ORDER : 1. Instant writ petition has been filed by petitioner-Company with the following prayers: 2. I have heard learned counsels for the respective parties. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the khatedari land measuring 07 bigha 09 biswa was acquired by a partnership firm, namely M/s Assam Roller Flour Mills vide registered Sale Deed dated 27.09.1960 and thereafter got it converted into industrial under the provisions of Rajasthan Industrial Areas Allotment Rules, 1959. Consequent thereto, a lease deed between M/s Assam Roller Flour Mills and Government of Rajasthan was executed on 13.07.1966 and got registered on 10.08.1966. 4. The industry established on the disputed land by the firm had to be closed down in the year 2000 and in the beginning of 2003 the firm applied for re-conversion of this land into agricultural land. At that time, Rule 13 and Rule 14 of the Rajasthan Industrial Areas Allotment Rules 1959, permitted such re-conversion. The difference in both the rules was that Rule-13 gave the absolute right to get the land re-converted into agricultural, whereas Rule-14 dealt with the situation where a person intended to use such converted land for any other non-agricultural purpose. 5. It was further argued that the said application remained pending for a period of more than two years. Meanwhile, Rule-13 was deleted by GSR 42 dated 06.10.2003, therefore, the application moved by the firm was dealt with under Rule-14(1) and the Collector vide order dated 22.06.2005, allowed the re-conversion of their land from industrial to agricultural. After the deletion of Rule-13, there was no provision in Rajasthan Industrial Areas Allotment Rules 1959 for simple re-conversion of khatedari land from industrial to agricultural where the khatedar had to close-down the mill/industry established on such land, as was the case with the firm M/s Assam Roller Flour Mills. Therefore, Rule-14 was amended in the year 2010, which reads as under: “Amendment of Rule-14 – The existing subrule (1) of rule 14 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Industrial Areas Allotment) Rules 1959 shall be substituted, namely: (1) Any person who has surrendered his khatedari land and got the land allotted on lease for the setting-up of an industry may at anytime apply to the Collector for reverting the land for the original use. In such case, the Collector shall pass an order for reversion and on such reversion the status of the land shall be the same as it was before he had surrendered his khatedari rights, but he shall not be entitled to get refund of any amount paid by him for the conversion or otherwise. If the person whose land was reverted to original use intends to use the said land for other non-agricultural purposes, he may apply to appropriate authority for conversion under the relevant rules.” 6. The submission was that Rule-13 & 14 as deleted/amended from time to time made it clear that when the firm M/s Assam Roller Flour Mills got re-converted its land from industrial to agricultural, the land in question acquired the status of agricultural land. 7. The firm M/s Assam Roller Flour Mills Ltd. by virtue of Deed of Conveyance registered as document No.2005001787 dated 25.07.2005 before the office of Sub-Registrar-VII, Jaipur, sold all its rights in the said agricultural land against valuable consideration in favour of the petitioner and accordingly mutation was sanctioned in favour of the petitioner. 8. The petitioner vide application dated 01.09.2005 applied for conversion of the said land from agricultural to commercial. Under the Master Development Plan of Jaipur, 2011, the land in question was shown in Industrial Zone. Therefore, modification in the Master Development Plan was also required to be made with the sanction of the State Government. For this purpose, an Agenda dated 28.10.2005 was prepared by the JDA. While preparing the agenda, a mistake occurred. In the agenda it was needed to be written that on change of land use (upantaran) from ‘industrial to commercial’, the petitioner was required to obtain lease deed on depositing conversion (rupantaran) charges from ‘agricultural to commercial’, whereas it was written that on change of land user (upantaran) from ‘industrial to commercial’, the petitioner was required to obtain lease deed on depositing conversion (rupantaran) charges from ‘Industrial to Commercial’ (hereinafter referred to as “condition no.4”). As stated above, the character of the land was agricultural, therefore, it was a case of conversion of agricultural land into commercial land not of industrial land into commercial. 9. As stated above, the character of the land was agricultural, therefore, it was a case of conversion of agricultural land into commercial land not of industrial land into commercial. 9. It was further contended that the said agenda was approved by the State Level Land Usage Conversion Committee, Jaipur in its meeting dated 03.01.2006 and so far as condition no.4 was concerned, the matter was left to be decided by the JDA. The said agenda also got approval of the State Government. Consequently, the JDA issued notification dated 20.01.2006 changing the use of the land from industrial to commercial in Master Development Plan 2011 on the condition that the petitioner will have to surrender 3268.61 sq.yd. land free of cost for the expansion of the road, which condition the petitioner complied with. 10. It was further contended that the JDA raised a demand of Rs.65,51,120/-towards conversion charges vide letter dated 01.02.2006. The petitioner deposited the said amount and the JDA passed an order dated 04.02.2006 under Section-90(B) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, and consequently the land vested with the JDA. Later on JDA issued the commercial Patta dated 08.03.2006 in respect of the said land in favour of the petitioner allowing the usage of land as commercial. After getting the necessary approvals/permissions from JDA, the petitioner developed multi-storied commercial project over the land in the year 2009 and substantial part of the same was sold to different persons. 11. It was further contended that all of a sudden, on 05.01.2016 i.e. after a period of 10 years, the petitioner was served with a Demand Notice by the JDA demanding an amount of Rs.7,18,12,474/-towards conversion charges which was further revised by another Demand Notice dated 22.09.2016 for Rs.18,04,28,841/-(7,18,12,474 principal amount+ 10,86,16,367 interest). 12. On enquiry, it was found that the demand was based upon an Audit Note dated 04.04.2008. The audit note was based upon the aforesaid condition no.4. The JDA submitted detailed reply dated 16.04.2008 to said audit note explaining that it was a case of conversion of agricultural land into commercial and conversion charges had been charged in accordance with circular of the State Government dated 13.09.2000 and thus a submission was made to cancel the audit note. 13. The JDA submitted detailed reply dated 16.04.2008 to said audit note explaining that it was a case of conversion of agricultural land into commercial and conversion charges had been charged in accordance with circular of the State Government dated 13.09.2000 and thus a submission was made to cancel the audit note. 13. When Audit Department did not agree, the JDA wrote a letter dated 21.07.2008 to the State Level Land Usage Conversion Committee stating that it was a case of conversion of agricultural land into commercial and thus the request was made to delete condition no.4. However, the JDA did not receive any reply to the said letter from the Audit Department. 14. The State Level Land Usage Conversion Committee (Jaipur) had been abolished on 27.08.2008 and powers of the Committee vested with the Urban Development & Housing Department, Jaipur. As such, again on 06.09.2011, 21.07.2008, 21.03.2014, 28.05.2014, 14.07.2015 & 18.01.2016, the JDA wrote reminder letters to said department making the same request, but to no effect. A letter to that effect was also written by the Collector (Recovery) Jaipur on 11.01.2017. When JDA did not receive any communication in response to its letters, it started the recovery proceedings which have been challenged by way of this writ petition. 15. It was further submitted that the Master Development Plan is a vision document and only nominal fee is prescribed for effecting modification therein, which was deposited by the petitioner. The charges are only for conversion of land from present usage to another. This preposition of law has been well explained by JDA in para 4 and 5 of its reply dated 16.04.2008 to the audit note. Condition No.4 which is bone of contention says about conversion charges and not of charges for modification in the Master Development Plan. In the present case, the only condition imposed while making modification in Master Development Plan was that the petitioner will have to surrender 3268.61 sq. yd. land for the expansion of road free of cost, which condition was complied with by the petitioner. 16. It was further contended that the demand raised by the JDA for the first time vide letter dated 05.01.2016 was challenged by the petitioner before the JDA Tribunal by filing an appeal. yd. land for the expansion of road free of cost, which condition was complied with by the petitioner. 16. It was further contended that the demand raised by the JDA for the first time vide letter dated 05.01.2016 was challenged by the petitioner before the JDA Tribunal by filing an appeal. The said appeal was disposed of by the Tribunal vide order dated 08.02.2016 with certain directions to the JDA which reads as under:- ^^1- vk{ksfir uksfVl fnukad 05-01-2016 ds lanHkZ esa vihykFkhZ vkt ls 20 fnu dh vof/k esa viuk Áfrosnu e; vko’;d nLrkostkr foi{kh dks ÁLrqr djsaA 2- vihykFkhZ }kjk ÁLrqr Áfrosnu ij foi{kh vius iwoZ i=kpkj lfgr bl lanHkZ esa tkjh uohure i= fnukad 18 tuojh 2016 ds e/; utj vk{ksfir uksfVl fnukad 05-01-2016 dk ÁLrqr vH;kosnu e; nLrkostkr dk ijh{k.k djrs gq, ;Fkk 'kh?kz iqufoZyksdu djsa ,oa blds fu.kZ; ls vihykFkhZ dks lwfpr fd;k tkosA 3- foi{kh }kjk mDr iqufoZyksdu ds fu.kZ; dh lwpuk vihykFkhZ dks fd;s tkus rd vk{ksfir@ vihyk/khu uksfVl fnukad 05-01-2016 dh fØ;kfUorh LFkfxr j[ksaA 4- bl fu.kZ; dh Áekf.kr Áfr lfpo] tfoÁk dks vko’;d okLrs dk;Zokgh gsrq Ásf"kr fd;k tkosA** 17. In compliance of the directions of the Tribunal, the petitioner made a detailed representation but the JDA rejected the said representation vide letter dated 15.03.2016 with a single line stating that “since condition no.4 had not been deleted by the Government, it has been decided to continue with the recovery”. Again the petitioner filed an appeal before the JDA Tribunal, but the Tribunal dismissed the said appeal vide order dated 13.04.2018 without appreciating the controversy. The Tribunal proceeded on the assumption that it was after the conversion of land from agriculture to commercial under Section 90B, the order regarding change of land-use from industrial to commercial was passed, which is factually incorrect. It was only after the modification in Master Development Plan, the conversion of land from agriculture to commercial was allowed. Therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal is against law and facts. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, prayed that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal as well as the impugned demand notices may be quashed and set aside and the writ petition may be allowed. 19. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-JDA submitted that the petitioner has failed to point out any illegality, infirmity or perversity in the said judgment of the Tribunal. 20. 19. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-JDA submitted that the petitioner has failed to point out any illegality, infirmity or perversity in the said judgment of the Tribunal. 20. It was further submitted that the petitioner has furnished an undertaking, according to which, the petitioner was required to pay the charges in lieu of change of user of land from industrial to commercial. The conversion of land was actually from industrial to commercial and not from agricultural to commercial, as claimed by the petitioner. The order dated 22.06.2005 passed by the Collector is not an order granting the conversion of permissible land use, rather the same is a fraction of process for conversion of the basic permissible use i.e. Industrial to some other, for which the land is reverted to its original form. By the said order, the Collector has merely put the land back to its original form i.e. agricultural, which is not of permissible use of land notified as industrial in the MDP 2011 and which can only be changed according to Section 25 of the JDA Act 1982, which cannot be invoked by the Collector or Authorised Officer and they have no competence or power to accord a change of use of land. 21. It was also contended that the Collector initiated and concluded the part of proceedings in respect of change of land use, viz, to put the land to its original form that is agricultural, on which the conversion of land use can be permitted on a further application to the competent authority for conversion under Rule 14(1) of the Industrial Area Allotment Rules, 1959. 22. Further, the land in question, which was sought to be used as commercial by the petitioner company, was industrial under the Master Plan, 2011. Putting of the land in question to agricultural by the Collector; and on count of again seeking of a permission by the petitioner-Company, in respect of the said land (which was having an Industrial user in Master Plan) to use it for non-agricultural purpose, by manner of seeking or initiation of 90-B proceedings, on conclusion of 90-B proceedings will put the land to its original user, which in present case was industrial; and the change of user if permitted will be a change of user of land from industrial to commercial. 23. 23. It was asserted further that the aforesaid fact of grant of change of user of land in question to commercial was permitted by the State Level Land Use Conversion Committee, in its meeting dated 3.1.2006, wherein the change of user of land permitted in the Master Plan, 2011 was allowed to be converted to commercial, with a specific condition (Condition No. 4) of payment by the petitioner company, of conversion charges from industrial to commercial. However, inadvertently, the JDA issued a demand note to the petitioner while calculating the charges on the basis of conversion of user of land from agricultural to commercial, in place of industrial to commercial. The petitioner-Company on account of the aforesaid bona fide mistake of JDA, cannot claim any benefit and thus, was not justified in saying that change of user of land was permitted from agricultural to commercial. The petitioner-Company, was fully aware about the fact of conversion of land from industrial to commercial, rather from agricultural to commercial. The petitioner undertook to abide by the conditions of the decision of the State Level Land Use Conversion Committee and furnished the undertaking dated 3.3.2009 consenting to pay the conversion charges accordingly. The case of petitioner-Company for conversion charges was considered and reviewed and after examining the totality of facts it was decided vide Annexure-R/4 dated 15.03.2016 to recover the charges for conversion of land from industrial to commercial. 24. It was further submitted that the petitioner cannot now claim any relief, as the proceedings pursuant to impugned notice have been converted into the proceedings under the Act of 1956. Such matter can be dealt with and decided by the competent authority empowered under the Act of 1956 and this Court would not be inclined to interfere with the proceedings pending before the Collector (Recovery), who is seized with the matter and initiated the proceedings and in furtherance thereof, has also issued attachment warrant and the petitioner property has been attached. The remedy, if any, available to the petitioner against the recovery of demand is as provided under the Act of 1956. 25. The remedy, if any, available to the petitioner against the recovery of demand is as provided under the Act of 1956. 25. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the petitioner is claiming relief solely on the basis of alleging the use of land to have been converted from Agricultural to Commercial under the proceedings enumerated under the Rules of 1959 and Section 90-B of the Land Revenue Act, 1956, while intentionally skipping to present before this Hon’ble Court about the change of actual permissible use of land, defined under the Master Plan, from industrial to commercial and also while making the effect of Section 54 and Section 25 of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 on the conclusion of proceedings under Rules of 1959 and under 90-B of the Act of 1956. 26. It was further contended that the order passed by the Collector under the Rules of 1959 or by the Authorised Officer under Section 90-B is not an order granting the change of permissible land user in MDP as neither the Collector nor the Authorised Officer under Section 90-B have any competence for the same, rather the same is a fraction of process for change of the basic form of land. The Collector under Rules, 1956 just puts the land to the agricultural form, subject to conversion by the local body and the Authorised Officer in an order passed under Section 90-B just orders for resumption of the land and thereafter to place the same at the disposal of JDA for the purpose of allotment/regularization, as provided under Section 54 of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982, after being satisfied in regard to requirements being fulfilled. The Collector and the Authorized Officer thereafter merely put the land after its resumption at the disposal of JDA and do not change the basic user as existing in the MDP. 27. The user of the land in dispute to commercial was sought by the petitioner-Company was an Industrial Land under the Master Plan, 2011. The Collector and the Authorized Officer thereafter merely put the land after its resumption at the disposal of JDA and do not change the basic user as existing in the MDP. 27. The user of the land in dispute to commercial was sought by the petitioner-Company was an Industrial Land under the Master Plan, 2011. Putting of the land in question at the disposal of JDA after its resumption by the Authorised Officer by manner of passing an order under 90B of the Act, 1956 and on count of the petitioner seeking a permission for commercial user of land which was having an industrial user in Master Development Plan, to use it for non-Industrial purpose, was permissible only after granting of change of user of Land in the Master Plan, as provided under Section 25 of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982. 28. It was submitted that the aforesaid fact of grant of change of land use in question to commercial was permitted under the notification 20.1.2006 wherein the change of use of land permitted in the Master Plan, 2011 was allowed to be converted to commercial from industrial, with a specific condition of payment by the Khatedars, of conversion charges from industrial to commercial. However, the JDA in respect of change of user of land in question from industrial to commercial, in place of the user of land from industrial (as it being in Master Plan, 2011) to commercial, wrongly issued demand note for conversion of user form agricultural to commercial, contrary to the decision of State and the notification issued in this regard. On account of the aforesaid bona fide slip-up of JDA, the petitioner cannot claim any benefit and thus, was not justified in saying that the change of land has been permitted to commercial from agricultural. 29. To strengthen his arguments, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sadhana Lodh Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd., (2003) 3 SCC 524 , wherein it was held as under:- “The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or Tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or the Tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the inferior court or Tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision.” In this regard, he has also placed reliance on Prem Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1977 WLN(UC) 158. 30. He further placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation Rajasthan Vs. Sanjeev Sachdeva & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 562 , wherein it was held as under:- “We may, in this respect, also indicate that, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 297 read with Section 173-A of the 1959 Act, 2000 Rules were promulgated. It is under the above-mentioned Rules that the respondents filed an application on 16.7.2003 for change of land use from residential to commercial. Following those Rules, the Corporation issued public notice inviting objections. Later, the Land Use Committee met and approved the conversion for which a demand notice of Rs.5,70,300/-was raised by the Corporation on 2.4.2004. We are of the view that the demand is legal and valid and in accordance with the provisions of Section 173A, as inserted by Amendment Act 19 of 1999 read with 2000 Rules. We are also of the view that the Rajasthan High Court has committed an error in applying the Judgment of this Court in Pareshar Soni’s case (supra) which was dealing with the un-amended provision of Section 173A.” 31. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in Union of India & Anr. Vs. Kartick Chandra Mondal & Anr., (2010) 2 SCC 422 , particularly paras 17 to 20. 32. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. Vs. Jaswant Singh & Anr., (2006) 11 SCC 464 , wherein in para 12 it was held as follows:- “12. …...In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are : (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Vs. Jaswant Singh & Anr., (2006) 11 SCC 464 , wherein in para 12 it was held as follows:- “12. …...In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are : (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches." 33. He further placed reliance on the judgment of the Single Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Ratan Rice Flour & Oil Mills Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 1981 WLN(UC) 185, wherein in para 6 it was observed thus: “6. ……………... In these circumstances, there is no reason to interfere with the proceedings regarding recovery of arrears sales tax as arrears of land revenue. Moreover, the petitioner Mills can have recourse to an alternative remedy available under Section 257-B of the Land Revenue Act and institute a suit to establish its right and title in respect of the property which has been attached and is sought to be sold in these proceedings. Therefore, a prayer was made to dismiss the writ petition. 34. It is to be noted that on 3.5.2018, notices of the writ petition were issued to the respondent and while staying the operation of the order dated 15.3.2016 and 13.4.2018, the attachment of property and seizure of bank accounts of the petitioner was ordered to be released, however, it was directed that the petitioner shall submit a bank guarantee for a sum of Rs.1 Crore in favour of the JDA within a period of 15 days. 35. 35. An application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India for vacation of the interim order dated 03.05.2018 was filed by the respondent-JDA. The said application was disposed of vide order dated 14.8.2019 and the interim order dated 03.05.2018 was modified in the following terms:- “In this view of the matter, I am of the considered view that interests of the justice would be served by taking in the interim a balanced view. That would be to direct the petitioner-Company to deposit a sum of Rs.5.00 crores (Five crores) with the JDA within a period of 60 days from today towards the demand of due charges for change of land use of the subject land to commercial. It is however made clear that in the event the petitioner-Company succeeds, the respondent JDA will be liable to refund the aforesaid amount or amount as the court may direct with interest at the current PLR rate of the State Bank of India commencing the date of deposit under the interim order till the date of re-payment. The interim order dated 3.5.2018 passed by this Court stands accordingly modified. The application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India stands disposed of.” 36. The order dated 14.08.2019 was challenged by the petitioner by way of filing D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1484/2019 before the Division Bench of this Court and the said appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 04.11.2019. 37. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and perused the record carefully along with the written submissions of both the parties. 38. Admittedly, the original status of the disputed land was “agricultural” and it was got converted by the vendor of the petitioner from “agricultural” to “industrial” way back in the year 1966. As the industry established on the land had to be closed down, the vendor of the petitioner wanted to get it re-converted to its original “agricultural” use and for that purpose, he moved an application before the competent authority in the year 1999 i.e. 6 years prior to the petitioner came into picture. The re-conversion was allowed by the Collector vide Order dated 22.06.2005 i.e. after 06 years of moving the application. 39. The re-conversion was allowed by the Collector vide Order dated 22.06.2005 i.e. after 06 years of moving the application. 39. Undisputedly, the land in dispute was purchased by the petitioner vide Sale Deed dated 25.07.2005 as “agricultural” land and thereafter it moved the application on 01.09.2005 seeking the conversion of land from “agricultural” to “commercial”, which was allowed by the Prescribed Authority. The petitioner deposited the (18 of 21) [CW-9362/2018] conversion charges as demanded by the JDA and after getting necessary approvals and permissions from JDA, the petitioner developed multistorey commercial project over the land, which was completed in the year 2009. The respondent has placed on record a copy of the Notification dated 07.10.2005, issued by the JDA in the compliance of provisions of Section 25 (3) of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 to show that the petitioner had applied for conversion of land from “manufacturing” to “commercial”. However, it is to be noted that the petitioner had never applied for conversion of land from “manufacturing” to “commercial”. From the application seeking conversion, it is evident that the petitioner only wanted to get the usage of the land to “commercial”. At that time, the status of land was “agricultural”. Meaning thereby, the petitioner had sought the conversion of the land from “agricultural” to “commercial”. In fact, in the Master Development Plan 2011, the usage of land was recorded as “manufacturing” and therefore to allow the conversion of land from “agricultural” to “commercial”, change in Master Development Plan 2011 was also required to be made. The procedure for the same has been laid under Section 25 of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982. For change in Master Development Plan, no charges are required to be made. Only nominal application fee is required to be paid, which was paid by the petitioner. The Notification relied upon by the respondent was issued seeking objections from general public regarding change of land-use in the Master Development Plan from “manufacturing” to “commercial”, as required under Section-25 (3) of the Jaipur Development Authority Act 1982. The recital made in said Notification to the effect that the petitioner had sought the change of land from “manufacturing” to “commercial” was used only in that context, so that change in the Master Development Plan could be made and consequently conversion of land from “agricultural” to “commercial”, as sought by the petitioner could be allowed. The recital made in said Notification to the effect that the petitioner had sought the change of land from “manufacturing” to “commercial” was used only in that context, so that change in the Master Development Plan could be made and consequently conversion of land from “agricultural” to “commercial”, as sought by the petitioner could be allowed. The necessary order for converting land from “agriculture” to “commercial” was passed by the respondent u/s. 90B on 04.02.2006 and the lease deed accordingly was registered at the instance of respondent in the sub registrar office on 08.03.2006. Entire amount of conversion of Rs.65,51,120/-was deposited and subsequently the amount of one time Urban Jamabandi and sewerage amount of Rs.28,61,298/-was also deposited in the year 2006 itself. 40. However, all of a sudden, after 10 years, the petitioner was served with a Demand Notice raising demand of Rs.7,18,12,474/-. It appears that the said demand was raised on the basis of an Audit Note dated 04.04.2008, which was the result of the some clerical error. It was further found that the JDA communicated with the authorities concerned for 10 years to get that clerical error corrected so that Audit Objection could be removed and when JDA did not receive any response from the authorities concerned, it issued demand notice of Rs.7,18,12,474/-. Therefore, it is apparent that the said demand is per se illegal, as the procedure laid down for the conversion of land from “agricultural” to “commercial” was duly adopted. As a matter of fact, the defence of the respondent that it was a case of conversion of land from “industrial” to “commercial” is contrary to the facts and law. 41. Admittedly, the JDA itself had made objections before the Audit Authority categorically submitting that the demand of depositing Rs.7,18,12,474/-is not acceptable and a request was made by the JDA to rectify the mistake. Therefore, now the submission of the JDA to the contrary cannot be accepted. 42. It is also settled law that on the basis of audit objections, demand cannot be raised. In the instant case the said objections were not even accepted by the respondent. 43. Therefore, now the submission of the JDA to the contrary cannot be accepted. 42. It is also settled law that on the basis of audit objections, demand cannot be raised. In the instant case the said objections were not even accepted by the respondent. 43. An objection has been raised on behalf of the respondent that this writ petition is not maintainable and on the contrary, the petitioner should approach the authorities under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, however this stand of the respondent is also not sustainable because the petitioner has challenged the judgment of JDA Appellate Tribunal and against the said judgment, the remedy of writ is maintainable. 44. It is trite that the existence of an alternative remedy whether adequate or not, does not alter the fundamentally discretionary nature of the High Court’s writ jurisdiction and, therefore, does not create an absolute bar on the exercise of the writ jurisdiction by the High Court. In this regard, reference can be made to the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra Chess Association vs. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 285 and Radha Krishna Industries Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2021 SCC Online SC 334. 45. Consequently, the writ petition succeeds and the same is allowed. The impugned judgment of the Tribunal dated 13.04.2018 as well as the communications/demand dated 05.01.2016, 15.03.2016 and 22.09.2016 are hereby quashed and set aside. The amount of Rs. 5 crores, deposited by the petitioner-Company under the interim order of this Court, be returned back to the petitioner with interest at the current PLR rate of the State Bank of India till the date of repayment. The compliance of the order of this Court be made within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.