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2021 DIGILAW 957 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Suresh Jinabhai Movaliya

2021-10-20

ASHOKKUMAR C.JOSHI

body2021
JUDGMENT : 1. Criminal Appeal No. 2563 of 2008 is filed by the Appellant – State under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 whereas Criminal Revision Application No. 667 of 2008 is filed by the Applicant / Original complainant challenging the judgment and order dated 24.06.2008, passed in Sessions Case No. 8 of 2005 by the learned Presiding Officer and Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.1, Junagadh, recording the acquittal. 2. Learned APP has fairly submitted that despite sufficient opportunity being given to the Applicant in Criminal Revision Application, the Applicant has chosen not to appear, therefore, the matters may be heard on merits. On such premises, the court has proceeded for final hearing in both the matters. 3. The facts, in brief, are that a private complaint dated 25.11.2003 came to be filed by the complainant, resident of Dhebar, Taluka Visavadar before the court of learned Magistrate, Visavadar, wherein the learned Magistrate passed an order under Section 156(3) and directed the concerned police station to inquire into the matter and submit the report. It is alleged in the said complaint that the complainant is studying in FY B.Com and residing with his family at Dhebar Village. Her father is doing agriculture work in the village. It is alleged that when the complainant was studying in 12th Standard, she came in contact with the respondent – accused No.7 – Dayaben Vaghasiya and thereafter relations were developed and they became best friends. As as result of that, the complainant was having full trust in the Respondent – Accused No.7. On 15.6.2003, the Respondent – Accused No.7 requested the complainant to come with her to Galdhara. Hence, the complainant had gone with the Respondent – Accused No.7, where the accused with the help of each other, had taken signature on the papers by keeping her in dark and thereafter informed her that marriage is taken place between the complainant and the Respondent – Accused No.5 – Asvinbhai. Thereafter, she was threatened not to tell anyone about the same, otherwise, they would kill her father and also destroy her family. Hence, the complainant did not inform about the said fact to anyone. The accused had also taken benefits of her. The accused persons therefore have committed the offence punishable under Sections 366, 341, 506(2), 114 of the Indian Penal Code for which, FIR came to be registered against them. Hence, the complainant did not inform about the said fact to anyone. The accused had also taken benefits of her. The accused persons therefore have committed the offence punishable under Sections 366, 341, 506(2), 114 of the Indian Penal Code for which, FIR came to be registered against them. 3.1 Upon such FIR being filed, investigation started and the Investigating Officer recorded statements of as many as 13 witnesses and produced certain documentary evidence and after completion of the investigation, Charge-sheet was filed against the accused persons for the offences in question. The learned Judge trial Judge framed the Charge against the accused persons. Since the accused persons did not plead guilty, trial was proceeded against the accused persons. Vide impugned judgment and order dated 24.06.2008, the learned trial Judge acquitted the accused persons. Being aggrieved by the same, the State has preferred the present appeal and the Original Complainant has preferred Criminal Revision Application. 4. Heard, learned APP Mr. Hardik Soni for the appellant – State and learned advocate Mr. U.T. Mishra with learned Advocate Mr. Mukesh T. Mishra for the respondents appearing in Criminal Appeal No. 2563 of 2008. 5. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has mainly contended that the learned trial Judge has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the prosecution case. The learned APP has submitted that the judgment and order passed by the trial court is perverse and requires to be interfered with by this court by setting aside the same. He has therefore submitted that the Appeal requires consideration and deserves to be allowed. 5.1 The learned APP, taking this Court through the oral as well as the documentary evidence on record, submitted that though the prosecution has proved the case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt, the learned trial Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence on record and thereby has committed an error in recording acquittal, and therefore, the impugned judgment and order suffers from material illegality, perversity and contrary to the facts and evidence on record. 5.2 Thus, the learned APP has submitted that although cogent and material evidence have been produced by the prosecution and the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt, the learned trial Judge has committed a grave error in acquitting the accused persons and accordingly, he urged that present appeal may be allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 6. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. U.T. Mishra appearing with learned Advocate Mr. Mukesh T. Mishra for the respondents – accused, while supporting the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court, submitted that the learned trial Judge has, after due and proper appreciation and evaluation of the evidence on record, has come to such a conclusion and has acquitted all the accused persons, which is just and proper. He submitted that it is trite law that if two views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality. Learned Advocate Mr. Mishra has drawn the attention of this court about the framing of charge coupled with pointing out date of birth of the victim i.e. 2.3.1985 and the date of incident as 22.6.2003. Therefore, the age of the victim was 18 years and 3 months on the date of occurrence. Learned Advocate Mr. Mishra has also drawn the attention of this court towards different depositions that it was the consent of the victim and therefore, there is no scope for bringing the accused under Section 366 of IPC and therefore whatever the reasons assigned by the learned trial court is just and proper and there is neither any error nor any irregularity in the order passed by the learned trial Judge. Therefore, upon such premises, there is no requirement of interference by this court in the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Judge. 7. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and gone through the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court as well as the material on record. 8. Therefore, upon such premises, there is no requirement of interference by this court in the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Judge. 7. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and gone through the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court as well as the material on record. 8. The Applicant in Criminal Revision Application has submitted that the judgment and order of the Hon’ble Sessions Court is illegal, erroneous and contrary to the evidence. On record. The learned Judge erred in observing t hat considering the chief-examination as well as cross-examination of the complainant, it is not supporting the contents of the private complaint of the complainant. The learned Judge observed that that oral evidence of PW5 and PW6 is supported the private complaint of the complainant. The learned Judge miserably failed to appreciate that oral evidence of the complainant is supporting her complaint and some minor discrepancies in the oral evidence is not the ground to disbelieve the case. The Applicant has further submitted in the Revision Application that the learned Judge has erred in not believing the PW7 merely on the ground that she had not filed any complaint though complainant told her that the accused are intending to take her against her will by giving threats and therefore on this ground along the learned Judge said that the oral evidence of the aforesaid witness is not supporting the complaint of the complainant and the oral evidence of the complainant. The learned Judge failed to appreciate that when the oral evidence of the witness is supporting the statement of the same witness then there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of witness. Even otherwise her statement and oral evidence are supporting the case of the prosecution. The learned Judge has failed to appreciate that delay in filing the complaint is properly explained in the complaint. The complainant girl was 18 years and three months at the time of incident and reasons of late filing of the complaint are given in detail in the complaint and supported by the oral evidence. It is therefore stated in the Revision Application that the learned Judge erred in holding that such a delay shows week case of the prosecution. The complainant girl was 18 years and three months at the time of incident and reasons of late filing of the complaint are given in detail in the complaint and supported by the oral evidence. It is therefore stated in the Revision Application that the learned Judge erred in holding that such a delay shows week case of the prosecution. It is further stated in the Revision Application that the learned Judge has lost site of the charges against the accused i.e. under Sections 366, 341, 506(2) and 114 IPC. It is further stated in the Revision Application that the learned Judge erred in holding that there is no question of kidnapping and wrongful restraint merely on the ground that as per the divorce deed at Exh.46, divorce took place between them as per custom on the basis that they had no child during the wedlock. The learned Judge failed to appreciate that this was not the reason for divorce, it was merely as declaration and when there was no consent of her and she had been trapped by the accused by creating false documents, how their marriage can be believed. The learned Judge also failed to appreciate that divorce has to be there because no one wish to continue such a marriage. That the learned Judge erred in believing that there was deemed consent of the complainant merely on the ground that the complainant has not filed complaint between 14.6.2003 to 11.11.2003 and as she had signed the marriage deed, under Section 114 it can be presumed that there was consent of her and both the deeds were executed before the competent officer of the Government and there is no reason for the Government officer in taking part of making false documents. The learned Judge failed to appreciate that the prosecution proved the case of executing marriage deed behind the back of victim and thereafter she has compelled to come with the accused against here ill and she had been taken away by the accused by threatening her. The learned Judge failed to appreciate that delay is properly explained and the Government officer would not know that the girl is being trapped by the accused so merely the marriage deed is executed before the government officer is no ground to disbelieve the case. On the aforesaid grounds, the Applicant has prayed to allow the Criminal Revision Application. 9. The learned Judge failed to appreciate that delay is properly explained and the Government officer would not know that the girl is being trapped by the accused so merely the marriage deed is executed before the government officer is no ground to disbelieve the case. On the aforesaid grounds, the Applicant has prayed to allow the Criminal Revision Application. 9. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope in acquittal appeals. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, the Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is prejudice in favour of the accused, firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 9.1 Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrive at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person, and therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. 9.2 Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. That the duty is cast upon the the appellate Court, in such circumstances, re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. That the duty is cast upon the the appellate Court, in such circumstances, re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 9.3 In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 752 , the Apex Court has observed that, “The presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused gets fortified and strengthened when the said accused is acquitted by the trial Court. Probably, for this reason, the law makers felt that when the appeal is to be filed in the High Court it should not be filed as a matter of course or as matter of right but leave of the High Court must be obtained before the appeal is entertained. This would not only prevent the High Court from being flooded with appeals but more importantly would ensure that innocent persons who have already faced the tribulation of a long drawn out criminal trial are not again unnecessarily dragged to the High Court”. 9.4 Yet in another decision in Chaman Lal v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2017 on 03.12.2020, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 988 the Apex Court has observed as under: “9.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 ), this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. (1975) 3 SCC 219 , Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17 , Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761 , Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699 , Budh Singh v. State of U.P. (2006) 9 SCC 731 , State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102 , S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (2008) 5 SCC 535 , Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 , Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P. (2010) 2 SCC 445 ) 13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) “… the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.” 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC 1 , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200 , Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 ) 15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42) “(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 16. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450 , this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368 , the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) “20. … an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.” 18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271 , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) “(i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.” A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State (2009) 10 SCC 401 . 19. 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.” 9.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: “20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 , Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501 , Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. (2009) 10 SCC 636 ).” (emphasis supplied) 9.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10 , that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 9.4 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 , this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. 9.4 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 , this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under: “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233) “10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.” 31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416) “8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court’s judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.” 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 309 , after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807 , in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 80910) “5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 52 ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. AIR 1953 SC 122 ) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions. 31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC 355 , this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.” (emphasis supplied).” 10. Having heard the arguments advanced by both the sides, it is an undisputed fact that the date of incident is 22.6.2003 and the date of birth of the victim is 2.3.1985 and therefore on the captioned date the victim was aged 18 years and 3 months; that is to say she is major. Therefore, this court is required to evaluate the evidence accordingly. 11. In the aforesaid backdrop, looking to the evidence of complainant PW-1 Gaurishankar Nanjibhai Dave, Exh. 17 – who is a Panchn at the respective time, in his cross-examination he has not supported the prosecution case. 11.1 So far as PW-2, Suresh Jagjivan Sadrani, Exh. 21 is concerned, he is declared hostile and on further examination by the APP, he has not supported the case of the prosecution. 11.2 The prosecution has further testified PW-3, Chandubhai Ambalal Soni, Exh.23 who is turned hostile and has not supported the prosecution case. 11.3 Further, the prosecution has examined PW-4 (the prosecutrix), Exh. 26, wherein she has admitted her age 18 years and in her cross-examination she has admitted that she was compelled to accompany Ashwin on Motorcycle and threat was given that if she discloses anything adverse against the accused person, in that case her father would be killed and her reputation would be disclosed in the public at large. It is pertinent to note that there is nothing on record that the victim has shouted or made any complaint so far as the custody of the victim with accused is concerned. A man of prudence can expect if anything is wrong against anybody, in that case, if one has no consent, in that case, one may shout or try to run away or try to inform somebody through any mode or medium and therefore it appears that the learned trial judge has rightly appreciated meticulously with the reasoned order so far as acquittal is concerned. 11.4 The prosecution has testified PW-5, Jayantilal Kababhai Vekaria, Exh.30. He seems to be the father of the victim. It is admitted by the father of the victim that it has come to his notice that his daughter is married for which registration has taken place in the office of Sub-Registrar. It is also admitted that he has not made any complaint when he went for inquiry in the office of the Sub-Registrar. It is admitted by the father of the victim that it has come to his notice that his daughter is married for which registration has taken place in the office of Sub-Registrar. It is also admitted that he has not made any complaint when he went for inquiry in the office of the Sub-Registrar. Upon such premises also this court is of the opinion that there is no requirement to interfere in the judgment passed by the learned trial judge since there is no illegality nor any perverse order is passed by the learned trial judge. 11.5 The prosecution has testified PW-6 Shantaben Jayantilal Vekaria, Exh.31. Though she has denied that knowingly the delay has taken place in filing the complaint since she was knowing the registration of marriage and it is also denied that false complaint is given against Suresh, Mansukh, Rajesh and Dinesh. 11.6 The prosecution has also testified PW-7 Manishben Bhanushankar Vegda, Exh.33, who happens to be the friend of the victim. She has admitted that she has no knowledge about any threat since she was standing at a far place. She has also admitted that she had not made any shouts when the threat was given to her. 11.7 The prosecution has also testified PW-8 Dhirubhai Khodabhai Vekharia, Exh.34, who happens to be the brother of father of the victim. He is neither an eyewitness nor he has supported the case of the prosecution since he is a relative of the prosecutrix and his testimony is of no help to the prosecution case. 11.8 The prosecution has also testified PW-9, Madhubhai Bhikhabhai Mangrolia, Exh.36. This witness is also not a material witness. The prosecution has also testified PW-10 Ratibhai Fulabhai Mangrolia, Exh.37 who was from the same village where the father of the complainant belongs. He is also not a material witness. The prosecution has also testified PW-11 Mohansinh Nainsinh Vaghela, Exh.39 who has prepared only the yadi as PSO. The prosecution has further examined PW-12 Hardevsinh Bhagwansinh Vaghela, Exh.44 who has carried out the panchnama for the scene of offence. The prosecution has also examined PW-13 Bhagwanbhai Gagubhai Bharwad, Exh.49 who is PSI at Visavadar Police Station and has investigated the case and has filed the charge sheet. He has not recorded the statement of the witness since his predecessor has done the same. 12. The prosecution has also examined PW-13 Bhagwanbhai Gagubhai Bharwad, Exh.49 who is PSI at Visavadar Police Station and has investigated the case and has filed the charge sheet. He has not recorded the statement of the witness since his predecessor has done the same. 12. Thus, on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the ocular and the documentary evidence on record, it transpires that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. The Court has gone through in detail the impugned judgment and order and found that the learned trial Judge has meticulously considered the depositions of all the witnesses and came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the learned trial Judge has rightly come to such a conclusion, which do not call for any interference at the hands of this Court. This Court is in complete agreement with such findings of the learned trial Judge. Additionally, the grounds taken in the Criminal Revision Application are also not tenable. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion and observations, in the considered opinion of this Court, the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge leveled against accused persons for want of sufficient material. The findings recorded by the learned trial Judge do not call for any interference. Resultantly, in fleri, the Criminal Appeal filed by the Appellant – State of Gujarat as well as Criminal Revision Application, which is filed by the Appellant / Original Complainant fail and are dismissed accordingly. Impugned judgment and order dated 24.06.2008, passed in Sessions Case No. 8 of 2005 by the learned Presiding Officer & Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Junagadh, recording the acquittal is confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. R&P be transmitted back forthwith.