ORDER 1. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order dated 16th July, 2019 passed by the Industrial Tribunal Jaipur on an application moved u/s 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 disapproving the dismissal order cannot be said to be fair and justified, once the Tribunal vide order dated 6.7.2002 itself reached to the conclusion that the enquiry was in accordance with the principle of natural justice. 2. Learned counsel submits that in-spite of having reached to the conclusion, the Industrial Tribunal has finally concluded vide its order dated 16th July, 2019 holding the removal order as bad in law and has reached to the conclusion that there was no evidence prima facie to hold the charges proved as against the concerned workman. 3. Learned counsel submits that once the enquiry was declared fair, only aspect required for the Tribunal to see whether there was evidence to prove the charges. 4. I have considered the submissions and perused the impugned order dated 16th July, 2019. 5. This court finds that the learned Tribunal has highlighted the established legal proposition that in cases relating to application moved u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act, it is required firstly to examine whether enquiry was fair and secondly it has to see whether prima facie charges are proved against the concerned workman on the basis of evidence as recorded in the enquiry and if both the conditions are fulfilled, the order need not be interfered with. 6. The Tribunal has although held the enquiry to be fair and in accordance with the principles of the natural justice that is to say that opportunity was duly given to the concerned workman in the enquiry, it further examined the second aspect and found that the evidence which has been relied upon to hold the workman guilty of the charges of driving vehicle with fast speed and negligently causing accident, resulting in injury on lady, was hearsay evidence. No eye witness was produced in the enquiry and both the witnesses namely - RD Sharma & Dayal Singh have given their statements based on police record and information received from the Depot. The Tribunal has also taken pains in examining statement of the workman who has nowhere admitted to have been driving vehicle with fast speed or negligence. No eye witness was produced in the enquiry and both the witnesses namely - RD Sharma & Dayal Singh have given their statements based on police record and information received from the Depot. The Tribunal has also taken pains in examining statement of the workman who has nowhere admitted to have been driving vehicle with fast speed or negligence. It is also noticed that in the criminal case registered on the basis of the FIR, he has been acquitted and version given by the workman driver that someone pelted stone on the vehicle which resulted in cracking of rear glass of the bus and he also received injury. Keeping all the aforesaid aspects and taking into consideration the acquittal of the workman in criminal case, the Tribunal has reached to the conclusion that prima facie there was no evidence to hold the petitioner guilty of the charges and has therefore set aside the order of removal and disapproved the said order. 7. In the opinion of this court, such an approach adopted by the Tribunal is in consonance with the law as settled by the Supreme Court. In the case of Roop Singh Neai Vs. Punjab National Bank reported in 2009(2) SCC 570 , the Supreme Court held as under:- "Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof." 8. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof." 8. Prima facie evidence must come on record in the departmental enquiry bringing home the charges , no eye witness was produced and the only statement recorded is based on police record which was made on the basis of filing of the criminal case wherein the petitioner-workman was already acquitted. Such an evidence in the departmental enqiury cannot be said to be admissible. Similarly, evidence of another witness based on information from the concerned Depot where the statement of the concerned workman-driver is of vehicle being damaged on account of stone pelted would not in any manner bring home the charge of speedy and negligent driving of the concerned vehicle. Assumption and presumption cannot substitute evidence. This is a case of no evidence. 9. The Labour Court has thus rightly reached to the conclusion and no interference is warranted in such circumstances. This court also notices that this writ petition has been filed relating to an order passed in the year 2019 in 2021 without giving any explanation. 10. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.