JUDGMENT : Both the appeals have been heard together with the consent of parties since common question of facts and law are involved and, thus, are being disposed of by a common order/judgment. 2. The instant intra-court appeals under Clause 10 of Letters Patent have been preferred against the order/judgment dated 06.10.2020 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 1611 and 1612 of 2020, whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petitions refusing to interfere with the impugned order as contained in memo dated 5th March, 2018, by which the respondent no. 3-Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad cancelled the allotment of a restaurant so far writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 1611 of 2020 is concerned; and Memo dated 6th March, 2018, by which the respondent no. 3-Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad directed the petitioner to handover the possession of the leased premises i.e. Multipurpose Building (Marriage Hall) near Kala Bhawan, Lubi Circular road, Dhanbad within 24 hours after denying renewal of the lease agreement of the said building so far it relates to writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 1612 of 2020 with a further direction to the respondent no. 1-Zila Parishad, Dhanbad to take possession of the premises in question and to conduct a fresh public auction in transparent and fair manner within a stipulated period of time. 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleadings made in the writ petitions, which are required to be enumerated herein for proper adjudication of the lis, are as under: In the year 2016, the Board of Zila Parishad, Dhanbad took a decision for leasing out the multipurpose building (marriage hall) and other halls/premises to the highest bidder by way of open auction and, as such, a public auction notice was published in the local newspaper vide memo no. 306 dated 09th March, 2017 with respect to settlement of a restaurant situated at Bekarbandh and a multipurpose building situated near Kala Bhawan, Lubi Circular Road, Dhanbad for a period of three years. The petitioners participated in the said auction held on 24th March, 2017 and being the highest bidders, were declared successful. Bipin Kumar Tiwary, petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 1611 of 2020 was allotted the restaurant at Bekarbandh and a lease agreement to that effect was executed between them on 29th March, 2017. The petitioners participated in the said auction held on 24th March, 2017 and being the highest bidders, were declared successful. Bipin Kumar Tiwary, petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 1611 of 2020 was allotted the restaurant at Bekarbandh and a lease agreement to that effect was executed between them on 29th March, 2017. He started to run the said restaurant in the name and style of “Apple Restaurant”. Sanjay Kumar Singh, the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 1612 of 2020 was allotted multipurpose building (marriage hall) near Kala Bhawan, Lubi Circular Road, Dhanbad and a lease agreement was executed between them on 29th March, 2017, renewable after every eleven months. Subsequently, the petitioners submitted their applications on 18th February, 2018 along with payment of rent inclusive of 5% of the increased rent to the respondent no. 3 for renewal of their lease agreement on the terms and conditions as mentioned therein. But the allotment made in favour of the petitioner Bipin Kumar Tiwary for running restaurant at Bekarbandh was cancelled by the respondent no.3 vide impugned Memo no. 220/Zi.Pa. dated 05th March, 2018 in the light of letter no.C-13/2016-MPLADS dated 23rd February, 2018, which is the subject matter of W.P.(C) No. 1611 of 2020. The petitioner, Sanjay Kumar Singh, was also served with letter dated 06th March, 2018 issued by the respondent no.3 informing him that on the complaint of one Ashok Kumar Singh, the allegation was enquired by the Executive Magistrate, Dhanbad and in the light of the enquiry report, it was decided not to renew the lease agreement of the multipurpose building (marriage hall) and, hence, the petitioner-Sanjay Kumar Singh was directed to vacate the possession of the said building to the Assistant Engineer, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad. The petitioners and others made objection against the said impugned notices before the Chairman, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad, who thereafter set aside the notices issued by the respondent no. 3 vide his letter no.226 dated 06th March, 2018 and advised the said authority that consent/approval of the respondent no.2 must be taken in all future decisions involving policy matters. Even after when the lease/agreement were not renewed, the petitioner -Bipin Kumar Tiwary filed writ petition being W.P. (C) No.1372 of 2018 and the petitioner-Sanjay Kumar Singh filed writ petition being W.P. (C) No.1270 of 2018. Even after when the lease/agreement were not renewed, the petitioner -Bipin Kumar Tiwary filed writ petition being W.P. (C) No.1372 of 2018 and the petitioner-Sanjay Kumar Singh filed writ petition being W.P. (C) No.1270 of 2018. During pendency of the said writ petitions, a meeting of the Board of Zila Parishad, Dhanbad was held on 11th January, 2020, wherein it was unanimously resolved to renew the respective lease agreements of the petitioners. Therefore, the petitioners sought for withdrawal of the said writ petitions, in consequence thereof, it was dismissed as withdrawn vide orders dated 6th March, 2020. Pursuant thereto, The respondent no. 2 issued letters to the petitioners that due to the lockdown in force in the wake of Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, the renewal could not be done. But, thereafter the respondent no. 3 published auction notice vide memo no.320 dated 6th June, 2020 whereby the leased premises of the petitioners were put to auction. Being aggrieved by the action of the respondents, the writ petitioners filed writ petitions being W.P.(C) No. 1611 of 2020 and 1612 of 2020 for redressal of their grievances. Plea was taken by the writ petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 1611 of 2020 that the impugned order dated 5th March, 2018 has been issued by the respondent no.3 without giving any notice to the petitioner and as such, the same is in utter violation of the principles of natural justice; and in violation of “the Members of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme” (MPLADS) guidelines as the restaurant leased out to the petitioner is running in the ground and first floor of the building, whereas the second floor of the said building has been constructed on a later date out of the fund provided under MPLADS. Further plea was taken that in spite of the fact that the Board of Zila Parishad, Dhanbad had already taken unanimous decision to renew the lease agreement with regard to restaurant in question in favour of the petitioner, the same was not done. It was further submitted that in fact, said restaurant building was in a dilapidated condition, as such after taking over the possession of the said restaurant building he had invested huge amount for renovation of the same by taking loan. Thus, the impugned order issued by the respondent no.3 being highly arbitrary and illegal, is liable to be set aside. It was further submitted that in fact, said restaurant building was in a dilapidated condition, as such after taking over the possession of the said restaurant building he had invested huge amount for renovation of the same by taking loan. Thus, the impugned order issued by the respondent no.3 being highly arbitrary and illegal, is liable to be set aside. Plea was made on behalf of petitioner-Sanjay Kumar Singh before the writ Court that the impugned order dated 6th March, 2018 was without providing any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner to explain the allegations levelled against him on the complaint filed by one Ashok Kumar Singh. The petitioner was not served with the enquiry report of the Executive Magistrate, Dhanbad. It was contended that the said Ashok Kumar Singh made a fictitious complaint on 6th December, 2017 before different authorities regarding the irregularities made in the process of allotment of the Multipurpose Building (Marriage Hall) as well as the other buildings but in the enquiry conducted by the District Panchayat Raj Officer, Dhanbad, he denied to have made any such complaint. It was further submitted that there was no irregularity in making allotment of the said marriage hall rather it was done through public auction and the petitioner being the highest bidder was allowed to run the same after execution of agreement. Moreover, no such issue was raised in the year 2017 when the lease was granted to the petitioner and only in the year 2020 issue regarding validity of auction was raised by way of filing a counter affidavit dated 19th September, 2020. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 submitted that the present writ petitions are barred by the principles of res judicata as the earlier writ petitions filed by the petitioners seeking same relief were dismissed as withdrawn vide orders dated 6th March, 2020 on the prayer of the petitioners themselves. It was further submitted that the public auction notice dated 9th March, 2017 for leasing out the premises in question i.e., restaurant at Bekarbandh and the multipurpose building (marriage hall) near Kala Bhawan, Lubi Circular Road, Dhanbad was not widely circulated in the newspapers and as such the principles/objective of publishing the notice got defeated. It was further submitted that the public auction notice dated 9th March, 2017 for leasing out the premises in question i.e., restaurant at Bekarbandh and the multipurpose building (marriage hall) near Kala Bhawan, Lubi Circular Road, Dhanbad was not widely circulated in the newspapers and as such the principles/objective of publishing the notice got defeated. Therefore, there was clear violation of established procedure of law in the earlier process of auction for leasing out the buildings of the Zila Parishad, as no resolution to that effect was passed by the Board Members. The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the rival submissions of the parties, dismissed the writ petition showing no interference with the order rather directed the respondents-authority to -Zila Parishad, Dhanbad to take possession of the premises in question and issue a fresh public auction in transparent and fair manner within a stipulated period of time, which is the subject matter of present intra-court appeals. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 4. Mr. Mahesh Tewari, learned counsel for the petitioners-appellants submits that the learned Single Judge while exercising power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has transgressed its jurisdiction by sitting on the bona fide decision of the District Board, wherein as per the resolution the decision has been taken to extend the period of lease but without appreciating the said aspect of the matter, the learned Single Judge has sat over the policy decision of the District Board by giving direction to go for fresh public auction for allotment of the premises in question, therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable. It has further been submitted that the allotment made in favour of petitioners was cancelled during subsistence of the lease, as would appear from resolution/minutes of the meeting dated 11th January, 2020 and once the lease period has been extended in course of its pendency, the cancellation of it cannot be justified decision of the District Board, Dhanbad. This aspect of the matter has also not been appreciated by learned Single Judge, therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable. 5. Per contra, Mr. This aspect of the matter has also not been appreciated by learned Single Judge, therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable. 5. Per contra, Mr. Navneet Toppo, learned counsel for the contesting respondents submits that there is no infirmity in the impugned order as the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the fact in entirety and considered that the premises in question under the control of District Board, Dhanbad is being allowed to be settled once by auction and thereafter by way of extension of the period of lease in favour of the same party which is nothing but creating a monopoly over market depriving chance to the others to participate in the process of auction. He submits that the District Boards is the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and the premises in question is under the direct control of the District Board and being the machinery of the State it is incumbent upon the District Board to settle/allot the premises in favour of such successful bidder who have been allowed to participate in the process of selection by inviting application widely in order to meet out the principles as laid down under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and in such circumstances, the learned Single Judge has reached to the conclusion that the public auction is necessary, as such it cannot be said that the impugned order suffers from error. So far as argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner about exceeding the jurisdiction by the writ Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned, it has been submitted that it is a frivolous argument as the power conferred by Constitution under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be restricted if the decision of the State authority suffers from unreasonableness and arbitrariness and in that situation, the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be well within its jurisdiction to look into the alleged unreasonableness and arbitrariness on the part of the concerned authority being the machinery of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India by exercising the power of judicial review. In exercise of such power the learned Single Judge, if has passed the order impugned directing the District Board, Dhanbad to go for the public auction for the premises in question, it cannot be said to suffer from error for the reason that it is necessary to follow the principle of transparency in the matter of allotment of premises in question. Therefore, the order passed by learned Single Judge suffers from no infirmity. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record and findings recorded by learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 7. This Court, before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order, deem it fit and proper to refer certain undisputed facts for proper adjudication of the lis. 8. The premises in question was allotted in favour of the writ petitioners by way of public auction dated 24th March, 2017, in which, they were declared successful bidder being the highest bidder. Petitioner-Bipin Kumar Tiwary was allotted a restaurant at Bekarbandh and he started running the said restaurant in the name and style of “Apple Restaurant” whereas petitioner-Sanjay Kumar Singh was allotted multipurpose building (marriage hall) near Kala Bhawan, Lubi Circular Road, Dhanbad, for which a separate lease agreement was executed on 29th March, 2017 by them, for a period of three years subject to renewal after every eleven months with further stipulation that every year 5 % shall be increase lease amount (i.e.5%+5%+5% value of current lease amount). The petitioners after completion of first 11 month submitted applications on 18th February, 2018 along with payment of rent inclusive of 5% of the increased rent before the respondent no. 3 for renewal of their lease agreement on the terms and conditions as mentioned therein. The petitioners after completion of first 11 month submitted applications on 18th February, 2018 along with payment of rent inclusive of 5% of the increased rent before the respondent no. 3 for renewal of their lease agreement on the terms and conditions as mentioned therein. But the allotment made in favour of the petitioner, Bipin Kumar Tiwary for running restaurant at Bekarbandh, was cancelled by the respondent no.3 vide impugned memo dated 5th March, 2018 in the light of letter dated 23rd February, 2018 and lease agreement of the petitioner-Sanjay Kumar Singh was also not renewed and he was served with letter dated 6th March, 2018 issued by the respondent no.3 informing that on the complaint of one Ashok Kumar Singh, the allegation was enquired into and on the basis of the enquiry report, it was decided not to renew the lease agreement of the multipurpose building (marriage hall) as such he was directed to handover the possession of the said building in favuor of Assistant Engineer, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad. Pursuant thereto, the petitioners represented before the Chairman, District Board, Dhanbad, who quashed the letter of termination of lease granted in favour of petitioners on the ground that no consent has been obtained by the undersigned (Chairman, District Board, Dhanbad) before cancelling the lease and there is violation of power conferred under Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act, with further direction that in future such type of policy decision shall not be taken without the consent of undersigned, i.e. Chairman, District Board, Dhanbad, as would be evident from Annexure 3 to the writ petitions. Thereafter, the matter of renewal of lease of vacant marriage hall, multipurpose building and other building were under consideration before the meeting of District Board, Dhanbad, as would appear from minutes of meeting dated 11.01.2020, Annexure 4 to the writ petition, whereby and whereunder it was decided to allot the premises in question at market rate in order to enhance the source of revenue of the Board. Annexure 5 to the writ petition (W.P.(C) No. 1611 of 2020) is the letter dated 5.06.2020, issued by Chairman, District Board, Dhanbad, in response to the letter written by the petitioner-Bipin Kumar Tiwary, whereby it was informed that matter of renewal of Restaurant in question shall be considered after end of lockdown imposed due to Covid-19 pandemic. Annexure 5 to the writ petition (W.P.(C) No. 1611 of 2020) is the letter dated 5.06.2020, issued by Chairman, District Board, Dhanbad, in response to the letter written by the petitioner-Bipin Kumar Tiwary, whereby it was informed that matter of renewal of Restaurant in question shall be considered after end of lockdown imposed due to Covid-19 pandemic. Likewise, vide Annexure 7 [W.P.(C) No. 1612 of 2020] letter dated 19.05.2020, the petitioner-Sanjay Kumar Singh was informed in the same manner that after lockdown, the matter of renewal of Multipurpose Building shall be considered. Thereafter, the respondent-authority has come out with a decision on 06.06.2020 as contained in memo no. 320 whereby and whereunder, the auction notice was issued inviting application for the auction of the premises in question including the building which is the subject matter of writ petition. 9. This Court, after going through the factual aspects, has found the fact that the writ petitioners in both the writ petitions has challenged the order of cancellation of the allotment of premises in question issued vide order dated 05.03.2018 and 06.03.2018 respectively. But, this Court has failed to understand that when the order of cancellation dated 05.03.2018 and 06.03.2018 which pertains to cancellation of allotment of lease executed in favour of petitioners has already been quashed and set aside by the Chairman, District Board, Dhanbad then why writ petitions were filed as writ petitioners in both the writ petitions are aggrieved with the cancellation of their allotment made in their favor but when the order of cancellation, as issued vide letter dated 05.03.2018 and 06.03.2018 was already quashed and set aside vide order dated 06.03.2018, what necessitated the writ petitioners to approach this Court in the year 2020. 10. When this Court has put a query to the learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard, Mr. Mahesh Tewari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has failed to answer these questions. 11. Further peculiar fact in the present case, as would appear from the impugned order, is that the public auction has been issued on 6.06.2020, as would appear from letter dated 06.06.2020, which is also prior to the filing of the writ petition but very surprisingly, the subsequent auction notice to which the writ petitioners, mainly said to have aggrieved, have not been questioned. According to our considered view, on the basis of factual aspect as dealt with by us hereinabove, the writ petitions ought to have been rendered infructuous by learned Single Judge after taking into consideration order dated 06.03.2018 passed by the Chairman, District Board, Dhanbad in both the writ petitions since the orders which were under challenge have already been taken care of by the Chairman, District Board, Dhanbad in the administrative side and both the orders have been quashed and set aside and, therefore, the order dated 05.03.2018, which is the subject matter of W.P.(C) No. 1611 of 2020 or the order dated 06.03.2018, which is the subject matter of W.P.(C) No. 1612 of 2020 will be said to have no existence the moment the Chairman, District Board, Dhanbad has quashed both the orders and thereby both the writ petitions ought to have been treated without having any cause of action since they were quashed much prior to filing of both the writ petitions. 12. When this Court put another question to Mr. Tewari, learned counsel for the petitioners that when the District Board had already come out with the public notice vide order dated 06.06.2020, which is prior to filing of the writ petitions, why the same had not been challenged when the grievance is being made against the action of the District Board to go for public auction? However, no reply could be given by him. Therefore, according to us both the writ petitions were misconceived. 13. Mr. Tewari, learned counsel for the petitioners, raises the issue of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in dealing with the matter of policy decision of the District Board for allotment of the premises in question which belong to District Board, Dhanbad. It is contended that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot impose its view to go for public auction. 14. Since an important legal issue has been raised by Mr. Tewari, learned counsel for the petitioners, questioning power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for the purpose of answering the aforesaid query, we are framing following issue for determination: As to whether the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can exercise the power of judicial review in the policy and administrative decision of the State? 15. 15. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be exercised for two-fold purpose viz., enforcement of (a).fundament rights as well as of (b). legal rights. The High Court has jurisdiction to review an administrative order which is perverse or arbitrary as also where there is non-compliance with statutory duty by statutory authority. But the High Court will not go into factual findings as held in M.P. State Co-op Dairy Federation Ltd. & Anr. v. Rajnesh Kumar Jamindar & Ors. [ (2009) 15 SCC 221 ]. The High Court while exercising power, has to see as to whether the impugned action or decision has been taken reasonably and intelligently and that it relates to the purpose for which it is to be exercised. The authority cannot act whimsically or arbitrarily. It should be done objectively, fairly and reasonably, as held in Banglore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa & Ors [ (1991) 4 SCC 54 ]. It is also observed that when wide power is vested in the government, it has to be exercised with greater circumspection as greater is the power, greater should be the caution. Though large or wide powers are given, the same are not absolute and exercise of power should only be made for public good and for public cause. Hence interference is permissible, on the principle of violation of public trust doctrine. Which means action should be tested for for good governance as has been held in Consumer Action Group & Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors [ (2000) 7 SCC 425 ]. Interference is also called for when the conditions necessary for taking or initiating action are not satisfied. If an action taken by any authority is contrary to law, improper, irrational or otherwise unreasonable, a court of law can interfere with such action by exercising power of judicial review. The Supreme Court declared broad principles of judicial review i.e., illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety in Coimbatore District Central Co-operative Bank Vs. Coimbatore District Centered Co-operative Bank Employees Assn. & Anr. (2007) 4 SCC 669 ]. Thus, there is no clear interdict on the power of the High Court to interfere with the policy decision. The Supreme Court declared broad principles of judicial review i.e., illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety in Coimbatore District Central Co-operative Bank Vs. Coimbatore District Centered Co-operative Bank Employees Assn. & Anr. (2007) 4 SCC 669 ]. Thus, there is no clear interdict on the power of the High Court to interfere with the policy decision. However, a policy decision taken by the Government is not liable to interference, unless the Court is satisfied that the rule-making authority has acted arbitrarily or in violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri & Ors v. Union of India & Ors [ (1981) 1 SCC 568 ], while upholding the decision to sell, observed that: "35. ... We certainly agree that judicial interference with the administration cannot be meticulous in our Montesquien system of separation of powers. The court cannot usurp or abdicate, and the parameters of judicial review must be clearly defined and never exceeded. If the directorate of a government company has acted fairly, even if it has faltered in its wisdom, the court cannot, as a super auditor, take the Board of Directors to task. This function is limited to testing whether the administrative action has been fair and free from the taint of unreasonableness and has substantially complied with the norms of procedure set for it by rules of public administration. In State of M.P. & Ors v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors [ (1986) 4 SCC 566 ], the change of the policy decision taken by the State of Madhya Pradesh to grant licence for construction of distilleries for manufacture and supply of country liquor to existing contractors was challenged. Dealing with the power of the Court in considering the validity of policy decision relating to economic matters, it was observed that: “34. But, while considering the applicability of Article 14 in such a case, we must bear in mind that, having regard to the nature of the trade or business, the Court would be slow to interfere with the policy laid down by the State Government for grant of licences for manufacture and sale of liquor. But, while considering the applicability of Article 14 in such a case, we must bear in mind that, having regard to the nature of the trade or business, the Court would be slow to interfere with the policy laid down by the State Government for grant of licences for manufacture and sale of liquor. The Court would, in view of the inherently pernicious nature of the commodity allow a large measure of latitude to the State Government in determining its policy of regulating, manufacture and trade in liquor. Moreover, the grant of licences for manufacture and sale of liquor would essentially be a matter of economic policy where the Court would hesitate to intervene and strike down what the State Government has done, unless it appears to be plainly arbitrary, irrational or mala fide. We had occasion to consider the scope of interference by the Court under Article 14 while dealing with laws relating to economic activities in R.K. Garg v. Union of India [ (1981) 4 SCC 675 : 1982 SCC (Tax) 30 : AIR 1981 SC 2138 : (1982) 1 SCR 947 ] . We pointed out in that case that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion, etc. We observed that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. We quoted with approval the following admonition given by Frankfurter, J. in Morey v. Dond [354 US 457] : “In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. We quoted with approval the following admonition given by Frankfurter, J. in Morey v. Dond [354 US 457] : “In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the Judges have been overruled by events — self-limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability.” What we said in that case in regard to legislation relating to economic matters must apply equally in regard to executive action in the field of economic activities, though the executive decision may not be placed on as high a pedestal as legislative judgment insofar as judicial deference is concerned. We must not forget that in complex economic matters every decision is necessarily empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call “trial and error method” and, therefore, its validity cannot be tested on any rigid a priori considerations or on the application of any strait jacket formula. The Court must while adjudging the constitutional validity of an executive decision relating to economic matters grant a certain measure of freedom or “play in the joints” to the executive. “The problem of Government” as pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Metropolis Theatre Co. v. State of Chicago [57 L Ed 730] ” “are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of Government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void.” The Government, as was said in Permian Basin Area Rate cases [20 L Ed (2d) 312] is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the State Government merely because it feels that another policy decision would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or logical. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the State Government merely because it feels that another policy decision would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or logical. The Court can interfere only if the policy decision is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. It is against the background of these observations and keeping them in mind that we must now proceed to deal with the contention of the petitioners based on Article 14 of the Constitution.” The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the State Government merely because it feels that another policy decision would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or logical. The court can interfere only if the policy decision is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. It is against the background of these observations and keeping them in mind this Court now proceed to deal with the contention of the petitioners based on Article 14 of the Constitution as held by the Apex Court in State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal (supra). In the case of Balco Employees Union (Regd.) Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 333 it has been held that interference of the High Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not totally taken away, but the Court must exercise reasonable restraint while interfering with such policy decisions to avoid judicial overreach. For exercise of power under Article 226, there cannot be an issue of jurisdiction rather issue would be when to exercise 25 the discretion. Therefore, keeping in view the principles laid down in the above judgments, this Court is to examine that the decision contained in the impugned order directing to go for public auction suffers from unreasonableness or in excess of the jurisdiction. It is not in dispute so far as the facts of the given case is concerned that the premises in question of immovable property which is under the administrative domain of District Board, Dhanbad, the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, can be allowed to go for extension of the lease extending the period of allotment once it has been allotted in favour of one or the others it will be justified decision if after extending of the period of lease, the allotment of the said premises will be done through the public auction. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sachidanand Pandey & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors [ (1987) 2 SCC 295 ] has observed that ordinarily rules for disposal of the scheme owned or public property was by way of public auction or by inviting tenders but there could be situations where departure from the said rule may be necessitated but then the reasons for departure must be rationale and should not be suggestive of discrimination and that nothing should be done which gives an appearance of bias, jobbery or nepotism. Further, in the case of Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther Vs. Kerala Financial Corporation [(1988) 1SCC 166], the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that the public property owned by the State or any other instrumentality of the State should be jointly sold in public auction or by inviting tenders. It was emphasized that this Rule has been insisted upon not only get the highest price for the aforesaid property but also to ensure fairness in the activity of the State and public authorities and nothing should be done by them which given an impression of bias, favouritism or nepotism. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court that the State or the instrumentality of the State is supposed to go for public auction in order to adopt fair and transparent policy and to create a faith upon public at large. 16. In the given facts of the case the public auction has been issued on 06.06.2020 but the same has not been questioned by the petitioner, as discussed by us in the preceding paragraphs and after considering that aspect of the matter as also considering the settled position of law pertaining to action of the State or instrumentality of the State to go for public auction to settle the public largesse or to made allotment in favour of one or the other, if directed to conduct a fresh public auction in transparent and fair manner, the same cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because the lease has been executed having the renewal clause subject to payment of rent at 5% enhanced price. If the submission, as has been made on behalf of learned counsel for the writ petitioners, will be accepted then the same will be nothing but result in creating a monopoly of one since once premises in question will be allotted in favour of particular allottees the same will remain in his possession forever and none other will be allowed to avail the said opportunity, which cannot be said to be fair process. 17. Moreover, as we have already referred above, the writ petitions ought to have been dismissed on the ground of having no cause of action since the order of public auction dated 06.06.2020 has not been challenged and, therefore, in no case writ petitioners can get any relief. 18. Further, so far as the issue of the assurance given in terms of the minutes of the meeting dated 11.01.2020 of the District Board, Dhanbad that the lease shall be renewed is concerned, it is alleged that both the writ petitions being writ petitions, W.P. (C) No. 1372 of 2018 and 1270 of 2018, were withdrawn but we are not making any remark upon the legality and propriety of the said order since the same is not the subject matter of present intra-court appeals. 19. On the basis of entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case and judgments referred hereinabove, we are of the view that even though learned Single Judge, instead of rendering the writ petition infructuous, has gone into the merit of the issue by directing to go for the public auction, as we have observed hereinabove, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed being misconceived but taking into consideration the final outcome of the writ petition and the discussions made hereinabove, are of the view that there is no reason to interfere with the order of learned Single Judge. 20. Accordingly, the appeal fails, and is dismissed. 21. I.A. No. being I.A. No. 14 of 2021 [In L.P.A. No. 351 of 2020] and I.A. No. 15 of 2021 [L.P.A. No. 352 of 2020] are filed for addition of prayer to the effect for quashing the public auction as published in the daily newspaper are also fit to be dismissed for the reasons that we have dismissed the writ petition on merit. Accordingly, Interlocutory Applications, being I.A. No. 14 of 2021 [In L.P.A. No. 351 of 2020] and I.A. No. 15 of 2021 [In L.P.A. No. 352 of 2020] are also dismissed.