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2021 DIGILAW 977 (GUJ)

PRESIDENT v. GHEMARBHAI SEDHABHAI CHAUDHARY

2021-10-22

A.S.SUPEHIA

body2021
JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ petition emanates from the order dated 28.02.2017 passed by the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal, Ahmedabad (for short “the Tribunal”) in Appeal No.173 of 2014 (old Application No.36 of 2010), wherein and whereby the Tribunal has directed the petitioner-Trust to reinstate the respondent No.1 in service by quashing and setting aside his dismissal order dated 10.04.2010 and the order passed by the Commissioner of Higher Education dated 05.04.2010. 2. The brief facts of the case are as under: 2.1 The respondent was serving as an Assistant Teacher in the School run by the petitioner-Trust. He was appointed vide order dated 01.04.1992 and was suspended on 14.04.1994 for serious irregularities committed by him. By the order dated 10.04.2010, the respondent No.1 was dismissed from service, which was challenged by him before the Tribunal by filing an Appeal No.173 of 2014. By the judgement and order dated 28.02.2017, the dismissal order of the respondent No.1 has been set aside by the Tribunal, which has been challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition. 3. Learned advocates Mr.Rasesh Rindani with Mr.J.K.Parmar appearing for the petitioners have submitted that a show cause notice dated 11.10.2008 was issued to the respondent No.1 containing four charges. A committee was constituted under the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Education Regulations, 1974 (the Regulations) for inquiring into the charges. It is submitted that the respondent No.1 was also represented by one Mr.Revabhai Jesangbhai Chaudhary as his defence representative and the petitioners had also participated in the same. After hearing them, the impugned order of dismissal was passed. It is submitted by the learned advocate Mr.Rindani that after following due legal procedure, the inquiry Committee held all the charges proved against the respondent No.1 and accordingly, he was dismissed from service. Learned advocate, while referring to the impugned order of the Tribunal, has submitted that the Tribunal has set aside the dismissal order on irrelevant grounds. It is submitted that the legality of the inquiry proceedings has been questioned by the Tribunal on incorrect assessment of facts. It is submitted that the observations made by the Tribunal with regard to inquiry proceedings undertaken by the Committee are erroneous. It is submitted that the legality of the inquiry proceedings has been questioned by the Tribunal on incorrect assessment of facts. It is submitted that the observations made by the Tribunal with regard to inquiry proceedings undertaken by the Committee are erroneous. While referring to the rojkam of the inquiry Committee, it is submitted that the Tribunal has fallen in error by observing that there is no signature put on the rojkam by any of the members of the Committee, whereas in fact the rojkam reveals that the same bears the signatures of the members of the Committee as well as representative of the respondent No.1. It is submitted that in fact when an opportunity was given to the respondent No.1 to submit anything more, over and above his statement, he did not avail such opportunity. 3.1 Learned advocate for the petitioners has further submitted that there were three charges levelled against the respondent No.1 with regard to (i) unauthorized absence; (ii) misappropriation of funds of the exam fees of the students; and (iii) irregularity committed by the respondent No.1 by allowing one student of standard XI-B viz. Chaudhary Nainaben Jurabhai to write the paper of English subject from her residence. It is as submitted that the respondent No.1 was habitual in misappropriating the funds of the school and initially, when it was found that he has misappropriated the funds of the school, he was issued a show-cause notice on 29.10.2007 calling upon his explanation with regard to non-deposition of the fees of the students collected by him. It is submitted by the learned advocate that an amount of Rs.29,500/- was not deposited by the respondent No.1 after collecting the fees from the students and when such show-cause notice was issued, by the reply dated 08.11.2007, he has admitted that he has spent the amount of fees and he would not be indulging himself in such mistake in future. It is submitted that an affidavit dated 03.01.2008 was also given by him stating that he would not be indulging in such activities and despite that, when again it was found that he did not deposit the amount of Rs.17,263/-, another notice dated 19.03.2008 was issued to the respondent No.1 for not depositing the fees of the students. It is submitted that an affidavit dated 03.01.2008 was also given by him stating that he would not be indulging in such activities and despite that, when again it was found that he did not deposit the amount of Rs.17,263/-, another notice dated 19.03.2008 was issued to the respondent No.1 for not depositing the fees of the students. Since, despite the issuance of the aforesaid notice, the respondent No.1 did not deposit the amount, a complaint was filed before Sathlana Police Station in this regard. Thus, it is submitted that the respondent No.1 was habitual in misappropriating the fees and the Tribunal has overlooked the aforesaid aspect, while setting aside the dismissal order. 3.2 With regard to the charge of irregularity committed by the respondent No.1 in taking the examination of one student of standard XI-B of the English subject, is concerned, the learned advocates appearing for the petitioners has further submitted that the management realized about such misconduct when it was found that one of the students namely, Chaudhary Nainaben Jurabhai, who was studying in standard XI-B, though was absent on the date of examination due to her illness, was allowed to write her answer sheet from her residence, without permission of the Management. It is submitted that a specific statement has been given by the student that respondent No.1 had in fact helped her to give her examination from the residence. Thus, it is submitted that she has supported the charge in her statement, which was recorded by the disciplinary committee on 07.10.2009. Thus, he has submitted that such charges are very serious in nature and hence, the Tribunal should not have set aside the dismissal order. 3.3 With regard to unauthorized absence, the learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that the respondent No.1 was on unauthorized leave for 23 days in the year 2007 and in the year 2008, he was absent for 20 days. He has submitted that the respondent No.1, without taking prior permission, has chosen to remain absent, which is a serious misconduct and hence, the dismissal order passed by the Management was not required to be interfered by the Tribunal. It is submitted that the Tribunal, without there being any material on record, has concluded that the inquiry was conducted with biased mind. It is submitted that the Tribunal, without there being any material on record, has concluded that the inquiry was conducted with biased mind. It is further submitted that the Tribunal has set aside the order of the dismissal on a misconceived notion that it was found that the same was very harsh and disproportionate looking to the misconduct, which in fact is an incorrect view since looking to the charges, which are proved, it cannot be said that the misconduct was very minor. 4. In response to the aforesaid submissions, learned advocate Ms.Mamta Vyas appearing for the respondent No.1 has submitted that the order of the Tribunal does not require interference since the same is passed in accordance with law. She has submitted that the Tribunal has examined the defects in holding the departmental inquiry against the respondent No.1 and has precisely set aside the dismissal order. With regard to the alleged charge of misconduct of misappropriation is concerned, she has submitted that the respondent No.1 was forced to file an affidavit and also a reply of admitting the misappropriation of the amount of the fees collected by him from the students and hence, such temporary misappropriation cannot be said to be grave misconduct. She has further submitted that the proceedings against the respondent No.1 was held by the Committee on five occasions and the respondent No.1 was never called upon to cross-examine the witnesses and on the fifth occasion, when the meeting of Committee was held, the respondent No.1 was immediately called to submit his explanation and hence, since he could not apply his mind, and in due haste, he has stated that he would not like to submit anything more, except what is stated in his defence statement dated 07.10.2009. It is submitted that as per provision of Rule 27(a)(6)(6) of the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Education Regulations, 1974 (the Regulations), the Committee is required to call upon the representative of the delinquent or the delinquent for cross-examining the witnesses and since such opportunity is not granted to the delinquent or his representative, the order of dismissal suffers from procedural defect and hence, the same precisely has been set aside by the Tribunal. 4.1 Learned advocate Ms.Vyas has further submitted that the charge, with regard to answering the English subject paper at the residence of one student - Naina Chaudhary of standard XI-B is concerned, the same also cannot be said to be proved in view of the affidavit filed by her on 09.09.2009 in support of the Respondent No.1. While placing reliance on the affidavit filed by the student, she has submitted that it would reveal that she was instructed by Principal, Mr.D.A.Patel to answer the same from her home and accordingly she has done so. Thus, she has submitted that as per the affidavit filed by the student dated 09.09.2009, she had written the papers at her home in view of the instructions of the Principal, Mr.D.A. Patel. Learned advocate, at this stage, has submitted that subsequently, Principal Mr.D.A.Patel was embroiled in the corruption case also and hence, a criminal prosecution was also instituted against him. 4.2 So far as the charge in relation to the unauthorized absence is concerned, learned advocate Ms.Vyas has submitted that from the date of appointment till the year 2007, the respondent No.1 was never issued any show-cause notice nor any adverse entry has been made in his confidential report and hence, the punishment of dismissal for the said charge is uncalled for. It is submitted by the learned advocate that the entire episode against the respondent No.1 has been concocted since the respondent No.1 had agitated against one incident, which had happened at the college and he was leading the parents against the Management. 4.3 Learned advocate Ms.Vyas has further submitted that during the pendency of the petition, since the impugned judgement and order was not stayed, the respondent No.1 filed Civil Application No.1 of 2018 praying for reinstatement as well as to pay difference of salary from 2010 to 2017. She has submitted that the aforesaid civil application was disposed of by an order dated 23.02.2021, in order to exhaust other remedies available to the respondent No.1. She has submitted that thereafter, the respondent No.1 filed a contempt application before the Division Bench, and in view thereof, the respondent No.1 was reinstated in service. She has submitted that the aforesaid civil application was disposed of by an order dated 23.02.2021, in order to exhaust other remedies available to the respondent No.1. She has submitted that thereafter, the respondent No.1 filed a contempt application before the Division Bench, and in view thereof, the respondent No.1 was reinstated in service. She has further submitted that in fact the District Education Officer (DEO) vide order dated 10.10.2017 had informed the petitioner-School to immediately implement the order of the Tribunal, since there was no order of stay operating against the same in the writ petition. It is submitted that in view of the contempt proceedings, the respondent No.1 was reinstated in service on 01.10.2021, however, he is not yet paid the difference of salary from 2010 to 2017. It is submitted by her that the respondent No.1 is suffering from throat cancer and will be retiring on 31.05.2022 and he is also willing to forego the back wages of five years and hence, the order of the Tribunal may not be disturbed. 5. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.Ronak raval appearing for the petitioner-DEO, Mehsana has submitted that it is true that the DEO had communicated the respondent No.1 to implement the order of the Tribunal but thereafter, realizing that the said communication or suggestion was uncalled for, vide communication dated 30.10.2018, the decision to impose 25% cut in the grant-in-aid of the petitioner-School for not implementing the order was withdrawn. It is submitted that ample opportunity was given to the respondent No.1 in the proceedings and after following the procedure, as prescribed under the rules and regulations, the order of dismissal was passed. It is submitted that after the entire record was examined, the order dated 05.04.2010 was passed by the Commissioner of Higher Education approving the order passed by the petitioner-School, after hearing the concerned parties. Thus, he has submitted that the State authority did not find any has irregularity or illegality in the entire procedure and looking to the seriousness of the charges, the dismissal order may not be interfered with by this Court. 5.1 In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned AGP has placed reliance on the judgements of the Apex Court in the cases of Regional Manager, UPSRTC, Etawah Vs. 5.1 In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned AGP has placed reliance on the judgements of the Apex Court in the cases of Regional Manager, UPSRTC, Etawah Vs. Hoti Lal, (2003) 3 S.C.C. 605 and State Bank Of India And Ors vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey, (2013) 2 S.C.C. 740 and has submitted that the Tribunal, while dealing with quantum of punishment, whether it is proportionate or disproportionate can only examine the decision making process and if it is found that the same does not suffer from irregularity or illegality, the punishment order is not required to be interfered with. It is submitted that there are serious charges of misappropriation against the respondent No.1 of the petitioner-School fees of the students and hence, the Tribunal has shown misplaced sympathy towards the Respondent No.1. 6. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and perused the documents, as pointed out by the them. The Record and proceedings are also examined by me threadbare. 7. The respondent No.1, who was serving as Assistant Teacher from 1992 and was suspended on 14.04.1994. The show-cause notice dated 26.02.2008 was issued to respondent No.1 calling upon his explanation with regard to four charges mentioned therein. The respondent No.1 filed his reply on 27.02.2008, denying all the allegations. As mentioned in the memo of the writ petition, the show cause notice contained four (04) charges as under: (A) Misconduct and unauthorized absence – respondent was on unauthorized leave of 23 numbers of days 2007 in year – 08 in 1st semester and 20 days in 2nd semester; (B) Misappropriation of fund – respondent has collected exam fee of students but not deposited in school/board, which was agreed by respondent in writing; (C) Misappropriation of fund – respondent has collected term fee of 2nd term for student of class 12A for amount of Rs.17263.00 in year 2007-08 which is also confirmed in writing by the respondent; AND (D) Respondent performed irregularity in examination – he has managed for answering/writing the paper of English subject from home of an absent student – Chaudhari Nainaben Jurabhai of standard 11-B. 8. A perusal of the aforesaid charges would reveal that so far as the first charge (A) is concerned, the same pertains to unauthorized absence initially for 23 days in 2007 and 20 days in the year 2008. A perusal of the aforesaid charges would reveal that so far as the first charge (A) is concerned, the same pertains to unauthorized absence initially for 23 days in 2007 and 20 days in the year 2008. The charge Nos.(B) and (C) pertain to misappropriation of the School fees paid by the students which was collected by the respondent No.1, and the last charge (D) pertains to answering the examination paper of English subject from home by an absent student namely, Chaudhari Nainaben Jurabhai of standard XI-B. 8.1 So far as charge No.A is concerned, the same pertains to unauthorized absence. Assuming in favour of the respondent No.1, that the said charge cannot be said to be serious in nature however, the charges with regard to misappropriation of School fees and the charge of managing or allowing an absent student to write the answer paper from her home can be said to be very grave in nature. 8.2 With regard to the misappropriation of student fees of the petitioner-School is concerned, the facts are undisputed. From the facts as narrated hereinabove and the documents on record, it transpires that the respondent No.1 was habitual in temporary misappropriating the School fees of the students, for which he was issued the show-cause notices. Initially, he misappropriated an amount of Rs.29,500/-. When a show-cause notice dated 29.10.2007 was issued to him, in his reply dated 08.11.2007, he admitted that he has spent the amount of fees for his personal use. An affidavit dated 03.01.2008 was also filed by him stating that he would not be indulging in such activities. Despite the aforesaid assurance given by the respondent no.1, he again misappropriated amount of Rs.17,263/- of the School fees collected from the students of Std. XI and Std.XII, which resulted in issuance of the notice dated 19.03.2008 to the respondent No.1 asking him to immediately deposit such amount however, he did not do so and hence, the petitioner-Management was constrained to file a police complaint against the respondent No.1. 9. For proving the subsequent charge of allowing the student to give examination from her home is concerned, the inquiry Committee had examined the student Chaudhari Nainaben Jurabhai on 11.04.2009. 9. For proving the subsequent charge of allowing the student to give examination from her home is concerned, the inquiry Committee had examined the student Chaudhari Nainaben Jurabhai on 11.04.2009. In her written statement given before the Committee, she has stated that on the day of the examination she was absent and she was given the question paper at her home, and she has answered the same from her home, and the answer-sheet was given to the respondent No.1. The said student had remained present before the Committee on 07.11.2009, which was the 5th meeting. 10. This Court has perused the rojkam of the Committee and it is noticed that on 07.11.2009, when the student Chaudhari Nainaben Jurabhai was present, the Committee had specifically asked the respondent No.1 to the effect that “whether over and above his statement dated 07.10.2009, if he has anything to say, he can do so”. The Committee has recorded that in response, the respondent-delinquent has specifically stated that he does not want to say anything. The rojkam of 5th meeting, which was held on 07.10.2009 reveals the signature of the respondent No.1. This Court has also perused the rojkam of all the meetings. The first meeting was held on 19.08.2009, in which the representative of the respondent No.1 had remained present, the second meeting was held on 19.09.2009, where both, the representative of the respondent No.1 as well as the respondent No.1 had remained present, again in the meeting of the Committee, which was held on 02.10.2009, both the representative as well as the respondent No.1 had remained present, in the fourth meeting held on 13.10.2009 and fifth meeting held on 07.11.2009, wherein both of them have remained present and in the sixth meeting, which was held on 02.01.2010, the representative of the respondent No.1 has remained present. 10.1 The rojkam of all these meetings reveal that either the respondent no.1 or his representative has remained present and they have also put their signatures. The Tribunal, while setting aside the dismissal order in paragraph No.14 of the impugned order, has held that the rojkam does not contain the signatures of the members of the meeting, which is a perverse finding and contrary to the record. The rojkam also reveals that though the respondent No.1 and his representative were also extended full opportunity, he did not choose to cross-examine the sole witness i.e. Chaudhari Nainaben Jurabhai. The rojkam also reveals that though the respondent No.1 and his representative were also extended full opportunity, he did not choose to cross-examine the sole witness i.e. Chaudhari Nainaben Jurabhai. 10.2 The advocate appearing for the respondent no.1 has contended that there is violation of Regulation 27(a)(6)(6) since he was not asked for crossexamining the witness. The translated version of Regulation 27(a)(6)(6)reads thus: “In the second sitting of the Inquiry committee, the concerned employees, in their defence, can cross-examine the evidences produced by the management, the representative appointed to represent the management and witnesses produced by the management. The Inquiry committee shall make written notes thereof.” 10.3 Thus, the contention raised by the respondent No.1 that the petitioner-Management was required to follow the procedure under Rule 27(a)(6)(6) of the Regulations by asking the respondent No.1-Teacher to cross-examine the witness, does not merit acceptance as on that day, when such witness was summoned, the petitioner-Management had specifically asked the respondent No.1 to submit or to say anything, over and above his reply dated 07.10.2009, but the respondent No.1 did not choose to cross-examine or to submit anything. The respondent No.1 was also represented by his representative and hence, the burden cannot be shifted to the petitioner-Management of asking them to cross-examine the witness, in wake of the fact that the petitioner-Management had asked the respondent No.1 in presence of his representative that if he wants to say anything, he can do so. The aforenoted regulation does not mandate that the Management has to call upon the employee to crossexamine their witness. It only speaks of giving an opportunity to the employee to cross-examine the witness. It is not the case of the respondent No.1 or his representative that they were not aware of presence of the witness. Thus, when the respondent No.1 and his representative were having the knowledge of her presence they should have availed such opportunity to cross-examine her however, they failed to do so and hence, it cannot be alleged that the petitioner-Management did not afford any opportunity of cross-examining the witness- student. The respondent n.1 has also emphasized on the affidavit dated 09.09.2009 made by the student-Chaudhary Naynaben Jorabhai. The respondent n.1 has also emphasized on the affidavit dated 09.09.2009 made by the student-Chaudhary Naynaben Jorabhai. It appears that when the said student had remained present on 07.11.2009 before the Inquiry Committee, and she presented her written statement dated 11.04.2009, in presence of 10 persons, who have endorsed her presence, the respondent No.1, neither chose to cross-examine her nor did he produce the affidavit dated 09.09.2009. The affidavit of the student will pale into insignificance in view of her subsequent statement recorded by the Management on 07.11.2009, wherein she has categorically identified her letter dated 11.04.2009 in presence of 10 witnesses. In her letter dated 11.04.2009, she has specifically levelled allegations against the respondent no.1 with regard to his involvement in helping her writing the answer paper from home. 10.4 Thus, the Tribunal has failed to appreciate all the aforementioned facts in their true perspective. The Tribunal has significantly erred in observing that the rojkam does not bear any signature of the members of inquiry Committee. With regard to the allegation of misappropriation, the Tribunal, in a very cursorily manner has observed that no opportunity was afforded to the respondent No.1. In fact there is no finding of the Tribunal on the aspect about his admission of guilt of misappropriation in light of the documents, which were produced before it. The Tribunal has brushed aside the issue with regard to the allegations of misappropriation by holding that the collection of the fees does not form part of the service of the respondent No.1, who was serving as a teacher. It is also observed that since subsequently the respondent No.1 has deposited the amount, it cannot be said that there was misappropriation on behalf of the respondent No.1. Such observation of the Tribunal can invite grave consequences of encouraging temporary misappropriation, and can severely impact functioning of the School. The respondent No.1, being a school Teacher, a high standard of morality and ethics was expected from him. It was expected that he would instantly deposit the school fees, after it was collected from the students. It has come on record that such amount of fees was misappropriated by the respondent No.1 for his personal use, and only after he was issued a show-cause notice, he deposited the same. It was expected that he would instantly deposit the school fees, after it was collected from the students. It has come on record that such amount of fees was misappropriated by the respondent No.1 for his personal use, and only after he was issued a show-cause notice, he deposited the same. After an assurance was given by the respondent No.1 not to repeat such misconduct, he again indulged himself in misappropriating the school fees, for which the petitioner-Management was also constrained to issue a show-cause notice and file a police complaint against the respondent No.1. Thus, despite assurance given by the respondent No.1, he did not improve and again misappropriated the School fees. Thus, such a demeanor of not depositing the fees of the students by a teacher can be said to be a very serious and grave misconduct. The Tribunal has indubitably misdirected itself on the issue by setting aside the dismissal order, in light of the proved misconduct. 10.5 One of the considerations which has found favour with the respondent No.1, is that the Tribunal was impressed with the submission that the entire proceedings are held with a biased mind in view of some incident of rape, which had occurred at Patan College. Such deliberation is also premised on whims and fancies, since the dismissal order is passed after the charges against the respondent no.1 are proved through the documentary evidence, after affording full opportunity to the respondent no.1. The Tribunal was not justified in inferring with the dismissal order on misconceived notion that the inquiry proceedings are conducted with a biased mind. There is no concrete evidence established in support of allegation of biased mind. Such finding has been recorded merely on the ipse dixit of the Tribunal. The findings of the Inquiry Committee cannot be acknowledged as bias in wake of the fact that the departmental inquiry does not suffer from any vice of violation of principles of natural justice or Regulations. 11. In a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. N. Gangaraj 2020 (3) SCC 423 : AIR 2020 SC 1878 , after survey of various judgements has explained the scope of interference with the punishment order in exercise of judicial review by the Tribunal and the High Court. The Apex Court has observed thus: “8. The Apex Court has observed thus: “8. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error. The power of judicial review is confined to the decision-making process. The power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority. 9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 ], a three- Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under : (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7) “ 7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.” 10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [ B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80], again a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/ tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12- 13) “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/ Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/ Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 ], this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil [High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144], this Court held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held as under : (SCC p. 423, para 16) “16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil v. High Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 97 : (2000) 1 LLN 160] of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. It was held as under : (SCC p. 423, para 16) “16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil v. High Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 97 : (2000) 1 LLN 160] of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya [State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721], this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 587-88, paras 7 & 10) “7. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 587-88, paras 7 & 10) “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806] and Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana [Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036] , High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil [ High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144].) xxxx 10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him.” 13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554], this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13) “13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 14. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari [Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 335], wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct. 15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not inter- fere with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the appellate authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed the larger Bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 ] and B.C. Chaturvedi [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law.” 12. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law.” 12. The Supreme Court has held that once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the appellate authority. It is asserted by the Supreme Court that finding of guilt of misconduct cannot be interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the department since the discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The Supreme Court has also cautioned that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be a ground for interfering with the findings in departmental inquiries. In the present case, the Tribunal has acted beyond its power of judicial review by setting aside the order of dismissal by assuming the role of an appellate authority. It was not open for the Tribunal to overlook or ignore the findings of the Inquiry Committee in wake of the fact that the respondent no.1 was afforded all opportunities to defend himself. Looking to the serious allegations levelled against the respondent no.1, which are proved, it cannot be said that the punishment of dismissal was so harsh and disproportionate which could have shaken its conscience. 13. It was also proposed by the learned advocate Ms.Mamta Vyas that the order of the Tribunal may not be interfered with since the respondent No.1 is already reinstated in service in view of the contempt proceedings and he will be retiring in the month of May, 2022 and since he is ready and willing to forego the wages of five years, appropriate orders may be passed directing the petitioners to allow respondent No.1 to continue till his retirement. 14. 14. The aforesaid submission is vehemently opposed by both, the petitioner-Management as well as the State and have submitted that in fact when it was realized that the order dated 25.10.2008 imposing cut of 25% in grant on the petitioner-School due to noncompliance was erroneous, the same was withdrawn by the order dated 30.10.2018. He has submitted that due to the threat given by the respondent No.1 for committing suicide by self-immolation and to fast till death, the DEO was constrained to issue communications to the petitioners to reinstate the respondent No.1. It is submitted that the reinstatement can always be subject to the result of the writ petition, since he was reinstated in view of the statement made by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners since the petitioner-Management was facing the contempt proceedings, as there was no stay operating against the order of the Tribunal. Thus, it is submitted by both - learned Advocate Mr.Rindani and learned AGP that there is no question of settlement looking to the proved serious allegations against the respondent No.1. 15. For the foregoing reasons and on the bedrock of the aforesaid observations, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside the dismissal order of the respondent No.1 in view of the charges, which were proved against him. It was expected of the respondent No.1, who was an Assistant Teacher, to set a paradigm of honesty and integrity for his students however, by indulging in such activities, he has lowered the morals intended for a Teacher. 16. In view of the aforenoted observations, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order is hereby quashed and set aside. RULE is made absolute accordingly. Since the writ petition is allowed, it will be open for the petitioners to pass appropriate orders with regard to the reinstatement of the Respondent No.1. 17. Record and proceedings be sent back. 18. After the pronouncement of the judgement, learned advocate Ms.Mamta Vyas has requested for staying of the present order. The request is refused in view of the forgoing observations.