ORDER : This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of Cr.P.C., praying this Court to issue a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 05.02.2020 (Annexure ‘G’) passed by respondent No.3 in file No:REV/MAG/CR-/2019-20/533 and direct the respondents to drop Section 145 Cr.P.C., proceedings and pass such other order as this Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case. 2. The petitioner in the main petition has contended that Sy.No.304 measuring 4 acres 38 guntas situated at Chitta Village, Bidar Taluk and District. The copy of the ROR from the year 1997-98 (Annexure ‘A’) filed along with petition, is clear that the land was a patta land and the entries in the name of petitioner’s husband in both column Nos.9 and 11. Earlier the survey number was given as 288 and subsequently re-numbered as Sy.No.304. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that earlier villagers have filed suit in O.S.No.12/2003 and the same was dismissed, wherein, the Civil Court has made an observation that out of 4 acres 38 guntas 2 acres of land was granted in favour of petitioner herein. The said judgment and decree has attained its finality. The learned counsel submits that in the said suit, the Deputy Commissioner as well as the Assistant Commissioner are parties to the proceedings. Now, the learned counsel would submit that at the instance of respondent Nos.7 to 9, the Tahasildar passed the impugned order under Section 146 of Cr.P.C. taking the possession of the property and appointing the receiver. The said order is in contravention of Section 145 of Cr.P.C. 4. The learned counsel also would submit that before passing the order under Section 146 of Cr.P.C. there must be a conditional order and no such conditional order was passed. The learned counsel also would submit that the land was granted to the petitioner’s husband in the year 2002 by the Assistant Commissioner and they are in possession of the suit land and in spite of the suit filed by the villagers was also dismissed again initiated proceedings under Section 146 of Cr.P.C. The very initiation of proceedings under Section 145 of Cr.P.C., is without jurisdiction and the Civil Court has already decided the issue involved between the parties. 5. 5. The learned counsel in support of his arguments also relied upon the order passed by this Court in Crl.P.No.255/1978 D.D. 30.08.1978. Referring to this judgment, it is observed that when an Executive Magistrate decides to hold an enquiry under Section 145 of Cr.P.C., he is in law required to issue what is called a preliminary order under Section 145(1) of Cr.P.C. Without issuing such an order, he cannot, in law, proceed to hold an enquiry or take any further steps in regard to the enquiry. Section 145(1) of Cr.P.C., lays down that an Executive Magistrate can, in law, issue a preliminary order only after being satisfied on the basis of a report of a police officer or on the basis of other information received by him to the effect that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof. Unless such an order has been passed, the learned Magistrate cannot invoke Section 146(1) of Cr.P.C. and also the Court held that where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged. It amounts to an abuse of process by the Tahasildar passing such an order and when there is no preliminary order under Section 145, the Tahasildar cannot pass an order under Section 146(1) taking the possession of property of the petitioner. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent Nos.7 to 9 would submit that the land was granted in respect of Sy.No.287 and also the learned counsel would submit that Sy.No.287 and Sy.No.288 are distinct properties. The land grant made in favour of the petitioner is in respect of Sy.No.287 and not in respect of Sy.No.288. The learned counsel also would submit that the total extent of land is 4 acres 38 guntas and the same is used by the public as grave yard. When such being the case, the Tahasildar rightly initiated the proceedings and granted land and the land in question are distinct properties. Hence, this Court cannot exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 7. The learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 6, though took time to file objection statement, he has not filed the same. 8. Hence, this Court cannot exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 7. The learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 6, though took time to file objection statement, he has not filed the same. 8. The learned High Court Government Pleader would submit that the Tahasildar has exercised the powers when there was a breach of peace in the village. Hence, the order cannot be quashed. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.7 to 9, it is not in dispute that out of 4 acres 38 guntas 2 acres of land was granted in favour of the petitioner vide order of the Assistant Commissioner dated 26.12.2002, which is marked as Annexure ‘F’ to the writ petition. On perusal of Annexure ‘F’, in the order, it is specifically mentioned as, 2 acres 38 guntas of land in Sy.No.288 was granted for public purpose i.e., for grave yard and 2 acres of land restored to Shri. Narasing Lalappa, the resident of Chitta, as this area is under his cultivation as per Revenue Inspector and based on the Tahasildar report. The Assistant Director of Land Records, Bidar directed to fix the boundaries of the above area as per rules. The said order was questioned again before the very Assistant Commissioner. The Assistant Commissioner vide order dated 18.02.2019 -‘Annexure R5’, made an observation that the land was granted in respect of Sy.No.287 in terms of ‘C’ form dated 03.09.1979 but right is claimed in respect of Sy.No.288. Hence, it is necessary to verify the original land grant records and already 17 years have been lapsed and while mentioning the name of private person in the records and the same has to be carried in terms of the rules and regulations and passed an order to take a necessary action to protect the property. No order as to cancellation of earlier grant. The petitioner’s counsel also relied upon the corrigendum issued regarding correction of survey number. But the fact is that when the villagers have challenged the earlier order by filing a suit in O.S.No.12/2003 immediately after the land was granted in favour of the petitioner herein, wherein, the Deputy Commissioner and also the Assistant Commissioner are the parties to the suit. The petitioner’s counsel also relied upon the corrigendum issued regarding correction of survey number. But the fact is that when the villagers have challenged the earlier order by filing a suit in O.S.No.12/2003 immediately after the land was granted in favour of the petitioner herein, wherein, the Deputy Commissioner and also the Assistant Commissioner are the parties to the suit. The Civil Court has taken note of the grant made in favour of the petitioner vide order dated 26.12.2002 and dismissed the suit making the observation that the land to the extent of 2 acres has already been granted in favour of this petitioner and given the finding that there was a grant in favour of the petitioner herein. The Assistant Commissioner ought not to have entertained and ordered to verify the original records and take action in terms of the rules and regulations. Apart from that on merits also in this petition it is the specific contention of the petitioner that an order has been passed by the Tahasildar consequent upon the order of the Assistant Commissioner dated 18.02.2019 invoking Section 146(1) of Cr.P.C., appointing the receiver and directed the receiver to take the possession of the property including the crop. 10. This Court would like to extract Sections 145(1) and 146(1) of Cr.P.C., before considering the said contention, which read as follows: “Section 145(1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. Section 146(1) If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of section 145 considers the case to be one of emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession as is referred to in section 145, or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent Court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof: Provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute.” 11. Having considered Sections 145(1) and 146(1) of Cr.P.C., it is clear that the Executive Magistrate after satisfying from the report of a Police Officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied and require the parties to give an opportunity and thereafter power vested with the Magistrate to attach subject of dispute and to appoint the receiver. 12. The learned counsel rightly contended that there is no any preliminary order as envisaged under Section 145(1) of Cr.P.C. and no such preliminary order has been passed and in the absence of any conditional order or preliminary order, the Tahasildar cannot pass an order under Section 146(1) of Cr.P.C. and no such enquiry is conducted as contemplated under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. after passing any preliminary order and passed the impugned order. 13. 13. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment referred supra, wherein, also this Court discussed Section 145(1) of Cr.P.C., and also Section 146 of Cr.P.C. and held that unless an order is passed under Section 145(1) of Cr.P.C., the learned Tahasildar cannot pass any order directly under Section 146(1) of Cr.P.C., and before passing such an order also there must be an enquiry, an opportunity has to be given to the parties and instead of proceeded to pass an order exercising the powers under Section 146(1) of Cr.P.C. Hence, there is a force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by the Tahasildar under Annexure ‘G’ is requires to be quashed. 14. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the following: ORDER (i) The petition is allowed. (ii) The impugned order dated 05.02.2020 (Annexure ‘G’) passed by respondent No.3 in file No:REV/MAG/CR-/2019-20/533, is hereby quashed.