JUDGMENT : N.J.Jamadar, J. 1. The petitioner, who has been detained under the provisions of section 3(2) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers And Persons Engaged In Black-Marketing Of Essential Commodities Act, 1981 (“MPDA Act”), by order dated 29th July, 2020, passed by the Commissioner of Police, Nashik (Respondent No. 1), has preferred this petition to quash and set aside the detention order, by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the background facts leading to this petition can be stated as under: a] The petitioner came to be arraigned in C.R.No. 173 of 2020 registered with Adgaon police station, Nashik City for the offences punishable under sections 307, 323 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code and section 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act for having allegedly attempted to commit murder of Gangadhar Panditrao Aaher, the first informant, and Suresh Ramesh Salunkhe, an injured witness, along with co-accused. The petitioner came to be arrested in the said crime on 4th July, 2020. b] It transpired that, in the intervening period, the Respondent No. 1 had recorded in camera statements of two witnesses. While the petitioner was still in judicial custody, the Respondent No. 1 passed the impugned order dated 29th July, 2020 with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The Respondent No. 1 was of the view that the material placed before him indicated that the petitioner was ‘a dangerous person’ within the meaning of section 2(b-1) of the MPDA Act. The illegal acts of the petitioner, over a period of time, posed a serious threat and danger to the lives of law abiding and peace loving citizens. The violent and dangerous acts of the petitioner were hazardous and prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Hence, the Respondent No. 1 ordered the detention of the petitioner in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3(2) of the MPDA Act. c] The impugned retention order was approver by the Government on 30th July, 2020. The Advisory Board opined that there was sufficient cause to detain the petitioner. Hence, the Respondent No. 1 ordered the detention of the petitioner in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3(2) of the MPDA Act. c] The impugned retention order was approver by the Government on 30th July, 2020. The Advisory Board opined that there was sufficient cause to detain the petitioner. The petitioner has, thus, invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court to quash the detention order contending that it suffers from non application of mind and non consideration of vital material and thereby unjustifiably infringes the personal liberty of the petitioner. 3. Though the petitioner has raised multiple grounds to assail the impugned order of detention, yet the petitioner has pressed into service the following grounds, as and by way of the principal challenge, to the impugned order. (g) The petitioner states and submits that the Sponsoring Authority while forwarding the proposal, did not place before the Detaining Authority the detailed order dated 11th June, 2020 and 18th June, 2020 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Nashik granting bail to other co-accused Akash Rajendra Dhalkane and Suraj Kantilal Verma in C.R.No. 173 of 2020 but forwarded only the operative part. The detailed order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Nashik while releasing the other coaccused was a vital piece of evidence and the same ought to have been forwarded to the Detaining Authority and the Detaining Authority ought to have called for it and perused the same. The Detaining Authority ought to have called for these orders in order to satisfy himself of possibility of the detenu being released on bail. (h) The petitioner states and submits that firstly given the fact that the detenu was in custody for more than a month, and on the date of issuance of the preventive detention order, there was never any possibility of he being enlarged on bail. Secondly, once he was not enlarged on bail but was in custody for more than a month and in relation to a serious crime, then, it is pure guess work on the part of the detaining authority that the detenu would be enlarged on bail in future. There are absolutely no materials which would indicate that there is a possibility of the detenu being enlarged on bail. There are absolutely no materials which would indicate that there is a possibility of the detenu being enlarged on bail. It was thus imperative upon the Detaining Authority to show the materials against the petitioner were clear, cogent and satisfactory and merely a general statement would not suffice. (i) The petitioner states and submits that the Detaining Authority failed to observe the finding rendered by the learned Sessions Judge while deciding the Anticipatory bail order dated 3rd July, 2020 showing that the State had also prayed for cancellation of bail of the petitioner in C.R.No.494 of 2019. 4. Affidavits in reply have been filed. The Respondent No. 1 has supported the impugned order by pointing the acts, conduct and antecedents of the petitioner which, according to the Respondent No. 1, justified an inference that the petitioner is a dangerous person and the subjective satisfaction that the petitioner’s being at large was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The affidavits in reply have also been filed on behalf of Respondent No. 2- State and Respondent No. 3 Advisory Board. 5. In the wake of aforesaid factual backdrop and pleadings, we have heard Mr. Akshay Bankapur, learned counsel for the Petitioner, and Mr. J.P. Yagnik, learned APP for the Respondents-State at some length. We have been taken through the material on record. 6. Mr. Bankapur, learned counsel for the petitioner, canvassed a submission that heavy onus rests on the Detaining Authority to justify the order of preventive detention when the detenu is already in confinement. Amplifying the submission, Mr. Bankapur would urge that in such a case, the material on record which the Detaining Authority considered, must indicate that the there was an imminent possibility of release of the detenu from confinement. 7. Laying emphasis on the grounds (g), (h) and (i), extracted above, Mr. Bankapur urged, with a degree of vehemence, that the grounds of detention served on the petitioner, in the case at hand, do not indicate that the Detaining Authority had satisfied himself that there was an imminent possibility of the release of the petitioner on bail. A two-pronged submission was advanced. First, the detailed orders under which the co-accused were released on bail in C.R.No. 173 of 2020 (in which the petitioner was in custody) were not placed before the Detaining Authority and the later had only considered the operative orders in those bail applications. A two-pronged submission was advanced. First, the detailed orders under which the co-accused were released on bail in C.R.No. 173 of 2020 (in which the petitioner was in custody) were not placed before the Detaining Authority and the later had only considered the operative orders in those bail applications. Second, the statement that there was “imminent possibility of the release of the petitioner on bail” was not supported by the material on record, and thus, a mere ipse dixit. 8. Mr. Bankapur further urged that, in the absence of aforesaid material, the Detaining Authority could not have formed an opinion that there was possibility of the petitioner being released on bail, like the co-accused, as the aspect of the role of the petitioner in the alleged offence and consequential parity in the matter of grant of bail, did not enter into the decision making process. Non consideration of the detailed orders passed by the Court, under which the co-accused were released on bail, according to Mr. Bankapur, thus vitiated the detention order. 9. In order to lend support to the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Bankapur placed a very strong reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Rekha vs. State of T.N. and Anr., AIR 2011 SC (Supp) 856. Emphasis was laid on the observations in para No. 10, which read as under: 10. In our opinion, if details are given by the respondent authority about the alleged bail orders in similar cases mentioning the date of the orders, the bail application number, whether the bail order was passed in respect of co-accused in the same case, and whether the case of the co-accused was on the same footing as the case of the petitioner, then, of course, it could be argued that there is likelihood of the accused being released on bail, because it is the normal practice of most courts that if a co-accused has been granted bail and his case is on the same footing as that of the petitioner, then the petitioner is ordinarily granted bail. However, the respondent authority should have given details about the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not been done in the present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored. (emphasis supplied) 10. However, the respondent authority should have given details about the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not been done in the present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored. (emphasis supplied) 10. Reliance was also placed on another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima vs. State of Manipur and Ors., AIR 2012 SUPREME COURT 321 wherein, after adverting to the pronouncement in the case of Rekha (supra), following observations were made: 14. When the Courts thought it fit to release the Appellant's husband on bail in connection with the cases in respect of which he had been arrested, the mere apprehension that he was likely to be released on bail as a ground of his detention, is not justified. In addition to the above, the FIRs in respect of which the Appellant's husband had been arrested relate to the years 1994, 1995 and 1998 respectively, whereas the order of detention was passed against him on 31st January, 2011, almost 12 years after the last FIR No.190(5)98 IPS under Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. There is no live link between the earlier incidents and the incident in respect of which the detention order had been passed. 15. As has been observed in various cases of similar nature by this Court, the personal liberty of and individual is the most precious and prized right guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III thereof. The State has been granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws as also under the laws of preventive detention, which therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to whether such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security of the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order, warranting the issuance of such and order. And individual incident of and offence under the Indian Penal Code, however heinous, is insufficient to make out a case for issuance of and order of preventive detention. (emphasis supplied) 11. Per contra, Mr. J.P.Yagnik, learned APP urged with tenacity that the facts in the case of Rekha (supra) are quite distinct from the facts of the case at hand. And individual incident of and offence under the Indian Penal Code, however heinous, is insufficient to make out a case for issuance of and order of preventive detention. (emphasis supplied) 11. Per contra, Mr. J.P.Yagnik, learned APP urged with tenacity that the facts in the case of Rekha (supra) are quite distinct from the facts of the case at hand. The pronouncement in the case of Rekha (supra), according to Mr. Yagnik, cannot be readily imported. In the said case, the Detaining Authority, as is evident from the perusal of the observations in paragraph No. 6, had not furnished any details like the bail application umber, the date of the order, whether the orders were passed in respect of the coaccused in the same case etc. In contrast, in the case at hand, the Detaining Authority was fully cognizant of the necessary particulars and did incorporate the same in the grounds of detention. In this view of the matter, Mr. Yagnik would strenuously urge that the mere non consideration of the detail order granting bail to the co-accused would not furnish the justifiable ground to quash the order of detention, which is otherwise well merited in the facts and circumstances of the case. 12. It may be apposite to extract the relevant paragraph of the grounds of detention, communicated to the petitioner, in order to appreciate the aforesaid submissions in a correct perspective. Paragraph 8 is material and, hence, extracted below: 8. I have carefully gone through material placed before me and I am subjectively satisfied that you are acting in manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. I am aware that now you are on bail in above one case i.e. 4(a)(i) and at present you are in magisterial custody in C.R.No. 173/2020. You applied for bail vide application no.901/2020 on 21/07/2020. The said application is pending. Your two associates in the above crime, named Akash Rajendra Dhakane and Suraj Kantilal Verma were released on bail by Hon’ble Addl. Session Judge-8, Nashik on 11/06/2020 and 18/06/2020 respectively. This is settled principal of law that “Bail is rule and the jail is an exception”. Considering these circumstances as you have file bail application on 21/07/2020 and hence there is imminent possibility that you may be released on bail. There is a provision u/s.437, 439 of Cr.P.C. that Hon’ble High Court or Session Court may grant conditional bail to you. Considering these circumstances as you have file bail application on 21/07/2020 and hence there is imminent possibility that you may be released on bail. There is a provision u/s.437, 439 of Cr.P.C. that Hon’ble High Court or Session Court may grant conditional bail to you. In future there is ‘imminent possibility’ of your bail in the said offence. Taking into consideration about your propensity towards criminality, there is ‘imminent possibility’ that you will revert to the similar activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in future. In view of your tendencies and inclination towards criminal activities reflected in the offences committed by you as stated above, I am satisfied that your are likely to revert to similar activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in future and that is necessary to detain you under the “Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers And Persons Engaged In Black-Marketing Of Essential Commodities Act, 1981, (Mah. Act No.LV of 1981), (Amendment 1996, 2009 and 2015)” to prevent you from acting in such prejudicial manner in future. Hence, I have issued the said Detention Order. 13. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid statements in paragraph 8, it becomes evident that the Detaining Authority was conscious and aware of the following facts: (i) the petitioner was in judicial custody in C.R.No.173 of 2020; (ii) the petitioner had preferred an application for release on bail and it was pending; (iii) the co-accused namely Akash Rajendra Dhakane and Suraj Kantilal Verma, in the said case, were released on bail by the Sessions Judge on 11th June, 2020 and 18th June, 2020 respectively; (iv) the Detaining Authority was of the view that in keeping with the settled principles of law, “the bail is rule and jail is exception”, there was “imminent possibility” of the petitioner being released on bail in future and (v) there were justifiable reasons to believe that, in the event of release on bail, the petitioner would revert to activities (similar to those in the past) prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 14. 14. It may be contextually relevant to note, at this stage itself, that the grounds (g), (h) and (i), extracted above, are but the facets of the principal challenge that there was no material before the Detaining Authority to record that there was an imminent possibility of the release of the petitioner on bail. The said grounds essentially elaborate the challenge with reference to non consideration of a particular piece of material. 15. It is well neigh settled that preventive detention is not to punish a person for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it. The satisfaction of the Detaining Authority of a reasonable probability of the likelihood of the detenu acting in a manner proscribed or prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, entertained on the basis of his past acts, conduct and antecedents, furnishes the justification for the detention order. If a person is already under detention, ordinarily there is no possibility of such a person behaving in a proscribed or prejudicial manner. However, cases may arise where the Detaining Authority may entertain reasonable apprehension that the proposed detenu may be released from confinement in near future and again revert to the activities prejudicial to the society. The later cases present the problem of sustainability of detention order passed while the detenu is in confinement. 16. It is trite law that even while a person is in custody, the detention order can be validly passed against him provided the Detaining Authority is aware of the fact that such person is actually in custody; there is reason to believe, on the basis of relevant material, that there is a possibility of his release, and, on being so enlarged, such person would in all probability again indulge in prejudicial activities. If all these three elements are manifest in the grounds of detention, which reflect the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority, then the order of detention cannot be interfered with on the premise that the detenu was in confinement when the detention order was made. 17. A useful reference in this context can be made to the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate Burdwan and Anr., AIR 1964 Supreme Court 334 wherein the Supreme Court expounded the legal position as regards the circumstances in which the order of detention can be passed against a person, whilst he is in detention. A useful reference in this context can be made to the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate Burdwan and Anr., AIR 1964 Supreme Court 334 wherein the Supreme Court expounded the legal position as regards the circumstances in which the order of detention can be passed against a person, whilst he is in detention. The observations in paragraph 12 are instructive and, hence, extracted below: 12. As abstract proposition of law, there may not be any doubt that s.3 (1) (a) does not preclude the authority from passing and order of detention against a person whilst he is in detention or in jail: but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order may differ and that may make a difference in the application of the principle that a detention order can be passed against a person in jail. Take for instance, a case where a person has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. It cannot be seriously suggested that soon after the sentence of imprisonment is pronounced on the person, the detaining authority can make an order directing the detention of the said person after he is released from jail at the end of the period of the sentence imposed on him. In dealing with this question, again the considerations of proximity of time will not be irrelevant. On the other hand, if a person who is undergoing imprisonment, for a very short period, say for a month or two or so, and it is known that he would soon be released from jail, it may be possible for the authority to consider the antecedent history of the said person and decide whether the detention of the said person would be necessary after he is released from jail, and if the authority is bona fide satisfied that such detention is necessary, he can make a valid ,order of detention a few days before the person is likely to be released. The antecedent history and the past conduct on which the order of detention would be based would, in such a case, be proximate in point of time and would have a rational connection with the conclusion ,drawn by the authority that the detention of the person after his release is necessary. The antecedent history and the past conduct on which the order of detention would be based would, in such a case, be proximate in point of time and would have a rational connection with the conclusion ,drawn by the authority that the detention of the person after his release is necessary. It may not be easy to discover such rational connection between the antecedent history of the person who has been sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and the view that his detention should be ordered after he is released after running the whole of his sentence. Therefore, we are satisfied that the question as to whether and order of detention can be passed against a person who is in detention or in jail, will always have to be determined in the circumstances of each case.(emphasis supplied) 18. Another Constitution Bench in the case of Haradhan Saha vs. The State of West Bengal and Ors., (1975) 3 Supreme Court Cases 198 had an occasion to consider this aspect while determining the constitutional validity of Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. It was, inter alia, observed that, “where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of Detaining Authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or the public order”. 19. A three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Pal Sahu vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (1986) 4 Supreme Court Cases 378 took a survey of the authorities and enunciated the legal position as under: 38. If there was and imminent possibility of the man being set at liberty and his detention coming to and end, then it appears, as a principle, if his detention is otherwise necessary and justified then there is nothing to prevent the appropriate authorities from being satisfied about the necessity of passing and appropriate order detaining the person concerned. 49. In view of the aforesaid principles that emerged, it is necessary to consider the grounds and determined whether there are causal connections. 49. In view of the aforesaid principles that emerged, it is necessary to consider the grounds and determined whether there are causal connections. The facts that a man is not in jail per se would not be determinative of the factor that order of preventive detention could not be passed against him. The fact that a man was found not guilty in a criminal trial would not also be determinative of the factors alleged therein. All these factors must be objectively considered and if there are causal connections and if bona fide belief was formed then there was nothing to prevent from serving and order of preventive detention even against a person who was in jail custody if there is imminent possibility of his being released and set at liberty if the detaining authority was duly satisfied.(emphasis supplied) 20. In the case of Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat vs. Union of India and Ors., (1990) 1 Supreme Court Cases 746 another three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, again adverted to the previous pronouncements on this aspect and culled out the principles as under: 21] The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that and order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the context of making and order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future, and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. 21. 21. The question was again considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Paul Manickam and Anr., (2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 342 and the principles were summarized as under: 14] So far as this question relating to procedure to be adopted in case the detenu is already in custody is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in several cases. Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in Jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on ball. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate and order of his preventive detention, and decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in and manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability, etc. ordinarily, it is not needed when detenu is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied on cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his an decedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detailed in order to prevent him from indulging such prejudicial activities the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. [See N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, Dharmendra Suganchand v. Union of India). The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India. The principles ware set out as follows. [See N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, Dharmendra Suganchand v. Union of India). The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India. The principles ware set out as follows. Even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed (1) If the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him; (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities, and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show awareness of custody and/or possibility of release on bail.(emphasis supplied) 22. The analysis of aforesaid decisions would indicate that there is no impediment in passing an order of detention against a person who is already in confinement provided three conditions become evident from the grounds of detention. First, the Detaining Authority was conscious of the fact that the detenu was in detention. Second, the Detaining Authority, on the basis of relevant material, records satisfaction that the detenu is likely to be released from confinement in near future. This likelihood of release, on the one hand, can not be said to have been made out by a mere theoretical possibility of enlargement on bail or release from confinement. On the other hand, it can not be construed so rigidly as to have been made out only when there is an absolute certainty of release, like in the case of default bail. Essentially the matter falls in the realm of possibility. The expressions “imminent possibility” and “strong likelihood” underscore that there exists an element of reasonable possibility of the detenu being set at large from custody. Third, having regard to the nature of the act and conduct attributed to the detenu the Detaining Authority records satisfaction that, in the event of release from confinement, the detenu would again indulge in prejudicial or proscribed activities and there is no other go but to detain the detenu in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. Third, having regard to the nature of the act and conduct attributed to the detenu the Detaining Authority records satisfaction that, in the event of release from confinement, the detenu would again indulge in prejudicial or proscribed activities and there is no other go but to detain the detenu in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. 23. In the case at hand, the thrust of the submissions on behalf of the petitioner was that the satisfaction recorded by Respondent No. 1 that there was imminent possibility of the release of the petitioner on bail was a mere ipse dixit. The reference to the fact that the co-accused of the petitioner, in the said case, were released on bail was not in itself sufficient as the detail bail orders were not placed before the Detaining Authority. As indicated above, support and sustenance was sought to be drawn from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rekha (supra). 24. In order to properly understand the import of the judgment in the case of Rekha (supra) especially the observations in paragraph 10 extracted above, it is necessary to note the factual backdrop. As regards the possibility of the detenu therein being released on bail, in paragraph 4 of the grounds of detention in the said case, the Detaining Authority had noted as under: 4] The sponsoring authority has stated that the relatives of Thiru. Ramakrishnan are taking action to take him on bail in the above case by filing bail applications before the Higher courts since in similar cases bails were granted by the Courts after a lapse of time. Hence, there is real possibility of his coming out on bail in the above case by fifing a bail application before the higher courts. 25. In the context of aforesaid statements, the Supreme Court in the case of Rekha (supra) observed in paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 as under: 6] “A perusal of the above statement in para 4 of the grounds of detention shows that no details have been given about the alleged similar cases in which bail was allegedly granted by the concerned court. 6 and 7 as under: 6] “A perusal of the above statement in para 4 of the grounds of detention shows that no details have been given about the alleged similar cases in which bail was allegedly granted by the concerned court. Neither the date of the alleged bail orders has been mentioned therein, nor the bail application number, nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect of the co-accused in the same case, nor whether the bail orders were passed in respect of other co- accused in cases on the same footing as the case of the accused. All that has been stated in the grounds of detention is that "in similar cases bails were granted by the courts". In our opinion, in the absence of details this statement is mere ipse dixit and cannot be relied upon. 7] In our opinion, this itself is sufficient to vitiate the detention order.” (emphasis supplied) 26. Placing reliance on the observations in paragraph 10 of the judgment in the case of Rekha (supra) especially the observations to the effect that it is the normal practice of most Courts that if a co-accused has been granted bail and his case is on the same footing as that of the petitioner, then the petitioner is ordinarily granted bail, it was urged that the non consideration of the detail bail order, is fatal. 27. We have extracted the relevant part of the grounds of detention, on purpose. The necessary particulars like the fact that the petitioner was in judicial custody, the petitioner had applied for bail, the co-accused were released on bail in the very same case, and the dates of the bail orders, do find mention therein. The Detaining Authority indisputably considered the operative orders whereby the co-accused were released on bail. The question which thus wrenches to the fore is whether the non consideration of the detail bail orders of the co-accused, who were released on bail, vitiates the order of detention qua the satisfaction that there was imminent possibility of the petitioner being released on bail. 28. Evidently, the answer to the aforesaid question is rooted in facts. The nature of the accusation against the petitioner assumes significance to ascertain the justifiability of the satisfaction as to the likelihood of the petitioner being released on bail. 28. Evidently, the answer to the aforesaid question is rooted in facts. The nature of the accusation against the petitioner assumes significance to ascertain the justifiability of the satisfaction as to the likelihood of the petitioner being released on bail. From the tenor of the First Information Report, it becomes abundantly clear that the petitioner was attributed with the role of having assaulted the first informant by means of sharp weapon when the petitioner and co-accused accosted first informant while they were riding a Honda Activa moped. The injured witness Suresh Salunkhe alleged that initially co-accused Suraj Verma had assaulted him and, thereafter, the petitioner attempted a blow by means of weapon on his back. 29. In the backdrop of the aforesaid allegations against the petitioner, a strenuous effort was made on behalf of the petitioner to draw home the point that the perusal of the detail order was necessary to ascertain as to whether the case of the petitioner stood on the same footing as that of the co-accused whom bail had been granted. We find it rather difficult to accede to these submissions unreservedly. First and foremost the fact that the coaccused have been released on bail is a vitally relevant consideration. Save and except in a case where it can be demonstrated that the allegations against the co-accused are not serious and the role attributed to him is minor, the grant of bail to the co-accused ordinarily brings in the element of parity. It would be contextually relevant to note that, in paragraph no. 10 of bail application preferred by the petitioner (a copy of which was placed before the Detaining Authority) it was specifically mentioned that the co-accused had already been released on bail and the accusations against the co-accused and the petitioner, in the First Information Report, were by and large similar, and, therefore, the petitioner be enlarged on bail. 30. In our view, to expect the Detaining Authority to delve deep into the question of similarity of the role attributed to detenu with co-accused, who have been already released on bail, would lead to undesirable consequences. 30. In our view, to expect the Detaining Authority to delve deep into the question of similarity of the role attributed to detenu with co-accused, who have been already released on bail, would lead to undesirable consequences. By a logical extension, it could be urged that where the proposed detenu is the sole accused, the Detaining Authority shall weigh the material (which would be taken into consideration by the Court) and arrive at a conclusion as to whether the case of the detenu was worth admitting to bail. The Detaining Authority has to form an opinion, on the basis of the material, as to whether, in the given circumstances, there is likelihood of the proposed detenu being released on bail. The detail consideration of the reasons ascribed in the bail order of the co-accused so as to judge the relative merit of the case of the proposed detenu for enlargement on bail, in our view, is beyond the remit of the Detaining Authority. 31. The mere fact that the proposed detenu is accused of serious non bailable offences, by itself, is not a ground to question the satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority that the proposed detenu is likely to be released on bail. The Courts are empowered to grant bail even in cases where the accused are arraigned for serious offences like murder and attempt to commit murder. The section with which accused is charged is thus not determinative of the entitlement to be released on bail. Multiple factors weigh in. 32. A profitable reference in this context can be made to two judgments. First, a judgment of the Supreme Court of Veeramani vs. State of T.N., (1994) 2 Supreme Court Cases 337 and second, a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shahid Mohd. Yusuf Shaikh vs. M.N. Singh, 2003 ALL MR (Cri) 857. 33. In the case of Veeramani (supra) the detenu was in custody for the offences punishable under section 302 and 307 of Indian Penal Code, when the order of detention was passed. It was urged before the Supreme Court that since the detenu was in custody for the serious offences punishable under sections 302 and 307 of Indian Penal Code, there was no question of his being released on bail and, in fact, the petitioner had not applied for bail. It was urged before the Supreme Court that since the detenu was in custody for the serious offences punishable under sections 302 and 307 of Indian Penal Code, there was no question of his being released on bail and, in fact, the petitioner had not applied for bail. The Supreme Court did not accede to the aforesaid submission, and made the following observations: “8] But in the instant case what we have to mainly see is whether there was awareness in the mind of the detaining authority that the detenu is in custody and that he had reason to believe that he is likely to be released. The grounds do disclose that the detaining authority was aware that the detenu is in custody and it is further mentioned that he was also aware that bail is usually granted by the courts in such cases and it is further emphasized that there is 'imminent possibility' of the detenu coming out on bail. As a matter of fact the High Court in its judgment while considering this aspect also observed thus : "The grounds indicate that the detenu, who was in remand, was likely to file a bail application and come out on bail. This shows the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority not only of the awareness of the petitioner being in remand, but his subjective satisfaction of the likelihood of the petitioner coming out on bail by filing bail application. Of course, the detaining authority need not have stated that he was also aware that bail is usually granted by courts in such cases and hence there is imminent possibility that he will come out on bail if it has to be held to be a sweeping statement, but on facts, it cannot be said that the statement is of a sweeping nature for, it is well known that in offences punishable under the sections listed above, bail orders are usually granted after some time and most certainly except in rarest of rare cases after the final report is laid." Therefore it cannot be said that the detaining authority has not applied its mind to this aspect. It is also submitted that the detenu, as a matter of fact, did not file any bail application. It is also submitted that the detenu, as a matter of fact, did not file any bail application. But it must be noted that the detenu was arrested on February 11, 1993 and remanded to custody and on February 16, 1993 itself the detention order was passed. Therefore there was no opportunity for him to file a bail application within this short interval.” 34. In the case of Shahid Mohd. Yusuf Shaikh (supra) the detenu therein was already in custody in connection with an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. A Division Bench of this Court, after adverting to the previous pronouncements and, in the facts of the said case, found that, though the petitioner therein was charged for the offence punishable under section 302, it was not a case in which the petitioner therein could, in no circumstances, be admitted to bail. Even otherwise, even if the accused is charged under section 302, it is not that such an accused would never get bail. There is always every likelihood of such person being released on bail, observed the Division Bench. On this premise, the contention on behalf of the petitioner that the order suffers from non application of mind was turned down. 35. We have adverted to the nature of the accusation against petitioner with a view to demonstrate that the accusation is not of such a nature that the petitioner could never be admitted to bail. Viewed through this prism, the fact that the co-accused were already admitted to bail was of material salience. The Detaining Authority, in our view, was thus justified in taking into account the said fact to record the satisfaction that there was an imminent possibility of the petitioner being released on bail. 36. Two other submissions were canvassed on behalf of the petitioner. One, the fact that the Anticipatory Bail Application of the petitioner was rejected by the Sessions Court, in the very same crime, was not taken into account by the Detaining Authority. Nor the fact that, while opposing the said application for Anticipatory Bail, the prosecution had submitted that it had prayed for cancellation of bail in C.R.No. 494 of 2019, for the offence punishable under section 325 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The submissions do not merit acceptance. Nor the fact that, while opposing the said application for Anticipatory Bail, the prosecution had submitted that it had prayed for cancellation of bail in C.R.No. 494 of 2019, for the offence punishable under section 325 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The submissions do not merit acceptance. The fact that Anticipatory Bail Application of the petitioner was rejected was not at all germane while considering the possibility of the release of the accused on bail, post his arrest, under section 439 of Code. It is trite that different consideration weigh in, while granting anticipatory bail and regular bail. Likewise, there is a significant distinction between rejection of bail, while the accused is in custody, and cancellation of bail, already granted. Non consideration of these aspects, therefore, does not detract materially from the satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority. 37. The upshot of aforesaid consideration is that non-consideration of the detail orders granting bail to the co-accused, in the circumstances of the case, in our view, does not impair the satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority. The pronouncement in the case of Rekha (supra), on which strong reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner, cannot be construed to lay down an immutable rule that the Detaining Authority must consider the detailed order passed by the Court in respect of the co-accused while arriving at the satisfaction regarding the possibility of the detenu being released on bail. As indicated above, in the case of Rekha (supra), there was a bald statement in the grounds of detention that “in similar cases bails were granted by the Courts”. The statement was as vague as possible. In the case at hand, definite particulars have been furnished. Thus, the pronouncement in the case of Rekha (supra) does not govern the facts of the instant case with equal force. 38. Contextually, it may be appropriate to note the caution administered by the Supreme Court in the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Padmausundara Rao (Dead) vs. State of T.N. and Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 533 , in the matter of placing reliance on precedents. The observations in paragraph 9 are instructive: 9] Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. The observations in paragraph 9 are instructive: 9] Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington Vs. British Railways Board (1972) 2 WLR 537 . Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. 39. Before parting, we record that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority, as regards the necessity of the detention of the petitioner in the backdrop of the antecedents of the petitioner, as reflected in the offences registered against the petitioner and the in camera statements of the witnesses, does not suffer from infirmities like absence of cogent material, non-consideration of relevant material or non application of mind. In the totality of the circumstances, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority that the acts and conduct of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order cannot be faulted at. 40. Resultantly, the challenge to the impugned order of detention does not merit acceptance. The petition thus deserves to be dismissed. Hence, the following order: ORDER The Petition stands dismissed.