JUDGMENT : Instant Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC lays challenge to judgment and decree dated 14.3.2019 passed by learned Additional District Judge-(II), Shimla, H.P. in Civil Appeal No. 7-R/13 of 2016, affirming judgment and decree dated 22.3.2016 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No. 2, Rohru, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh in Civil Suit No. 6/71 of 2010/09, whereby suit for redemption with respect to land denoted by Khasra no. 32, measuring 0-21-48 Hectares situate in Chak Jakhar, Tehsil Rohru, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh (hereinafter, ‘suit land’) came to be dismissed. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case as emerge from the record are that the appellants-plaintiffs (hereinafter, ‘plaintiffs’) filed a suit for redemption with respect to suit land, claiming therein that in the year 1985, defendant No.1 approached the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and asked him to mortgage some portion of the land comprising of Khasra No. 32 with possession, to which the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs agreed and handed over possession to defendant No.1. He also claimed that the aforesaid document qua mortgage was also written. Plaintiffs claimed that subsequently, when plaintiffs asked defendant No.1 to hand over possession of the land after receipt of the mortgage consideration, defendant No.1 avoided him on one pretext or the other and as such, he had no option but to get the land redeemed through the process of law. 3. Aforesaid claim of the plaintiffs came to be resisted and contested by defendant No.1, who besides taking preliminary objections of pecuniary jurisdiction and limitation, averred that the suit land was previously mortgaged to him with possession but thereafter, plaintiff and his sisters Smt. Jhapti Devi and Smt. Bigoni Devi executed a sale deed in favour of wife of defendant No.1 on 2.2.1983. It is averred by the defendant No.1 that the suit land was mortgaged with defendant No.1 but not in 1985, as claimed by the plaintiff(s), but prior to that and on 2.2.1983, a sale deed has been executed in favour of wife of defendant No.1. 4. Plaintiff(s) filed replication, reiterating the contents of plant and controverting those of the written statement. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court, framed following issues on 6.10.2010: “(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of possession in respect of the suit land by way of redemption, as prayed for? 4. Plaintiff(s) filed replication, reiterating the contents of plant and controverting those of the written statement. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court, framed following issues on 6.10.2010: “(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of possession in respect of the suit land by way of redemption, as prayed for? OPP (2) Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction, as alleged? OPP (3) Whether this court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit as alleged? OPP (4) Whether the suit is barred by limitation, as alleged? OPD (5) Whether no cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD (6) Whether the plaintiff has not come to the court with clean hands. If so, its effect? OPD (7) Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his own act and conduct to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD (8) Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form, as alleged? OPD (9) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, as alleged? OPD (10) Relief.” 6. Learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence led on record by respective parties, dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs on three grounds, viz. (1) plaintiff has not brought on record mortgage deed executed between him and defendant No.1, which is the basis of the suit and no other evidence in order to prove the mortgage deed is admissible except the mortgage deed itself in terms of S.91 of the Indian Evidence Act. (2) the General Power of Attorney cannot depose on behalf of the principal about the facts which are/were in the personal knowledge of the principal and (3) defendant No.1 has clearly proved on record sale deed dated 2.2.1983 Ext. DW-1/C, which clearly reveals that the suit property was transferred by the plaintiff and his sisters in favour of wife of defendant No.1. 7. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, plaintiffs preferred an appeal in the court of learned Additional District Judge-II, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, which also came to be dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 14.3.201. 7. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, plaintiffs preferred an appeal in the court of learned Additional District Judge-II, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, which also came to be dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 14.3.201. In the aforesaid background, appeal at hand came to be instituted at the behest of the plaintiffs, praying therein to decree their suit after setting judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below. 8. Though, vide order dated 10.9.2019, this court ordered that till the next date of hearing, defendant No.1 will not change the nature of suit land nor encumber the same in any manner, whatsoever, but admission of the appeal came to be hotly contested by defendant No.1. Learned counsel for the defendant No.1, vehemently argued that no question of law, much less substantial one, arises in the case at hand, for consideration of this Court, as such, appeal deserves to be dismissed. In view of above, appeal came to be listed for final hearing /disposal at admission stage with the consent of the parties. 9. Ms. Meera, Advocate, appearing for the plaintiffs, argued that once defendant No.1 categorically admitted his status in mortgage in his written statement, suit of the plaintiff for redemption could not have been dismissed on account of non-production of the mortgage deed. She further argued that learned Courts below erred in observing that title of defendant No.1 is proved by Ext. DW-1/C, sale deed, especially when the same was not proved in accordance with law. While referring to the pleadings as well as evidence led on record by respective parties, Learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs strenuously argued that both the learned Courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence as well as law, in right perspective, as such, judgments and decrees rendered by both the learned Courts below are not sustainable in the eye of law. 10. Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned senior counsel, duly assisted by Mr. Janesh Gupta, Advocate, while appearing for defendant No.1, supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below. He argued that once the plaintiffs failed to place on record documents, if any, reduced in writing, with regard to mortgage, suit having been filed by them rightly came to be dismissed. Janesh Gupta, Advocate, while appearing for defendant No.1, supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below. He argued that once the plaintiffs failed to place on record documents, if any, reduced in writing, with regard to mortgage, suit having been filed by them rightly came to be dismissed. He also argued that though perusal of statement made by PW- 4, Devi Dutt, General Power of Attorney of the original plaintiff, is of not much relevance, but otherwise also, statement made by him rightly was not taken into consideration by learned Courts below, in terms of provisions contained under S.91 of the Indian Evidence Act, which clearly provides that a General Power of Attorney cannot depose for the principal, about the facts, which are/were in the personal knowledge of the principal. 11. I have heard Learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available on record minutely. 12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record vis-à-vis the reasoning assigned by both the learned Courts below, while dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs, this court is not persuaded to agree with learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs that both the learned Courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather, both the learned Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and as such, there is no scope left for interference by this Court. Moreover, this court finds that no question, much less a substantial one, is involved in the appeal at hand, for determination by this court, as such, present appeal deserves to be dismissed on this sole count. 13. Precisely, in the case at hand, the original plaintiff, Kasru Mal (since deceased) filed the suit for decree of redemption, claimed to be mortgaged with defendant No.1, for a sum of Rs.3300/-. Though defendant No.1 by way of written statement, specifically admitted factum with regard to mortgage of suit land by the plaintiff but further claimed that subsequently, plaintiff and his sisters, Jhapti Devi and Bigoni Devi, executed sale deed in favour of his wife on 2.2.1983. Interestingly, aforesaid factum with regard to execution of sale deed in favour of wife fo defendant No.1 never came to be specifically repudiated by the plaintiff(s), in the replication filed to the written statement of defendant No.1. Interestingly, aforesaid factum with regard to execution of sale deed in favour of wife fo defendant No.1 never came to be specifically repudiated by the plaintiff(s), in the replication filed to the written statement of defendant No.1. In the case at hand, record reveals that though at the time of recording of evidence of the plaintiffs, original plaintiff, Kasru Mal was alive but yet he did not enter into the witness box, rather, Shri Devi Dutt, who is son of the original plaintiff, appeared as General Power of Attorney. Above named witness denied that his father and sisters of his father, namely Jhapti Devi and Bigoni Devi, had executed sale deed dated 2.2.1983 but such statement of this witness may not be sufficient to refute the factum with regard to execution of sale deed, especially, when plaintiff failed to specifically refute the aforesaid claim of defendant No.1 in the replication filed by him to the written statement of defendant No.1. 14. PW-3, Surat Singh, though corroborated the version of the plaintiff that land was mortgaged by plaintiff for Rs.3300/- and plaintiff had offered Rs.3300/- for redemption of mortgage deed, but such offer was not accepted by defendant No.1, but in his cross-examination, he admitted that there is an orchard and fruit plants thereupon are grown by Mohinder Singh, defendant No.1 and his wif, smt. Sarla Devi. Since this witness specifically admitted in his cross-examination that on the suit land, there is an orchard and fruit plants were grown by defendant No.1 and his wife, Sarla Devi, statement made by this witness to the extent that suit land was mortgaged by plaintiff, may not be of much relevance. 15. DW-1 Mohinder Singh, tendered his evidence by way of affidavit, Ext. DW-1/A. In his cross-examination, he admitted that in the year 1982, land was mortgaged but categorically deposed that in the year 1983, Kasru sold land by way of registered sale deed in favour of his wife, Sarla Devi. 16. True it is that in the case at hand, sale deed, Ext. DW-1/C was not entertained by revenue officials for sanctioning mutation, as is evident from document, Ext. DW-1/B dated 29.12.1984, but if the reasons recorded in that document are perused, it clearly reveals that mutation on the basis of aforesaid document, could not be recorded for the reason that there was some discrepancy in the description and measurement of the land. DW-1/C was not entertained by revenue officials for sanctioning mutation, as is evident from document, Ext. DW-1/B dated 29.12.1984, but if the reasons recorded in that document are perused, it clearly reveals that mutation on the basis of aforesaid document, could not be recorded for the reason that there was some discrepancy in the description and measurement of the land. Mere refusal on the part of revenue authorities to enter mutation on the basis of sale deed may not be sufficient to discard claim of defendant No.1 with regard to purchase made by him vide sale deed, Ext. DW-1/C, especially when at no point of time, challenge, if any, ever came to be laid on behalf of the plaintiff(s) to the aforesaid sale deed. Vide aforesaid sale deed, rights of the plaintiff in the suit were purchased by Sarla Devi, wife of defendant No.1, as such, plaintiff could not claim to have any right of redemption. Admittedly, in the case at hand, plaintiff(s) in the plaint claimed that the document qua mortgage was written but yet he/they failed to produce the same during trial for the reasons best known to him/them. Once, the document, with regard to mortgage was with the plaintiff(s) he/they could not have withheld it, rather, it being the best piece of evidence, ought to have been placed on record, enabling learned trial Court to adjudicate the controversy in an effective manner. 17. Once, mortgage deed was the basis of the suit, and it was claimed to be reduced into writing, no other evidence led on record could be held sufficient to prove the mortgage deed, as has been specifically provided under S.91 of the Indian Evidence Act. S.91 of the Indian Evidence Act is reproduced as under: “91. 17. Once, mortgage deed was the basis of the suit, and it was claimed to be reduced into writing, no other evidence led on record could be held sufficient to prove the mortgage deed, as has been specifically provided under S.91 of the Indian Evidence Act. S.91 of the Indian Evidence Act is reproduced as under: “91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of documents.— When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained. —When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained." Exception 1.—When a public officer is required by law to be appointed in writing, and when it is shown that any particular person has acted as such officer, the writing by which he is appointed need not be proved. Exception 2.—Wills 2[admitted to probate in 3[India]] may be proved by the probate. Explanation 1.—This section applies equally to cases in which the contracts, grants or dispositions of property referred to are contained in one document, and to cases in which they are contained in more documents than one. Explanation. 2.—Where there are more originals than one, one original only need be proved. Explanation 3.—The statement, in any document whatever, of a fact other than the facts referred to in this section, shall not preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same fact.” 18. Explanation. 2.—Where there are more originals than one, one original only need be proved. Explanation 3.—The statement, in any document whatever, of a fact other than the facts referred to in this section, shall not preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same fact.” 18. Aforesaid provision of law clearly provides that when the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself. 19. Order III, rules 1 and 2 CPC, empowers holder of a Power of Attorney to act on behalf of the principal but the question which is of paramount consideration in the case at hand, is whether a Power of Attorney/General Power of Attorney can give testimony on behalf of the principal. 20. By now, it is well settled that provisions contained in Order III, rules 1 and 2 CPC empower the holder of Power of Attorney to ‘act’ on behalf of the principal but the word, ‘act’ employed in Order III, rules 1 and 2 CPC, confines only in respect of ‘acts’ done by the Power of Attorney holder in exercise of power granted by the instrument. The word, ‘acts’ would not include deposing in place and instead of principal. Holder of Power of Attorney may depose for the principal, in respect of such acts but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him. Similarly, Power of Attorney holder cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined. 21. In the case at hand, as has been taken note herein above, though, at the time of commencement of the plaintiff’s evidence, original plaintiff Kasru Mal was alive, but yet he was not produced and instead his son, Devi Dutt, being Power of Attorney deposed as PW-4. 21. In the case at hand, as has been taken note herein above, though, at the time of commencement of the plaintiff’s evidence, original plaintiff Kasru Mal was alive, but yet he was not produced and instead his son, Devi Dutt, being Power of Attorney deposed as PW-4. PW-4 in his evidence denied that his father and sisters of his father namely Jhapti Devi and Bigoni Devi had executed a Will on 2.2.1983. Such statement of PW-4 may not be sufficient to disprove execution of sale deed. Since aforesaid sale deed was allegedly executed by the original plaintiff Kasru Mal, factum with regard to its execution/non-execution could only be stated by Kasru Mal, the original plaintiff but, definitely not by the General Power of Attorney, who being Power of Attorney holder, had only authority to appear on behalf of the original plaintiff, Kasru Mal and, in no circumstance, he could depose in the court about the acts which were not in his personal knowledge. 22. Since no specific challenge, if any, ever came to be laid to sale deed, Ext. DW-1/C, coupled with the fact that the defendant No.1 successfully proved on record execution of sale deed dated 2.2.1983, suit for redemption of the property having been filed by the plaintiff(s) qua the property which was subject matter of the sale deed, rightly came to be dismissed. 23. In view of above no substantial question of law arises for determination in the present appeal. 24. Now, it would be appropriate to deal with the specific objection raised by the learned counsel representing the defendant with regard to maintainability and jurisdiction of this Court, while examining concurrent findings of law and facts returned by both the Courts below. Learned counsel for the respondents, invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015)4 SCC 264 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held: “16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for reappreciation of evidence. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for reappreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs’ right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” (p.269) 25. Perusal of the judgment, referred hereinabove, suggests that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. There can be no quarrel (dispute) with regard to aforesaid observation made by the Apex Court and true it is that in normal circumstances High Court, while exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, is restrained from re-appreciating the evidence available on record. 26. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Parminder Singh versus Gurpreet Singh, Civil Appeal No. 3612 of 2009, decided on 25.7.2017, has held as under: “14) In our considered opinion, the findings recorded by the three courts on facts, which are based on appreciation of evidence undertaken by the three Courts, are essentially in the nature of concurrent findings of fact and, therefore, such findings are binding on this Court. Indeed, such findings were equally binding on the High Court while hearing the second appeal.” 27. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid exposition of law that concurrent findings of facts and law recorded by both the learned Courts below can not be interfered with unless same are found to be perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such findings. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid exposition of law that concurrent findings of facts and law recorded by both the learned Courts below can not be interfered with unless same are found to be perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such findings. In the case at hand, as has been discussed in detail, there is no perversity as such in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below, rather same are based upon correct appreciation of evidence as such, deserve to be upheld. 28. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made herein above, I find no merit in the appeal at hand, which is accordingly dismissed. Judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below are upheld. 29. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of. Interim directions, if any, stand vacated.