JUDGMENT : VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, J. 1. In instance case, in a dispute between the parties referred for arbitration, the Arbitrator had passed an award under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (hereinafter in short ‘the Act’) on 1.10.2019. Signed copy of award was provided to parties on the same day. 2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with award, appellants had preferred objections before learned District Judge under Section 34 of the Act along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the same. Objections along with application for condonation of delay were filed on 17th February, 2020 after expiry of 138 days as Courts were closed for winter vacation from 20th January, 2020 to 17th February, 2020. 3. Learned District Judge, referring the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Subash Projects and Marketing Limited, (2012) 2 SCC 624 has dismissed the application for condonation of delay being not filed within limitation period as provided under Section 34 of the Act. 4. The aforesaid dismissal of application by learned District Judge has been assailed in present appeal. 5. Section 34(3) of the Act provides the limitation period for filing objections under Section 34 of the Act against the award passed by the Arbitrator, which reads as under: “34(1)............ (2).................. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.” 6. As evident from the aforesaid provision that Section 34(3) of the Act provides the limitation period of 3 months for filing objections and proviso thereof provides a further period of 30 days which can be condoned by Court for sufficient cause shown by applicant preventing him from filing objections within three months. Therefore, prescribed period for limitation is 90 days and 30 days are the extended period which can be condoned by Court after three months. Therefore, prescribed period for limitation is 90 days and 30 days are the extended period which can be condoned by Court after three months. It has been specifically provided in the Proviso that Court is not empowered to extend the period beyond 30 days. 7. As per Section 43 of the Act, provisions of Limitation Act are applicable to the arbitration as it applies to the proceedings in the Court. Therefore, it has been contended on behalf of State that in view of provisions of Section 4 of Limitation Act, the period when Court was closed deserves to be excluded for calculation of period available for filing objections. 8. In present case, limitation period prescribed in Section 34(3) had expired on 1st January, 2020, but, not during the closure of Court as Court had closed for winter vacation on 20.1.2020 (19.1.2020 was Sunday). 9. Section 4 of Limitation Act is applicable for extension of prescribed period of limitation. 30 days provided in Proviso of Section 34(3) is not a prescribed limitation period, but, it is a limit of the Court with respect to period for which Court can condone the delay after expiry of prescribed period of limitation of three months. 10. The aforesaid issue is no longer res-integra in view of pronouncement of the Supreme Court, as referred by learned District Judge also, in Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board’s case wherein the Court has held as under: “9. Section 43(1) of the 1996 Act provides that the 1963 Act shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in Court. The 1963 Act is thus applicable to the matters of arbitration covered by the 1996 Act save and except the extent its applicability has been excluded by virtue of the express provision contained in Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act. 10............ 11. The question, therefore, that falls for out determination is whether the appellants are entitled to extension of time under Section 4 of the 1963 Act in the above facts? 12. Section 4 of the 1963 Act reads as under: “4. Expiry of prescribed period when Court is closed-Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens. 12. Section 4 of the 1963 Act reads as under: “4. Expiry of prescribed period when Court is closed-Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens. Explanation - A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day.” The above section enables a party to institute a suit, prefer an appeal or make an application on the day the court reopens where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on the day when the court is closed. 13. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963 Act are “prescribed period”. What is the meaning of these words? 14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines: “2(j) “Period of Limitation” which means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule and prescribed period means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application for setting aside arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned in proviso that follows sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the “period of limitation” and therefore, not “prescribed period” for the purposes of making the application for setting aside the arbitral award. The period of 30 days beyond three months which the court may extend on sufficient cause being shown under the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act being not the “period of limitation” or in other words “prescribed period” in our opinion, Section 4 of the 1963 Act is not, at all, attracted to the facts of the present case.” 11. In case three months expire during the days when Court is closed, then filing of objections/petition under Section 34 of the Act, on the first opening day of Court, would amount to filing of objections within the period but when period of three months expires prior to closure of Court for vacation/holidays, then, the Court has power only to extend the period for further 30 days and in such eventuality, Section 4 of Limitation Act will be of no help as 30 days period, limited in proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act is a period beyond the prescribed period of limitation for filing the objections which provides cap of maximum period of 30 days which can be condoned in filing objections/petition under Section 34 of the Act. In normal course, in general cases, where no such cap limiting the power of the Court with respect to period of delay in filing appeal/application/other proceedings to which Section 5 of Limitation Act is applicable, the Court has power to condone the period without any limit subject to satisfactory explanation of sufficient cause and other necessary ingredients preventing the applicant from filing appeal/application/other proceedings. But for proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act, such power has been limited by the statute in filing of objections/petition under Section 34 of the Act. 12. Therefore, in case of objections/petition under Section 34 of the Act, benefit of exclusion of period of vacation/holidays of Court would not be applicable where three months have expired prior to closure of Court and 30 days are expiring during closure of Court. 13. In view of above discussion, I do not find any infirmity, illegality or perversity in the order passed by learned District Judge and accordingly, present petition is dismissed along with pending miscellaneous application OMP (M) No. 25 of 2021.