under Section 64 IPC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that the order to pay compensation may be enforced by awarding sentence of imprisonment in default. 75. In the present case, the learned appellate court while modifying the sentence and limiting it to the period already undergone in custody with fine already imposed by the learned trial court, so far as the petitioner-Krishna Kant Kushwaha is concerned and enhancing the fine from Rs. 4,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- so far as the petitioner-Mundrika Devi is concerned, additionally directed payment of the amount deposited by the investing parties who were the victims of the case. 4,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- so far as the petitioner-Mundrika Devi is concerned, additionally directed payment of the amount deposited by the investing parties who were the victims of the case. Thus, the direction for payment to investing parties is for all purposes by way of compensation under Section 357(3) of Cr.P.C. However, no time limit for making such payment has been prescribed, but the modification of sentence is subject to payment to investing parties and also payment of fine amount. 76. Considering the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2012) 8 SCC 721 (supra), this Court finds that the default sentence on account of non-payment of compensation has been held to be a mode of enforcement of payment of compensation. This Court is of the considered view that the default sentence in connection with compensation is a mode of its enforcement which is in addition to the mode of recovery of money as provided under Section 421 of Cr.P.C. Section 421 Cr.P.C. clearly provides that any money (other than a fine) payable by virtue of any order made under Code of Criminal Procedure and the method of recovery of which is not otherwise expressly provided for shall be recoverable as if it were a fine. This Court is also of the considered view that even if a person has served the default clause regarding payment of compensation awarded for the purposes of victims of the crime, the same continues to be recoverable as fine in terms of Section 431 of Cr.P.C. Thus, merely by serving the default sentence qua non-payment of compensation awarded under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. the petitioners are not absolved of their liability to pay the compensation to the victims of the crime i.e. the investing parties in the present case and the same would still remain recoverable by taking recourse to Section 431 of Cr.P.C. 77. In the present case, the compensation to the investing parties as directed by the learned appellate court is not part of sentence as it is not a fine. Accordingly, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that in case of non-payment of compensation to the investing parties, at best the petitioners would be subjected to the sentence already imposed by the learned trial court and then no compensation would be payable, is devoid of any merits and hence rejected. 78. Accordingly, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that in case of non-payment of compensation to the investing parties, at best the petitioners would be subjected to the sentence already imposed by the learned trial court and then no compensation would be payable, is devoid of any merits and hence rejected. 78. This Court is of the considered view that even if the petitioners serve the entire sentence as awarded by the learned trial court, the victim compensation directed to be paid by the learned appellate court by directing refund of money to the investing parties (total investing parties as per the present record is 13), the same would still be recoverable under Section 431 Cr.P.C. This Court also finds upon perusal of Section 421 of Cr.P.C. which deals with warrant and attachment of properties of the defaulter for recovery of fine, that the section clearly provides that if the sentence directs that in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall be imprisoned and if such offender has undergone the whole of such imprisonment in default, no court shall issue such warrant unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, it considers it necessary to do so, or unless it has made an order for payment of expenses or compensation out of fine under Section 357 Cr.P.C. 79. In the present case, the payment to investing parties is referrable to Section 357(3) of Cr.P.C. and therefore, merely by serving the default sentence i.e. the sentence imposed by the learned trial court, the petitioners cannot be absolved of their liability to pay the compensation amount i.e. the amount to the investing parties. Under such circumstances, the learned appellate court though have not quantified the amount payable to the investing parties, but on the basis of materials on record from which the learned counsel for the petitioners have drawn up a chart as mentioned above, the amount payable to the investing parties would be recoverable in terms of Section 431 of Cr.P.C. read with Section 421 of Cr.P.C. 80. So far as Mundrika Devi is concerned, the impugned Judgment is required to be modified by directing her to deposit Rs. 3,67,750/- in 6 installments of Rs. 50,000/- on or before the last date of every month commencing from 31.01.2022 and the last monthly installment in the seventh month would be Rs. 67,750/-. So far as Mundrika Devi is concerned, the impugned Judgment is required to be modified by directing her to deposit Rs. 3,67,750/- in 6 installments of Rs. 50,000/- on or before the last date of every month commencing from 31.01.2022 and the last monthly installment in the seventh month would be Rs. 67,750/-. Accordingly, she would be liable to deposit as under: (a) fine of Rs. 10,000/- to be deposited by 15.01.2022. In case of non-deposit of the fine amount, she will serve the remaining sentence as imposed by the learned trial court. (b) 50% of Rs. 7,35,500/- which comes to Rs. 3,67,750/- which is the refundable amount of PW-1 and PW-2 as per the installment mentioned above. (c) In case, she defaults in depositing the amount as per any installment, she would serve the sentence already imposed by the learned trial court and the remaining amount of Rs. 3,67,750/- will be recoverable as per Section 431 read with Section 421 of Cr.P.C. (d) The amount of Rs. 3,67,750/- or any part thereof so deposited by her would be disbursed to PW-1 and PW-2 in the same proportion as per their remaining amount of investment upon due identification by the learned court below. 81. So far as petitioner Krisna Kant Kuswaha is concerned, he has played active role in connection with the alleged offence with regard to each of the victims. Accordingly, he would be liable to deposit as under: (a) fine of Rs. 10,000/- to be deposited by 15.01.2022. In case of non-deposit of the fine amount, he will serve the remaining sentence as imposed by the learned trial court. (b) Remaining 50% of Rs. 7,35,500/- which comes to Rs. 3,67,750/- so far as refundable amount of PW-1 and PW-2 are concerned. (c) Remaining balance refundable amount with regards to PWs. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 i.e. Rs. 9,66,000/-. (d) The total amount of Rs. 3,67,750/- plus Rs. 9,66,000/- i.e. Rs. 13,33,750/- is directed to be deposited in 26 installments of Rs. 50,000/- each on or before the last date of every month commencing from 31.01.2022 and the last monthly installment in the twenty seventh month would be Rs. 33,750/-. (e) In case, he defaults in depositing the amount as per any installment, he would serve the sentence already imposed by the learned trial court and the remaining amount of Rs. 50,000/- each on or before the last date of every month commencing from 31.01.2022 and the last monthly installment in the twenty seventh month would be Rs. 33,750/-. (e) In case, he defaults in depositing the amount as per any installment, he would serve the sentence already imposed by the learned trial court and the remaining amount of Rs. 13,33,750/- will be recoverable as per Section 431 read with Section 421 of Cr.P.C. (f) The amount of Rs. 13,33,750/- or any part thereof so deposited by him would be disbursed to PWs. 1 to 13 in the same proportion as per their remaining amount of investment upon due identification by the learned court below. 82. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, the conviction of the petitioners is upheld and the criminal revision petitions are hereby disposed of with modification in the sentence/quantum of amount to be deposited by each of the petitioners. 83. Interim order, if any, in both the cases, stands vacated. 84. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed. 85. Let the Lower Court Records of the case be sent back immediately to the court concerned. 86. Let this Judgment be communicated to the court concerned through “FAX/E-mail.”