ORDER : 1. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench (for short “the Tribunal”) on 23.1.2020, whereby it dismissed the Original Application filed by the petitioner (O.A. No. 63/363/2018) for grant of compassionate appointment, on the basis of limitation, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition. 2. The father of the petitioner was working as Audit Officer in the office of Auditor General (Audit) and had rendered 28 years of service when he unfortunately died on 13.9.2012 leaving behind his widow and two children. The petitioner submitted written request for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate basis along with affidavit dated 19.8.2013. His case was considered by the competent Committee constituted for this purpose in its meeting held on 4.9.2013 but was rejected on the ground that he had secured less marks than the candidate who had been offered appointment. The petitioner was duly informed about this decision vide communication dated 11.9.2013 through registered AD letter. 3. Petitioner contended that such letter was never received by him so as to afford him cause of action for filing the Original Application before the Tribunal. However, the learned Tribunal rejected the Original Application by recording the following reasons: “6. It is not in dispute that the case of the applicant was considered in the meeting held on 4.9.2013 and it was not found deserving as he secured less marks than the candidate to whom appointment was offered and decision was duly conveyed to him vide order dated 11.9.2013. The applicant did not challenge that decision and filed a belated representation which has been rejected vide order dated 12.4.2017. Perusal of the pleadings makes it clear that applicant has not given any reasons as to why after rejection order dated 11.9.2013, he had not approached Court of law. It cannot be believed that he was not aware of this fact because once he had moved an application for appointment on compassionate grounds, then he cannot be expected to remain mum and will not approach respondents to know law is no excuse. This has so been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court recently in the case of Prahald Pant vs. AIIMS, 2020 (1) SLR 431 (Para 43) where the Lordships have held that “Law of limitation is founded on public policy. The object of Limitation is to put a quietus on stale and dead disputes. This has so been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court recently in the case of Prahald Pant vs. AIIMS, 2020 (1) SLR 431 (Para 43) where the Lordships have held that “Law of limitation is founded on public policy. The object of Limitation is to put a quietus on stale and dead disputes. A person ought not to be allowed to agitate his claim after long delay.” 4. It is vehemently contended by Mr. Romesh Verma, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the findings recorded by the Tribunal are totally perverse as there is no material on record to suggest that the order dated 11.9.2013 had ever been communicated to the petitioner. 5. This contention has been raised simply to be rejected as the respondents have placed on record despatch receipt showing despatch of said communication and postal receipt of registered AD to the petitioner on 11.9.2013. 6. Under Section 114 III. (f) read with Section 16 of the Evidence Act, 1872, a presumption can be drawn regarding service of notice and since notice in this case has been sent through registered post, the presumption of truth would apply through greater force as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samittri Devi and Another vs. Sampuran Singh and Another, (2011) 3 SCC 556 . 7. Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 provides of limitation and reads as under: “21. Limitation: (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application: (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made. (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where: (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates. (b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.” 8. While considering the aforesaid provision the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.C.S. Negi vs. Union of India and Others, (2018) 16 SCC 721 has held that the Tribunal cannot admit an application unless the same is made within the specified period or the order is passed in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 21 for entertaining the application after the prescribed period of limitation. It was further held that since Section 21(1) is couched in negative form, therefore, it is the duty of the Tribunal to first consider the issue of limitation and only thereafter admit the same if found to have been made within the prescribed period of limitation or sufficient cause is shown for not doing so or order is passed under Order 21(3). It is apt to reproduce the relevant observations as made in paragraphs 13 and 14 which read as under: “13. It is apt to reproduce the relevant observations as made in paragraphs 13 and 14 which read as under: “13. A reading of the plain language of the above reproduced section makes it clear that the Tribunal cannot admit an application unless the same is made within the time specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) or Section 21(2) or an order is passed in terms of sub-section (3) for entertaining the application after the prescribed period. Since Section 21(1) is couched in negative form, it is the duty of the Tribunal to first consider whether the application is within limitation. An application can be admitted only if the same is found to have been made within the prescribed period or sufficient cause is shown for not doing so within the prescribed period and an order is passed under Section 21(3). 14. In the present case, the Tribunal entertained and decided the application without even adverting to the issue of limitation. The learned counsel for the petitioner tried to explain this omission by pointing out that in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents, no such objection was raised but we have not felt impressed. In our view, the Tribunal cannot abdicate its duty to act in accordance with the statute under which it is established and the fact that an objection of limitation is not raised by the respondent/non-applicant is not at all relevant.” 9. Adverting to the facts, it would be noticed that the petitioner approached the Tribunal only in the year 2018, whereas his case had already been rejected by the Committee constituted by the respondents in its meeting held on 4.9.2013 as communicated to the petitioner vide order dated 11.9.2013. 10. Mr. Romesh Verma, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that since the petitioner was a poor person, therefore, the provisions of limitation ought to be construed liberally. However, we find no merit in this submission. 11. Limitation laws by its very nature are technical laws and must be construed as such. These by definition are harsh laws and it would be a mistake to look for ethical principles in such laws. However, we find no merit in this submission. 11. Limitation laws by its very nature are technical laws and must be construed as such. These by definition are harsh laws and it would be a mistake to look for ethical principles in such laws. When Courts come to the conclusion that Legislature clearly intends that application shall be barred by particular time, the Court must give effect to such provisions, irrespective of the way the parties are placed vis-a-vis on the merits of the case and what ever is the fallout in terms of the hardship to the looser. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Tribunal in the instant writ petition and, therefore, the same is accordingly dismissed. 13. Petition stands disposed of accordingly, so also the pending applications, if any.