JUDGMENT : 1. The essential question raised in these writ petitions is with regard to the issuance of death certificates where a person is missing and has not been heard of for more than seven years. 2. W.P.(C) No.12086 of 2021 is filed seeking directions to the respondents to issue a death certificate in respect of Sri. K.T. Augustine to the petitioner, considering the date of death as 24.7.2003. Challenge is also raised as against Exhibit P9 reply of the 4th respondent informing the petitioner that the application submitted by the petitioner has been sent for clarification to the Chief Registrar. The 1st petitioner, who was the wife of Sri. K.T. Augustine, has passed away during the course of the writ petition and has been deleted from the party array. The 2nd petitioner is the son of Sri. K.T. Augustine. It is stated that Sri. K.T. Augustine is missing from 24.7.2003. 3. W.P.(C) No.4159 of 2021 is filed seeking directions to the 2nd respondent to issue death certificate to the petitioner in respect of his father Sri. P.I. George. 4. In both these writ petitions it is submitted that after the concerned persons had gone missing, FIR had been registered in the concerned police stations and efforts had been made to trace the missing persons, but to no avail. 5. I have heard Sri. Prasanth S and Sri. V. Philip Mathews, the learned counsel for the petitioners appearing in these cases, Sri. K. Janardhana Shenoy and Sri. S. Harikrishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the concerned local authorities and Smt. Surya Binoy B., the learned Government Pleader. 6. In W.P.(C) No.12086 of 2021, when the amounts due under an insurance policy were not disbursed to the petitioners, they had filed W.P.(C) No.19824 of 2012 and this Court, by Exhibit P5 judgment, held that the presumption of death can safely be drawn under Section 108 of the Evidence Act and therefore directed the Insurance Company to pay the policy amount to the petitioners. By Exhibit P6 order, it was clarified that 24.7.2003 is to be presumed as the date of death. It is submitted that it was thereafter that the petitioner has submitted Exhibit P7 application for death certificate appending the judgment, which has not been considered by the 4th respondent. By Exhibit P6 order, it was clarified that 24.7.2003 is to be presumed as the date of death. It is submitted that it was thereafter that the petitioner has submitted Exhibit P7 application for death certificate appending the judgment, which has not been considered by the 4th respondent. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in view of the clear findings in Exhibit P5 judgment of this Court, the respondents are duty bound to take note of Exhibit P7 application and to issue a death certificate showing the date of death as 24.7.2003. 7. In W.P.(C).No.4159 of 2021, the petitioner and his mother filed O.S.No.298 of 2014 before the Munsiff Court, Chengannur seeking a declaration that the petitioner's father is to be presumed dead and seeking partition of the properties belonging to him. The Munsiff Court, Chengannur by Exhibit P2 judgment and decree dated 28.5.2015 decreed the suit in part allowing the prayer of partition. However, the relief of declaration was declined. It is submitted that thereafter an application for death certificate was submitted, which has not been acted upon even in the light of Exhibit P2 judgment. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.4159 of 2021 rely on the decisions of this Court in Union of India v. Gangadharan [ 2020 (2) KLT 207 ] and Mariamma Samuel v. State of Kerala [ 2013 (2) KLT 418 ]. It is contended that since competent courts of law have already held that the missing persons are no longer alive and have granted reliefs amounting to declaration, taking note of the fact of their death, the respondents are also duty bound to act upon the said declarations and to issue a death certificate in the light of such declaration. 9. A statement has been filed by respondents 1, 3 and 4 in W.P. (C).No. 12086 of 2021. It is contended therein that the finding in Exhibit P5 judgment does not bind the said respondents and that for the registration of death of a missing person, after 7 years, a specific direction of the court is required. It is contended by the learned counsel that a declaration from a competent civil court with regard to the death is a prerequisite and that no death certificate can be issued in the absence of the same. 10. It is contended by the learned counsel that a declaration from a competent civil court with regard to the death is a prerequisite and that no death certificate can be issued in the absence of the same. 10. In W.P.(C) No.4159 of 2021 also, a statement has been placed on record by respondents 2 and 3. It is stated that Exhibit P1 FIR has been registered with regard to the missing of Sr. P.I. George from 10.3.2007. It is stated that no record of death of the person exists and unless information as to death is received, a certificate of death cannot be issued under the Kerala Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, 1999. It is submitted that all that can be issued is a Non-Availability Certificate in Form 10 in terms of Rule 13(3) of the Rules upon an application for the same. It is stated that the petitioner has produced Exhibit P2 ex parte judgment passed in a suit for declaration and partition filed by the petitioner and his mother. The sole defendant in the suit is the daughter of Sri. P.I. George and that the declaratory relief was declined and a preliminary decree for partition was passed for partition of the property into three equal shares. It is stated that it was specifically found that a declaration, even if granted, would bind no one other than the parties to the suit and that therefore a declaration is not liable to be granted in the case on hand. It is stated that Section 35 of the Specific Relief Act mandates that a declaration is binding only on the parties to the suit and that it will not bind the Municipality. The learned counsel also places reliance on the decisions of this Court in Devaki Amma Kamalamma and Another v. Grace Appi Amma and others ( 2017 (3) KHC 12 ] and Joseph Peter and others v. Elizabeth Manuel and others [2019 (3) KLT SN 17]. 11. I have considered the contentions advanced on all sides. It is not in dispute before me that the persons in respect of whom the death certificate are sought for have been missing since 2003 and 2007 respectively and FIRs have been registered and the persons have not been traced or heard of. 11. I have considered the contentions advanced on all sides. It is not in dispute before me that the persons in respect of whom the death certificate are sought for have been missing since 2003 and 2007 respectively and FIRs have been registered and the persons have not been traced or heard of. Reliance is placed on judgments which are produced along with the writ petitions to contend that the factum of death of the concerned persons stands accepted by courts of law. The question, therefore, would be with regard to the effect of such judgments. 12. Section 107 and 108 of the Indian Evidence Act read as follows:- “107. Burden of proving death of person known to have been alive within thirty years.—When the question is whether a man is alive or dead, and it is shown that he was alive within thirty years, the burden of proving that he is dead is on the person who affirms it. 108. Burden of proving that person is alive who has not been heard of for seven years.—1[Provided that when] the question is whether a man is alive or dead, and it is proved that he has not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard of him if he had been alive, the burden of proving that he is alive is [shifted to] the person who affirms it.” 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 4159/2021 relies on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Mariamma Samuel v. State of Kerala [ 2013 (2) KLT 418 ]. The question there was with regard to the grant of interest on delayed payment of family pension in respect of a person, who was reportedly missing and was not heard of for more than seven years. After the statutory period, the wife filed applications for retiral benefits and family pension. The prayer for grant of retiral benefits was allowed, but the claim for interest was rejected by the learned single Judge. The Division Bench held that after a person is not heard of for seven years by those who naturally would have heard of him, there is a presumption of civil death that relates back to the date when he went missing. The Division Bench held that after a person is not heard of for seven years by those who naturally would have heard of him, there is a presumption of civil death that relates back to the date when he went missing. In view of the fact that the grant of retirement benefits was not challenged and considering the delay in granting the benefits after the writ petitioner approached the court in March, 2020, interest @ 9% was granted from the date when the petitioner approached the court till the date of payment of the benefits. 14. The decision in Syamala v. LIC of India [2011 (1) KLT SN 25] is with regard to the evidenciary value of a certificate of death issued by the Department of Maritime Administration of Bermuda Government under provisions of Merchant Shipping (Returns of Births and Deaths) Regulation 1980. This court held that such a certificate can be treated as a certificate of death and a nominee need not wait for a court decree after a period of seven years where such a certificate is available. 15. A Division Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 25.5.2021 in OP(CAT) No.210 of 2017, after elaborately considering the law on the point, held as follows:- “35. The statutory Tribunals are clothed with power of adjudication of disputed questions. However the nature of such adjudication by those authorities is generally summary in nature and is circumscribed by the limit of statutory frame work for which those authorities are created by the statute concerned. The Civil Court on the other hand can decide factual questions as discussed above conclusively and such determination by those courts unless modified or nullified, would bind the parties finally. Every provision in the Code of Civil Procedure is moulded in such a way as to make the determination of factual questions by the Civil Courts so elaborate and conclusive and not capable of being vexed again by any of the parties. In the scheme of the Code such decisions impliedly carry even a declaration as to the legal character of the right or liability or the estate in question. 36. While exercising the writ jurisdiction the constitutional courts are never expected to undertake such arduous task of sifting of the evidence relating to the questions posed above. 37. In the scheme of the Code such decisions impliedly carry even a declaration as to the legal character of the right or liability or the estate in question. 36. While exercising the writ jurisdiction the constitutional courts are never expected to undertake such arduous task of sifting of the evidence relating to the questions posed above. 37. In a proceeding instituted under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India this Court has intrinsic limitations in resolving the issues relevant in the facts and circumstance of this case. 38. We are of the view that this Court cannot allow its constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes for which remedies under the civil law are available.” 16. In Devaki Amma Kamalamma and Another v. Grace Appi Amma and others ( 2017 (3) KHC 12 ], this Court held as follows:- “It is trite that no presumption as to the date or time of death is available. Whether a person is alive or dead should be a question arising in a suit or proceeding and then only the said provisions would operate. In other words, a presumption being not evidence in itself and only a rule concerning evidence, it can be put forward only in a property instituted suit or proceeding.” 17. In Bhargavi Amma v. Bhaskara Pillai (1988 KHC 496], this Court held as follows:- “8. Basing on the decision in Velayudhan Sarojini v. Sankaranarayanan Sivanandan ( 1956 KLT 126 ), I was told by this counsel for the appellant that it is erroneous to apply S.107 and 108 to the same case because the court cannot have at the same time two diametrically opposite presumptions of life and death. That was an instance in which the case was referred to a third Judge when the Division Bench differed. Applicability or inapplicability of both the presumptions in the same case was not a question considered or opinion expressed by the Division Bench as it was unnecessary. Therefore the opinion by the third Judge on a point which was not necessary cannot be opinion of the Bench and it is obiter also. Applicability or inapplicability of the presumptions of both the sections can arise in the same case without any illegality. Therefore the opinion by the third Judge on a point which was not necessary cannot be opinion of the Bench and it is obiter also. Applicability or inapplicability of the presumptions of both the sections can arise in the same case without any illegality. In the same case itself one party can make a claim by alleging and establishing the presumption under S.107 and the opposite party can rebut the same by establishing the presumption under S.108 and the first party can rebut the presumption under S.108 by again proving the factum of the person actually living within the said period of seven years. Burden of proof according to law under S.101 of the Evidence Act alone will be static. Onus of proof according to adducing evidence under S.102 will always shift on the initial discharge of burden. When one party successfully discharges the initial burden under S.107 it is shifted to the opposite side to prove death. When that party successfully discharges the burden under S.108, the onus of proving life is again shifted back to the first party. In that case the real dispute was not the presumption of life or death under S.107 and 108, but the question was whether on three specified dates the presumption of life or death could be applied without specific proof by the party so asserting. 9. The effect of the two sections is only this. When the question is whether a man is alive or dead, there will be the presumption of continuance of life for thirty years from the date on which he is proved to be alive and there will be a presumption of death at the time when the question is raised if it is established that he was not heard of for the preceding seven years. Life or death on a particular date is not the presumption of these sections. That is a matter for proof by the party who is bound to fail if it is not proved. Presumption of death under S.108 does not import any presumption that he died on a particular day. That presumption will apply only as on the date on which the question is raised before court. That is a matter for proof by the party who is bound to fail if it is not proved. Presumption of death under S.108 does not import any presumption that he died on a particular day. That presumption will apply only as on the date on which the question is raised before court. Likewise no presumption can arise under S.107 that a man who must be presumed to have died on the date of suit under S.108 was alive on a particular day within the seven years under S.108 simply because that day comes within the period of thirty years from the date of proof of life under S.107. When the question is one of living or dead, the presumption under either section could only be on the date of suit or on the date on which the question was raised and not on any particular previous day. Of course when the burden of proving the presumption under S.107 is discharged and the Opposite party to whom the burden of proving death shifted has not discharged the same under S.108 or otherwise, the presumption of life will be there. When a party's case depends on establishing that a given person who is presumed to be dead was alive or dead on a particular day or time within the 7 years period under S.108 success or failure will depend upon whether the party succeeded in proving the date or time of death. The effect of S.107 is only that when it is shown that a person was alive within 30 years, the burden of proving that he is dead is on the person who affirms it. That presumption has to be controverted by the counter presumption under S.108 or actual death on a particular date or time. The principle behind S.107 is the legal presumption of continuance of state of things proved to exist. 10. Both the presumptions under S.107 and 108 are only rebuttable. These two sections only deal with burden of proof and the consequent presumptions arising out of the discharge of that burden which the opposite party is free to rebut by adducing satisfactory evidence. 10. Both the presumptions under S.107 and 108 are only rebuttable. These two sections only deal with burden of proof and the consequent presumptions arising out of the discharge of that burden which the opposite party is free to rebut by adducing satisfactory evidence. Anyhow, the presumption under S.108 regarding death could only be as on the date of suit in the absence of evidence regarding death on any particular date (See Velayudhan Sarojini v. Sankaranarayanan Sivanandan 1956 KLT 126 Saraswati Goswami and others v. General Manager N. P Railway AIR 1976 Gauhati 15 and Surjit Kaur v. Jhujhar Singh AIR 1980 Punjab & Haryana 274). The decision of the present case does not depend upon the life or death on any previous day. When the presumption of death as on the date of suit is established under S.108, it was for the defendant to adduce positive evidence to prove that they are alive. Both presumptions under S.107 and 108 come into play only after the suit is instituted though the presumption of life under S.107 prevails until dispensed by the proof of actual death or proof of facts raising the presumption of death. In the latter case presumption of death prevails till actual existence of life is proved. These two sections actually do not prove life or death or their existence or happening on any particular day. They only raise presumptions either way for the purpose of shifting burden to deal with the procedure to be followed. In this case the presumption established under S.108 is not rebutted by the defendant and hence in spite of the absence of proof regarding the factum of actual death or the dates of death, there is presumption under S.108 that as on the date of suit both of them were dead or not alive. If so the decree has only to stand. The second appeal is dismissed with costs.” 18. In LIC of India v. Anuradha [ 2004 (2) KLT 351 (SC), the Apex Court considered the provisions of Sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act. Relying on the precedents on the point the Apex Court held that the legal presumption under Section 108 of the Act is with regard to death of the person and not as to the time and place of such death. Relying on the precedents on the point the Apex Court held that the legal presumption under Section 108 of the Act is with regard to death of the person and not as to the time and place of such death. The presumption raised under Section 108 was held to be confined only to presuming the factum of death of the persons whose life or death is an issue, after the lapse of seven years. It was further held that the occasion for raising the presumption would arise only when the question is raised in a court, tribunal or before an authority who is called upon to decide as to whether a person is alive or dead. So long as the dispute is not raised before any Forum or any legal proceeding, the occasion for raising the presumption does not arise. It was further held that the issue as to date or time of death shall have to be determined on evidence and the burden would lie on the person who makes assertion of death having taken place at a given date or time. 19. In Joseph Peter and others v. Elizabeth Manuel and others [2019 (3) KLT SN 17], it was held that presumption of death of a person who is unheard for for more than 7 years is a rebuttable presumption and has to be decided on evidence. It was held that it is not a question which can be decided in execution of a decree for partition. 20. In the instant cases, the judgments relied on are one rendered by this Court while considering the question of payment of amounts under an LIC policy and another in a suit for partition. With regard to the suit for partition, the evidenciary value of the judgment is to be considered in the light of Sections 41 to 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 21. Section 41 of the Act specifically provides for the evidenciary value of such judgments and reads as follows:- “41. With regard to the suit for partition, the evidenciary value of the judgment is to be considered in the light of Sections 41 to 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 21. Section 41 of the Act specifically provides for the evidenciary value of such judgments and reads as follows:- “41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction.—A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant. Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof— that any legal character, which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation; that any legal character, to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time when such judgment, [order or decree] declares it to have accrued to that person; that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, [order or decree] declared that it had ceased or should cease; [order or decree] declared that it had ceased or should cease;" and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, [order or decree] declares that it had been or should be his property.” 22. Section 42 and 43 of the Indian Evidence Act read as follows:- “42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in Section 41.—Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in Section 41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state. 43. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in Section 41.—Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in Section 41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state. 43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in Sections 40 to 42, when relevant.—Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provisions of this Act. 23. It is therefore clear that judgments in rem like judgments passed in probate, insolvency, matrimonial or guardianship or other similar proceedings is admissible in all cases whether such judgments are inter partes or not. However, for the judgments to be considered to be judgments in rem. There must be an adjudication of status, which is conclusive against all the world. 24. Section 35 of the Specific Relief Act provides that a declaration made under Chapter VI (declaratory decree) in binding only on the parties to the suit and persons claiming through them. It is also worth noting that the provisions of the Registration of Births and Deaths Rules as well as the circulars issued by the Director of Panchayats clarify the procedure to be adopted for registration of deaths and specifically states that there has to be a declaration obtained from a competent court with regard to the death of a person. It is stated that if the judgment granting the declaratory relief does not specify the date of death, then the date when the petitioner approaches the court should be reckoned as the date of death. 25. Section 13(3) of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 reads as follows:- “13. Delayed registration of births and deaths – xxxx (3) Any birth or death which has not been registered within one year of its occurrence, shall be registered only on an order made by a Magistrate of the first class or a Presidency Magistrate after verifying the correctness of the birth or death and on payment of the prescribed fee.” 26. The Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, Kerala, 1999 does not provide for the issuance of a death certificate in respect of a missing person. The Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, Kerala, 1999 does not provide for the issuance of a death certificate in respect of a missing person. Moreover, a death certificate is to be issued in a prescribed form which has to contain the date and place of death. Rule 13 provides for issuance of a 'non-availability certificate' where the birth or death is not found registered. 27. Though the provisions of Section 41 to 44 of the Evidence Act are not specifically applicable to judgment of this Court, which is a court of record which has the power to punish for contempt of its directions, I see from the judgment produced that there is no binding declaration contained in the judgment. 28. The relevant portions of Exhibit P5 judgment in W.P.(C) No.12086/2021 reads as follows:- 9. Herein, the date from which Sri. Augustine was missing, going by the averments in the writ petition is 24.7.2003. Even if there is a mistake in the date as 24.7.2001, seven years have gone already. Therefore, as presumption about death can be drawn safely. 10. Learned standing counsel for the Corporation, Sri. Easwaran submits that the Corporation is not empowered to grant a declaration and hence, the claim was not finalised. 11. In the light of the above the claim for disbursement of amounts under the LIC policy bearing No.773248142 taken by Sri. K.T. Augustine, will be processed and the eligible amounts will be disbursed to the petitioners within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. Since the petitioners have raised a claim as per Ext.P5 dated 24.9.2010 and as the policy has been kept alive by payment of premiums, the claim will be adjudicated on that basis and the premiums paid thereafter will be refunded.” 29. The principle enunciated in the provisions of the Evidence Act, the Specific Relief Act and the precedents relied on would make it clear that the judgment is one rendered in the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the pleadings of the parties on record. As such, the contention that the date of missing should be assumed as the date of death and a death certificate issued accordingly, cannot be accepted. 30. As such, the contention that the date of missing should be assumed as the date of death and a death certificate issued accordingly, cannot be accepted. 30. It is worthwhile to note that though a declaratory relief has been sought for in the partition suit, such relief was specifically declined by the court. In any view of the matter, in view of the specific provisions of the Evidence Act, Exhibits P2 in W.P.(C) No.4159/2021 cannot be treated as a judgment in rem so as to confer the benefit of presumption as to the death or the date of death for the purpose of issuance of a death certificate by the Municipality which is admittedly not a party to the suit. 31. In the above view of the matter, the contention raised by the petitioners that the judgments relied on by them are declaratory judgments as to the death and the date of death of the missing persons cannot be accepted. Those judgments cannot have binding effect on the Municipality/Municipal Corporation in question and cannot have the effect of a declaratory judgment as against them for the purpose of issuing a certificate of death. In the above view of the matter, the prayers sought for in these writ petitions cannot be granted. Writ petitions fail and the same are accordingly dismissed. This will not prejudice the contentions of the parties or the rights of the petitioners in moving the appropriate Fora with proper parties for proper reliefs.