ORDER : 1. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a challenge is made to the show cause notice dated 28.09.2021 issued by respondent no. 1 – Commissioner of Municipalities, Administration, Gujarat State. 2. It is the case of the petitioners that General Elections of Dhanera Municipality was held on 17.02.2018 and the result was declared on 19.02.2018. Out of total 28 seats, for 18 seats, candidates belonging to Indian National Congress, got elected, whereas, 11 seats went to Bhartiya Janta Party. Out of all these 18 councilors, one Balvantji Chhogaji Barot who was elected as President of the Municipality, was subsequently disqualified. As a result of which, 17 elected councilors remained in Dhanera Municipality belonging to Indian National Congress, whereas, 2 councilors have unfortunately died. Hence, 15 councilors remained, who are the present petitioners. The elections of President and Vice President were to be held every two and half years. As a result of this, on expiration of two and half years, for election of President of Dhanera Municipality, an agenda notice was circulated by the Deputy Collector, Dhanera to hold elections on 20.08.2020. Subsequently, a show cause notice under Section 37 and Section 70 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act were issued upon the petitioners only with a view to see that they cannot participate in election process for the posts of President and Vice President. According to the petitioners, 13 issues which have been mentioned in the show cause notice were relating to the Resolutions which have been passed by the general body, which consists of elected members including the members belonging to different political party. The show cause notice has been issued upon the petitioners only on 06.08.202 under Section 37 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act. Simultaneously, according to the petitioners, the Regional Commissioner, initiated proceedings under Section 70 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act for recovery, at the instance of the councilors, who were in minority though they were very much part of the Resolutions passed by the Municipalities and in such proceedings also, the petitioners were issued notice under Section 70 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act. The next date of hearing was kept on 20.08.2020 at 12:30 pm., knowing fully well that on that very day, the elections of President and Vice President were to be held. The next date of hearing was kept on 20.08.2020 at 12:30 pm., knowing fully well that on that very day, the elections of President and Vice President were to be held. This action was challenged by the petitioners by filing writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 9675 of 2020 in which show cause notice as indicated above, has been challenged and vide order dated 19.08.2020, the Court protected the petitioners by directing the authorities to adjourn the proceedings beyond the date of elections. On 25.08.2020, in the said election process of President and Vice President, one Jagalben Kanaji Thakore was elected as President, whereas petitioner no. 14 i.e. Shankarbhai Savabhai Patel was elected as Vice President. As the election was over, the petitioners withdrew the said petition with a view to raise all the contentions before the adjudicating authority i.e. respondent no. 1 and accordingly, the petition was disposed of vide order dated 27.08.2020. After the said withdrawal of the petition before the authority, the petitioners submitted reply, raising all the permissible contentions including preliminary issues with regard to issuance of show cause notice under Section 37 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act. Though an impression was given to the petitioners that personal hearing would be given before passing the final order, however, on 23.12.2020, an order came to be passed under Section 37 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, removing the petitioners. Since there was violation of the principles of natural justice, the petitioners challenged the same by way of petition being Special Civil Application No. 670 of 2021. However, in the meantime, pursuant to the impugned order, as indicated above, the Collector, Banaskantha vide order dated 28.12.2020, appointed In-charge President of Municipality, one Ms. Jignaben Yogeshbhai Trivedi, was made In-charge President till the next President is elected. According to the petitioners, Ms. Trivedi, is belonging to rival political party. 2.1. It is the case of the petitioners that during the pendency of the aforesaid petition challenging the order of removal, the authorities initiated process of election of President and Vice President, as a result of this, Civil Application No. 2 of 2021 was moved, seeking stay against the elections of President and Vice President and the Court vide order dated 19.01.2021, was pleased to stay the process of elections till the final disposal of the petition. On 05.02.2021, the Court was pleased to allow the petition and while setting aside the impugned order, passed by respondent no. 1, since it was found by the Court that the same was without recording of any proper reasons and as such, remanded the matter back to respondent no. 1 for fresh consideration. It is stated by the petitioners that this order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 05.02.2021, was carried before the Division Bench by way of preferring Letters Patent Appeal No. 274 of 2021, however, the same was not entertained and disposed of as withdrawn with certain observations. 2.2. It is further the case of the petitioners that thereafter, respondent no. 1 issued notice on 24.02.2021, for hearing, but then 11 councilors belonging to Bhartiya Janta Party were made applicants and the petitioners were made to understand respondents as if the proceedings were initiated at the behest of the said persons. It was indicated by the petitioners that vide order dated 23.12.2020, 4 issues/charges namely charge nos., 3, 5, 11 and 13 were dropped and there was no appeal against the said order of dropping of those charges, but the notice which has been issued is indicating those charges as well. According to the petitioners, steps under Section 37 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act cannot be initiated at all and that initiation itself is politically motivated and by inserting certain further facts in the memo, it has been contended that though an effective representation was made, reply was submitted, but vide order dated 18.06.2021, in exercise of power under Section 37 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, the petitioners came to be removed and as such, with a view to usurp the power in local body, the petitioners are dealt with in such a manner that they can be remediless and hence, by way of Special Civil Application No. 9277 of 2021, the said order dated 18.06.2021 was assailed. On 09.08.2018, the Court allowed the petition, set aside the impugned order passed by respondent no. 1 basically on the ground that no reasons are assigned and while disposing of the petition, few observations were made to indicate that all the councilors were equally responsible, but then on the basis of the earlier order dated 18.06.2021, it was recorded that though all the councilors were responsible, notice to the BJP councilors is not issued. 1 basically on the ground that no reasons are assigned and while disposing of the petition, few observations were made to indicate that all the councilors were equally responsible, but then on the basis of the earlier order dated 18.06.2021, it was recorded that though all the councilors were responsible, notice to the BJP councilors is not issued. Accordingly, now fresh notice was issued under Section 37 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act even to BJP councilors as well. It is the case of the petitioners that thereafter by way of impugned notice dated 28.09.2021, the petitioners as well as the BJP councilors have been called upon to show cause as to why they should not be removed under Section 37 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act and the hearing was fixed on 07.10.2021. By alleging that the proceedings are politically motivated just with a view to help out councilors of BJP, the next date so given for hearing was very short and the matter was kept on 14.10.2021. In the meantime, respondent no. 3 i.e. the Deputy Collector had issued an agenda notice on 07.10.2021 for the purpose of electing President of Municipality since earlier President has resigned and the post accordingly felt vacant and as such, in this peculiar circumstance, the petitioners have approached this Court for the purpose of challenging the issuance of notice. With the aforesaid background, the petitioners have invoked extra ordinary equitable jurisdiction to challenge the notice itself. 3. Mr. R. S. Sanjanwala, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Dipen Desai, learned advocate for the petitioners has contended that issuance of notice itself is a politically motivated initiation against the petitioners just with a view to somehow remove the petitioners, and has further contended that the notice itself is outside the purview of Section 37 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act and if the contents thereof are to be apparently seen, according to Mr. Sanjanwala, learned Senior Advocate it is well settled position that mere irregularity or negligence or causing loss to the Municipality does not by itself empower the authority to remove the councilors by taking resort to Section 37 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act. It has further been contended that the impugned notice is in view of the fact that vide previous order i.e. 23.12.2020 and 18.06.2021, respondent no. 1 has already dropped four charges namely charge nos. It has further been contended that the impugned notice is in view of the fact that vide previous order i.e. 23.12.2020 and 18.06.2021, respondent no. 1 has already dropped four charges namely charge nos. 3, 5, 11 and 13, but still however, the present impugned notice contained all the said 13 charges including which were dropped and as such, also the impugned notice deserves to be quashed. Further, it has been contended that the chronology of events would clearly indicate that election of President is schedule immediately after the date of hearing before respondent no. 1 which would indicate that somehow the petitioners are to be removed belonging to a different political party so as to facilitate the remaining BJP councilors, and as such, by raising this multiple contentions as stated above, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala, has requested to set aside the impugned order. No other submissions have been made. 4. Having heard the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala assisted by Mr. Desai, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, it transpires from the record that the show cause notice has been issued by the competent authority which is not in dispute. What is in dispute is that the circumstances stated therein are not such which may warrant initiation under Section 37 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act. Further the impugned notice is dated 28.09.2021 whereas, the present petition appears to have been presented in which regular number is given on 18.10.2021 and in between it appears that the petitioners have chosen not to co-operate with the hearing afforded to the petitioners by the authority. 4.1. The Court at this stage is not inclined to examine the merit or demerit of the show cause notice and the contents thereof, in view of the fact that the authority is yet to examine and adjudicate the process. The Court at this stage cannot assume that the authority will not act in accordance with law simply because the chronology projected by the petitioners to indicate political mala fides, the Court cannot usurp the discretion of authority which is in-fact a fact finding authority and under an obligation to act in accordance with law. Since the petition is at notice stage, the Court is not inclined to usurp the jurisdiction or discretion available to statutory authority. 4.2. Since the petition is at notice stage, the Court is not inclined to usurp the jurisdiction or discretion available to statutory authority. 4.2. The Court at this stage would like to refer to few observations contained in the case of D.N. Jeevaraj v. Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka & Ors., reported in (2016) 2 SCC 653 , delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to indicate that the statutory authorities are required to be allowed to exercise their own discretion vested in the statute. Para 41 and 43 since are relevant to the issue, the Court would like to reproduce the same hereunder :- “41. This Court has repeatedly held that where discretion is required to be exercised by a statutory authority, it must be permitted to do so. It is not for the courts to take over the discretion available to a statutory authority and render a decision. In the present case, the High Court has virtually taken over the function of the BDA by requiring it to take action against Sadananda Gowda and Jeevaraj. Clause 10 of the lease-cum-sale agreement gives discretion to the BDA to take action against the lessee in the event of a default in payment of rent or committing breach of the conditions of the lease-cum-sale agreement or the provisions of law.[8] This will, of course, require a notice being given to the alleged defaulter followed by a hearing and then a decision in the matter. By taking over the functions of the BDA in this regard, the High Court has given a complete go-bye to the procedural requirements and has mandated a particular course of action to be taken by the BDA. It is quite possible that if the BDA is allowed to exercise its discretion it may not necessarily direct forfeiture of the lease but that was sought to be preempted by the direction given by the High Court which, in our opinion, acted beyond its jurisdiction in this regard. 43. To this we may add that if a court is of the opinion that a statutory authority cannot take an independent or impartial decision due to some external or internal pressure, it must give its reasons for coming to that conclusion. 43. To this we may add that if a court is of the opinion that a statutory authority cannot take an independent or impartial decision due to some external or internal pressure, it must give its reasons for coming to that conclusion. The reasons given by the court for disabling the statutory authority from taking a decision can always be tested and if the reasons are found to be inadequate, the decision of the court to by-pass the statutory authority can always be set aside. If the reasons are cogent, then in an exceptional case, the court may take a decision without leaving it to the statutory authority to do so. However, we must caution that if the court were to take over the decision taking power of the statutory authority it must only be in exceptional circumstances and not as a routine. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High Court has not given any reason why it virtually took over the decision taking function of the authorities and for this reason alone the mandamus issued by the High Court deserves to be set aside, apart from the merits of the case which we have already adverted to.” 4.3. Yet another decision in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Haldia v. Krishna Wax Private Limited reported in (2020) 12 SCC 572 , wherein also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed which cannot be unnoticed by the Court. Hence, the Court deems it proper to reproduce hereunder the relevant observations contained in para 14 of the said decision indicated above. “14. It has been laid down by this Court that the excise law is a complete code in itself and it would normally not be appropriate for a Writ Court to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and that the concerned person must first raise all the objections before the authority who had issued a show cause notice and the redressal in terms of the Civil Appeal 8609/2019 [Diary No. 17005 of 2018] Commissioner of Central Excise, Haldia vs. M/s. Krishna Wax (P) Ltd. existing provisions of the law could be taken resort to if an adverse order was passed against such person. For example in Union of India and another vs. Guwahati Carbon Limited5, it was concluded; The Excise Law is a complete code in order to seek redress in excise matters and hence may not be appropriate for the writ court to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, while in Malladi Drugs and Pharma Ltd. vs. Union of India, it was observed:- “………...The High Court, has, by the impugned judgment held that the Appellant should first raise all the objections before the Authority who have issued the show cause notice and in case any adverse order is passed against the Appellant, then liberty has been granted to approach the High Court in our view, the High Court was absolutely right in dismissing the writ petition against a mere show cause notice.” 4.4. This Court has taken a view on the issue whether at the stage of show cause notice writ jurisdiction be exercised or not and for that purpose, decision dated 08.07.2021 passed by the Court in Special Civil Application No. 9652 of 2021 is also relevant to the issue in which, several decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court have also been taken into consideration. This view has so far not been disturbed. As a result of this, the Court is of the view that since the petition is at notice stage and there is ample opportunity available to the petitioners to agitate and explain the circumstances before the authority, the same does not deserve to be entertained. 4.5. All these circumstances which are tried to be projected by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala to persuade the Court to usurp the discretion of the authority to adjudicate the impugned show cause notice can well be agitated before the authority and the Court at this stage is not inclined to accept the submissions with regard to political mala fides as tried to be projected. 4.6. Sanjanwala to persuade the Court to usurp the discretion of the authority to adjudicate the impugned show cause notice can well be agitated before the authority and the Court at this stage is not inclined to accept the submissions with regard to political mala fides as tried to be projected. 4.6. The Court is also mindful that there is no specific embargo on exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India even at notice stage, but in the circumstances of the present case, when the competence of authority is not in question and appropriate opportunity is open for the petitioners to project all these grievances before the statutory authority and further even if the petitioners are aggrieved, statute has provided adequate mechanism to ventilate the grievance, the Court is not inclined to thwart such adjudication process of statutory authority. Hence, no case is made out by the petitioners to call for any interference. At this stage, the Court is clarifying that the petition is not entertained since it is at notice stage itself and the Court has not expressed any opinion on merit and it is independently open for the petitioners to project every circumstances before the authority so as to enable the authority to take appropriate decision in accordance with law. It is further observed that respondent no. 1 authority while examining the impugned show cause notice shall pass a reasoned order after affording appropriate opportunity. 5. With the aforesaid observations, the present petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs.