JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 04.07.2013 passed in Misc. Case No.110 of 2013:Yogendra Pratap Singh versus Jeetendra Pratap Singh, and also the order dated 09.11.2020 passed in Civil Appeal No.56 of 2020. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that his father Late Kaamta Singh was a police employee who retired in the year 1970. From his earning as well as by taking advance on his G.P.F. account, Kaamta Singh had bought certain land in village Adhar Khera Tahsil Bakshi ka Talab Lucknow and also some land in district Mau. He had inherited some land through family settlement in District Sultanpur also. There is no dispute regarding land situated in Sultanpur as it has been of ancestral stock and divided among the petitioner and his brother Jitendra Pratap Singh equally. The land that was bought by the father of the petitioner in Adhar Khera was fraudulently got registered by Kaamta Singh’s brother, that is the petitioner’s uncle in his name. The petitioner was educated and working as an Advocate. When consolidation proceedings where initiated in 1996 in village Adhar Khera the petitioner filed objection under Section 9A 2 of the Act and land that had been wrongly got registered in his uncle’s name, was registered in the name of the petitioner and his brother. Section 52 publication has been done in Village Aadhar Khera in 2003. The brother of the petitioner was unemployed and looked after farming and the petitioner divided his time between his profession as an Advocate and the farming that was being done at village Aadhar Kheda. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that in 1977 after the retirement of the father of the petitioner he divided his property amongst the petitioner and his brother orally. The respondent no.1 was given land situated in village Teghna District Mau where one huge pond of 6 acres had been got dug out by the petitioner’s father which was being used for fish farming. The petitioner was given land situated at village Aadhaar Khera Distt Lucknow. The petitioner and respondent no.1 continued in possession of their share and now have become old therefore, were in agreement that the family settlement that was entered into between the two brothers at the instance of Kamta Singh during his lifetime be given legal and binding colour. The petitioner was given land situated at village Aadhaar Khera Distt Lucknow. The petitioner and respondent no.1 continued in possession of their share and now have become old therefore, were in agreement that the family settlement that was entered into between the two brothers at the instance of Kamta Singh during his lifetime be given legal and binding colour. Hence the petitioner filed a suit for Declaration and Permanent Injunction before the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Havali Lucknow. 4. It is the petitioner’s case that the petitioner had claimed a Declaration on the basis of Hindu Gains of Learning Act 1930 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1930’) and not under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950 (hereinin after referred to as ‘the Act of 1950’). The Munsarim put up a wrong report that the case is cognizable by the Revenue court and not by the Civil court. On the basis of this wrong report, the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Havali, Lucknow got it registered as Miscellaneous Case No.110 of 2013 for the purpose of deciding the question of jurisdiction of the civil court. The Civil Judge (Junior Division) thereafter rejected the suit on the ground of not being maintainable before the civil court by observing that the disputed property, that is, the land of plot no.25 situated at village Aadhaar Kheda district Lucknow which is recorded in the name of the defendant, is an agricultural land. The Plaintiff on the basis of a partition made by his father orally, had prayed for deletion of the name of the defendant from the revenue record and Declaration of Title and recording of entry in plaintiff’s name in the revenue records. Since the plaintiff had sought declaration of title over agricultural land which can be granted only by the revenue courts under the U.P.Z.A.&L.R. Act and because such declaration cannot be given by the civil court, the civil court had no jurisdiction. Consequently, the suit was rejected as not maintainable. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed a Revision under Section 115 C.P.C. before the learned Special Judge/ Additional District Judge Lucknow. The Revision was rejected on 27.07.2015. It has been stated that the Additional District Judge wrongly came to the conclusion that the land in question being agricultural land, a declaration of title being sought over it, can only be given by the revenue court. 5. The Revision was rejected on 27.07.2015. It has been stated that the Additional District Judge wrongly came to the conclusion that the land in question being agricultural land, a declaration of title being sought over it, can only be given by the revenue court. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that the land in question had been acquired by the father of the petitioner under Act of 1930 and therefore the Act of 1950 had no application on it. The petitioner challenged the order passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Divsion) Havali Lucknow, dated 04.07.2013 and also the order dated 27.07.2015 passed by the learned Special Judge/Additional District Judge in a Writ Petition before the High Court bearing No.6339 (M/S) 2015. The Court taking it up as fresh pointed out that against the order passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) dated 04.07.2013 the petitioner should have filed an Appeal before the District Judge and not a Revision. The petitioner withdrew the writ petition on 29.10.2015. The petitioner thereafter filed Civil Appeal No.56 of 2020. The Appeal has been dismissed by the District Judge on a mechanical observation that the Special Judge/Additional District Judge Lucknow while rejecting the Revision was also exercising the power of an Appellate Court. Once the order dated 4.07.2013 had been affirmed in Revision by a court having coordinate jurisdiction as that of the District Judge, the judgment dated 27.07.2015 would act as Res Judicata and the Appeal would not be maintainable. The order dated 04.07.2013 and the order dated 09.11.2020 have been challenged in Writ Petition No. 7346 (MS) of 2021. 6. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Satish Chand Kashish that the petitioners case ought to have been decided by the Civil court in view of the Hindu Gains of Learning Act 1930 and the trial court had wrongly sent the petitioner to the revenue court and has wrongly refused to exercise jurisdiction saying that the land in question over which the petitioner seeks a declaration is agricultural land and therefore the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred under the provisions of the Act of 1950. 7. After giving the learned counsel for the petitioner a hearing at length, the petitioner wanted to argue the matter in person and sought permission from the Court. 7. After giving the learned counsel for the petitioner a hearing at length, the petitioner wanted to argue the matter in person and sought permission from the Court. He was also heard as he said that he was practising on the revenue side before the lower courts for the past 50 years. It was argued by the petitioner in person that the Act of 1950 became enforceable with effect from July 1952 where as the Act of 1930 has been in operation much before Independence and has not been repealed by the U.P. Act of 1950, therefore, being a special Act, and not being specifically overruled, it shall override the provisions of the U.P. Act no. 1 of 1951. In the written submissions filed by the learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Satish Chand Kashish, an extract of a Commentary published by the Eastern Book Company whose Author is Shri Vishwanath Prasad Srivastava, has been filed. The extract refers to judgment rendered in Mangal Singh versus Harkesh AIR 1958 Alld 42, where it was held that if the property had been acquired with the smallest aid of the joint family fund, then the acquisition would be deemed to be a joint family property. It would be the duty of the person in whose name the deed stood and who said that it was his separate property to prove that he had not taken the aid of family funds. Prior to the Act of 1930, this kind of property was taken to be joint family property, but since the passing of the Act of 1930, the property acquired by special skill and knowledge by an individual is deemed to be his exclusive property. The Act of 1930 having not been repealed by the Act of 1950 self acquired property could only become joint family property if the person who acquired it waived the intention of holding it as his exclusive property, and threw it in the common stock with the idea of abandoning all his personal and exclusive claim over it. 8. The petitioner in person had also placed before this court a copy of the Act of 1930. 8. The petitioner in person had also placed before this court a copy of the Act of 1930. A perusal of Short Title and extract as produced before this Court, shows that it was an Act which was notified to remove doubts as to the rights of a member of a Hindu undivided family in the property acquired by him by means of his learning and to provide a uniform rule as to its dispensation. As defined under Section 2(b) of the said Act, “gains of learning“ means all acquisition of property made substantially by means of learning, whether such acquisitions be made before or after the commencement of the Act, whether such acquisitions be the ordinary or the extraordinary result of such learning. “Learning“ has been defined under the Section 2(c) of the Act as education, whether elementary, technical, scientific, special or general, and training of every kind which is usually intended to enable a person to pursue any trade, industry, profession or avocation in life. It is the case of the petitioner that the property in question has been acquired by his father through his learning and it being his property he had given it to the petitioner who filed a suit for Declaration. 9. In the written submission that has been filed by Shri Satish Chand Kashish a copy of the extract of the book “Commentaries on U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950“ has been filed. A perusal of such extract shows that the petitioner has filed the “Statement of Objects and Reasons“ for bringing in the Act of 1950. The principal aim of the Act of 1950 was to remove intermediaries between the cultivator and the State and the aim was to bring about a radical change in the existing land system through a coordinated plan of rural reconstruction to ensure agricultural efficiency and increase food production and to raise the standard of living of the rural masses, and to give opportunities for the full development of the peasants personality. “The landlord tenant system established by the British for reasons of expediency and administrative convenience, should, with the dawn of political freedom, give place to a new order which restores to the cultivator the rights and the freedom which were his and to the village community the supremacy which it exercised over all the elements of village life”. 10. “The landlord tenant system established by the British for reasons of expediency and administrative convenience, should, with the dawn of political freedom, give place to a new order which restores to the cultivator the rights and the freedom which were his and to the village community the supremacy which it exercised over all the elements of village life”. 10. The Act of 1950 provided for three kinds of tenure for the first time. Bhoomidhari rights would be given to all tenants who paid 10 times of the rent in one instance. The remaining tenants would be called Sirdars with permanent and inheritable rights in land, and the right to use the land for any purpose connected with agriculture, horticulture or Animal Husbandry, and to make any improvements till such time that their rights matured into Bhoomidhari rights. A temporary or minor form of land tenure called Asami was also created for a small number of non-occupancy tenants, of land in which stable rights cannot be given such as tracts of shifting or unstable cultivation, or a person to whom land is left in future by such Bhumidhar or Sirdars who were incapable of cultivating the land themselves because of physical or mental infirmity. The general body of tenants of Sirdars on whom hereditary rights do not accrue, and of the existing subtenants would be given security of tenure for a period of five years after which they could, on payment of 15 times the hereditary rate of the rent of the tenant in chief, acquire Bhoomidhari rights. The Act of 1950 provided for all lands of common utility, such as Abadi sites, pathways, wasteland, forests, fisheries, public wells, tanks and water channels, to be vested in the village community on the Gaon Samaj consisting of all residents of the village as well as landless labourers. Gram Panchayat acting on behalf of the village community was entrusted with powers of land management. This measure was intended to make the village a small republic and a cooperative community to facilitate economic and social development and increase the growth of social responsibility and community spirit. In order to remedy the inefficiency and waste involved in the cultivation of existing uneconomic holdings, the Act of 1950 made a provision for encouragement and rapid growth of cooperative farming. 11. In order to remedy the inefficiency and waste involved in the cultivation of existing uneconomic holdings, the Act of 1950 made a provision for encouragement and rapid growth of cooperative farming. 11. The Act of 1950 received the assent of the President on January 24, 1951 under Article 201 of the Constitution of India and was published on 26.01.1951 in the Uttar Pradesh Gazette extraordinary. The said Act was challenged promptly and the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in the case of Attar Singh versus State of U.P. and others, and it became enforcible from July 1952. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that since the petitioner intended to get the land which was the self acquired property of his father Kamta Singh divided in terms of family settlement, there were no rights derived under the Act of 1950. The rights to the property acquired by Kamta Singh were governed by the Act of 1930 as they were acquired out of income generated from his employment in the police department. Section 229B of the Act of 1950 would not be applicable and consequently there would not be any bar under Section 331. 13. The relevant extract of Section 331 of the Act of 1950 is being quoted here in below : "331. Cognizance of suits, etc. under this Act.-(1) Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in Column 4 of Schedule II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in Column 3 thereof [,] [or of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application:] [Provided that where a declaration has been made under Section 143 in respect or any holding or part thereof, the provisions of Schedule II insofar as they relate to suits, applications or proceedings under Chapter VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereof.] [Explanation.-If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be identical to that which the revenue court would have granted.] 14. In Ram Awalamb and others vs. Jata Shankar and others, 1968 RD 470, a Full Bench of this Court has observed that ''if the Suit is maintainable for the main relief in the Civil Court, then there is no bar for the Civil Court to grant all possible reliefs flowing from the same cause of action. The determination of the question as to which out of the several reliefs arising from the same cause of action is the main relief will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.” It has been further clarified and observed that ''where on the basis of a cause of action-(a) the main relief is cognizable by the Revenue Court, only the fact that the ancillary relief claimed are cognizable by the Civil Court would be immaterial of determining the proper forum of the suit; (b) the main relief is cognizable by the Civil Court, the suit would be cognizable by the Civil Court only and the ancillary reliefs which could be granted by the Revenue Court may also be granted by the Civil Court.' (Emphasis Supplied) 15. In Ram Padarath and others vs. IInd Additional District Judge, Sultanpur 1989 RD 21 (FB), a Full Bench of this Court after referring to Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, which makes a specific provision for cancellation of void as well as voidable documents, observed that voidable documents are those whose legal effect cannot be put to an end without they being cancelled by a declaratory decree in this regard by the civil court in a regular suit filed under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. A void document however is not required to be cancelled necessarily. Its legal effect, if any, can be put to an end by declaring it to be void and granting some relief based upon such observations instead of canceling it. Once it is held to be void it can be ignored by any court or authority, being of no legal effect or consequence. For such a void document to be declared so, a person may approach the competent civil court. Once it is held to be void it can be ignored by any court or authority, being of no legal effect or consequence. For such a void document to be declared so, a person may approach the competent civil court. However, if apart from cancellation, some other relief is claimed which is the "real relief" and the claim for which provides the proximate ground or reason for approaching the court of law, or when any other relief can be claimed or is involved in the matter cropping up because of the evidence of the void document or instrument, and the "real relief" claimed is one which is mentioned in Schedule II of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the same can be granted by the revenue court only, and the jurisdiction of the civil court to grant such a relief or reliefs is ousted by section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. “The law relating to right, title and interest over agricultural land is contained in U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The said Act being a special Act, enumerates in Schedule II the types of suits etc, the cognizance of which is to be taken by the Revenue Court specified therein. In the Explanation attached to Section 331, it has been specifically mentioned that if the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may be identical to that which the revenue court would have granted.” 16. The Full Bench after considering the phrase "cause of action" and the phrase "any relief", as mentioned in Section 331 of the Act, came to the conclusion that the Explanation to Section 331 has enlarged its scope further. The cause of action may determine the form and keeps the jurisdiction of the revenue courts intact as also the relief of the nature which is mentioned under Schedule II of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The Full Bench observed that the reliefs of the nature mentioned in Schedule II of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act can be claimed from the Revenue Court which can take cognizance of such suit or proceeding, notwithstanding that the relief provided in a different language can also be granted by the Civil Court. 17. The Full Bench observed that the reliefs of the nature mentioned in Schedule II of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act can be claimed from the Revenue Court which can take cognizance of such suit or proceeding, notwithstanding that the relief provided in a different language can also be granted by the Civil Court. 17. If no relief can be granted to a person unless the declaration of his tenancy rights is made, in that situation the suit would be cognizable by the revenue court as such a declaration can only be granted by the revenue court. Even in cases where the suit is for injunction and/or possession if he is out of possession, then the suit will be cognizable by the revenue court notwithstanding that any relief for injunction may otherwise be granted by the civil court. 18. The Full Bench observed in Ram Padarath (supra) in Para-19 thus:- "19. If more than one reliefs are claimed by a particular person, no relief can be granted to that person unless declaration of his tenancy rights is made and in that situation the suit will be cognizable by the revenue court as declaration can be granted by the revenue court. Similarly if a person claims relief of injunction and in the alternative for possession if he is found to be out of possession and his name is not on the record then without declaration that in fact he is the tenant or he is in possession of the tenancy rights no further relief can be granted and the suit is cognizable by the revenue court. In case the suit is for injunction and/or possession if he is out of possession then the suit will be cognizable by the revenue court notwithstanding the relief for injunction is to be granted by the civil court.........The Civil Court would have no Jurisdiction as the case first involved declaration of right as tenure-holder which could be granted by the revenue court only and thereafter relief could have been granted only if he was held to be tenure-holder by succession.....…" (Emphasis Supplied) Similarly, in Indrapal vs. Jagannath 1993 ALJ 235, this Court observed in Para-9 as follows:- "9. Thus, the essence of the matter in deciding whether the suit is cognizable by the civil Court or the revenue court is whether Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is attracted to the facts of the case. If in substance, the main question involved relates to declaration of right or title, then the suit would lie in the revenue court and not in the civil Court......." (Emphasis Supplied) 19. The Full Bench in Ram Padarath (supra) relied upon Chandrika Misir versus Bhaiya Lal; AIR 1973 SC 2391 , which had said in a case arising out of a suit for injunction and in the alternative for possession in respect of agricultural land, that in view of Schedule II of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, the relief of possession could only be granted by the revenue courts under Section 331 of the Act and thus ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The Supreme Court observed that the civil court would have no jurisdiction as the case first involves the declaration of rights as a tenure holder which could only be granted by the revenue courts, and thereafter relief could have been granted regarding injunction to protect possession. In paragraph 22, the Full Bench observed that the forum for action in relation to void documents or regarding agricultural land depends on the "real cause of action" with reference to the facts averred. Void documents necessarily do not require cancellation like voidable documents. 20. Ram Padarath (supra) has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in paragraph 18 of its judgment in Bismillah versus Janeshwar Prasad and others, 1990 (1) SCC 207 . 21. In Kamla Prasad vs. Krishna Kant Pathak (2007) 4 SCC 213 , the Supreme Court observed thus : "...No doubt there is no relief of declaration of ownership of agricultural land specifically sought in the plaint, but in essence the claim of plaintiff was based on his ownership right of the disputed land, while the plea of defendant was that plaintiff was not owner of the property. Then adjudication of title of land in substance was the main question involved in the suit, although, it was not expressly prayed for in plaint. Then adjudication of title of land in substance was the main question involved in the suit, although, it was not expressly prayed for in plaint. Therefore, in substance, when the main question involved for adjudication in this case relates to declaration of right or title then suit would lie in revenue court and not in civil court. Therefore, in such matter the jurisdiction of civil court is barred under Section 331 of UPZA & LR Act. This provision of Section 331 is attracted when in substance main question to be determined for resolving dispute between parties relates to declaration of rights or title of agricultural land..…" (Emphasis Supplied) 22. This Court has carefully perused the provisions of the Act of 1930, a copy of which has been annexed to the writ petition. It is evident that the Act was intended to remove doubts as to the rights of a member of a Hindu undivided family property acquired by him by means of his learning. Before the Act of 1930 any property acquired by a member of joint Hindu family either through his own income or through the aid of Joint family funds would become the property of the Hindu joint family. With this Act a uniform rule as to the right of a member of a Hindu undivided family in property acquired by him by means of his own gains of learning was notified. It was immaterial that such learning would have been in whole or in part imparted to him by any member of the joint family, or with the aid of the joint family funds, or with the aid of the funds of any member thereof, or either himself or his family during the time he was acquiring this learning was being maintained or supported wholly or in part by the joint funds of his family or by the funds of any member thereof. 23. No doubt in the plaint filed before the Civil Court the petitioner has mentioned in detail how his father acquired property separate from the Joint Hindu family property which he owned as coparcener in Sultanpur, but there was no quarrel with regard to whether the property situated in district Mau or in District Lucknow was not the self acquired independent property of his father Kamta Singh. Late Kamta Singh having acquired the property out of his own income as an employee of the police department had a right to bequeath such property any person whether belonging to his family or an outsider and the petitioner was not seeking a declaration from the civil court against his collaterals who were coparceners in Joint Hindu family property situated at Sultanpur. It was alleged by the petitioner that Kamta Singh during his life time orally divided the self acquired property between his two sons. The petitioner and the respondent no.1. The petitioner was given property situated in Lucknow and respondent no.1 was given property situated in Mau. The petitioner alleged that the name of his brother the respondent no.1 had been wrongly entered in the revenue records of the property situated at village Aadhaar Khera in Lucknow. He wanted the name of respondent no. 1 to be expunged from the revenue records and the property situated in Lucknow to be declared as the petitioner’s Bhoomidhari and also prayed for permanent injunction restraining the respondent no.1 from interfering in the peaceful possession of the petitioner on the property situated in Lucknow. Such a prayer as was made in the plaint had nothing at all to do with the Act of 1930 as it was not the case of the petitioner that his father’s right to bequeath his self acquired property to his sons was in question. It was the petitioner who sought to base his case upon family settlement (which settlement was seriously disputed by the respondent), entered into between the between him and his brother during the lifetime of his father Kamta Singh. It was simply a case under section 229 B of the Act of 1950. If the petitioner wanted that family Settlement that was entered into in the lifetime of his father be given legal effect to then he could have filed a suit for partition under Section 176 of the Act of 1950. The partition was to be affected between the petitioner and his brother not between the petitioner and his collaterals. This was not a case under the Act of 1930. 24. With respect to agricultural land, the Act of 1950 is a special Act which would be applicable notwithstanding any other law for the time being in operation. The partition was to be affected between the petitioner and his brother not between the petitioner and his collaterals. This was not a case under the Act of 1930. 24. With respect to agricultural land, the Act of 1950 is a special Act which would be applicable notwithstanding any other law for the time being in operation. The Act of 1950 for the first time created rights, temporary or permanent, over agricultural land, it had been promulgated for an entirely different purpose as has been mentioned in the “Statement of Objects and Reasons“ of the said Act. The Act of 1930 need not have been repealed by the Act of 1950 as in pith and substance, the Act of 1930 dealt with self acquired property through gains of learning by a member of a joint Hindu family even with some aid of joint family funds. The Act of 1930 is personal law. All personal law with regard to devolution of property becomes immaterial in view of the Act of 1950 as the Act of 1950 creates for the first time Bhoomidhari rights. The petitioner was asking for a declaration of his Bhoomidhari rights over agricultural land which was not recorded in his name but was recorded in the name of his brother. In Mahendr Singh versus others, 1967 RD 191, it has been held by this court that personal laws like Hindu law are irrelevant for the purpose of determination of Bhoomidhari rights. Special rights were created by the Act of 1950 for the first time and these new rights are wholly governed by the provisions of the Act. By Section 152 of the Act of 1950, the rights of a Bhoomidhar are transferable subject only to the conditions mentioned thereunder. Application of personal laws regarding devolution of joint family property would curtail the right given by Section 152 of the Act. Sections 171 to 173 of the Act of 1950 laid down the special mode of succession which was wholly inconsistent with personal laws. 25. The Civil Judge (Junior Division) Havali rightly dismissed the Suit as not maintainable by observing that the petitioner wanted Plot No. 25 which was recorded in the name of respondent no.1 to be recorded in the name of the petitioner as Bhoomidhar with transferable rights. 25. The Civil Judge (Junior Division) Havali rightly dismissed the Suit as not maintainable by observing that the petitioner wanted Plot No. 25 which was recorded in the name of respondent no.1 to be recorded in the name of the petitioner as Bhoomidhar with transferable rights. Since the land in question was agricultural land on which a declaration was sought of ownership, the Suit was found by the Learned trial court to be barred under the provisions of the Act of 1950. I do not find any legal or factual infirmity in the order dated 4.7.2013. 26. The District Judge besides mentioning the merits of the petitioners contention regarding the applicability of the Act of 1930 vis-a-vis the Act of 1950, additionally found that the Revision had been dismissed by a Court of coordinate jurisdiction and the court of District Judge would not sit as appellate court over an order passed in Revision by the Court of Additional District Judge. The question of jurisdiction was a pure question of law and it makes no difference whether the impugned order was assailed in Appeal or Revision. No evidence was to be led, no questions of fact were to be considered. The Additional District Judge in Revision had found that the Suit was filed for declaration and injunction and it was prayed that the name of the defendant be removed from the revenue records over plot no. 25 in village Aadhar Khera and the name of the plaintiff be recorded therein as Sankramaniya Bhoomidhar. Additional District Judge had also noted the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the property had been acquired by his father, and therefore the Act of 1930 would be applicable consequently the provisions of the Act of 1950 are not applicable, but had rejected the argument on the ground that the Act of 1950 is a Special Act which has overriding effect over personal law. The petitioner in fact was seeking a declaration of his right title under Section 229B of the Act of 1950 such declaration of title over agricultural land can only be granted by the revenue court as there was a bar under Section 331 of the Act. Even in respect of partition of agricultural land there is a specific provision under Section 176 of the Act. 27. Even in respect of partition of agricultural land there is a specific provision under Section 176 of the Act. 27. The District Judge in his order dated 09.11.2020 has observed that original jurisdiction is also part of Appellate jurisdiction and is exercised by the same court upon which Revisional jurisdiction is conferred. The District Judge also observed that there was no question of fact that was needed to be determined in the Appeal filed before him, only a question of law relating to jurisdiction of the civil court was involved in the Appeal. The Revisional court had already considered this question of law and being a court of Coordinate jurisdiction the District Judge could not sit in Appeal over such view expressed regarding lack of jurisdiction. I do not find any infirmity in such observations of the District Judge. 28. The petition is dismissed as devoid of merit. No Order as to costs.