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2021 DIGILAW 992 (JHR)

State of Jharkhand v. Aasha Devi

2021-12-03

RAJESH SHANKAR

body2021
JUDGMENT : RAJESH SHANKAR, J. 1. The case is taken up through Video Conferencing. 2. The present civil review petition has been preferred for review of the order/judgment dated 26.11.2020 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 2293 of 2019 whereby the said writ petition has been disposed of with a direction to the Sub-Registrar, Lohardaga (the petitioner No. 2) to register the sale-deed of the land in question presented by the respondents. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioner No. 2 vide order dated 10.05.2018, refused to register the sale-deed executed by the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 in favour of the respondent No. 1 in respect of the land appertaining to Khata No. 57, Plot No. 1042, corresponding to new Survey Khata No. 126, Plot No. 1236, Village-Harmu, P.S-Lohardaga, District-Lohardaga, measuring an area of 05 Decimals. Thereafter, the respondent No. 2 preferred a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 4129 of 2018 before this Court which was disposed of vide order dated 28.08.2018 with a liberty to him to prefer an appeal under Section 72 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1 the purchaser of the aforesaid land preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga being Misc. Appeal No. 04 of 2018-19 which was dismissed vide order dated 22.02.2019. The sole ground for dismissal of the said appeal was that the said land was acquired by the government for public purposes by way of Gazette Notification of Ranchi district dated 20.03.1993 issued in pursuance of the order dated 16.03.1993 passed by the Additional Collector, Lohardaga in Land Ceiling Case No. 47/1973-74 under the provision of Section 15(1) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 as the said land was found beyond the ceiling limit and was thus declared to be the surplus land. However, the order dated 16.03.1993 passed by the Additional Collector, Lohardaga in Land Ceiling Case No. 47/1973-74 was challenged by the landlord-Jagniwas Sharma in Land Ceiling Appeal No. 03/1999 before the Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga, who allowed the said appeal and set aside the order of the Additional Collector, Lohardaga vide order dated 26.06.2008 holding inter-alia that the land which were donated to the family deity of the said landlord, were also included as surplus land. It was also observed by the Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga that the landlord-appellant was entitled to get exemption from the land ceiling area of total three units including himself as his two sons were major on the appointed day to decide the land ceiling area in Land Ceiling Case No. 47/1973-74. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga preferred Revision Case No. 29/2009 before the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand against the order dated 26.06.2008 passed by his predecessor in Appeal No. 03/1999. In the meantime, the respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 2293 of 2019 before this Court. During pendency of the said writ petition, the said revision filed before the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand was dismissed as not maintainable vide order dated 11.09.2019 and thereafter the said writ petition was also disposed of vide order dated 26.11.2020 quashing the order dated 10.05.2018 passed by the Sub-Registrar, Lohardaga as well as the order dated 22.02.2019 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga with further direction to the Sub-Registrar, Lohardaga to register the sale-deed of the land in question presented by the respondents. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that during pendency of the writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 2293 of 2019, the State of Jharkhand had filed the review petitions dated 05.03.2020 and 20.03.2020 through the Circle Officer, Bhandra and the Circle Officer, Lohardaga respectively for reviewing the order dated 26.06.2008 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga in Land Ceiling Appeal No. 03/1999. It is further submitted that since the fact regarding filing of the review petitions by the State before the Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga was not brought on record of W.P. (C) No. 2293 of 2019, the same could not be considered by this Court and the said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 26.11.2020 directing the Sub-Registrar, Lohardaga to register the sale-deed of the land in question. The fact of pendency of review petitions before the Deputy Commissioner, Loahardaga could not be placed by the State before this Court due to spread of Covid-19 pandemic during the said period. 5. Before appreciating the said contentions made by learned counsel for the petitioners, it would be relevant to go through the few judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with the conditions under which a review petition may be entertained. 6. 5. Before appreciating the said contentions made by learned counsel for the petitioners, it would be relevant to go through the few judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with the conditions under which a review petition may be entertained. 6. In the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma vs. Aibam Pishak Sharma and Others, (1979) 4 SCC 389 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “3........It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh vs. State of Punjab there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. In the case of Parsion Devi and Others vs. Sumitri Devi and Others, (1997) 8 SCC 715 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter-alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected.” A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.” 8. In the case of Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. vs. Mawasi and Others, (2012) 7 SCC 200 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “27. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj vs. State of Karnataka, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury vs. Sukhraj Rai and Rajunder Narain Rae vs. Bijai Govind Sing and observed: “19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury vs. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury vs. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae vs. Bijai Govind Sing that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: “.........nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in.........The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have, however, gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects, in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.” Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under: “It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.” Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order 40 had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression ‘for any other sufficient reason’ in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. The court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice.” 28. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, the three-Judge Bench referred to the provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and observed: “32.......It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words ‘any other sufficient reason’ must mean a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words ‘any other sufficient reason’ must mean a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule. (See Chhajju Ram vs. Neki) This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi vs. Parath Nath and was adopted by our Federal Court in Hari Sankar Pal vs. Anath Nath Mitter, FC at pp. 110-11. The learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that his case comes within the ground of ‘mistake or error apparent on the face of the record’ or some ground analogous thereto.” 29. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs. Govt. of A.P. another three-Judge Bench reiterated that the power of review is not analogous to the appellate power and observed: “11..........A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out.” 30. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma, this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court can review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe: “3.......But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” 32. In Parsion Devi vs. Sumitri Devi, the Court observed: “9.......An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.....A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.” 33. In Lily Thomas vs. Union of India, R.P. Sethi, J. who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J. summarised the scope of the power of review in the following words: “56......Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised.” 34. In Haridas Das vs. Usha Rani Banik, the Court observed: “13.........The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict.” 35. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict.” 35. In State of W.B. vs. Kamal Sengupta, the Court considered the question whether a Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its decision, referred to Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the judicial precedents and observed: “21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier. 22. The term ‘mistake or error apparent’ by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision.” 9. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision.” 9. It has consistently been held in the aforesaid judgments that a review petition cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.” The power of review may be exercised on discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, even after exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking review or could not be produced by him at the time when the original order was made. It may also be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found and on any such analogous ground. 10. It has been held by this Court in the judgment passed in W.P. (C) No. 2293 of 2019 that mere fact of the said land having not been de-notified, cannot be a ground to refuse the registration of the said land, particularly when the then Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga quashed the order of the Additional Collector, Lohardaga passed in Land Ceiling Case No. 47 of 1973-74 holding that the land which had been donated, also included the land of the landlord as surplus. This Court has further held that the Court of the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand, Ranchi has not interfered with the order dated 26.06.2008 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga and the respondents have not stated in the counter affidavit as to whether the order of the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand, Ranchi has been challenged in any superior Court of law. 11. Now the petitioners claim that review petitions filed by the State of Jharkhand, through the Circle Officers, Bhandra and Lohardaga for review of the order dated 26.06.2008 passed in Land Ceiling Appeal No. 03/1999 were pending before the Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga and the said fact was not brought on record of the writ petition due to spread of Covid-19 pandemic. It appears that the said review petitions were filed after inordinate delay of about 12 years. Moreover, the said fact is not a new matter, rather the petitioners due to their own laches, did not bring on record the said fact at the time of hearing of W.P. (C) No. 2293 of 2019. It cannot be said to be a sufficient ground to review the earlier order/judgment passed by this Court in the said writ petition. Moreover, the said fact is not a new matter, rather the petitioners due to their own laches, did not bring on record the said fact at the time of hearing of W.P. (C) No. 2293 of 2019. It cannot be said to be a sufficient ground to review the earlier order/judgment passed by this Court in the said writ petition. There has been no due diligence on the part of the petitioners. They have also failed to show any error apparent on the face of the record in the order/judgment dated 26.11.2020 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 2293 of 2019. Otherwise also, the Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga has not yet passed any order on the review petitions dated 05.03.2020 and 20.03.2020 filed by the State, through the Circle Officer, Bhandra and the Circle Officer, Lohardaga (if at all the same is permissible under law). 12. The petitioners having not made out any case for review of the order/judgment dated 26.11.2020 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 2293/2019, the present review petition is accordingly dismissed.