JUDGMENT : P.B. SURESH KUMAR, J. 1. Petitioner is a Non Banking Financial Company. The father of the first respondent availed a loan from the petitioner for purchase of a vehicle. Ext.P1 is the agreement entered into by the father of the first respondent with the petitioner in this regard. It is stated that when the father of the first respondent committed defaults in remitting the instalments of the loan, the petitioner issued a notice to him and also to the guarantors to the loan transaction, calling upon them to pay the overdue instalments of the loan. It is also stated that on receipt of the said notice, one of the guarantors to the loan transaction who is a sibling of the first respondent surrendered the vehicle to the petitioner, as the father of the first respondent died in the meanwhile. It is further stated by the petitioner that they have issued thereafter Ext.P2 notice to the guarantors to the loan transaction calling upon them to liquidate the balance outstanding in the loan account and to take back the vehicle and informing them that the petitioner would otherwise initiate arbitration proceedings as provided for in Ext.P1 agreement for realisation of their dues by selling the vehicle. It is further stated by the petitioner that since the requirements in Ext.P2 notice have not been complied with by the guarantors to the loan transaction, arbitral proceedings have been initiated by the petitioner and the same is pending. 2. In the meanwhile, the first respondent instituted a complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Thrissur (the Commission) alleging that the vehicle purchased with the loan provided by the petitioner has been taken possession forcibly by the petitioner and that the said conduct of the petitioner would amount to unfair trade practice and deficiency of service. Ext.P3 is the complaint preferred by the first respondent in this regard. The prayer in Ext.P3 complaint, in the circumstances, was for a direction to the petitioner to return the vehicle to the first respondent. On Ext.P3 complaint, the Commission issued notice to the petitioner directing them to appear before the Commission on 15.07.2020. Ext.P3 is the complaint preferred by the first respondent in this regard. The prayer in Ext.P3 complaint, in the circumstances, was for a direction to the petitioner to return the vehicle to the first respondent. On Ext.P3 complaint, the Commission issued notice to the petitioner directing them to appear before the Commission on 15.07.2020. In Ext.P3 complaint, the first respondent filed I.A. No. 147 of 2020 seeking a direction to the petitioner to return the vehicle to him, and on the said interlocutory application, the Commission passed Ext.P5 interim order without notice to the petitioner on 27.02.2020 directing the petitioner to return the vehicle to the first respondent. It is stated by the petitioner that they were not aware of Ext.P5 interim order as the same was not served on them. Later, on 05.02.2021, the first respondent filed Ext.P6 interlocutory application in the complaint seeking action against the petitioner for non-compliance of Ext.P5 order, and on Ext.P6 interlocutory application, the Commission issued Ext.P7 notice directing the petitioner to appear before the Commission on 05.03.2021. The writ petition was instituted, in the circumstances, challenging Ext.P5 order mainly on the ground that the Commission has no jurisdiction to pass an order in the nature of Ext.P5. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated that the Commission functioning under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (the Act) has no jurisdiction to pass an interim order in the nature of Ext.P5. According to the learned counsel, insofar as the petitioner has already initiated proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the first respondent can obtain the relief sought for in I.A. No. 147 of 2020 only from the Arbitrator in the pending arbitration proceedings, if at all he makes out a case for such a relief. It was also contended by the learned counsel that the impugned order is against the spirit of Section 51(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It was further contended by the learned counsel that at any rate, the Commission has no jurisdiction to pass an order in the nature of an interim mandatory injunction and even if it has power to pass such an interim order, the same cannot be passed without notice to the parties. 5. It was further contended by the learned counsel that at any rate, the Commission has no jurisdiction to pass an order in the nature of an interim mandatory injunction and even if it has power to pass such an interim order, the same cannot be passed without notice to the parties. 5. Lack of jurisdiction on the part of statutory/quasi-judicial authorities is certainly one of the well-recognised exceptions to the self-imposed restraint that the High Courts shall not exercise the power of judicial review where the party invoking the review jurisdiction of the Court has an alternative and efficacious remedy. The question arises for consideration therefore is as to whether Ext.P5 can be said to be an order vitiated by lack of jurisdiction. 6. The Courts in India and abroad have all throughout maintained a distinction between cases where a statutory/quasi-judicial authority exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it in law and cases where there was a wrongful exercise of the available jurisdiction. Though the distinction between jurisdictional error and error of law within jurisdiction has been reduced almost to a vanishing point by the decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic Ltd. vs. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969) 2 AC 147 and by the various decisions of the Apex Court that followed the view taken in Anisminic Ltd. in the context of the power of the superior courts to interfere with the decisions of the subordinate courts/tribunals or administrative authorities, it has been clarified by the Apex Court in Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka, (2020) 13 SCC 308 that the said decisions cannot be applied while considering the question of exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution, despite the availability of a statutory alternative remedy. In other words, while considering the question of exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the traditional distinction between “jurisdictional error” and “error of law within the jurisdiction” shall be kept in mind and followed. Jurisdiction of a statutory/quasi-judicial authority means its entitlement to enter upon an enquiry into a particular matter. If a statutory or quasi-judicial authority is not entitled to enter upon an enquiry into a particular matter and despite that if it does so, its actions would be vitiated by lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of a statutory/quasi-judicial authority means its entitlement to enter upon an enquiry into a particular matter. If a statutory or quasi-judicial authority is not entitled to enter upon an enquiry into a particular matter and despite that if it does so, its actions would be vitiated by lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction arises when a statutory/quasi-judicial authority is either expressly or impliedly prohibited from entering upon an enquiry into a particular matter. On the other hand, if a statutory/quasi-judicial authority is entitled to enter upon an enquiry into a particular matter, then any subsequent error can only be regarded as an error within the jurisdiction [See M.L. Sethi vs. R.P. Kapur, (1972) 2 SCC 427 ]. The question whether there is lack of jurisdiction or merely error within jurisdiction, needs to be resolved by construing the facts of the case on hand. 7. Reverting to the facts, the fact that the Commission has jurisdiction to pass interim orders on complaints instituted before it, is not disputed by the petitioner. The relevant part of Section 38 of the Act dealing with the jurisdiction of the Commission to pass interim orders reads thus: 38. Procedure on admission of complaint: (1) The District Commission shall, on admission of a complaint, or in respect of cases referred for mediation on failure of settlement by mediation, proceed with such complaint. xxx xxx xxx (8) Where during the pendency of any proceeding before the District Commission, if it appears necessary, it may pass such interim order as is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 8. As explicit from the extracted provision, the jurisdiction aforesaid is so wide that the Commission can pass any interim order, if it appears to it necessary, as is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. The case of the petitioner is only that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to pass an interim order in the nature of Ext.P5. The case of the petitioner is only that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to pass an interim order in the nature of Ext.P5. The reasons put forth by the petitioner in support of the said stand are that the same is against the spirit of Section 51(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; that the relief granted by the Commission in terms of the impugned order could be granted only by the Arbitrator; that an order in the nature of an interim mandatory injunction does not fall within the scope of sub-section (8) of Section 38 of the Act and that if at all such an order falls within the scope of the said provision, the Commission ought to have issued notice to the petitioner before passing such an order. In other words, the essence of the case of the petitioner is that the impugned order is one passed otherwise than in accordance with the contemplation of the statute. In so far as the petitioner does not challenge the jurisdiction of the Commission to enter upon an enquiry to pass an interim order as is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, none of those reasons would make out a case of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Commission. Those reasons, on the other hand, could be considered only as errors committed by the Commission in the order passed pursuant to the enquiry to pass the interim order. As such, the same would only amount to errors within the jurisdiction. The position would have been certainly different, if the Commission has no power to pass an interim order at all. 9. The writ petition, in the circumstances, is without merits and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.