JUDGMENT : The 1st defendant in a suit for both prohibitory and mandatory injunctions is the appellant. The plaintiff filed the suit alleging that he has a right over the well, situated on the western side of his property and the defendants are trying to fill up the same. 2. According to the plaintiff, he purchased the plaint schedule property in the year 1981 and has been residing in the building therein. He purchased the property including a share in the well situated on the western side of the property. The defendants are residing on the western side of the property. The defendants have no right over the well. The defendants made an attempt to fill up the well for which they have no right. On the above facts, the plaintiff filed O.S.No.675/1997 on the file of the Additional Munsiff's Court-II, Thrissur (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial court') for an injunction restraining the defendant from filling up of the well on the western side of the plaint schedule property and from covering of any portion of the well in any manner which would contaminate or reduce the utility of the well water. Further, mandatory injunction directing the defendants to restore the wall around the well to its original position is sought for. 3. The defendants contended that the plaintiff has no right to use the well. According to them, the well is within the property purchased by the 1st defendant in the year 1979. During 1988-89, there was shortage of water and at that time the defendants permitted the plaintiff to take water from the well. However, the permission granted was subsequently withdrawn. 4. The trial court framed necessary issues for trial. The plaintiff was examined as PW1 and Exts.A1 to A6 were marked. The 1st defendant was examined as DW1 and Exts.B1 and B2 were marked. The reports of the Advocate Commissioner were marked as Exts.C1 and C2. 5. On appreciation of the evidence, the learned Munsiff found that the defendants have no right over the well. The learned Munsiff also recorded that the plaintiff was not claiming any proprietary right over the well and his claim is that he has right to use and enjoy the well. 5. On appreciation of the evidence, the learned Munsiff found that the defendants have no right over the well. The learned Munsiff also recorded that the plaintiff was not claiming any proprietary right over the well and his claim is that he has right to use and enjoy the well. But the learned Munsiff on the basis of the recital in Ext.A1 title deed of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff is having share over the well and that the plaintiff is using the well, found that the plaintiff has the right to use the well. Accordingly, the trial court granted a mandatory injunction as well as prohibitory injunction by judgment and decree dated 7.11.1998. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the 1st defendant filed A.S.No.54/2003 before the Sub Court, Thrissur (hereinafter referred to as 'the first appellate court'). By judgment and decree dated 13.2.2004, the first appellate court dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. Hence this second appeal. The parties are hereinafter referred to as referred in the original suit unless otherwise stated. 7. Heard Sri.P.K.Ravisankar, the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.Arun B.Varghese, the learned counsel for the respondent. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the plaintiff did not have any proprietary right over the well and the well is situated within the property of the 1st defendant. On the contrary, the plaintiff claimed in the plaint that he has proprietary right over the well. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the plaintiff realised that he was not able to prove his contention that he has the proprietary right. The plaintiff conceded that he did not have the proprietary right over the well but he claimed the right to use the same on the basis of the recital in his title deed. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the deed was subsequent to the assignment of the land to the 1st defendant and hence will not confer any right on the plaintiff. Thus, it is submitted that in the absence of any legal right to the plaintiff to use the disputed well, the two courts below erred in finding that the plaintiff has the right to use the well. 9. Thus, it is submitted that in the absence of any legal right to the plaintiff to use the disputed well, the two courts below erred in finding that the plaintiff has the right to use the well. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the plaintiff purchased the plaint schedule property from Smt.Thailambal on 8.1.1981 including a right over the well on the western side of the property. The defendants have no right over the well situated on the western side. The defendants are not using the well whereas the plaintiff has been using the well to draw water. The plaintiff has no other source of drinking water other than the well provided under the sale deed in favour of him. 10. When this appeal came up for admission as early as on 20.12.2004 this Court formulated the following substantial questions of law:- (i) Whether the courts below have acted in accordance with law in the matter of appreciating the evidence on record? (ii) Have the properties which are the subject matter of the suit been identified in accordance with law? (iii) What are the legitimate inferences flowing out of Ext.A1, being later in point of time than Ext.B2? Can the plaintiff make any claim on the basis of Ext.A1 after Smt.Thailambal had executed Ext.B2 in favour of the mother of the first defendant on 12.3.1978? 11. A learned Single Judge of this Court heard and allowed the appeal by the judgment and decree dated 25.5.2015. This Court entered a finding that, once the respondent, who is the plaintiff, has failed in establishing that he has any proprietary right over the well in dispute, the courts below were not at all justified in holding that the respondent had a right to use the disputed well. Accordingly, the judgments of the courts below granting the decree in favour of the respondent were set aside. The suit was dismissed. 12. The respondent filed S.L.P.(C)No.24358/2015 before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court set aside the judgment and decree of this Court and remanded the matter to consider the substantial questions of law which were not reflected as per the judgment dated 25.5.2015 passed by this Court. 13. The claim of the plaintiff is that he obtained right over the well on the strength of Ext.A1 sale deed dated 8.1.1981 executed by Smt.Thailambal, the predecessor in title of the plaintiff. 13. The claim of the plaintiff is that he obtained right over the well on the strength of Ext.A1 sale deed dated 8.1.1981 executed by Smt.Thailambal, the predecessor in title of the plaintiff. It is a fact that prior to Ext.A1, the mother of the 1st defendant obtained the property by Ext.B2 dated 12.3.1978 from Smt.Thailambal. The mother of the 1st defendant sold the same to the 1st defendant on 08.08.1979 by Ext.B1 sale deed. It is clear that as on the date of execution of Ext.A1, she had already sold the property now owned by the 1st defendant which included the well also. Needless to say, the recital in Ext.A1 that the plaintiff is given a share in the well is of no legal consequence and will not confer legal right. The approach of the first appellate court in interpreting Ext.B2 document on the basis of Ext.A1 which is a document executed subsequently is against the principles of interpretation. Firstly, Ext.B2 does not admit of any ambiguity requiring any different interpretation. Secondly, a document executed three years after Ext.B2 cannot be looked into to understand the intention of the parties at the time of its execution. 14. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, the trial court held that even though the plaintiff claimed absolute right over the well, at the time of argument, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that he is not claiming any proprietary right over the disputed well and his claim is that he has the right to use and enjoy the well. Relying on Himalayan Co-operative Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh [ AIR 2015 SC 2867 ], the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the lawyers should follow the client's instructions rather than substituting their judgment for that of the client. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the submission made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff before the trial court falls within those that clearly belong to the client and the learned counsel clearly failed to consult the client or in making the decision for the client appropriately. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the plaintiff may not be non-suited for the mistake committed by the learned counsel concerned. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the plaintiff may not be non-suited for the mistake committed by the learned counsel concerned. 15. It is true that there is nothing on record to indicate that the learned counsel for the plaintiff has been authorised to make a submission before the trial court relinquishing the rights pleaded in the plaint. Under the circumstances, it is not just and proper to decide the appeal itself based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff before the trial court. 16. Access to safe, affordable and reliable drinking water is a basic human right. It is indispensable to sustaining healthy livelihood and maintaining a person's dignity. Human right to water is essential for building peaceful and prosperous human relations and ensuring that no one is left behind on the street without drinking water. There is no evidence adduced by the defendants to prove that the plaintiff has any other source of drinking water. It has come out in evidence that he has no access to safe drinking water other than the well which is situated on the property which absolutely belongs to the defendant. Going by the evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff has no proprietary right over the well. The well absolutely belongs to the defendant by virtue of Ext.B2 sale deed. 17. In the written statement, the defendants have admitted that during 1988-89 there was a shortage of water and while so the defendants permitted the plaintiff to draw water from the well. Thus, it is clear that the defendants permitted the plaintiff to draw water from the well at least from 1988 onwards. 18. A licence may be implied from the conduct of the licensor whereby acquiescence or encouragement, he allows something to be done on his own land by another person who believes the land to be used is his own. In the case on hand, the defendants permitted the plaintiff to draw water from their well knowing fully well that the plaintiff has no other source of drinking water. This is an extreme case of acquiescence or estoppel by conduct from which a licence may be implied. In the case on hand, the defendants permitted the plaintiff to draw water from their well knowing fully well that the plaintiff has no other source of drinking water. This is an extreme case of acquiescence or estoppel by conduct from which a licence may be implied. A licence may also be implied from the conduct of the defendants which induces in the mind of the plaintiff a reasonable belief that the defendants' consent to the drawing of water from the well which would have been unlawful but for such tacit consent. In Ext.C1 report, the Commissioner noted that the plaintiff has been using the well on the date of inspection. The Commissioner noted that an electric connection has been provided to the motor installed by the plaintiff. It is a fact that as on the date of filing the suit, the plaintiff has been drawing water from the well though the plaintiff has no proprietary or exclusive right over the well. Thus, the tacit consent may consist of words spoken or written or of certain acts and omissions on the part of the defendants which would induce the plaintiff in the position of the licensee to believe that what he does is either actively approved or not objected to by the licensor and that he, therefore, consent to it. Here the long and continued acquiescence on the part of the defendants who are the owners of the land where the well situates, estop them from questioning such acts as unlawful and imply a licence on their part. 19. Assuming for argument sake that the defendants, out of gratitude, allowed the plaintiff who was their immediate neighbour to fix up a water pump inside the well for drawing drinking water, the onus of proving the conditions rendering a licence irrevocable is upon the plaintiff who relies on Section 60 of the Easement Act. Normally, a licence is revocable unless the case falls under clause (a) or clause (b) of Section 60 of the Easement Act. Under clause (a) if the licence is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force, the licence would not be revocable and under clause (b) if the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution, the licence will not be revocable. Under clause (a) if the licence is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force, the licence would not be revocable and under clause (b) if the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution, the licence will not be revocable. It is a mixed question of fact and law that whether the necessary conditions about the revocability of the licence exists or not. In order to render a licence irrevocable three conditions are required, (i) the licensee executed a work of permanent character; (ii) he did so acting upon the licence; and (iii) he incurred the expenses in the execution. What constitutes a work of a permanent character is a question of fact in each case. Where the defendants had consented the plaintiff to draw drinking water for his daily use to his house and permitted the plaintiff to fix a water pump inside the well with electricity connection from the defendants' house, the right conferred on the plaintiff is one of a basic human right which cannot be revoked. The plaintiff has no other source of water to survive. The decision of the question, whether or not a structure is of a permanent character, depends upon the purpose for which the construction has been made. What is not merely of a temporary nature must be treated as a work of permanent character. (see Jacob v. Executive Officer, Mulamthuruthy Panchayat [ 1981 KLT 742 ]). 20. Both the trial court and the first appellate court concurrently held that the plaintiff has a right to draw water from the well on the western side of the plaint schedule property. Considering the fact that the subject matter is drinking water and the plaintiff has no other source of drinking water for his livelihood, it is absolutely necessary to interfere with the concurrent finding of facts arrived at by the two courts below to the extent of drawing water from the well on the western side of plaint schedule property. The defendants have no manner of right to contaminate or reduce the utility of the well water to the detriment of the plaintiff. The defendants have also no right to change the nature of the well. The defendants have no manner of right to contaminate or reduce the utility of the well water to the detriment of the plaintiff. The defendants have also no right to change the nature of the well. At the same time, the plaintiff has no right to claim any ownership right over the well which is situated on the property of the defendants. The well absolutely belongs to the defendants. They have every right to maintain the same for their use. However, they have no right to fill up the well or cover the well to prevent the plaintiff from using the same. The substantial questions of law framed by this Court have been answered as above. 21. For the above reasons, the Regular Second Appeal is allowed in part and the impugned judgment and decree are modified as hereunder:- 1. The defendants being the owner of the well on the western side of the plaint schedule property have every right to maintain the well for their use as absolute owners thereof. However, the defendants are restrained by way of permanent prohibitory injunction from filling up the well or from doing any act which would contaminate or reduce the utility of the well water for the domestic use of the plaintiff as stated in Ext.C1 report. In case the well is not maintained properly by the defendants, the plaintiff is at liberty to get it maintained at his expense and in case of obstruction on the part of the defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to get it maintained at his expense by way of a decree for mandatory injunction through the process of court. 2. Considering the fact that the parties are neighbours, there would be no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand closed.