Nathabhai Naranbhai Kodiyatar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited
2021-10-27
NIKHIL S.KARIEL
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. Heard learned Advocate Ms. Dimple Thaker on behalf of the petitioner and learned Advocate Shri Dipak Dave on behalf of the respondents- Company. 2. By way of this petition the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: “11A. That this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to admit this petition. 11AA. That the Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue writ or directions quashing and setting aside the circular dated 16.11.1999 passed by the Respondent Company and be pleased to declare the said circular as illegal, arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice. 11B.That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue writ or directions quashing and setting aside the order dated 19.06.2019 and 17.08.2020 passed by the Respondent No.1 rejecting the request of the petitioner for changing the date of birth in the service record and that the Hon’ble Court be pleased to direct the Respondent Company to change the date of birth of the petitioner in the service record to 21.10.1963 and restrain the respondents from taking coercive action against the petitioner in any manner;” 3. Learned Advocate Ms. Thaker on behalf of the petitioner submits that the petitioner had joined employment with the respondent-Company as Helper at Talala office Sub Division in the Veraval Division on 20.03.1987. The post is now termed as ‘Electrical Assistant”. At the time of joining of the employment the date of birth as recorded in the service book of the petitioner was 21.10.1961 which was based on the School Leaving Certificate of one Coronation High School which was submitted as documentary proof. 4. It is stated by the learned Advocate that originally an application for change in date of birth in the service book was being considered in the respondent organization on the basis of Service Registration No. 18 which was published vide Establishment Circular No. 03.12.1998 which inter alia permitted the employee to request for correction of date of birth in the service record with satisfactory proof and documentary evidence upto the time when the employee completed 50 years of age. Learned Advocate has submitted that vide Circular dated 16.11.1999 the S.R. had been revised and whereas application for correction was permissible only upto the time when the employee had completed two years in the service.
Learned Advocate has submitted that vide Circular dated 16.11.1999 the S.R. had been revised and whereas application for correction was permissible only upto the time when the employee had completed two years in the service. Learned Advocate would submit in this context that while the petitioner was in employment, services of the petitioner came to be terminated vide an order dated 06.06.1998 and whereas the same had been challenged by the petitioner before learned Labour Court and whereas vide an award dated 17.03.2016 the learned Labour Court had been pleased to reinstate the present petitioner of service with continuity but without backwages. The petitioner had been reinstated immediately thereafter. Learned Advocate submits that when the petitioner was due for promotion the year 2017, various documents had been sought for and whereas it was at that time that the petitioner realized the date of birth as mentioned in the School Leaving Certificate issued by the Coronation High School as 21.10.1961 and whereas since the same was erroneous the petitioner had inquired as regards the same and had found out that since the school in which the petitioner had studied had mentioned wrong date of birth in the School Leaving Certificate, therefore, the same came to be entered into service record. According to the petitioner the petitioner had initially studied in one Limbda Pay Centre School governed by District Panchayat, Junagadh where the date of birth as recorded of the petitioner was 21.10.1963. Learned Advocate further submits that the petitioner had thereafter studied in Vivekanand Vidhya Mandir, Mangrole and it appears that for the first time the date of birth is incorrectly mentioned as 21.10.1961 and since the petitioner had left that school to join Coronation High School the same date had been mentioned by the Coronation High School. Learned Advocate submits that the petitioner had approached the Vivekanand Vidya Mandir as well as Limbda Pay Centre School to correct the date of birth of the petitioner in their records which had been done by the said school. Learned Advocate further submits that the petitioner had even sought for copy of birth certificate in the year 2018 and whereas according to the birth certificate the date of birth of the petitioner was 21.10.1963.
Learned Advocate further submits that the petitioner had even sought for copy of birth certificate in the year 2018 and whereas according to the birth certificate the date of birth of the petitioner was 21.10.1963. Learned Advocate would submit that the petitioner had thereafter made representations to the concerned authority for correction in date of birth and whereas vide an order dated 19.03.2019, the Superintending Engineer had been pleased to inform the Executive Engineer, under whom the petitioner was working above application of the petitioner being received after two years of service as per Circular dated 16.11.1999 and therefore the request was rejected. It appears that while the said communication does not refer to date of representation made by the petitioner but from the perusal of second request by the petitioner to the In-charge General Manager ( H.R.) of the respondent- Company dated 30.05.2020, it appears that the first application of the petitioner for requesting correction in date of birth was on 28.02.2019, thus the order dated 19.03.2019 appears to be issued in the context of representation dated 28.02.2019. It is further submitted by learned Advocate Ms.Thaker that a subsequent request of the petitioner dated 30.05.2020 had been rejected vide order dated 01.06.2019 by reaffirming the stand taken by the Department vide an order dated 19.03.2019. It appears that the petitioner had submitted representations even thereafter and whereas vide communication dated 17.08.2020 the petitioner was informed about the decision to reject the request having already been taken and communicated to the petitioner and therefore the petitioner was asked not to make any further representation on the same subject. The communication dated 01.06.2019 and 17.08.2020 are under challenge before this Court. 5. It appears that the petitioner has also challenged the Circular dated 16.11.1999 with regard to revised Service Registration No. 18 but as such there are no grounds raised in the petition or no submission advanced before this Court for substantiating such challenge. 5.1 Learned Advocate Ms. Thaker would submit that since the petitioner was not in the service from 06.06.1998 to 07.03.2016 he had no knowledge of revision in the policy of the respondent as records change in date of birth and upon his reinstatement in the service in the year 2016 the petitioner had requested the authorities to correct the date of birth.
Thaker would submit that since the petitioner was not in the service from 06.06.1998 to 07.03.2016 he had no knowledge of revision in the policy of the respondent as records change in date of birth and upon his reinstatement in the service in the year 2016 the petitioner had requested the authorities to correct the date of birth. Learned Advocate would submit that since the petitioner was not well-versed with the procedure more particularly since the job of the petitioner was to climb electric poles, therefore, the case of the petitioner should be viewed sympathetically and respondents ought to be directed to consider the request of the petitioner for correction in date of birth. Learned Advocate would further submit that in any case the policy of making application after two years of joining service having been issued during period of when the petitioner was under termination therefore the period of two years should be counted from the date of reinstatement of the petitioner. Learned Advocate therefore submits that the respondents have erred in applying the revised policy of 1999 strictly, more particularly since the petitioner was not in service during such time period and hence it is requested to this Court to interfere and set aside the decision of the respondents and pass appropriate decision in favour of the petitioner. 6. As against the same learned Advocate Shri Dipak Dave for the respondents – Company has vehemently contended the petition and has submitted that while the petitioner had attempted to state that he had come to know about the error in recording his date of birth only in the year 2017 while the petitioner had collected the documents for the purpose of promotion yet as such the petitioner was aware about the same from much earlier since in the declaration form for admission to the Contributory Provident Fund of the erstwhile Gujarat Electricity Board, the date of birth of the petitioner was specifically mentioned as 21.10.1961 which certificate has been signed by the present petitioner in the month of June 1989.
Learned Advocate would further submit that even otherwise after joining service, the petitioner had requested for a certificate from the respondent for the purpose of availing personal loan and whereas in a certificate issued by the Executive Engineer, PGVCL, Mangrole dated 01.09.2016, the date of birth of the petitioner is clearly mentioned as 21.10.1961 and whereas the date of retirement of the petitioner was shown as 31.10.2021. Learned Advocate Shri Dave would submit that in any case since revised policy of the respondents requires an employee to submit a request for correction in the date of birth within a period of two years from joining service and even if the date of reinstatement of the petitioner is taken as the relevant date yet the first representation appears to have been made by the petitioner on 28.02.2019 i.e approximately three years after his reinstatement. Learned Advocate would further submit that request of the petitioner had been rejected vide communication dated 19.03.2019 yet the petitioner went on making representations and whereas the petitioner has approached this Court at the fag end of his service career for correction in his date of birth more particularly since the petitioner is scheduled to retire on 31.10.2021 as per the present date of birth whereas according to the learned Advocate Shri Dave this Court as well as the Hon’ble Apex Court have in catena of judgments very specifically held that request of the correction in the date of birth at the fag end of service career ought not to be accepted. In support of his contention learned Advocate has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India vs. C. Rama Swamy reported in 1997(4) SCC 647 . Learned Advocate has sought to rely upon paragraph no. 25 of the said judgment which is quoted as hereunder: “25. In matters relating to appointment to service various factors are taken into consideration before making a selection or an appointment. One of the relevant circumstances is the age of the person who is sought to be appointed. It may not be possible to conclusively prove that an advantage had been gained by representing a date of birth which is different than that which is later sought to be incorporated.
One of the relevant circumstances is the age of the person who is sought to be appointed. It may not be possible to conclusively prove that an advantage had been gained by representing a date of birth which is different than that which is later sought to be incorporated. But it will not be unreasonable to presume that when a candidate, at the first instance, communicates a particular date of birth there is obviously his intention that his age calculated on the basis of that date of birth should be taken into consideration but the appointing office. In fact, where maturity for a responsible office. In fact, where maturity is a relevant factor to assess suitability, an older person is ordinarily considered to be more mature and, therefore, more suitable. In such a case, it cannot be said that advantage is not obtained by a person because of an earlier date of birth, if he subsequently claims to be younger in age, after taking that advantage. In such a situation, it would be against public policy to permit such a change to enable longer benefit to the person concerned. This being so, we find it difficult to accept the broad proposition that the principle of estoppel would not apply in such where the age of a person who is sought to be appointed may be a relevant consideration to assess his suitability.” 7. Learned Advocate therefore has requested to this Court to reject the petition and not to consider the prayers made by the petitioner herein. 8. Heard learned Advocates on behalf of the parties who have not submitted any further. 9. At the outset it is required to be noted that while original policy for requesting for correction of date of birth of the respondents permitted an employee to make such application until he completed 50 years of the age. said policy vide Service Registration No. 18 came to be revised by Circular dated 16.11.1999 which inter alia require application for correction of date of birth to be made by an employee within two years of his joining service. It appears that during the time when the revision had been made in the policy, the petitioner was not in service.
said policy vide Service Registration No. 18 came to be revised by Circular dated 16.11.1999 which inter alia require application for correction of date of birth to be made by an employee within two years of his joining service. It appears that during the time when the revision had been made in the policy, the petitioner was not in service. It also requires to be appreciated that considering the date of birth of the petitioner as being in the year 1961, when the petitioner attained the age of 50 years in the year 2011, at that time also the petitioner was under order of termination. Thus it is only after the petitioner had been reinstated in the month of March 2016, that right accrued in favour of the petitioner to make an application for correction of date of birth. The revised policy prescribed the period of two years from putting entry in service and since such policy is not stated to be retrospective in nature therefore the petitioner since he was under termination when policy had been revised could have made an application for correction of date of birth within a period of two years form the date of reinstatement. It appears that for the first time the petitioner had made a representation /application for correcting the date of birth on 28.02.2019 at this stage it would be pertinent to mention that in the pleadings though it is mentioned that petitioner had made several representations before the authority since 2017 and whereas copy of representation is annexed at Annexure F which is representation of the petitioner dated 28.02.2019, referred to hereinabove. Furthermore, perusal of the documents annexed with the petition as well as reading of representation dated 28.02.2019, does not reveal any representation being made by the petitioner before 28.02.2019. Thus the first representation made by the petitioner was approximately 11 months after the period of two years was over. It further appears on the record that the said request had been rejected by the concerned authorities on 19.03.2019. It also appears that the petitioner had continued to make representations and whereas vide communicate dated 01.06.2019 and 17.08.20220 the requests of the petitioner were rejected more particularly relying upon the original order of the rejection dated 19.03.2019. 10.
It further appears on the record that the said request had been rejected by the concerned authorities on 19.03.2019. It also appears that the petitioner had continued to make representations and whereas vide communicate dated 01.06.2019 and 17.08.20220 the requests of the petitioner were rejected more particularly relying upon the original order of the rejection dated 19.03.2019. 10. The law as regards strict adherence to the specified time limit prescribed in relevant rules is set out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various decision and whereas in decision in case of State of Haryana vs. Satish Kumar Mittal and another reported in 2010 (9) SCC 337 the said aspect had been reiterated. Relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are quoted hereinbelow for benefit: “13. Thus, as seen from the above position, the relevant rule always required an application for correction of date of birth to be submitted within two years from joining the service. The amended rule of 20.12.2000 made a slight modification that application filed after two years could be considered which will be only on the recommendation of the Administrative Department. This provision has now been removed after the rule was amended on 13.8.2001. 14. The import of such a provision has been clarified by this court from time to time. Thus, in paragraph 7 of the Home Department vs. R.Kirubakaran this Court held as follows: “7. An application for correction of the date of birth should not be dealt with by the tribunal or the High Court keeping in view only the public servant concerned. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotions for ever. Cases are not unknown when a person accepts appointment keeping in view the date of retirement of his immediate senior.
Cases are not unknown when a person accepts appointment keeping in view the date of retirement of his immediate senior. According to us, this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the court or the tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case, on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. If no rule or order has been framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application has to be filed, then such application must be filed within the time, which can be held to be reasonable." The Court has, thereafter stated that burden in such cases lies on the applicant and noted that in many of such cases, the employees approach the Court on the eve of retirement. The Courts and Tribunals must be slow in granting any interim relief in such cases. The same principle has been reiterated in State of UP vs. Gulaichi [ 2003 (6) SCC 483 ]; State of Punjab vs. S C Chadha [ 2004 (3) SCC 394 ]; and State of Gujarat vs. Vali Mohmed Dosabhai Sindhi [ 2006 (6) SCC 537 ]. 15. As recorded above, it has been held time and again that the application for correction of date of birth is also to be looked into from the point of view of the concerned department and the employees engaged therein. The other employees have expectations of promotion based on seniority and suddenly if such change is permitted; it causes prejudice and disturbance in the working of the department. It is, therefore, quite correct for the State to insist that such application must be made within the time provided in the rules, say, two years, as in the present case. 16.
The other employees have expectations of promotion based on seniority and suddenly if such change is permitted; it causes prejudice and disturbance in the working of the department. It is, therefore, quite correct for the State to insist that such application must be made within the time provided in the rules, say, two years, as in the present case. 16. It is also seen that such applications are made very often, almost at the end of the service of the employee or in any case, belatedly. Whatever may be the reason, the fact remains that in the present case, the application was made after some nine years of joining into service. Even assuming that first respondent came to know in June 2001 that there was an error in his date of birth entered in the matriculation certificate, as claimed by him, he took more than three years to issue the notice under Section 80 of the CPC and then to file the suit. Whether the suit was time barred or not, the claim was in any case belated. It has to be filed within the time provided or within a reasonable time and it is not to be entertained merely on the basis of plausible material as held in Kirbukaran (supra). As observed by this Court in State of UP vs. Shiv Narayan Upadhyaya [ 2005 (6) SCC 49 ]: “9. As such, unless a clear case on the basis of clinching materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent and that too within a reasonable time as provided in the rules governing the service, the court or the Tribunal should not issue a direction or make a declaration on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible." 11. From the above observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court it becomes clear that request by the employee for correction in date of birth could be made in strict adherence to the service revised and in case of the petitioner even if considering the relevant date for calculating the period of two years as per revised policy being the date of reinstatement then also the application of the petitioner is beyond the period of two years. 12. Furthermore the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent decision in case of Karnataka Rural Infrastructure Development Limited vs. T.P. Nataraja & Ors.
12. Furthermore the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent decision in case of Karnataka Rural Infrastructure Development Limited vs. T.P. Nataraja & Ors. Reported in 2020 ( SC) online SC 767 decided on 21.09.2021 has reiterated and clarified the position with regard to considering the application for correction in date of birth. Relevant portion of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para 10 is quoted for better appreciation: “10. Considering the aforesaid decisions of this Court the law on change of date of birth can be summarized as under: (i) application for change of date of birth can only be as per the relevant provisions/regulations applicable; (ii) even if there is cogent evidence, the same cannot be claimed as a matter of right. (iii) application can be rejected on the ground of delay and latches also more particularly when it is made at the fag end of the service and /or when the employee is about to retire on attaining the age of superannuation. 13. From the above principles set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court it becomes clear that while the application for change of date of birth could be made as per the relevant provisions only, the same could not be changed as a matter of right and more particularly an application could be rejected on the ground of delay and latches more particularly when it is made at the fag end of service, when the employees about to retire. In the instant case the first rejection by the respondents of an application by the petitioner to correct the date of birth was on 19.03.2019. This would not mean that application of the petitioner dated 28.02.2019 was within the time prescribed in the relevant policy of the respondent. The petitioner had not approached this Court and not challenged the rejection of his request in the year 2019 and whereas the present petition is preferred in the month of November 2020 whereas the petitioner schedule to retire on 31.10.2021. Thus it clearly appears that the petitioner has approached this Court at the fag end of service when he was about to retire on attaining the age of superannuation. Such application before this Court could not be and ought not to be countenanced. 14.
Thus it clearly appears that the petitioner has approached this Court at the fag end of service when he was about to retire on attaining the age of superannuation. Such application before this Court could not be and ought not to be countenanced. 14. Having regard to the observations, discussions and findings made hereinabove, this Court is of the opinion that no error could have been stated to have been committed by the respondents in rejecting the request of the petitioner for change in date of birth in the service record and hence the petition fails and is hereby rejected.