ORDER : The petitioner which undertakes various shipping activities, had entered in to an agreement dated 06.12.2018 with the 1st respondent Corporation for the purposes of “manning and technical management of DCI dredge XIV at various ports in India”. This contract was for a period of one year, which was extendable by another year on behalf of the 1st respondent for a value of Rs.3,99,90,991/-. According to the terms of the agreement, the petitioner was required to offer a performance guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee. Accordingly, the petitioner had furnished a bank guarantee bearing No.0462OBG18022589 dated 04.12.2018 through the 2nd respondent for a sum of Rs.39,99,099/-. The Petitioner was put in possession of the said vessel and started managing the same. 2. By a letter dated 07.08.2019, the 1st respondent claimed default on the part of the petitioner and issued a notice of unilateral termination and takeover of the vessel belonging to the 1st respondent on 21.08.2019. The petitioner replied to the said notice on 12.08.2019 and sought amicable resolution of the issues. As there was no response, the petitioner again sent an e-mail dated 19.08.2019, denying the claims of the 1st respondent and sought clearance of pending dues before the vessel could be delivered to the 1st respondent. 3. The 1st respondent by an e-mail dated 20.08.2019 accepted the offer of the petitioner for a mutual resolution of the issues. However, the petitioner received another e-mail dated 20.08.2019, where the 1st respondent reiterated its intention to repossess the vessel on 21.08.2019 and that no payment would be made to the petitioner. This was replied by the petitioner on 20.08.2018 itself. However, there was a meeting between the representatives of the petitioner and 1st respondent on 22.08.2018 during which, certain issues were discussed and minutes of the meeting were prepared. The petitioner contends that in this meeting, the 1st respondent had undertaken not to invoke the bank guarantee issued by the petitioner, as performance guarantee, pending resolution of the disputes. On that basis, the petitioner had handed over the vessel of the 1st respondent on 23.08.2019. However, on 26.08.2019, the 1st respondent sought a modification of the minutes to the effect that the undertaking of the 1st respondent was substituted to state that the same would be dealt as per contractual terms and conditions. 4. On that basis, the petitioner had handed over the vessel of the 1st respondent on 23.08.2019. However, on 26.08.2019, the 1st respondent sought a modification of the minutes to the effect that the undertaking of the 1st respondent was substituted to state that the same would be dealt as per contractual terms and conditions. 4. The petitioner further contends that even though the contract ended effectively on 23.08.2019 and the 1st respondent was bound under the general conditions of the contract to return the bank guarantee, the 1st respondent went ahead and sought encashment of the bank guarantee. At that stage, the petitioner approached this Court by way of Writ Petition No.8301 of 2020, challenging the action of the 1st respondent seeking to encash the bank guarantee. On 29.04.2020 this Court, by way of an interim order, had directed the respondents not to encash the bank guarantee for a period of one week after the lock down is lifted. However, the bank guarantee was invoked and the proceeds were paid out to the 1st respondent. 5. Aggrieved by the said action of the respondents 1 and 2, the petitioner has now approached this Court contending that the invocation of the bank guarantee by the 1st respondent and the payment, arising out of such invocation, by the 2nd respondent is bad, arbitrary and required to be set-aside for the following grounds: A. In the meeting on 22.08.2019, the 1st respondent gave an undertaking, as reflected in the minutes, that it would not invoke the bank guarantee until the issues between the petitioner and the 1st respondent were resolved. On the basis of this undertaking, the petitioner had given back the vessel under its management and possession to the 1st respondent. By doing so, the petitioner had changed its position to its detriment on the basis of the undertaking given by the 1st respondent. In such a situation, the invocation of the bank guarantee by the 1st respondent is hit by the principle of promissory estoppel and is also amounts to egregious fraud, because of which, the invocation of the bank guarantee by the 1st respondent has to be set aside. In such a situation, the invocation of the bank guarantee by the 1st respondent is hit by the principle of promissory estoppel and is also amounts to egregious fraud, because of which, the invocation of the bank guarantee by the 1st respondent has to be set aside. B. Apart from the above, Sri P. Roy Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, would point out that this Court by an order dated 29.04.2020 had directed the respondents not to encash the bank guarantee for a period of one week after the lock down is lifted. The passing of this order was intimated to the respondents 1 and 2 by an e-mail of the counsel for the petitioner on 29.04.2020 itself. In such circumstances, the respondents could not have encashed the bank guarantee and such encashment requires to be reversed. 6. In its counter affidavit, the 1st respondent denies the allegation of the petitioner. It is the case of the 1st respondent that there were discussions in the meeting on 22.08.2019. However, no undertaking was given by the 1st respondent as claimed by the petitioner. It is the further submission of the 1st respondent that the minutes were initially drafted by the petitioner and sent to the 1st respondent. After perusing minutes, the 1st respondent, having realized the error in the minutes had requested the petitioner on 26.08.2019 to rectify the said mistake by amending the minutes. The 1st respondent contends that in view of these facts, the claim of the petitioner that the 1st respondent had given an undertaking and that such undertaking was recorded in the minutes is in correct. 7. As far as invocation of the bank guarantee, in violation of the order of this court, is concerned, the 1st respondent, initially denied the receipt of the email from the learned Counsel. However, after further verification, the 1st respondent admitted receipt of the email on 29.4.2020. However, the 1st respondent submits that the bank guarantee was invoked on 06.04.2020 itself and as such, there was no violation of the orders of this Court dated 29.04.2020. 8. The 2nd respondent in its counter states that the invocation of the bank guarantee by the 1st respondent was on 06.04.2019. However, there were certain issues because of which the invocation process was not initiated immediately. The 2nd respondent submits that on 27.04.2020, the invocation of bank guarantee was processed. 8. The 2nd respondent in its counter states that the invocation of the bank guarantee by the 1st respondent was on 06.04.2019. However, there were certain issues because of which the invocation process was not initiated immediately. The 2nd respondent submits that on 27.04.2020, the invocation of bank guarantee was processed. It would be instructive to extract the exact pleading in this connection, which is as follows: “In this regard it is submitted that the transfer of amounts falling under the BG transactions is facilitated through a software called “TIPlus” from the front end whereas the debit of individual accounts are done through another software namely ‘Finacle’. In the instant case, the payment initiated on 27.04.2020 was shown as ‘completed’ in the ‘TIPlus’ whereas the said payment transaction was failed as the same did not pass Finacle as the individual account of petitioner was not having funds to debit. Hence the payment was re-initiated on 30.04.2020 by force debiting the account of the petitioner and transaction completed on 30.04.2020. The said process are purely technical and it is clear from the facts and circumstances that the payment initiated on 27.4.2020 and conclusion of the same on 30.04.2020 are the sequence of the same process. It is re-iterated that the Bank has not received any copy of interim order passed in WP.No.8301/2020 until 04.05.2020 except an e-mail from the Counsel of the petitioner on 29.04.2020 stating that a Writ Petition has been filed before this Hon’ble Court, however, the payment was initiated prior to the petitioner filing the said Writ Petition. It is also pertinent to note that the said mail attachment received from the advocate of the petitioner does not specifically state that any restraint/stay order had been passed in the said Writ Petition nor does the same mention any details of the order. Consideration of the Court: 9. Sri P. Roy Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner would rely upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills vs. State of Uttar Pradesh And Ors., 1979 (2) SCR 641 and also on Section 63 of the Contract Act for the proposition that the invocation of the bank guarantee is hit by the principle of promissory estoppel and on the ground of egregious fraud. 10. 10. Sri P. Roy Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner would also rely upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ABL international Ltd vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation, (2004) SCC 553 to the effect that findings of fact can be given by this Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. It is true that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that in exceptional cases and circumstances, this Court can go into questions of fact in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, these are the issues raised in W.P. No. 8301 of 2020 and would need to be decided in that Writ Petition. 12. The question of whether the invocation of the bank guarantee is in violation of the orders of this Court is more relevant for a decision in this case. 13. The counter affidavit of the 1st respondent shows that the bank guarantee was invoked by the 1st respondent on 06.04.2020 itself. This was quite some time before the petitioner approached this Court and obtained an order on 29.04.2020. 14. According to the counter affidavit of the 2nd respondent, the process of invocation and encashment of the bank guarantee was initiated by 2nd respondent on 27.04.2020 and the same had failed. Subsequently, after receipt of a notice of the order of this Court on 29.04.2020, the 2nd respondent again went through the process of encashment of the bank guarantee on 30.04.2020. The statement of the 2nd respondent that the process of encashment which commenced on 27.04.2020 and ended on 30.04.2020 is a continuous process cannot be accepted. The 2nd respondent unequivocally states that after the first attempt had failed, a second attempt was done and the description of the second attempt clearly shows there was manual intervention in this process. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the payment on the basis of the invocation of the bank guarantee was in violation of the orders of this Court dated 29.4.2020. 15. The law relating to the consequences of such violation is fairly settled. The review of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MANOHAR LAL Vs. UGRASEN (2010) 11 SCC 557 , would suffice: 24. 15. The law relating to the consequences of such violation is fairly settled. The review of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MANOHAR LAL Vs. UGRASEN (2010) 11 SCC 557 , would suffice: 24. In Mulraj v. Murti Raghunathji Maharaj [ AIR 1967 SC 1386 ] this Court considered the effect of action taken subsequent to passing of an interim order in its disobedience and held that any action taken in disobedience of the order passed by the Court would be illegal. Subsequent action would be a nullity. 25. In Surjit Singh v. Harbans Singh [ (1995) 6 SCC 50 : AIR 1966 SC 135 ], this Court while dealing with the similar issue held as under: (SCC p. 52, para 4) “4. … In defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the court orders otherwise. The court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes.” 26. In All Bengal Excise Licensees' Assn. v. Raghabendra Singh [ (2007) 11 SCC 374 : AIR 2007 SC 1386 ] this Court held as under: (SCC p. 387, para 28) “28. … a party to the litigation cannot be allowed to take an unfair advantage by committing breach of an interim order and escape the consequences thereof. … the wrong perpetrated by the respondent contemnors in utter disregard of the order of the High Court should not be permitted to hold good.” 27. In DDA v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. [ (1996) 4 SCC 622 : AIR 1966 SC 2005] this Court after making reference to many of the earlier judgments held: (SCC p. 636, para 18) “18. … ‘… on principle that those who defy a prohibition ought not to be able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good, and not tainted by the illegality that produced them.’ [Ed.: As observed in Clarke v. Chadburn, (1985) 1 WLR 78, p. 81 C.] ” 28. … ‘… on principle that those who defy a prohibition ought not to be able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good, and not tainted by the illegality that produced them.’ [Ed.: As observed in Clarke v. Chadburn, (1985) 1 WLR 78, p. 81 C.] ” 28. In Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund [ (2007) 13 SCC 565 : AIR 2008 SC 901 ] this Court while dealing with the similar issues held that even a court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the event of coming to the conclusion that a breach of an order of restraint had taken place, may bring back the parties to the same position as if the order of injunction has not been violated. 29. In view of the above, it is evident that any order passed by any authority in spite of the knowledge of the interim order of the court is of no consequence as it remains a nullity. 16. In the circumstances the Writ petition is allowed with the following directions: 1. The 1st respondent shall repay, to the 2nd respondent, within two weeks of receipt of this order, the money received from the 2nd respondent on account of the invocation of Bank Guarantee bearing No. 04620BG18022589. 2. Upon such payment, the Bank Guarantee of the Petitioner bearing No. 04620BG18022589 will stand restored, without any charge to the Petitioner. 3. The invocation of the said Bank Guarantee will await further orders/result of W.P. No. 8301 of 2020 pending before this Court. 4. The said bank Guarantee will be kept alive and valid by the Petitioner subject to the orders of this Court in W.P. No. 8301 of 2020. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any pending, in this Writ petition, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.