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2021 DIGILAW 940 (JHR)

Rang Bahadur Sharma, son of Jagat Sinha v. Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd.

2021-11-18

RAVI RANJAN, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2021
JUDGMENT : I.A. No. 1046 of 2021 This Interlocutory Application has been filed for condoning the delay of 85 days, which has occurred in preferring this appeal. 2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. 3. Having regard to the averments made in this application, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. 4. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1046 of 2021 is allowed and delay of 85 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No. 93 of 2020 5. The instant intra-court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is preferred against the order/judgment dated 14.10.2019 passed in W.P.(S) No. 2475 of 2017 whereby and whereunder the writ petition was dismissed refusing interference with the order of punishment. 6. The brief facts of the lis which is required to be enumerated read as hereunder: The writ petitioner was initially appointed in the year 1988 as Unskilled Khalasi and subsequently promoted to the post of Correspondence Clerk in the year 1993. While discharging his duties, the petitioner was served with a letter as contained in Memo No. 3695 dated 02.09.2009 informing the petitioner that the Board intended to initiate a departmental proceeding on the charges as contained in charge-sheet and a show cause was called for from him. The writ petitioner replied to the show cause notice vide letter dated 17.09.2009 stating that while he was discharging the duty in Special Cell in addition to work of other Sections, no Assistant was posted in the said Cell, as such it was difficult for him to discharge his duties taking into consideration the fact he was already over-loaded with other work and further the delay in disposal of the file in question was not intentional and delay occurred only because of excessive workload on him. In the reply, it was further stated that in his entire service career, there was no complaint against him and it is the first instance such allegation has been leveled against him, as such prayer for exoneration of the charge was made. But the reply of the petitioner was not found to be satisfactory as such enquiry was conducted by the Conducting officer who submitted his report vide letter dated 23.03.2010 stating that the petitioner unnecessarily retained the file of the delinquent-employee for a period of six months and submitted wrong proposal. But the reply of the petitioner was not found to be satisfactory as such enquiry was conducted by the Conducting officer who submitted his report vide letter dated 23.03.2010 stating that the petitioner unnecessarily retained the file of the delinquent-employee for a period of six months and submitted wrong proposal. The Enquiry Officer taking into consideration the stand taken by the petitioner as also other material fact held the petitioner guilty of the charges. On the basis of enquiry report, second show cause was issued upon the petitioner vide memo no. 1287 dated 05.08.2010, to which he replied, whereupon the disciplinary authority finally passed the impugned order of punishment dated 13.10.2010 whereby the petitioner was awarded the punishment of censure for the year 2005-08 and further withholding of three increments with cumulative effect, against which the petitioner preferred appeal, which was rejected by the appellate authority vide order dated 08.06.2011. Being aggrieved, the writ petitioner-appellant invoked the power of this Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by preferring writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 2475 of 2017 by challenging the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority on the ground that withholding of three increments with cumulative effect since is a major punishment could not have been awarded in absence of any serious breach of duty committed by the petitioner. The allegation that the petitioner had retained the concerned file for a period of about six months and given a wrong proposal is human error which occurred due to excess workload and in absence of helping hands as no Assistant was posted in the Allegation Cell, as such the files were kept pending for some time. It was further contended that while passing the impugned order of punishment the respondents failed to take into consideration the Circular of the Jharkhand State Electricity Board issued vide Memo No. 3265 dated 02.12.2004 wherein it has been resolved that no employee would be awarded punishment for a bona fide mistake committed in course of employment. It was further contended that while passing the impugned order of punishment the respondents failed to take into consideration the Circular of the Jharkhand State Electricity Board issued vide Memo No. 3265 dated 02.12.2004 wherein it has been resolved that no employee would be awarded punishment for a bona fide mistake committed in course of employment. While on the other hand plea was taken on behalf of respondent-JSEB (now Jharkhand Urja Vikash Nigam Limited, in short “JUVNL”) that there is no error in the impugned order of punishment rather the award of punishment is proportional to the guilt committed by the petitioner and has been passed after following the mandatory provisions of the enquiry/departmental proceeding. The enquiry officer after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner has found the petitioner guilty of the charges leveled against him and based upon such finding the disciplinary authority after following the principles of natural justice has imposed the impugned punishment, which has been affirmed by the appellate authority, as such the same requires no interference. The learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the argument advanced on behalf of the parties declined to interfere with the impugned order of punishment as also the appellate order, which is the subject matter of present intra-court appeal. 7. Mr. Samavesh Bhanj Deo, learned counsel for the writ petitioner-appellant submits that the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition has not appreciated the plea of the writ petitioner to the effect that there was lack of work force in the Section where he was posted and due to heavy workload such error was committed which was unintentional and, therefore, punishment of withholding three increment with cumulative effect, which is major in nature, ought not to have been imposed upon the writ petitioner-appellant but the learned Single Judge discarding the aforesaid plea declined to interfere with the impugned order of punishment, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from material irregularity. Hence, the same is not sustainable in the eyes of law and is liable to be quashed and set aside. 8. Per contra, Mr. Hence, the same is not sustainable in the eyes of law and is liable to be quashed and set aside. 8. Per contra, Mr. Manish Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents submits that there is no error in the order passed by learned Single Judge as learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition after taking into consideration the nature of allegation, the finding recorded by the enquiry officer wherein the writ petitioner was afforded with the opportunity to defend his case and the disciplinary authority basing upon the finding recorded by the enquiry officer has imposed the punishment. It has further been submitted that the writ Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has limited scope of interference with the concurrent finding recorded by the two consecutive administrative authorities. Therefore, submission has been made that the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from no error. 9. This Court, having heard learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the rival submissions of the parties, deem it fit and proper first to refer certain admitted facts, which are necessary for proper adjudication of the lis. 10. Admittedly, the writ petitioner while posted as Correspondence Clerk in the Allegation Cell, a memo of charge was served upon him on the allegation that he intentionally delayed in putting up the files of delinquent-employees, namely, Sri Raj Mangal Prasad Verma and Sri Umesh Prasad Sharma, which were of urgent nature amounting to violation of the official working procedures. Based upon the aforesaid charge, the petitioner was served with letter as contained in Memo No. 3695 dated 02.09.2009 informing the petitioner that the Board intended to initiate a departmental proceeding on the charges as contained in charge-sheet and a show cause was called for from the petitioner. The writ petitioner replied to the show cause notice vide letter dated 17.09.2009 which was found unsatisfactory, therefore, enquiry was conducted by the Conducting officer who submitted his report vide letter dated 23.03.2010 stating that the petitioner unnecessarily retained the file of the delinquent-employee for a period of six months and submitted wrong proposal. On the basis of said enquiry report, second show cause was issued upon the petitioner vide memo no. On the basis of said enquiry report, second show cause was issued upon the petitioner vide memo no. 1287 dated 05.08.2010, to which he replied, whereupon the disciplinary authority finally passed the impugned order of punishment dated 13.10.2010 whereby the petitioner was awarded the punishment of censure for the year 2005-08 and further withholding of three increments with cumulative effect, against which the petitioner preferred appeal, which was also rejected by the appellate authority vide order dated 08.06.2011. Being aggrieved the writ petitioner approached this Court by filing writ petition, which was dismissed, which is the subject matter of present intra-Court appeal. Argument has been advanced by learned counsel for the writ petitioner-appellant that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the very plea of the writ petitioner of excessive workload put by the competent authority in the Allegation Cell which caused delay in processing the files of delinquent-employees, which is the subject matter of departmental proceeding. Further plea has been taken that imposing punishment of withholding of three annual increments with cumulative effect is considered to be excessive in nature taking into consideration the nature of allegation leveled against the writ petitioner. While on the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-JUVNL has submitted that there is very limited scope of interference under the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to exercise the power of judicial review in a case of finding recorded by the enquiry officer in the disciplinary proceeding. Apart from that it has been submitted that nature of allegation leveled against the petitioner is serious in nature since he has tried to help the delinquent-employees by keeping the file pending which amounts to gross negligence and dereliction in duty on the part of the writ petitioner. It has further been submitted that the learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the nature of allegation and also the finding recorded by the enquiry officer as also the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority, has declined to interfere with the impugned order of punishment, which may not be interfered with by this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in exercise of power of judicial review by reversing the fact finding by re-appraisal of the evidence. 11. 11. We deem it fit and proper to refer to certain judicial pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the scope of judicial review in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in Union of India & Ors Vs. P. Gunasekaran [ AIR 2015 SC 545 ] wherein at paragraph 13, the following guidelines has been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision, which reads hereunder as: “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr. [ (2017) 4 SCC 75 ], has laid down therein that it is equally settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can certainly interfere with the quantum of punishment, if it is found disproportionate to the gravity of offence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali [ (2017) 4 SCC 507 ], has laid down the guidelines at paragraphs 13 and 14 showing interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, which is quoted herein below: “13. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1931 , Para 6), this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations.” Thus, it is evident from the judicial pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court, as referred herein above, that guidelines have been laid down for interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in exercise of power of judicial review. 12. This Court after considering the aforesaid judgment is now considering the fact of the given case. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that he was not afforded with the opportunity to defend his case before the enquiry officer rather he has fully participated in the enquiry and defended the charge whereafter the enquiry officer, after considering his reply and taking into considering the charge leveled against him, has found that he has retained the file for a period of six months while discharging the duty in Allegation Cell. The enquiry officer has considered the said charge to be serious in nature and after having recorded the finding of proving of charge forwarded the same before the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has accepted the same and imposed the punishment of censure for the year 2005-08 and further withhold of three increments with cumulative effect. Therefore, according to our considered view, taking into consideration the ratio laid down in Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra) and Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. The disciplinary authority has accepted the same and imposed the punishment of censure for the year 2005-08 and further withhold of three increments with cumulative effect. Therefore, according to our considered view, taking into consideration the ratio laid down in Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra) and Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali (supra), there is no breech of principles of natural justice and the specific finding has been recorded by the enquiry officer while dealing with charge, which has been accepted by the disciplinary authority by imposing punishment, and the appellate authority has refused to interfere with the order of punishment, therefore, there is concurrent finding by the two administrative authorities i.e., disciplinary authority and appellate authority. In such a circumstance since no other issue save and except the issue of non-consideration of plea of excessive workload as has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, which according to our considered view cannot be treated to be a valid ground to interfere with the administrative decision. When a public servant is assigned with duty to discharge in a particular manner, it would be incumbent on his part to discharge his duty with utmost sincerity and with all devotion. In the case in hand, the writ petitioner has failed to discharge his duty as directed by the higher authorities in processing the file of delinquent-employees who were facing the departmental proceeding by keeping the said file for a period of about six months. Therefore, according to our considered view, the act of the writ petitioner cannot be said to be bona fide and also it cannot be said that writ petitioner was discharging his duty with utmost sincerity. There can be delay of few days or weeks but there cannot be delay of six months in disposing of the file of a particular Section by the concerned who was custodian of the said file. There can be delay of few days or weeks but there cannot be delay of six months in disposing of the file of a particular Section by the concerned who was custodian of the said file. If the enquiry officer has come to a conclusive finding that there is gross dereliction in duty on the part of the writ petitioner the said finding cannot be reversed by this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in exercise of power of judicial review that too when the finding recorded by the enquiry officer has been accepted by the disciplinary authority by imposing punishment and the appellate authority has declined to interfere with the punishment imposed by disciplinary authority. Therefore, there is concurrent finding of the administrative authorities and in such a circumstance interference by the High Court in exercise of power of judicial review by re-appreciating the evidence for reversing the fact finding of the enquiry officer will amount to sitting as appellate Court, which is not permissible, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra) and Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali (supra). 13. We are, therefore, of the view that the writ petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by exercising the power of judicial review as per the proposition of law laid down in Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra) and Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali (supra). 14. We, having discussed the fact in detail as above as also considering the order passed by learned Single Judge, are of the view that the learned Single Judge has considered all these aspects of the matters as also the legal position, as discussed herein above, thus, the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from no infirmity. 15. Accordingly, the appeal fails, and is dismissed.