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2021 DIGILAW 948 (ALL)

Faheem v. State of U. P.

2021-08-26

PIYUSH AGRAWAL, SURYA PRAKASH KESARWANI

body2021
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Mohammad Akram, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Roopak Chaubey, learned AGA for State-respondents. 2. On oral request of learned counsel for the petitioners, Superintendent of Police, Bijnor is allowed to be impleaded as respondent No. 3 in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 5439 of 2021 and 5521 of 2021 writ petitions. Necessary correction be carried out in the array of parties during course of the day. 3. Notice on behalf of respondent No. 3 has been accepted by the learned AGA. 4. All the above noted writ petitions involving challenge to the similar notices dated 5.10.2020 issued by Additional District Magistrate (Administration), Bijnor, under Section 3 (1) of U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1970'). 5. Since the facts and controversy involved in all the above writ petitions are similar, therefore, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, all these writ petitions are being finally decided together, treating Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 5477 of 2021 as leading writ petition and facts therein are being noted. 6. The leading writ petition was heard on 17.8.2021, 18.8.2021, 19.8.2021 and 25.8.2021. On 17.8.2021, this Court has passed the following order: ''This writ petition has been filed praying to quash the notice dated 5.10.2020 issued by the Additional District Magistrate (Administration), Bijnor under Section 3(1) of U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned notice has been issued merely on the basis of Case Crime No. 130/2020 dated 5.4.2020 under Sections 330, 354(kha) and 506, I.P.C., P.S. Najibabad, District Bijnor which arises from the matrimonial dispute between brother of the petitioner, namely Sikandar and his wife, in which the petitioner being brother was falsely implicated. He further submits that subsequently, the aforesaid husband and wife have also entered into a compromise on 29.8.2020 and resolved their dispute. Prima-facie, the impugned notice appears to be an abuse of process of law by the respondent No. 2. Learned A.G.A. prays for and is granted a day's time to obtain instructions. Put up tomorrow as a fresh case at 10 a.m.'' 7. On 18.8.2021, this Court has passed the following order: ''On the oral request of learned counsel for the petitioner, the Superintendent of Police, Bijnor is allowed to be impleaded as respondent No. 3 during the course of the day. Put up tomorrow as a fresh case at 10 a.m.'' 7. On 18.8.2021, this Court has passed the following order: ''On the oral request of learned counsel for the petitioner, the Superintendent of Police, Bijnor is allowed to be impleaded as respondent No. 3 during the course of the day. Notice on behalf of respondent No. 3 has been accepted by the learned AGA. Pursuant to the order dated 17.8.2021, learned AGA has received written instructions and states that pursuant to the impugned notice dated 5.10.2020, the petitioner appeared on 23.10.2020 and 1.3.2021, submitted reply on 19.7.2021 and the next date fixed is 20.8.2021. As prayed, put up tomorrow, i.e., on 19.8.2021 at 10.00 a.m. for further hearing to enable the respondents to file counter-affidavit. In the counter-affidavit, the respondents shall show-cause as to why exemplary costs be not imposed upon them, as the impugned notice under Section 3(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Control of Goondas Act, 1970, prima facie, appears to be abuse of the process of law by the respondents for brief reasons noted in our order dated 17.8.2021.'' 8. On 25.8.2021, this Court has passed the following order: ''Heard Sri Mohammad Akram, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Roopak Chaubey, learned A.G.A. for the State-respondents. Counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 dated 18.8.2021 and an affidavit in the form of the counter-affidavit dated 23.8.2021 of Paramachandra Srivastava, Naib Tehsilder, Dhampur, District Bijnor (who is not respondent in the present writ petition) have been filed today, which are taken on record. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that against the similar show-cause notices relating to the same FIR No. 130 of 2020, dated 5.4.2020, the other accuseds have filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 5439 of 2021 (Mukarram vs. State of U.P. and Another) and Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 5521 of 2021 (Waseem vs. State of U.P. and Another), which have not yet come up for hearing as a fresh case. Learned A.G.A. states on instructions that show-cause notices in cases of other accuseds have also been withdrawn. He undertakes to produce the relevant orders on the next date. Put up tomorrow as fresh case for further hearing at 10.00 a.m. alongwith record of Criminal Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 5439 of 2021 (Mukarram vs. State of U.P. and Another) and Criminal Misc. He undertakes to produce the relevant orders on the next date. Put up tomorrow as fresh case for further hearing at 10.00 a.m. alongwith record of Criminal Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 5439 of 2021 (Mukarram vs. State of U.P. and Another) and Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 5521 of 2021 (Waseem vs. State of U.P. and Another).'' 9. In paragraph Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the counter-affidavit dated 18.8.2021, the Additional District Magistrate (Administration) District Bijnor, respondent No. 2 (who issued the impugned notice) has stated as under: ''5. That it is stated that the petitioner is an accused of case crime No. 130 of 2020 under sections 323, 354 B, 506 IPC, Police Station Nazibabad, District Bijnore. As Section 354 B IPC relates with the offence against women and preventive actions are being taken in such type of cases, therefore inadvertently, in the present case also, the notice under Section 3 (1) of U.P. Control of Goondas Act was issued, whereas the dispute between the parties was infact matrimonial dispute. 6. That the deponent admits that the issuing of the notices under Section 3 (1) of U.P. Control of Goondas Act is not required under the law in such type of matrimonial disputes. 7. That the deponent tenders his unconditional and unqualified apology for the inconvenience caused to this Hon'ble Court, though the same was inadvertent and the deponent undertakes to be more cautious and vigilant in future in respect of his duties and action. 8. That it is further submitted that in the aforesaid case, the next date fixed is 20.8.2021 and on that date, the notices under Section 3 (1) of U.P. Control of Goondas Act issued against the petitioner shall be withdrawn.'' 10. In paragraph Nos. 4, 5 and 6 of the counter-affidavit dated 18.8.2021, the Superintendent of Police, District Bijnor, respondent No. 3 has stated as under: ''4. In paragraph Nos. 4, 5 and 6 of the counter-affidavit dated 18.8.2021, the Superintendent of Police, District Bijnor, respondent No. 3 has stated as under: ''4. That it is stated that the deponent/respondent No. 3 had recommended the proceedings under Section 3 (1) of U.P. Goondas Act, against the petitioner on the basis of the First Information Report registered against the petitioner in Case Crime No. 130 of 2020 under Section 323, 354 B, 506 IPC, Police Station Nazibabad, District Bijnore and beet information as the offence in Case Crime No. 130 of 2020 was related to crime against women, therefore, inadvertently, in the present case, the deponent had recommended for initiation of proceeding under Section 3 (1) of U.P. Goondas Act, whereas the dispute between the parties was infact matrimonial dispute. 5. That the deponent admits that his recommendation for issuing the notices under Section 3 (1) of U.P. Control of Goondas Act is not required under the law in such type of matrimonial disputes. On 18.8.2021, the deponent had recommended for withdrawal of notices issued under Section 3 (1) of U.P. Control of Goondas Act against the petitioner before the competent authority i.e. respondent No. 2. 6. That the deponent tenders his unconditional and unqualified apology for the inconvenience caused to this Hon'ble Court, though the same was inadvertent and the deponent undertakes to be more cautious and vigilant in future in respect of his duties and action particularly in recommending for issuance of notices under Section 3 (1) of U.P. Goondas Act.'' 11. In paragraph No. 5 of the counter-affidavit dated 23.8.2021 filed by Naib Tehsildar, Dhampur, District Bijnor, it has been stated as under: ''5. That on 20.8.2021 was the date fixed in the present matter before the respondent No. 2 but as 20.8.2021 was declared holiday, therefore, the matter was heard by respondent No. 2 on 21.8.2021. On that date after hearing the parties and after perusing the matter on record the respondent No. 2 had withdrawn his show-cause notice dated 5.10.2020 issued to the petitioner.'' 12. Learned AGA has produced before us the copies of two orders, both dated 21.8.2021 passed in the matter of show-cause notice issued to the co-accused namely Waseem and Mukarram, which are the subject-matter of above noted Criminal Misc. Writ Petition Nos. Learned AGA has produced before us the copies of two orders, both dated 21.8.2021 passed in the matter of show-cause notice issued to the co-accused namely Waseem and Mukarram, which are the subject-matter of above noted Criminal Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 5521 of 2021 and 5439 of 2021 and it shows that the show-cause notices issued to aforesaid two petitioners have also been withdrawn by the Additional District Magistrate (Administration), Bijnor by two separate orders dated 21.8.2021. Learned AGA has also produced a copy of the order dated 21.8.2021 issued to another co-accused under Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1970, passed by Additional District Magistrate, (Administration), Bijnor, which shows that similar notices under Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1970 has been withdrawn. 13. Perusal of the counter-affidavits filed by the respondents as afore-quoted itself shows that it is admitted case of the respondents that impugned show-cause notice under Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1970 was issued to the petitioner merely on the ground of single criminal case registered against him on account of some matrimonial dispute. 14. Section 2 (b) of U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970 defines the word ''Goonda'' as under: ''2 (b). 'Goonda' means a person who: (i) either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of an offence punishable under Section 153 or Section 153-B or Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code or Chapter XV, Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the said Code; or (ii) has been convicted for an offence punishable under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; or (iii) has been convicted not less than thrice for an offence punishable under the U.P. Excise Act, 1910 or the Public Gambling Act, 1867 or Section 25, Section 27 or Section 29 of the Arms Act, 1959; or (iv) is generally reputed to be a person who is desperate and dangerous to the community; or (v) has been habitually passing indecent remarks or teasing women or girls; or (vi) is a tout.'' 15. Perusal of the definition of the word ''Goonda'' as afore-quoted shows that a competent authority may initiate proceeding under the Act of 1970, only if the person is ''Goonda'' as defined under the Act. Perusal of the definition of the word ''Goonda'' as afore-quoted shows that a competent authority may initiate proceeding under the Act of 1970, only if the person is ''Goonda'' as defined under the Act. Section 2 (b) provides that ''Goonda'' means a person who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of an offence punishable under Section 153 or Section 153-B or Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code or Chapter XV, Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the said Code; or has been convicted for an offence punishable under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; or has been convicted not less than thrice for an offence punishable under the U.P. Excise Act, 1910 or the Public Gambling Act, 1867 or Section 25, Section 27 or Section 29 of the Arms Act, 1959; or is generally reputed to be a person who is desperate and dangerous to the community; or has been habitually passing indecent remarks or teasing women or girls; or is a tout. 16. In the case of Bhim Sain Tyagi vs. State of U.P. and Others, 1999 (39) ACC 321 (FB), a Full Bench of this Court has held as under: ''17. The aforesaid anxiety of the Division Bench should be taken due note by the Executive and whenever a show-cause notice is issued, it should strictly comply with the provisions of the Act and rules. Once the decision of Ramji Pandey has held the field in this State for more than 18 years, there does not seem to be any necessity of taking a contrary view for the simple reason that all that the District Magistrate was expected by that decision to do is that the proposed Goonda should be made aware of ''general nature of material allegation'' against him, which is the requirement of the law. By asking the respondents to furnish to the proposed Goonda the general nature of material allegations against him, the Full Bench in Ramji Pandey only required the law to be followed. None should doubt that once in the show-cause notice, the general nature of the material allegations exists, no Court interference with such a show-cause notice is called for. By asking the respondents to furnish to the proposed Goonda the general nature of material allegations against him, the Full Bench in Ramji Pandey only required the law to be followed. None should doubt that once in the show-cause notice, the general nature of the material allegations exists, no Court interference with such a show-cause notice is called for. Challenge to a valid show-cause notice complying with the requirement of law has always failed and no scope of exercising provisions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India exists in such matters. On the contrary, whenever general nature of material allegations are absent and the proposed goonda raises a grievance through a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court's interference to the extent of the illegality of the notice being examined has been rightly upheld in Ramji Pandey but simultaneously it must be added that, always ensuring that, fresh notice may be issued by the District Magistrate in accordance with law. It has already been noticed above that in Subas Singh (supra), the respondents' right to issue fresh notice in accordance with law was upheld and even in Harsh Narain (supra), subsequent proceedings alone were quashed due to the defective notice. 18. In the administration of criminal law in our country, one comes across two very important terms (1) charge and (ii) statement of accused. In fact, these two are fundamental requirements of the principles of natural justice which have to be followed before an accused is condemned. One would shudder at the idea that an accused shall have stood condemned when the charge would only narrate that there is an F.I.R. against him registered under Section 302, I.P.C. at a police station or that in the statement of the accused, only one question is put to him that an F.I.R. has been lodged against him under Section 302 at a police station and that alone is held sufficient compliance of law. For action against a proposed goonda, the provisions contained in Section 3 of the Act, bereft of the technicalities and broader legal necessities in a trial of an accused under the Criminal Procedure Code, combine not only the ''charge'' and the ''statement of the accused'', but also requires his ''defence evidence.'' Thus, the proposed goonda must get the fullest opportunity to defend himself. Therefore, the general nature of the material allegations must be disclosed to him by the District Magistrate. 19.... 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the combined answer to the aforesaid three questions is that the decision in Ramji Pandey is good law, a show-cause notice which fails to indicate general nature of material allegations may be challenged and quashed on that ground under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with liberty to the respondents always to issue fresh notice in accordance with law.'' (Emphasis supplied by us) 17. In Imran Alias Abdul Quddus Khan vs. State of U.P. 2000 (1) ACC 171 (paras-11, 12, 13 and 14), a Division Bench of this Court explained the provisions of Section 2(b) of the Act, 1990 and held as under: ''11. Ex-facie, a person is termed as a 'goonda' if he is a habitual criminal. The provisions of Section 2 (b) of the Act are almost akin to the expression 'anti social element' occurring in Section 2 (d) of Bihar Prevention of Crimes Act, 1981. In the context of the expression 'anti social element' the connotation 'habitually commits' came to be interpreted by the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1984) 3 SCC 14 . The meaning put to the aforesaid expression by the Apex Court would squarely apply to the expression used in the Act, in question. The majority view was that the word 'habitually' means 'repeatedly' or 'persistently'. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. It connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in each of the said sub-clauses or an aggregate of similar acts or omissions. Even the minority view which was taken in Vijay Narain's case (supra) was that the word 'habitually' means 'by force of habit'. It is the force of habit inherent or latent in an individual with a criminal instinct with a criminal disposition of mind, that makes a person accustomed to lead a life of crime posing danger to the society in general. It is the force of habit inherent or latent in an individual with a criminal instinct with a criminal disposition of mind, that makes a person accustomed to lead a life of crime posing danger to the society in general. If a person with criminal tendencies consistently or persistently or repeatedly commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under the specified chapters of the Code, he should be considered to be an 'anti social element'. There are thus two views with regard to the expression 'habitually' flowing from the decision of Vijay Narain's case (supra). The majority was inclined to give a restricted meaning to the word 'habitually' as denoting 'repetitive' and that on the basis of a single act cannot be said to be forming the habit of the person. That is to say, the act complained of must be repeated more than once and be inherent in his nature. The minority view is that a person in habitual criminal who by force of habit or inward disposition inherent or latent in him has grown accustomed to lead a life of crime. In simple language, the minority view was expressed that the word 'habitually; means 'by force of habit'. The minority view is based on the meaning given in stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Ed. Vol. II-1204-habitually requires a continuance and permanence of some tendency, something that has developed into a propensity, that is, present from day to day. Thus, the word- 'habitual' connotes some degree of frequency and continuity. 12. The word 'habit' has a clear well understood meaning being nearly the same as 'accustomed' and cannot be applied to single act. When we speak of habit of a person, we prefer to his customary conduct to pursue, which he has acquired a tendency from frequent repetitions. In B.N. Singh vs. State of U.P. AIR 1960 All. 754 , it was observed that it would be incorrect to say that a person has a habit of anything from a single act. In the Law Lexicon? Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, 1997 Ed. by P. Ramanatha Aiyer, the expression 'habitual' has been defined to mean as constant, customary and addicted to a specified habit; formed or acquired by or resulting from habit; frequent use or custom formed by repeated impressions. In the Law Lexicon? Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, 1997 Ed. by P. Ramanatha Aiyer, the expression 'habitual' has been defined to mean as constant, customary and addicted to a specified habit; formed or acquired by or resulting from habit; frequent use or custom formed by repeated impressions. The term 'habitual criminal', it is stated may be applied to any one, who has been previously more than twice convicted of crime, sentenced and committed to prison. The word 'habit' means persistence in doing an act, a fact, which is capable of proof by adducing evidence of the commission of a number of similar acts. 'Habitually' must be taken to mean repeatedly or persistently. It does not refer to frequency of the occasions but rather to the invariability of the practice. 13. The expression 'habitual criminal' is the same thing as the 'habitual offender' within the meaning of Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This preventive Section deals for requiring security for good behavior from 'habitual offenders'. The expression 'habitually' in the aforesaid section has been used in the sense of depravity of character as evidenced by frequent repetition or commission of offence. It means repetition or persistency in doing an act and not an inclination by nature, that is, commission of same acts in the past and readiness to commit them again where there is an opportunity. 14. Expressions like 'by habit' 'habitual' 'desperate' 'dangerous' and 'hazardous' cannot be flung in the face of a man with laxity or semantics. The Court must insist on specificity of facts and a consistent course of conduct convincingly enough to draw the rigorous inference that by confirmed habit, the petitioner is sure to commit the offence if not externed or say directed to take himself out of the district. It is not a case where the petitioner has ever involved himself in committing the crime or has adopted crime as his profession. There is not even faint or feeble material against the petitioner that he is a person of a criminal propensity. The case of the petitioner does not come in either of the clauses of Section 2 (b) of the Act, which defines the expression 'Goonda'. Therefore, to outright label bona fide student as 'goonda' was not only arbitrary capricious and unjustified but also counter productive. The case of the petitioner does not come in either of the clauses of Section 2 (b) of the Act, which defines the expression 'Goonda'. Therefore, to outright label bona fide student as 'goonda' was not only arbitrary capricious and unjustified but also counter productive. A bona fide student who is pursing his studies in the Post Graduate course and has never seen the world of the criminals is now being forced to enter the arena. The intention of the Act is to afford protection to the public against hardened or habitual criminals or bullies or dangerous or desperate class who menace the security of a person or of property. The order of externment under the Act is required to be passed against persons who cannot readily be brought under the ordinary penal law and who for personal reasons cannot be convicted for the offences said to have been committed by them. The legislation is preventive and not punitive. Its sole purpose is to protect the citizens from the habitual criminals and to secure future good behavior and not to punish the innocent students. The Act is a powerful tool for the control and suppression of the 'Goondas' it should be used very sparingly in very clear cases of 'public disorder' or for the maintenance of 'public order'. If the provisions of the Act are recklessly used without adopting caution and desecretion, it may easily become an engine of operession. Its provisions are not intended to secure indirectly a conviction in case where a prosecution for a substantial offence is likely to fail. Similarly the Act should not obviously be used against mere innocent people or to march over the opponents who are taking recourse to democratic process to get their certain demands fulfilled or to wreck the private vengeance.'' (Emphasis supplied by us) 18. Similarly the Act should not obviously be used against mere innocent people or to march over the opponents who are taking recourse to democratic process to get their certain demands fulfilled or to wreck the private vengeance.'' (Emphasis supplied by us) 18. In the case of Suresh Tewari vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2018 (5) ALJ 1, a Division Bench of this Court considered the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar, 1984 (3) SCC 14 and a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Bhim Sain Tyagi's case as well as provisions of Section 2(b) of the Act and held as under: ''The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1984) 3 SCC 14 , has been pleased to hold that it is essential to refer to at least two incidents of commission of crime for applicability of Clause (i) of Section 2(b) of the Act. Since there is reference of one incident only in the notice, it falls short of the legal requirement as provided in Clause (i) of Section 2(b) and in this way the notice being illegal could be challenged before this Court as laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Bhim Sain Tyagi vs. State of U.P. and Others, 1999 (39) ACC 321. If there had been reference of two or more incidents in the impugned notice, then the minimum legal requirement of Section 2(b) Clause (i) would have been satisfied, and then in that case sufficiency of the material on merits could not be challenged before this Court, but before the authority concerned as laid down in the Division Bench ruling in the case of Jaindendra @ Chhotu Singh vs. State of U.P. (supra). But since the impugned notice in the present case is short of the legal requirement, it could be challenged in this Court. The observations in Para 12 of the ruling in the case of Jaindendra (supra) which have been quoted above, also support this conclusion.'' (Emphasis supplied by us) 19. In a recent judgment dated 3.2.2021 in Criminal Misc. But since the impugned notice in the present case is short of the legal requirement, it could be challenged in this Court. The observations in Para 12 of the ruling in the case of Jaindendra (supra) which have been quoted above, also support this conclusion.'' (Emphasis supplied by us) 19. In a recent judgment dated 3.2.2021 in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 347 of 2021 (Rahul Yadav vs. State of U.P. and Others), a Division Bench of this Court has observed as under: ''Learned A.G.A. is also not in a position to dispute the legal position that for bringing a person under the clutches of the Act, he should be a habitual criminal/offender and a single or sporadic incident would not bring him within the purview of the Act.'' 20. Thus, a person is termed as ''Goonda'' if he is a habitual criminal. The word ''habitually'' means ''repeatedly'' or ''persistently''. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts to justify an inference of ''habitual''. Frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in sub-Section 2(b) of the Act, 1970 or an aggregate of similar acts or omissions would bring a person within the definition of the word ''Goonda'' under Section 2(b) of the Act, 1970. Therefore, a single act of an accused constituting a criminal case, cannot bring him within the meaning of the definition of the word ''Goonda'' under Act, 1970. To bring him within the definition of the word ''Goonda'' he must be a habitual criminal or/habitual offender. A notice issued with reference to only one incident, falls short of legal requirement as provided in Clause (i) of Section 2(b) and thus, the authority issuing such notice would be acting without jurisdiction. Such a notice being illegal, may be challenged before this Court. If there had been reference to two or more incidents in an impugned notice, then the minimum legal requirement of Section 2(b)(i), would be satisfied and then in that case, sufficiency of the material on merit may be challenged before the authority concerned. 21. The definition of ''Goonda'' under the Act, 1970 clearly reveals that a person may be said to be ''Goonda'' if he is habitual in committing crime. An accused in a criminal case arising out of matrimonial dispute does not indicate that such a person, is a habitual offender. 21. The definition of ''Goonda'' under the Act, 1970 clearly reveals that a person may be said to be ''Goonda'' if he is habitual in committing crime. An accused in a criminal case arising out of matrimonial dispute does not indicate that such a person, is a habitual offender. Thus the notices issued by respondent No. 2 to the petitioners were wholly without jurisdiction and a glaring example of abuse of power. It is only after we passed the orders dated 17.8.2021 and 18.8.2021, the respondent No. 2 withdrawn the impugned notices by orders dated 21.8.2021 to escape from the consequences of his illegal and unauthorized action. 22. However the question still remains as to whether the respondents may escape from their responsibilities for acting arbitrarily, illegally and unauthorisely? In our view they cannot escape from the consequences. The officer who unauthorisely, illegally and without jurisdiction issued the impugned show-cause notices caused harassment, compelling the petitioners to file the present writ petitions incurring expenses. 23. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in its entirety, we dispose of all the above noted three writ petitions with costs of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) awarded to each petitioners. It is made clear that each petitioner shall get cost of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand), which shall be paid by the respondents within six weeks from today.