JUDGMENT : K.BABU, J. This appeal arises from the judgment dated 28-01-2021 in W.P(C).No.4120/2014 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge declined to grant any reliefs to the appellant/petitioner and closed the writ petition. 2. The appellant instituted the writ petition with the following prayers: (i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order quashing Ext.P18. (ii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order quashing Ext.P10. (iii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order quashing Ext.P16. (iv) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction directing respondent No.1 to pay interest @ 18% per annum for the period of 8 months of delayed payment of retirement benefits to the petitioner. (v) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to consider Ext.P19 within a time frame to be fixed by this Hon’ble Court. (vi) Grant the petitioner such other appropriate reliefs that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit to grant. & (vii) Award the petitioner the costs of this writ petition. 3. Heard Sri.P.B.Krishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Sri.M.Gopikirishnan Nambiar, the learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 & 2, and Sri.P.Vijayakumar, the learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, appearing for respondent No.3. 4. The appellant served the Coffee Board for 36 years and retired as a Junior Liaison Officer on 29-08-2008 on attaining the age of superannuation. The retirement benefits were not disbursed to the appellant within one month of the retirement. The appellant submitted a series of representations. The retirement benefits were disbursed only in April, 2009. Hence, the appellant sought interest for the delayed payment of amounts due to him. 5. Respondents 1 and 2 resisted the claim of the appellant, contending that the delay caused in disbursing the retirement benefits was not deliberate or intentional. It was further submitted that the delay caused at different levels was mainly on account of the implementation of the VIth Central Pay Commission and would not have arisen in any normal circumstances. Respondents 1 and 2 further submitted that the delay in disposal of cases of pension fixation of officials in 'pay-cell' was mainly due to the dearth of trained personnel, which hampered the speedy disposal of such cases. Respondents 1 and 2 further submitted that the delay in disposal of cases of pension fixation of officials in 'pay-cell' was mainly due to the dearth of trained personnel, which hampered the speedy disposal of such cases. Respondents 1 and 2 also contended that the writ petition was filed five years after the disbursement of the retirement benefits and the appellant has not explained the delay in instituting the writ petition. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that as per Rule 65(1)(a) of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, the Accounts Officer shall, on receipt of the pension papers, apply the requisite checks, record the account enfacement and assess the amount of pension and gratuity and issue the payment order not later than one month in advance of the date of retirement of the Government servant. It is further contended that the Chairman or the Director of Finance has not acted in terms of the provisions of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 despite the fact that the appellant had applied for superannuation pension on 25-02-2008 itself with all relevant records. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that provisional pension should have been paid to the appellant in case of anticipated delay in disbursement of retirement benefits in view of the O.M No.11(6)-E, V(A)/73 dated 22-07-1974 of the Ministry of Finance. 7. The learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 relying on Anx.R1(a) submitted that the appellant as early as on 24-11-2008 had opted for fixation of pension in tune with the VIth Pay Commission, and hence, the appellant was well aware of the reasons for the delay caused in the disbursement of retirement benefits. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that there is no satisfactory explanation on the part of the appellant in the delay in the institution of the writ petition. 8. The appellant retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 29-08-2008 as a Junior Liaison Officer from the Coffee Board. On 25-02-2008, the appellant submitted the documents required to process pension as per Ext.P2. After superannuation on 29-08-2008, the appellant submitted Ext.P4 representation on 10-10-2008 to the Chairman of the Coffee Board requesting instantaneous actions to sanction and disburse all the retirement benefits to him along with monthly pension. On 25-02-2008, the appellant submitted the documents required to process pension as per Ext.P2. After superannuation on 29-08-2008, the appellant submitted Ext.P4 representation on 10-10-2008 to the Chairman of the Coffee Board requesting instantaneous actions to sanction and disburse all the retirement benefits to him along with monthly pension. By way of Ext.P5 representation, the appellant on 10-11-2008 again requested the Chairman of the Coffee Board to take necessary action to grant superannuation pension and other retirement benefits. The pecuniary benefits were sanctioned by respondents 1 and 2 by a pension payment order dated 30-01-2009. Exhibit P6 order was passed on 11/13-3-2009. Exhibit P7 authorisation dated 31-03-2009 was issued to the Bank concerned and effected payment to the account of the appellant in April 2009. The appellant submitted Ext.P9 representation dated 25-04-2009, seeking interest on the delayed payment and action against the officials culpable for the delay. Exhibit P9 representation was rejected by the competent authority stating that the delay has occurred on account of the implementation of the VIth Central Pay Commission and that there was no deliberate or intentional attempt to delay the matters. Thereafter, the appellant submitted Ext.P11 representation dated 10-01-2010 to the Chairman of the Coffee Board seeking interest at the rate as applicable for GPF deposits for the delayed payment. He also submitted Ext.P17 representation before the Pension Adalat Committee on 05-04-2013. The competent authorities rejected all those representations. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant relying on a series of representations, the last of which was Ext.P19 dated 20-08-2013, contended that the challenge from the side of respondents 1 and 2 that there is delay in the institution of the writ petition is not sustainable. 10. The challenge of respondents 1 and 2 is mainly on the ground that the delay in the disbursement of retirement benefits was not deliberate, and it happened mainly on account of the implementation of the VIth Pay Commission, for which the appellant himself opted as per Anx.R1(a). 11. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the retirement benefits being the vested right of the appellant was delayed in violation of the statutory provisions, and hence he is entitled to interest in respect of the amounts due to him during the period in which it was delayed. 12. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the retirement benefits being the vested right of the appellant was delayed in violation of the statutory provisions, and hence he is entitled to interest in respect of the amounts due to him during the period in which it was delayed. 12. In the instant case, as early as on 25-02-2008 the appellant had submitted the required documents to process his retirement benefits, which is evident from Ext.P2. Admittedly, the retirement benefits were disbursed to the appellant only in April, 2009. 13. Respondents 1 and 2 resisted the claim of the appellant contending that, he had opted for getting the retirement benefits on the basis of recommendations of the VIth Pay Commission and that the delay in the disbursement of the retirement benefits to the appellant was caused on account of the fixation of pension and other retirement benefits based on the recommendations of the VIth pay commission. The respondents further pleaded that delay in the disposal of cases relating to pension fixation of officials was mainly due to the shortage of trained personnel in the `pay-cell’ of the department concerned. As per Anx.R1(a), the appellant had opted for getting his retirement benefits based on the recommendation of the VIth Pay Commission. The appellant submitted Annexure R1(a) option on 24-11-2008. 14. The appellant had submitted Ext.P4 representation dated 10-10-2008 and Ext.P5 representation dated 10-11-2008 requesting to take steps to grant superannuation pension and retirement benefits without delay, immediately after his retirement on 29-08-2008. 15. Relying on Rule 65(1)(a) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the respondents ought to have completed the steps for settling the pension and other retirement benefits of the appellant within 30 days from the date of retirement. Rule 65(1)(a) of the CCS (Pension) Rules reads thus: “65. Authorization of pension and gratuity by the Accounts Officer (1) (a) On receipt of pension papers referred to in Rule 61, the Accounts Officer shall apply the requisite checks, record the account enfacement in Part II of Form 7 and assess the amount of pension and gratuity and issue the pension payment order not later than one month in advance of the date of the retirement of the Government servant if the pension is payable in his circle of accounting unit.” 16. The above extracted provision mandates that the pension and other retirement benefits should be settled within 30 days from the date of retirement. Admittedly, the Central Pay Commission was implemented only on 10-10-2008, that is, after the retirement of the appellant. The explanation for the delay caused in processing the retirement benefits to the appellant, linking the same with the implementation of the VIth Pay Commission, is against the provisions of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 and hence is not acceptable. Moreover, respondents 1 and 2 admitted in the affidavit placed on record that the dearth of sufficient staff was the main reason for the delay caused in processing the retirement benefits of the appellant. Respondents 1 and 2 failed to comply with the statutory responsibility in disbursing the benefits due to the appellant in time. 17. Even otherwise, as per O.M No.11(6)-E, V(A)/73 of the Ministry of Finance dated 22-07-1974, provisional pension should have been paid in case of anticipated delay in disbursement of the retirement benefits. Such a course was also not adopted in the instant case. It may be true that there is only a delay of eight months in disbursing the benefits due to the appellant. 18. The respondents have a contention that the appellant is not entitled to the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that, there is delay in the institution of the writ petition. The appellant was given the retirement benefits in April 2009. On 25-04-2009, the appellant submitted Ext.P9 representation to the Chairman of the Coffee Board seeking interest at the rate as applicable for GPF deposits for the delayed payment of his retirement benefits. 19. As per Ext.P10, the respondents replied that provisional pension was not granted to the appellant as he had not specifically requested for the same. As per Ext.P11 representation dated 10-01-2010, the appellant raised the claim that he is entitled to interest at the rate applicable for the GPF deposits for the delayed payment. As per Ext.P12 representation dated 02-04-2010, the appellant reminded the authorities that as per the relevant provisions of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, he was entitled to interest for the delayed payment. As per Exts.P13 and P14 O.Ms, the competent authority in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry directed the officers concerned to redress the grievances of the appellant. As per Ext.P12 representation dated 02-04-2010, the appellant reminded the authorities that as per the relevant provisions of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, he was entitled to interest for the delayed payment. As per Exts.P13 and P14 O.Ms, the competent authority in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry directed the officers concerned to redress the grievances of the appellant. On 23-08-2011, the appellant was served with a letter from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry that his case was treated as closed. Subsequently, the appellant on 05-04-2013 submitted Ext.P17 representation before the Pension Adalat Committee. As per Ext.P18 dated 02-08-2013, the appellant was informed that Ext.P17 representation of the appellant was disposed of. Thereafter, on 20-08-2013, the appellant submitted a further representation (Ext.P19) to the Secretary, Coffee Board informing that in the event interest is not granted to him, he would be compelled to proceed as per law. The appellant thereafter, on 07-02-2014, instituted the writ petition. In the instant case, the cause of action is continuous. We hold that there is no delay in the institution of the writ petition. 20. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches are adopted as a mode of discretion to decline the exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on the facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches are one of the facets to deny the exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause of action, etc. The Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. (Vide: Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others thr. Power of Attorney Holder v. M.I.D.C and Others ( AIR 2013 SC 565 ). 21. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon the breach of the right and the remedy claimed and when and how the delay arose. 21. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon the breach of the right and the remedy claimed and when and how the delay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of the delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court, and such discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the party’s defence must be tried upon principles which are substantially equitable. {Vide: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. ( AIR 1974 SC 2271 ); State of M.P. & Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., ( AIR 1987 SC 251 ); Tridip Kumar Dingal & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., [ (2009) 1 SCC 768 ]; [AIR 2008 SC (Supp)] 824; and Tukaram Kana Joshi and Ors. thr. Power of Attorney Holder v. M.I.D.C and Ors ( AIR 2013 SC 565 )}. 22. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, the delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the manifest illegality cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. The Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have, in fact emerged, by delay on the part of the Petitioners. The Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have, in fact emerged, by delay on the part of the Petitioners. [Vide: Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports & Ors., ( AIR 1970 SC 769 ); Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ) ; Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur & Ors., ( AIR 1993 SC 802 ); (1992 AIR SCW 3181) Dayal Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., ( AIR 2003 SC 1140 ) : (2003 AIR SCW 685) and Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar & Ors., ( AIR 2011 SC 2161 ) : (2011 AIR SCW 3033)]. 23. Retirement benefits are the precious property right of the appellant. It is a constitutional right in terms of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. 24. The right to property is now considered to be, not only a constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human right. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right, human rights are considered to be in the realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment etc. Now however, human rights are gaining an even greater multi faceted dimension. The right to property is considered, very much to be a part of such a new dimension. {Vide: Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram & Ors. [ (2007) 10 SCC 448 ]: [AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 1169] ; Amarjit Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. [ (2010) 10 SCC 43 ] : [AIR 2011 SC (Civ) 1587] : (2011 AIR SCW 3413); Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. ( AIR 2011 SC 1989 ) : (2011 AIR SCW 3337) ; State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar & Ors. ( AIR 2012 SC 559 ) : (2012 AIR SCW 276) ; Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P & Anr. ( AIR 2012 SC 573 ) : (2012 AIR SCW 129) and Tukaram Kana Joshi and Ors. thr. Power of Attorney Holder v. M.I.D.C and Ors ( AIR 2013 SC 565 )}. 25. In M/s. Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan etc. ( AIR 2012 SC 573 ) : (2012 AIR SCW 129) and Tukaram Kana Joshi and Ors. thr. Power of Attorney Holder v. M.I.D.C and Ors ( AIR 2013 SC 565 )}. 25. In M/s. Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan etc. etc v. State of U.P and others ( AIR 1982 SC 33 ), the Apex Court held that deprivation of property without the authority of law is prohibited under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 26. While considering the delay in the processing of DCRG on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings of an employee of the Fertilisers And Chemicals Travancore Ltd., a Division Bench of this Court presided by one of us (Alexander Thomas, J) in Viswanathan v. Fertilizers and Chemical Travancore Ltd., [ 2021 (2) KLT 899 ] held that though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right covered by Part III of the Constitution of India, right to property is a constitutional right in terms of Article 300A of the Constitution of India and therefore no person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. The Division Bench further held that the right to livelihood of a person in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India is also directly affected in the case of this nature. 27. In the instant case, the appellant submitted a series of representations seeking expeditious settlement of his retirement benefits, after his retirement. If the respondents had anticipated any delay in disbursement of the retirement benefits, they should have granted a provisional pension to the appellant, which they have not done. 28. We are of the considered view that the delay in the payment of retirement benefits to the appellant was attributable to administrative lapses and the delay in payment was not caused on account of failure on the part of the appellant to comply with the procedure laid down by the authorities for processing his pension papers. 29. There is delay in payment of retirement benefits, including pension/commuted value of pension and gratuity. In terms of Rule 68(1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 interest shall be paid for the delay in disbursement of gratuity. Rule 68(1) reads thus: “68. 29. There is delay in payment of retirement benefits, including pension/commuted value of pension and gratuity. In terms of Rule 68(1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 interest shall be paid for the delay in disbursement of gratuity. Rule 68(1) reads thus: “68. Interest on delayed payment of gratuity (1) If the payment of gratuity has been authorized later than the date when its payment becomes due, and it is clearly established that the delay in payment was attributable to administrative lapses, interest shall be paid at such rate as may be prescribed and in accordance with the instructions issued from time to time: Provided that the delay in payment was not caused on account of failure on the part of the Government servant to comply with the procedure laid down by the Government for processing his pension papers.” 30. There is no specific statutory provision mandating payment of interest for the delayed disbursement of pension/commuted value of pension and other retirement benefits. 31. The Apex Court has repeatedly been emphasising the legal position that pension, gratuity and other retirement benefits are no longer matters of any bounty to be distributed by the Government but are valuable rights acquired and property in their hands and any delay in settlement and disbursement whereof should be viewed seriously and dealt with severely by imposing penalty in the form of payment of interest. 32. In S.K.Dua v. State of Haryana and another [ (2008) 3 SCC 44 ], the Apex Court held that even in the absence of statutory rules, administrative instructions or guidelines, an employee can claim interest under Part III of the Constitution relying on Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution in the event of delayed disbursement of the retiral benefits. 33. Hence, the appellant is entitled to interest for the period from 01-09-2008 to 31-03-2009 at a reasonable rate. 34. In Gorakhpur University and Others v. Dr.Shitla Prasad Nagendra and others [ (2001) 6 SCC 591 ], the Apex Court awarded interest @18% per annum for the delayed payment of the retirement benefits. In O.P.Gupta v. Union of India and others [ (1987) 4 SCC 328 ], the Apex Court awarded interest @12% per annum on the delayed payment of pension. In H.Gangahanume Gowda v. Karnataka Agro Industries Corpn. In O.P.Gupta v. Union of India and others [ (1987) 4 SCC 328 ], the Apex Court awarded interest @12% per annum on the delayed payment of pension. In H.Gangahanume Gowda v. Karnataka Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd., ( AIR 2003 SC 1526 ) the Apex Court awarded interest @ 10% per annum on the delayed payment of gratuity. In D.D.Tewari v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited and others [ (2014) 8 SCC 894 ] the Apex Court awarded interest @ 9% per annum for the delayed payment of pension and gratuity amount from the date of entitlement till the date of the actual payment. In Vijay L Mehrotra v. State of U.P [ (2001) 9 SCC 687 ] the Apex Court awarded interest @ 18% per annum with effect from the date of retirement till the date of payment. In University of Kerala v. Sobha [2020 (1) KLT Online 1162] a Division Bench of this Court awarded interest @ 9% per annum from the date of retirement. In Viswanathan v. F.A.C.T Ltd., (supra) a Division Bench of this Court awarded interest @ 8% per annum for the delayed payment of gratuity. 35. In the result, plea of the appellant is to be allowed. The impugned judgment dated 28-01-2014 in W.P(C) No. 4120/2014 is set aside. Respondents 1 and 2 shall pay interest @ 8% per annum for the retirement benefits, which was due to the appellant, from 01-09-2008 to 31-03-2009 within two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. The Writ Appeal will stand disposed of as above.