JUDGMENT : ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. The instant Writ Petition (Civil) WP(C).No.5902/2015 has been filed before this Court by the appellant herein seeking the following prayers [See page 34 of the paper book of this Writ Appeal]: “a) Call for the records and files leading to Exhibits-P3 and P5 orders issued by 2nd and 1st respondents respectively, and quash Exhibits P3 and P5 orders by issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order, direction; and b) Grant such other and further reliefs as are deemed just and necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case including the costs of this proceedings;" 2. The learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, has rendered the impugned judgment on 12.10.2020 dismissing above WP(C) by upholding the impugned orders passed by respondents 2 & 1 respectively, and directing that the maternity benefit covered by the impugned orders shall be immediately disbursed to contesting respondent No.3 in the WP(C). Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment dated 12.10.2020 dismissing the above WP(C), the writ petitioner has filed the instant intra court appeal under Sec.5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. 3. Heard Sri.B.Ashok Shenoy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in the W.A./petitioner in the WP(C), Sri.B.Unnikrishna Kaimal, learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for official respondents 1 & 2 (appellate authority and original authority respectively under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961) and Sri.V.J.James, learned counsel for contesting respondent No.3 (claimant of maternity benefit). 4. The proceedings under challenge in the above writ petition was the one at Ext.P-3 order dated 26.12.2011 passed by the 2nd respondent original authority under Sec.17 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, and as confirmed by Ext.P-5 appellate order dated 12.11.2014 issued by the 1st respondent appellate authority under the said Act. 5. A brief recital of the facts of the case will be pertinent. R-3 herein/R-3 in the WP(C) was an employee of the writ appellant/writ petitioner, and she had submitted Ext.R-3(a) application on 14.6.2011 seeking maternity leave for 12 weeks w.e.f. 17.6.2011. In Ext.R-3(a) application, the 3rd respondent had informed the petitioner employer that she (employee) is being operated on 20.6.2011 for delivering a child, and she should be granted maternity leave w.e.f. 17.6.2011. It is common ground that the 3rd respondent/employee had delivered a girl child on 20.6.2011. In Ext.R-3(a) application, the 3rd respondent had informed the petitioner employer that she (employee) is being operated on 20.6.2011 for delivering a child, and she should be granted maternity leave w.e.f. 17.6.2011. It is common ground that the 3rd respondent/employee had delivered a girl child on 20.6.2011. Since, the claimed maternity benefit was not honoured by the writ petitioner/appellant/employer, the 3rd respondent/employee had preferred Ext.P-1 complaint dated 27.9.2011 before the 2nd respondent original authority (The Assistant Labour Officer concerned). The petitioner/appellant/employer had given remarks on the said application as per Ext.P-2 letter dated 25.10.2011. The 2nd respondent Assistant Labour Officer had heard both sides and passed the impugned Ext.P-3 order dated 26.12.2011 directing the employer to pay maternity leave benefits amounting to Rs.50,400/-along with medical bonus under Sec.8 of the abovesaid Act amounting to Rs.2,500/-, within one week. The employer had challenged Ext.P-3 order by preferring a statutory appeal as per Ext.P-4 before the 1st respondent appellate authority (The Deputy Labour Commissioner) in terms of Sec.17(3) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. One of the contentions urged in the said appeal was to the effect that the impugned Ext.P-3 order happened to be passed without affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioner/appellant/employer and that evidence collected behind the back has also been relied on by the original authority. More crucially, the main contention urged by the writ petitioner/appellant/employer was that the grant of maternity leave benefits for the period prior to 17.6.2011 and for the period since 31.7.2011, is against the provisions contained in Sec.5 of above Act, more particularly Sec.5(3) thereof. Further that, since the employee was paid wages by the employer up to 16.6.2011, the employee was not entitled for maternity benefits for the period prior to 17.6.2011. However, it is stated in the appeal that according to the employer, the 3rd respondent employee is entitled for grant of maternity benefits for 48 days for the period from 17.6.2011 up to 31.7.2011. The 1st respondent appellant authority, after hearing both sides, has passed the impugned Ext.P-5 appellate order on 12.11.2014 dismissing Ext.P-4 appeal and thus confirming Ext.P-3 order passed by the original authority. The learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, has repelled the contentions of the petitioner and has upheld the impugned orders at Exts.P-3 & P-4. 6. The 1st respondent appellant authority, after hearing both sides, has passed the impugned Ext.P-5 appellate order on 12.11.2014 dismissing Ext.P-4 appeal and thus confirming Ext.P-3 order passed by the original authority. The learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, has repelled the contentions of the petitioner and has upheld the impugned orders at Exts.P-3 & P-4. 6. The prime contention urged before us by Sri.B.Ashok Shenoy, learned counsel appearing for the writ appellant/writ petitioner is the same as the one advanced by him before the learned Single Judge. The said contention is based on the interpretation of Sec.5(3) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, as amended w.e.f 10.1.1989, which was holding the field at the time when the claim of maternity benefit was made in the year 2011 [The said provision under Sec.5(3) has been subsequently amended w.e.f. 1.4.2017 and the said amended provision has no relevance or application to the facts of the present case, as the claim period of maternity leave benefits is much prior to the coming into force of the said 2017 Amendment]. 7. The specific contention in that regard as urged by Sri.B.Ashok Shenoy, learned counsel appearing for the writ appellant is to the effect that Sec.5(3) specifically mandates that the maximum period for which any woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit shall be twelve weeks, of which not more than six weeks shall precede the date of her expected delivery. On this basis, it is contended by the appellant that the Act specifically contemplates and mandates that the claim should be in such a manner that the entire period of maternity leave cannot exceed 12 weeks and at the same time, six weeks thereof shall precede the date of expected delivery of the lady employee, and the next six weeks thereof shall be consequently after the expected date of delivery. It is argued that a strict and watertight compartmentalization of the 12 weeks period have been made by the Legislature, as six weeks prior to the expected date of delivery and six weeks after the date of delivery, and if the claim is not in consonance with the said mandate in Sec.5(3), then the claimed maternity leave benefits for the first six weeks period, if it is not in compliance as above, need not be honoured and only the claimed maternity leave benefits for the latter six weeks period which is after the date of expected delivery, alone need be honoured by the employer. 8. The abovesaid contention has been rebutted by Sri.V.J.James, learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent, as well as by Sri.B.Unnikrishna Kaimal, learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for official respondents 1 & 2. It is argued by the respondents that the abovesaid plea made by the appellant is not based on either the explicit or implicit mandate of Sec.5(3), and that all what is mandated in Sec.5(3) is that out of the 12 weeks, not more than six weeks shall/may precede the expected date of delivery of the lady employee. That, in a case where the lady employee feels that she is healthy and she is capable of working even for the period six weeks prior to the date of expected delivery, she is having the option to do so. Further that, even the prohibition against the employer as per Sec.4 is only that no employer shall knowingly employ a woman in the establishment during six weeks immediately following the day of her delivery or miscarriage or medical termination of pregnancy, etc and that the Act does not place any prohibition in the employee voluntarily working for the period of six weeks prior to date of expected delivery, if she is able to do so. But, at the same time, an option is given to the lady employee that if, as a matter of fact, she requires maternity leave even for the period of six weeks prior to date of expected delivery, she is entitled to claim it. But, at the same time, an option is given to the lady employee that if, as a matter of fact, she requires maternity leave even for the period of six weeks prior to date of expected delivery, she is entitled to claim it. Or if she does not want to invoke that option, she can carry forward the first six weeks period, so that both the first six weeks period and the latter six weeks period contemplated in Sec.5(3), either from the date of expected delivery or from a period immediately preceding the date of expected delivery. Further that, the latter six weeks period contemplated in Sec.5(3) should certainly be after the date of expected delivery. Hence, it is argued by the learned Senior Government Pleader and the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent that the abovesaid contention raised by the appellant is on a misconception of law and is not based on the correct interpretation of the various provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act, more particularly Sec. 5(3) thereof. 9. We have heard the parties in extenso. In order to appreciate and resolve the abovesaid controversy, it may be apposite to refer to Sections 4, 5 & 6 of the Maternity Benefit Act, more particularly some provisions thereof which as it stood prior to the coming into force of the Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 1988 (Central Act 61 of 1988), which has been made effective from 10.1.1989, as well as the corresponding provisions as it stood after the coming into force of said amendment w.e.f 10.1.1989. Sec.4 of the Maternity Benefit Act deals with employment of, or work by, women prohibited during certain period. Sec.4 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 [hereinafter referred to as “the Act”], as it stood prior to coming into force of the 1988 amendment reads as follows: “4. Employment of, or work by, women prohibited during certain period.-(1) No employer shall knowingly employ a woman in any establishment during the six weeks immediately following the day of her delivery or her miscarriage. (2) No woman shall work in any establishment during the six weeks immediately following the day of her delivery or her miscarriage. Employment of, or work by, women prohibited during certain period.-(1) No employer shall knowingly employ a woman in any establishment during the six weeks immediately following the day of her delivery or her miscarriage. (2) No woman shall work in any establishment during the six weeks immediately following the day of her delivery or her miscarriage. (3) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 6, no pregnant woman shall, on a request being made by her in this behalf, be required by her employer to do during the period specified in sub-section (4) any work which is of an arduous nature or which involves long hours of standing, or which in any way is likely to interfere with her pregnancy or the normal development of the foetus, or is likely to cause her miscarriage or otherwise to adversely affect her health. (4) The period referred to in sub-section (3) shall be-- (a) the period of one month immediately preceding the period of six weeks, before the date of her expected delivery; (b) any period during the said period of six weeks for which the pregnant woman does not avail of leave of absence under section 6.” An amendment has been made to Sec.4(2), wherein after the words “or her miscarriage” the words “miscarriage or medical termination of pregnancy” has also been introduced w.e.f. 1.2.1996 by the Central Amendment Act 29 of 1995. The said amendment does not have much bearing to the facts of this case. 10. The most crucial section in this case is the one at Sec.5 of the Act. Sec.5 of the Act as it stood prior to the 1988 amendment reads as follows [See The AIR Manual, 4th Edition 1979, Vol.25, Pages 260 & 261] : “5. Right to payment of maternity benefit.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every woman shall be entitled to, and her employer shall be liable for, the payment of maternity benefit at the rate of the average daily wage for the period of her actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and for the six weeks immediately following that day. Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section, the average daily wage means the average of the woman’s wages payable to her for the days on which she has worked during the period of three calendar months immediately preceding the date from which she absents herself on account of maternity, or one rupee a day, whichever is the higher. (2) No woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit unless she has actually worked in an establishment of the employer from whom she claims maternity benefit, for period of not less than one hundred and sixty days in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery: Provided that the qualifying period of one hundred and sixty days of aforesaid shall not apply to a woman who has immigrated into the State of Assam and was pregnant at the time of the immigration. Explanation.-For the purpose of calculating under this subsection the days on which a woman has actually worked in the establishment, the days for which she has been laid off during the period of twelve months immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery shall be taken into account. (3) The maximum period for which any woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit shall be twelve weeks, that is to say, six weeks up to and including the day of her delivery and six weeks immediately following that day: Provided that where a woman dies during this period, the maternity benefit shall be payable only for the days up to and including the day of her death: Provided further that where a woman, having been delivered of a child, dies during her delivery or during the period of six weeks immediately following the date of her delivery, leaving behind in either case the child, the employer shall be liable for the maternity benefit for the entire period of six weeks immediately following the day of her delivery but if the child also dies during the said period, then, for the days up to and including the day of the death of the child.” 11. Sec.5 of the Act, as it stood after the coming into force of the 1988 amendment made effective from 10.1.1989, provides as follows [See The AIR Manual, 5th Edition 1989, Vol.33, Pages 828 & 829]: “5. Sec.5 of the Act, as it stood after the coming into force of the 1988 amendment made effective from 10.1.1989, provides as follows [See The AIR Manual, 5th Edition 1989, Vol.33, Pages 828 & 829]: “5. Right to payment of maternity benefit.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every woman shall be entitled to, and her employer shall be liable for, the payment of maternity benefit at the rate of the average daily wage for the period of her actual absence, that is to say, the period immediately preceding the day of her delivery, the actual day of her delivery and any period immediately following that day. Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section, the average daily wage means the average of the woman's wages payable to her for the days on which she has worked during the period of three calendar months immediately preceding the date from which she absents herself on account of maternity, the minimum rate of wages fixed or revised under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 or ten rupees, whichever is the highest. (2) No woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit unless she has actually worked in an establishment of the employer from whom she claims maternity benefit, for a period of not less than eighty days in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery: Provided that the qualifying period of eighty days aforesaid shall not apply to a woman who has immigrated into the State of Assam and was pregnant at the time of the immigration. Explanation.-For the purpose of calculating under this subsection the days on which a woman has actually worked in the establishment, the days for which she has been laid off or was on holidays declared under any law for the time being in force to be holidays with wages during the period of twelve months immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery shall be taken into account. (3) The maximum period for which any woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit shall be twelve weeks of which not more than six weeks shall precede the date of her expected delivery: Provided that where a woman dies during this period, the maternity benefit shall be payable only for the days up to and including the day of her death: Provided further that where a woman, having been delivered of a child, dies during her delivery or during the period immediately following the date of her delivery for which she is entitled for the maternity benefit, leaving behind in either case the child, the employer shall be liable for the maternity benefit for that entire period but if the child also dies during the said period, then, for the days up to and including the date of the death of the Child.” 12. Sec.6 of the Act as it stood prior to the 1988 amendment provides as follows [See The AIR Manual, 4th Edition 1979, Vol.25, Pages 262 & 263]: “6. Notice of claim for maternity benefit and payment thereof.-(1) Any woman employed in an establishment and entitled to maternity benefit under the provisions of this Act may give notice in writing in such form as may be prescribed, to her employer, stating that her maternity benefit and any other amount to which she may be entitled under this Act may be paid to her or to such person as she may nominate in the notice and that she will not work in any establishment during the period for which she receives maternity benefit. (2) In the case of a woman who is pregnant, such notice shall state the date from which she will be absent from work, not being a date earlier than six weeks from the date of her expected delivery. (3) Any woman who has not given the notice when she was pregnant may give such notice as soon as possible after the delivery. (4) On receipt of the notice, the employer shall permit such woman to absent herself from the establishment until the expiry of six weeks after the day of her delivery. (3) Any woman who has not given the notice when she was pregnant may give such notice as soon as possible after the delivery. (4) On receipt of the notice, the employer shall permit such woman to absent herself from the establishment until the expiry of six weeks after the day of her delivery. (5) The amount of maternity benefit for the period preceding the date of her expected delivery shall be paid in advance by the employer to the woman on production of such proof as may be prescribed that the woman is pregnant, and the amount due for the subsequent period shall be paid by the employer to the woman within forty-eight hours of production of such proof as may be prescribed that the woman has been delivered of a child. (6) The failure to give notice under this section shall not disentitle a woman to maternity benefit or any other amount under this Act if she is otherwise entitled to such benefit or amount and in any such case an Inspector may either of his own motion or on an application made to him by the woman, order the payment of such benefit or amount within such period as may be specified in the order.” 13. Sec.6 of the Act as it stood after the coming into force of the 1988 amendment provides as follows [See The AIR Manual, 5th Edition 1989, Vol.33, Page 831] : “6. Notice of claim for maternity benefit and payment thereof.-(1) Any woman employed in an establishment and entitled to maternity benefit under the provisions of this Act may give notice in writing in such form as may be prescribed, to her employer, stating that her maternity benefit and any other amount to which she may be entitled under this Act may be paid to her or to such person as she may nominate in the notice and that she will not work in any establishment during the period for which she receives maternity benefit. (2) In the case of a woman who is pregnant, such notice shall state the date from which she will be absent from work, not being a date earlier than six weeks from the date of her expected delivery. (3) Any woman who has not given the notice when she was pregnant may give such notice as soon as possible after the delivery. (3) Any woman who has not given the notice when she was pregnant may give such notice as soon as possible after the delivery. (4) On receipt of the notice, the employer shall permit such woman to absent herself from the establishment during the period for which she receives the maternity benefit. (5) The amount of maternity benefit for the period preceding the date of her expected delivery shall be paid in advance by the employer to the woman on production of such proof as may be prescribed that the woman is pregnant, and the amount due for the subsequent period shall be paid by the employer to the woman within forty-eight hours of production of such proof as may be prescribed that the woman has been delivered of a child. (6) The failure to give notice under this section shall not disentitle a woman to maternity benefit or any other amount under this Act if she is otherwise entitled to such benefit or amount and in any such case an Inspector may either of his own motion or on an application made to him by the woman, order the payment of such benefit or amount within such period as may be specified in the order.” 14. As mentioned earlier hereinabove, Sec.5(3) of the Act has been subsequently amended as per the Central Act 6 of 2017, which came into force on 1.4.2017 and Sec.5(3) as so amended w.e.f. 1.4.2017, reads as follows: “(3) The maximum period for which any woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit shall be twenty six weeks of which not more than eight weeks shall precede the date of her expected delivery: Provided that the maximum period entitled to maternity benefit by a woman having two or more than two surviving children shall be twelve weeks of which not more than six weeks shall precede the date of her expected delivery: Provided further that where a woman dies during this period, the maternity benefit shall be payable only for the days up to and including the day of her death: Provided also that where a woman, having been delivered of a child, dies during her delivery or during the period immediately following the date of her delivery, for which she is entitled for the maternity benefit, leaving behind in either case the child, the employer shall be liable for the maternity benefit for that entire period but if the child also dies during the said period, then, for the days up to and including the date of the death of the child.” However, the said 2017 amendment of Sec.5(3) does not have any direct bearing to the facts of this case and the same has been referred to, only to note the subsequent Legislative change. 15. So, it can be seen that as per Sec.4(1) of the Act, no employer shall knowingly employ a women in any establishment during the six weeks immediately following the day of her delivery, etc. Sec.4(2) further mandates that no woman shall work in any establishment during the six weeks immediately following the day of her delivery or a miscarriage, etc. Hence, it can be seen that the prohibition imposed by the Legislature is only that woman employee shall not be employed in the establishment for the period of six weeks after the day of her delivery, miscarriage, etc. Hence, it can be seen that the prohibition imposed by the Legislature is only that woman employee shall not be employed in the establishment for the period of six weeks after the day of her delivery, miscarriage, etc. Further, Sec.4(3) would also stipulate that without prejudice to the abovesaid provisions of Sec.6, no pregnant woman, shall on a request being made by her in that regard, be required by her employer to do work during the period specified in Subsection 4 of Sec.4, any work which is of an arduous nature or which involves long hours of standing, is in any way is likely to interfere with the pregnancy or the normal development of the foetus, or is likely to cause a miscarriage, or otherwise adversely affect her health. Sec.4 further makes it clear that the period referred to in Sec.4(3) shall be (a) the period of one month immediately preceding the period of six weeks before the date of her expected delivery and (b) any period during the said period of six weeks for which the pregnant woman does not avail leave for absence under Sec.6. So, Subsections (3) & (4) of Sec.4 would make it clear that the woman employee cannot be compelled by an employer to engage in any arduous work against her choice, during the six weeks period prior to the day of expected delivery. There is no prohibition anywhere in Sec.4 that the women employee shall not, at any cost, work with the establishment for the period of six weeks prior to the day of expected delivery. The main prohibition is the one in Sec.4(2) which is to the effect that she shall not work in any establishment during the six weeks immediately following the day of her delivery or miscarriage, etc. 16. Now, coming to Sec.5 of the Act it can be seen that Sec.5(1) is the provision which confers the main right for grant of maternity leave benefits. Sec.5(1) as it stood prior to the 1988 amendment stipulated that subject to the provisions of the Act, any woman shall be entitled to, and her employer shall be liable for, the payment of maternity leave benefit at the rate of the average daily wage for the period of her actual absence, immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and for six weeks immediately following that day. The explanation appended to Sec.5(1) stipulates that for the purpose of Sec.5(1) the average daily wage means the average of the woman's wages payable to her for the days on which she has worked during the period of three calendar months immediately preceding the date from which she absents herself on account of maternity or one rupee a day, whichever is higher. The said explanation of Sec.5(1) has been amended w.e.f. 10.1.1989 reads as follows: “5. Right to payment of maternity benefit.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every woman shall be entitled to, and her employer shall be liable for, the payment of maternity benefit at the rate of the average daily wage for the period of her actual absence, that is to say, the period immediately preceding the day of her delivery, the actual day of her delivery and any period immediately following that day. Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section, the average daily wage means the average of the woman's wages payable to her for the days on which she has worked during the period of three calendar months immediately preceding the date from which she absents herself on account of maternity, the minimum rate of wages fixed or revised under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 or ten rupees, whichever is the highest.” 17. The next crucial provision which has bearing on the facts of this case is the one as per the operative portion of Sec.5(3). Sec.5(3) as it stood prior to the 1988 amendment stipulated that the maximum period for which any woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit shall be twelve weeks, that is to say, six weeks upto and including the day of her delivery and six weeks immediately following that day, etc. The abovesaid provision contained in Sec.5(3) has been amended as per the 1988 amendment made effective from 10.1.1989, as per which it is stipulated that the maximum period for which any woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit shall be twelve weeks, of which not more than 6 weeks shall precede the date of her expected delivery, etc. 18. Further, Sec.6(4) as it stood prior to 1988 amendment provided that on receipt of requisite notice, the employer shall permit such woman to absent herself from the establishment until the expiry of six weeks after the date of her delivery. 18. Further, Sec.6(4) as it stood prior to 1988 amendment provided that on receipt of requisite notice, the employer shall permit such woman to absent herself from the establishment until the expiry of six weeks after the date of her delivery. The said provision in Sec.6(4) has been amended as per 1988 amendment effective from 10.1.1989, as per which it is provided that on receipt of the requisite notice, the employer shall permit such woman to absent herself from the establishment during the period for which she receives the maternity benefit. 19. A combined reading of Secs.4 & 5 of the Act as it stood prior to the 1988 amendment and as it stood after the 1988 amendment, would lead to the following situation: The provisions of Sec.5(1) & Sec.5(3) as it stood prior to the 1988 amendment would have led to an arguable case that could have been made by an employer as if out of the total 12 weeks, six weeks thereof should be preceding the expected day of delivery and next 6 weeks should be succeeding the expected day of delivery. Such a hyper technical contention could have been raised even taking into account the provisions contained in Sec.6(4) of the Act as it stood prior to the 1988 amendment inasmuch as, it is stated therein that on receipt of notice, the employer shall permit such woman to absent herself from the establishment until the expiry of six weeks after the day of delivery so as to raise a technical argument that the outer time limit of the total 12 weeks maternity leave will expire by six weeks after the day of delivery. Of course, such hyper technical contentions could have been easily resolved by a proper interpretation of the Act taking into account its intention and also taking a purposive construction. However, the Legislature has intervened in the field and has made amendments to Sec.5(1), Sec.5(3) & Sec.6(4) as per the 1988 amendment made effective from 10.1.1989. 20. As per the 1988 amended provision, Sec.5(1) clearly stipulates that the entitlement for maternity leave benefit is for the period preceding the day of her delivery, the actual day of her delivery and any period immediately following that day (emphasis supplied). 20. As per the 1988 amended provision, Sec.5(1) clearly stipulates that the entitlement for maternity leave benefit is for the period preceding the day of her delivery, the actual day of her delivery and any period immediately following that day (emphasis supplied). Further, Sec.5(3) as so amended in 1988 clearly provides that the maximum period for which any woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit shall be 12 weeks of which not more than 6 weeks shall precede the date of her expected delivery. Sec.6(4) as amended in 1988 further makes amendment whereby it has been provided that on receipt of the requisite notice, an employer shall permit such woman to absent herself from the establishment during the period for which she receives the maternity benefit, which is in sharp contradistinction to the wordings used in the unamended provisions of Sec.6(4) which may give rise to a hyper technical interpretation as if the total 12 weeks' maternity leave duration should expire within six weeks from the day of expected delivery. Now as per the amended provisions of Sec.6(4) made effective from 10.1.1989, the employer is obliged to permit the woman employee to absent herself from the establishment during the period during which she receives maternity benefit, etc. 21. A combined reading of these amended provisions as it stood from 10.1.1989 which govern the field in the instant case, as far as the leave period is concerned, would clearly show that it is the option of the woman employee to decide whether she should split up the total 12 week period in the manner she so desires, and she has even the option to decide that in the 12 week period, the first six weeks period may be taken only just before the day of the delivery, as she is so medically advised, etc. and there is no compulsion that the first 6 weeks' period should necessarily be before the day of expected delivery. The only compulsion is that the latter 6 weeks period of the total period of 12 weeks should be definitely after the day of expected delivery. Of course, the employer cannot insist that the woman employee should compulsorily attend duty even for arduous work, etc. during the six weeks period prior to the date of delivery. The only compulsion is that the latter 6 weeks period of the total period of 12 weeks should be definitely after the day of expected delivery. Of course, the employer cannot insist that the woman employee should compulsorily attend duty even for arduous work, etc. during the six weeks period prior to the date of delivery. However, if the woman employee so chooses on her volition depending upon the nature of the work, or the nature of her medical and physical conditions that she could work for the six weeks period prior to the day of delivery or the part of the said six weeks period (prior to delivery) she has the liberty to do so. If she so chooses as in the instant case, then she is even entitled to ensure that she can claim the maternity leave benefits for the total 12 weeks period out of which the latter 6 weeks period should definitely be only after the day of expected delivery. That is the only restriction imposed in the abovesaid provisions of the Act. Hence, the abovesaid contention of the employer in the instant case that the claim for maternity leave benefits made by the woman employee in this case cannot be legally honoured, as she has commenced her total 12 weeks maternity leave period from the day of her expected delivery, is totally untenable. 22. There is yet another perspective in the matter. It is by now well established that if matters are intimately connected with the conferment of the Constitutionally guaranteed Right to Life as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, then not only constitutional concept of reasonableness but also the principles of proportionality, dignity, etc would also come into play. There cannot be any doubt that at the time of abovesaid 12 week period, the unborn child in the womb of the woman, also has the Right to Life. Therefore, the abovesaid provisions in Secs.4, 5, 6, etc. have to be construed in the light of the Right to Life which is conferred on not only the woman employee but also on her unborn child. Therefore, the abovesaid provisions in Secs.4, 5, 6, etc. have to be construed in the light of the Right to Life which is conferred on not only the woman employee but also on her unborn child. Therefore, the constitutional concepts of reasonableness, dignity and principles of proportionality will intimately come to play, and the Constitutional Courts while interpreting abovesaid provisions should take into account these crucial aspects as well in the process of interpretation of such laws as in the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. 23. Viewed from that prism, we are fully justified to hold that the provisions in Sec.5(3) of the Act, does not in any manner, insist that the total 12 week maternity leave period should be split up into two watertight compartments consisting of a six weeks' period prior to the day of expected delivery, and a six weeks' period after the day of delivery. All what is stipulated in Sec.5(3) is that the maximum period for which a woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit shall be 12 weeks, of which not more than six weeks shall precede the date of her expected delivery. In a case where the woman employee is capable of working in the establishment even during the six weeks period before the date of delivery or part thereof, depending upon the various factors mentioned hereinabove, she is perfectly at liberty to do so. The only inhibition is that the employer cannot insist that she should necessarily do arduous duty, etc. during the said six weeks' period prior to the expected date of delivery going by the prescriptions of Sec.4. 24. If the woman employee chooses to work in the establishment even in the period prior to the day of expected delivery as in the instant case, then there is no question of denying maternity leave benefits for the entire 12 weeks period gained by her from the day of expected delivery or from such period which may be immediately preceding the day of delivery if she so chooses, is an indefeasible right conferred on her by the Legislature. 25. The upshot of above discussion is that the learned Single Judge is fully right in holding that the impugned orders at Exts.P-3 & P-5 are legally correct. 25. The upshot of above discussion is that the learned Single Judge is fully right in holding that the impugned orders at Exts.P-3 & P-5 are legally correct. Hence, we fully endorse the conclusion made by the learned Single Judge, but though on the basis of the reasonings mentioned hereinabove, which may be slightly divergent from the one adopted by the learned Single Judge. In other words, no ground is made out by the appellant to judicially interdict the conclusions of the learned Single Bench as per the impugned judgment. 26. Sri.V.J.James, learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent would point out that the claimed maternity benefit period and delivery of the child, all happened in the year 2011 and 10 long years have passed thereafter, and even now she has not received a single pie. 27. Sri.B.Ashok Shenoy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in the W.A./petitioner in the WP(C) would fairly submit on the basis of instructions of his party that the entire amounts covered by Ext.P-3 as affirmed by Ext.P-5 has already been deposited by the appellant before the 2nd respondent Assistant Labour Officer, Ernakulam (original authority) as per the interim order dated 10.4.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in the instant W.P.(C) etc. 28. Having regard to abovesaid submission it is ordered that in case the amounts have already been deposited by the appellant employer before the 2nd respondent, then the 2nd respondent shall immediately release the entire amount of Rs.52,900/-(comprising of Rs.50,400/-as maternity leave benefit + Rs.2,500/-as medical bonus) to the 3rd respondent forthwith. 29. The Secretary to the Office of the Advocate General will ensure that a copy of this judgment is immediately transmitted to the 2nd respondent to ensure the forthwith release of said amount to the 3rd respondent. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Appeal will stand dismissed.