JUDGMENT : Anil K. Narendran, J. The petitioners filed R.C.P.No.130 of 2017 before the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Vatakara, a petition filed under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, seeking eviction of respondents 1 and 2 herein-tenants from the petition schedule shop room. The 3rd respondent herein is the alleged sub-lessee. In the Rent Control Petition, the tenants filed counter opposing the order of eviction sought for. The 3rd respondent filed separate counter. On 07.03.2019, the tenants and the alleged sublessee were set ex parte and the Rent Control Court passed an order of eviction under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(v) of the Act. On 21.03.2019, the tenants filed I.A.No.528 of 2019 in R.C.P.No.130 of 2017, under Section 23(1)(h) of the Act, seeking an order to set aside the ex parte order dated 07.03.2019. In that application, the landlords filed a counter statement dated 24.06.2019. The delivery of the petition schedule shop room was effected on 23.05.2019, as evidenced by Ext.P5. The landlords-judgment holders have taken the risk of effecting delivery without giving notice to the tenants in the execution petition. The application filed by the tenants to set aside the ex parte order of eviction was allowed by Ext.P6 order dated 07.07.2019. Thereafter, the tenants filed I.A.No.1100 of 2019 in R.C.P.No.130 of 2017, under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking redelivery of the petition schedule shop room. The landlords filed counter statement opposing the relief sought for in that application. After considering the rival contentions, the Rent Control Court allowed I.A.No.1100 of 2019 in R.C.P.No.130 of 2017 by Ext.P12 order dated 08.01.2020, whereby the landlords are directed to re-deliver the petition schedule shop room to the tenants within a period of one month from the date of that order. Feeling aggrieved by Ext.P12 order of the Rent Control Court, the landlords are before this Court in this original petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. On 12.11.2020, when this original petition came up for admission, this Court admitted the matter on file and issued notice to the respondents. This Court granted an interim order staying the delivery of the shop room scheduled in R.C.P.No.130 of 2017 of the Rent Control Court, Vatakara pursuant to Ext.P12 order, for a period of eight weeks. 2. On 12.11.2020, when this original petition came up for admission, this Court admitted the matter on file and issued notice to the respondents. This Court granted an interim order staying the delivery of the shop room scheduled in R.C.P.No.130 of 2017 of the Rent Control Court, Vatakara pursuant to Ext.P12 order, for a period of eight weeks. The said interim order, which was extended from time to time, is still in force. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners-landlords and also the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2-tenants. Despite service of notice, none appears for the 3rd respondent-the alleged sub-lessee. 4. The issue that arises for consideration in this original petition is as to whether any interference is warranted on Ext.P12 order dated 08.01.2020 of the Rent Control Court, whereby I.A.No.1100 of 2019 in R.C.P.No.130 of 2017 filed by the tenants stands allowed and the landlords are directed to re-deliver the petition schedule shop room to the tenants, within one month from the date of that order. 5. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioners-landlords would place reliance on Ext.P13 series of photographs in order to contend that the 3rd petitioner has already started a Fancy and Footwear shop in the petition schedule shop room and it is a subsequent event which ought to have been taken note of by the Rent Control Court before ordering re-delivery of the petition schedule shop room. Since the Rent Control Petition is of the year 2017, without interfering with Ext.P12 order, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act, a time-bound consideration of R.C.P.No.130 of 2017 may be ordered and till the disposal of R.C.P. the interim order granted in this Rent Control Revision may continue to be in force, so as to enable the 3rd petitioner herein to conduct Fancy and Footwear shop in the petition schedule shop room. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2-tenants would contend that within the time limit specified, the tenants have filed an interlocutory application to set aside the ex parte order of eviction. However, the landlords have chosen to move the execution court with an application for delivery, without giving notice to the tenants and got the ex parte order of eviction executed. However, the landlords have chosen to move the execution court with an application for delivery, without giving notice to the tenants and got the ex parte order of eviction executed. Once the application filed by the tenants to set aside the ex parte order was allowed, the tenants filed I.A.No.528 of 2019 in R.C.P.No.130 of 2017, invoking the provisions under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. After considering the materials on record, the Rent Control Court allowed that application by Ext.P12 order. 7. In Ext.P12 order, the Rent Control Court noticed that the ex parte order against the tenants has already been set aside and R.C.P.No.130 of 2017 restored to file. The landlords produced Ext.B1 to show that the Amin delivered the petition schedule shop room to them on 23.05.2019. The Rent Control Court noticed that there is no evidence adduced on the side of the landlords to show that the 3rd petitioner herein started business in the petition schedule shop room after spending Rs.7,50,000/-after delivery of the shop room. When the ex parte order is set aside and the Rent Control Petition was restored to file, the tenants are entitled to restitution of the petition schedule shop room. 8. Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with application for restitution. As per sub-section (1) of Section 144, where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the court which passed the decree or order shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied, reversed, set aside or modified; and, for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of the decree or order. 9. 9. As per Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 144 of the Code, for the purposes of sub-section (1), the expression "court which passed the decree or order" shall be deemed to include, (a) where the decree or order has been varied or reversed in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, the court of first instance; (b) where the decree or order has been set aside by a separate suit, the court of first instance which passed such decree or order; (c) where the court of first instance has ceased to exist or has ceased to have jurisdiction to execute it, the court which, if the suit wherein the decree or order was passed were instituted at the time of making the application for restitution under this section, would have jurisdiction to try such suit. As per subsection (2) of Section 144, no suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub-section (1). 10. In Moosa v. Jyothi [ 2000 (3) KLT 416 ] a learned Single Judge of this Court noticed that the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act does not contain any specific provision extending the powers under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure to that court. However, in Cheru Ouseph v. Kunhipathumma [ 1981 KLT 495 ] it was held that, in respect of procedural matters all powers which are not specifically denied by the Statute or Rules should be vouchsafed to tribunals and courts so that they may effectively exercise their judicial function. Power to advance the course of justice by relying on unenumerated powers or inherent or residuary powers cannot be denied to such tribunals. The power under Section 144 of the Code is one such power that must be attributed to Rent Control Courts. That power being one basically intended to do justice to the parties is hence found to be available to Rent Control Courts. 11. The power under Section 144 of the Code is one such power that must be attributed to Rent Control Courts. That power being one basically intended to do justice to the parties is hence found to be available to Rent Control Courts. 11. In view of the provisions under sub-section (1) of Section 144 of the Code, where an ex parte order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court is set aside, the Rent Control Court which passed the order of eviction shall, on the application of the tenant entitled to the benefit by way of restitution, cause such restitution to be made, to place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such order of eviction has been set aside; and for this purpose, the Rent Control Court may make any orders which are consequential on such order of eviction being set aside. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioners-landlords would contend that, once the 3rd petitioner herein started a Fancy and Footwear shop in the petition schedule shop room, the Rent Control Court ought not to have ordered restitution of the petition schedule shop room of the landlords, invoking the provisions under Section 144 of the Code. The Rent Control Court ought to have taken note of that subsequent event or changed circumstances before passing any orders in the interlocutory application filed by the tenants under Section 144 of the Code. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal [ (2002) 2 SCC 256 ] and also the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Korah Abraham v. Varughis [ 2004 (2) KLT 192 ] to buttress his arguments. 13. In Om Prakash Gupta the Apex Court held that the ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystalised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. 13. In Om Prakash Gupta the Apex Court held that the ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystalised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However, the court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. 14. In Korah Abraham a Division Bench of this Court held that subsequent event could be brought to the notice of the Rent Control Court, Appellate Authority or even before the Revisional Authority so that the court could mould the relief to do complete justice between the parties and also could shorten the litigation. But the court should at the threshold, when the subsequent events are brought to its knowledge, examine whether those events have any fundamental impact on the main issue and if not addressed would cause serious prejudice to the parties either to the landlord or to the tenant. Subsequent events could be brought in by the tenant as well as the landlord since Rent Laws are neither pro-landlord nor pro-tenant. But the court should be guarded that its process is not abused or taken undue advantage of or misused or used as a medium to delay the rights of parties. 15. In the instant case, the tenants, who are evicted from the petition schedule shop room in the execution of ex parte order of eviction in R.C.P.No.130 of 2017, filed I.A.No.1100 of 2019, invoking the provisions under Section 144 of the Code, seeking restitution, after the ex parte order of eviction was set aside by the Rent Control Court, vide Ext.P6 order dated 07.07.2019 in I.A.No.528 of 2019 in R.C.P.No.130 of 2017. The underlying principle of Section 144 of the Code is that, once the decree or order which was executed is varied, reversed, set aside or modified, on an application filed seeking restitution status quo ante has to be restored, as no litigant should suffer on account of a wrong order passed by the court. 16. The doctrine of restitution implies that where a party derives benefit by virtue of a decree or order which was later set aside or modified, he has to surrender the said benefit once that decree or order is varied, reversed, set aside or modified. The provisions of Section 144 of the Code will be attracted when the restitution sought for is in respect of the decree or order which had been varied, reversed, set aside or modified; the party applying for restitution is entitled to a benefit under the decree or order which had been varied, reversed, set aside or modified; and the restitution claimed is consequential on the reversal, variation, setting aside or modification of the decree or order. Once an ex parte order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court is set aside, the tenant who was evicted from the petition schedule shop room on the strength of that order of eviction is entitled to restitution, on filing an application invoking the provisions under Section 144 of the Code, since the landlord who derived benefit by virtue of an ex parte order of eviction which was later set aside, has to surrender the said benefit once that order of eviction is set aside, by restoring status quo ante. The legal right of the tenant to seek restitution of the petition schedule shop room cannot be denied on the ground that the landlord has started any business or trade in the said shop room spending a few lakhs. Therefore, we find no merits in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Om Prakash Gupta and also the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Korah Abraham that, once the 3rd petitioner herein started a Fancy and Footwear shop in the petition schedule shop room, the Rent Control Court ought to have declined restitution of that shop room to the tenants, taking note of that subsequent event. 17. 17. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under Article 227(1) of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. 18. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. 19. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [ (2010) 9 SCC 385 ], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well established principles of law. The High Court is vested with the powers of superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction under this Article is, in some ways, wider than the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember the well known adage that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. 20. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. 20. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [ (2015) 12 SCC 39 ] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 21. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [ 2016 (1) KHC 1 ] a Division Bench of this Court held that the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or the tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or the tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law. 22. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 23. In the instant case, it cannot be said that, while passing Ext.P12 order the Rent Control Court committed manifest error or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable. In that view of the matter, we find no reason to interfere with Ext.P12 order of the Rent Control Court dated 08.01.2020 in I.A.No.1100 of 2019 in R.C.P.No.130 of 2017 of the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Vatakara. In the result, this original petition fails and the same is accordingly, dismissed.